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SUMMARY
In recent years, scholarly attention on the complementary role
of monetary integration to further economic integration in
developing countries has tended to emphasise the direct and indirect
benefits of 'limited monetary integration' while neglecting
considerations of those benefits likely to accrue from adopting a
common currency or fixed rates of exchange between their national
currencies.
	 However, the decision by the Heads of State and
Government of the 16 members of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) in May 1983 requesting a study of proposals
leading to the creation of a single ECOWAS monetary zone has given a
new scope and dimension of interest in the economics of common
currencies.
The West African countries in their efforts to integrate and
achieve higher growth and development are increasingly frustrated by
a number of internal and external factors including their dependent,
disintegrated and inefficient patterns of domestic production, trade
and currency systems, in particular, the continuing weakness and
increasing precariousness of their national currencies, and a
succession of global monetary and financial crises. These
constraints, together with the payments and adjustment problems they
have occasioned, and the relative unsuccessful experiences in
currency management, payments and exchange restrictions within the
West African Clearing House (WACH) and the exclusively francophone
West African Monetary Union (WAMU or UMOA), have created a need for
extending and deepening the scope for monetary and economic co-
operation in the region.
The Study advocates principally an all-embracing monetary union
by means of a common currency as a strategic catalyst and timely
element of realism that would create an impulse for national
development and regional economic integration. 	 Using basic
propositions concerning aspects of monetary integration, stressing
in particular the foundations of optimum currency areas, the Study
tries to present a comprehensive and analytic discussion of the
feasibility, processes, beneficial effects and constraints involved
in achieving currency unification in the broader setting of West
Africa's disparate economic and socio-political developments.
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CHAPTER 1
OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
1.1 RATIONAL, SCOPE AND HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY
The sixteen countries which comprise the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) represent a group which is diverse in
terms of geo-physical conditions, natural resource endowment and
overall economic performance. Amidst this diversity there are also
a number of common socio-politico-economic elements: relatively low
income levels; a relatively slow and in many cases declining rate of
economic growth, especially in the seventies; desperate demographic
trends; and sporadic instances of political instability - generally
in the form of increased militarisation of political leadership.
More specifically, the Multiplicity of national currencies, the
disparate levels of external and intra-regional inconvertibility
between them, and the sporadic and unsettling speculative activities
over changes in their international exchange values have ravaged the
majority of West African countries, thus making financial and
overall economic management as well as economic integration
extremely difficult.
It is needless to point out that these adverse conditions have
been accentuated by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the
consequent protective floating of the major international currencies
which are at the heart of the exchange rate mechanisms in West
Africa, the volatility of the purchasing power of these currencies
and the uncertainty about future developments towards a new and
relatively more equitable international monetary system, as well as
by the 1973/74 and 1979/80 oil price crises and their concomitant
effects on import and domestic prices.
The above factors have led to significant costs for West
African countries resulting also from the high incidence of 'black
market' and other illegal currency and commodity activities as well
as from the transfer of seigniorage between countries and from the
region as a whole. These in turn have involved substantial real
economic costs associated with consequent unstable and rapidly
expanding money supplies amid tighter exchange controls and payments
restrictions, the continued weakness of many currencies and the
erosion of even their internal (national) confidence, and the loss
of overall financial resource mobilisation and utilisation
efficiency.
In this perspective, the rationale of monetary integration
among West African countries is with particular emphasis on its
instrumentality for meaningful economic integration. The approach
followed emphasises the politico-economic calculus of feasibility in
a dynamic setting in contrast to the traditional approach of the
literature on optimum currency areas. The various modalities of
monetary integration are surveyed and a detailed discussion is
offered of the major operational issues which arise in monetary
unions.
Against the costs associated with the potential loss of
national autonomy, especially the loss of the exchange rate as a
basic policy instrument to deal with fundamental external
disequilibria, participation in a currency union increases the role
of a currency as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. The
union should eliminate speculative capital and commodity flows among
participating countries and the costs associated with their control.
It should increase capital mobility within the area and also reduce
speculative flows between the area and the outside world. Intra-
union trade is stimulated by reducing the risks involved.
Furthermore, a common currency improves monetary efficiency in
the area through reserve saving, reduction in the cost of financial
management, risk-pooling, intermediation, information saving and
innovation (Mundell, 1973). It has been noted, however, that some
of these potential benefits, and in particular reserve saving, are
likely to be limited in the early stages of a monetary union when
actual reserve-pooling is limited (Ishiyama, 1975). Some authors
consider most important the potential benefits driving from the
effects of the establishment of a common currency area on government
functions. In particular, it is believed that monetary integration
is likely to be advantageous to the participating countries by
accelerating fiscal integration (see Williamson, 1973; Ishiyama,
1975). On the other hand, the European experience so far seems to
suggest that progress in fiscal integration can prove exceedingly
difficult.
In this setting, monetary integration can be beneficial to West
African countries. In particular, it will enhance regional
convertibility and intra-West African trade by eliminating the costs
associated with black market activities. It will facilitate the
elimination of economic disparities among the member countries as
well as the rationalisation of economic and financial dependence.
Suffice it to say that where monetary union is formed between
members more appreciable gains can be reaped. Monetary union in
this case is characterised by two main elements:
(a) the issuance of a single West African common currency, the
flow of which is unrestricted among member countries, and
(b) the establishment of a regional monetary authority which
would pool foreign exchange reserves and enhance policy
integration and regional monetary supranationality.
In recent years, West African countries, in common with several
other regions among LDCs, have shown increased interest in the
modalities and net benefits that might accrue from monetary
integration. However, apart from the sub-regional common currency
system within the institutional framework of the West African
Monetary Union (WAMU), the scope of monetary integration in the
region from a multilateral point of view has been restricted to the
very rudimentary Clearing House arrangements. While the relevance
of the WAMU for the ECOWAS as a whole has, however, to be critically
qualified by the fact that France has fundamental participatory
role in its operational framework and sustenance, the performance
of the all-embracing West African Clearing House (WACH) is so far
mixed and rather unsatisfactory. Intra-ECOWAS trade, regional
currency convertibility and inter-state monetary and financial links
which were meant to be enhanced under the Clearing House
arrangements are still as low as before its creation and real
progress in economic integration is hardly evident.
While there exists a considerable analytic literature on
monetary unions, especially as they pertain to discussions regarding
monetary integration among the developed industrial countries, there
is still very little work at either the conceptual or empirical
level on their likely impact on LDCs - notwithstanding the extent to
which the monetary and adjustment systems of many of these countries
have been so adversely affected by the upheavals in the world
economy and the international monetary system which culminated in
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. In particular, these
discussions emerged during the 1960s in connection with the long-
standing controversy about the pros and cons of fixed or flexible
exchange rates, and were revived first, by the proposal for a common
European currency as put forward in the Werner Report (1970) and,
later with the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
1979. It is here that the empiricism of the associated theory of
optimum currency areas offers important considerations as to the
conditions and constraints under which a country can join a currency
group with positive net benefits and suggests how countries should
be grouped into few and effective currency areas.
Monetary integration in this context is however relegated to
the last (or at least a very late) step in economic and political
integration as comprising two related bodies of theory: a stage
theory of economic integration and a theory of monetary integration
which also is now generally conceptualised into two distinct stages:
partial (or limited) and complete (or full) monetary integration.
Even where monetary integration is accepted in principle, there are
still two generally unresolved issues. The first is whether
monetary integration should precede, follow or develop alongside
with economic integration. The second is whether the transition to
monetary union should at the initial stage stress economic policy
co-ordination and harmonisation before exchange rate rigidity (or
currency unification) or vice versa (ie Economists versus
Monetarists).
There is no doubt that these unresolved issues make the
appreciation and choice of strategy for monetary integration more
difficult for LDCs. Despite their having also shown increased
interest in monetary integration in recent years, the experience of
LDCs on this front appears rather limited, both in their
understanding of the underlying concepts and of the choice of
realistic options for them. The fact is that economic integration
among LDCs is still basically of the conventional approach so that
the achievement of a monetary union in particular is consistent with
the stage process for attaining complete economic integration.
Thus, while for them the recommended option is limited monetary
integration as they are still at the rudimentary and early stages of
economic integration, purely in terms of established currency area
criteria also, LDCs do not possess the characteristics suitable for
monetary union and therefore cannot adopt currency modification
among them (Kafta, 1969 and 1973; Robson, 1983). It is further
stressed that the idea of a payments union of the conventional type
would not appear feasible, given their reluctance to expose
themselves to the dangers of accumulating inconvertible balances in
their reserves (Del Valle, 1978). By contrast, Mundell (1972) has
argued that monetary integration should proceed from the 'top down,
not from the grass roots up' and has therefore proposed a common
currency for Africa as he has also done for Europe (1973).
It is, nonetheless, against the relatively unproven background
of the inappropriateness of a monetary union for LOCs that this
study attempts to reassess the critical role of monetary
integration, in particular, currency unification, as a means to
revive the national economies of West Africa and further the process
of economic and political integration within the region.
Up to date studies on West African monetary unification (eg
Ijewere, 1976; Osagie, 1979; IMF, 1980; Cincin-Sain and Marshall,
1983; Frimpong-Ansah, 1983), virtually all of which have been
undertaken at the instance of the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, have
generally ruled out monetary union as a shortrun or immediate option
for the community. Limited monetary integration - ie a
convertibility agreement for the exchange of national currencies in
respect of all intra-regional transactions (IMF, 1980), the
liberalisation of trade transactions first and then capital
transactions (Cincin-Sain and Marshall, 1983) and/or the expansion
of the Clearing House to incorporate trade credit and balance of
payments support mechanisms (Frimpong-Ansah, 1983) - is still the
most widely discussed and strongly recommended option for the member
countries. More recently, however, the member countries have
heightened the momentum- of monetary integration among them by
committing themselves towards the creation of an 'ECOWAS Monetary
Zone' (undefined) and the Council of Ministers of the Community has
been commissioned to 'supervise' its execution (resolution passed at
the meeting of the Committee of Governors held in Arusha, Tanzania,
August, 1983).
Economic arguments apart, monetary integration in any form must
also be assessed significantly on geo-political and social
considerations. All of these factors are closely related and, in
addition to external developments, are variable and therefore
obviously crucial in appreciating the choice, modalities and outlook
of any strategy for any group of integrating countries. However, in
each of the previous studies on monetary integration in West Africa,
there is little space and attention devoted to providing in one
volume a comprehensive analysis of the economic background and non-
economic constraints for economic development and integration.
Besides, there is obviously little appreciation of the fact that,
especially in the light of the changing international monetary
environment, monetary integration in West Africa needs to be more
positively approached and therefore deserves a new dimension in form
and timing.
Deteriorating domestic economic performance and protectionism
abroad (both in terms of trade and exchange rate management) should
force this sudden change. The historic fragmentation of the West
African socio-economic structures and, in particular, the growing
disintegration in the infrastructure of monetary and financial
arrangements and currency relationships constitute the major
obstacle to economic rationalisation and regional integration. On a
scale wider than that undertaken by any of the previous studies,
this study makes analytic reflections on the major monetary and
financial constraints to national development, evaluates the
performance of ECO WAS and of both the West African Clearing House
(WACH) and the West African Monetary Union (WAMU), and then defines
a new role for monetary integration within the community's
institutional framework, and in essence, proposes the institution of
a single common currency as the short-run sine qua non of national
development, regional convertibility and beneficial economic
integration within the ECOWAS.
Finally, another important feature of this study is that it is
timely and in many ways consistent with an outline of proposed
background studies for the realisation of the 'ECOWAS Monetary Zone'
(see Appendix I).
1.2 METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The comparative analytic methodology adopted for the study is
in three forms. Firstly, emphasis is placed on the structural
differences, similarities and interaction of ECOWAS member countries
with each other to reflect, in general, size, political and economic
capacities. The collective nature of currency unification process
becomes critical as the small and generally less prosperous member
countries (eg Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Sierra
Leone, Benin and Burkina) are taken to be of equal size and status
in the union in relation to the large and economically and
politically more advanced and powerful partners (ie Ivory Coast and
Nigeria). The greater and more pronounced inter-member country
differences are, the more critical are the implications of the
associated polarization effects and the distribution of the costs
and benefits of integration.
Secondly, the region is divided into three main groups, viz,
countries within the WAMU, countries in the former sterling area,
and a miscellaneous group that includes Liberia which, with the US
dollar as national currency, has the most convertible currency and
liberalised exchange transactions in the region.
Thirdly, comparative reference where relevant is made to other
monetary and/or economic integration schemes. It is believed that
any discussion of West African monetary integration would be greatly
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enhanced by taking into account the integration experiences of other
regions of the world as these experiences could be highly
instructive by way of defining the major issues involved. As far as
monetary integration is concerned, especially the available
transition processes, the study has drawn substantially from
discussions regarding monetary integration in Western Europe
(notably the EEC).
As noted earlier, the case for monetary integration must
reflect the existing and true structural characteristics of the
member countries. In West Africa, many of these characteristics are
deep-rooted and with a long historical perspective. However, the
main statistical analysis is placed on developments since 1970 as
the 1970s and early 1980s have represented the most critical years
for the West African economies and the global economy. Of course,
pre-1970 development's can also be taken into consideration where
they are particularly relevant in shaping current trends and
institutional arrangements (eg colonial influence on trade, banking
and monetary policy structures).
Similarly, while theoretical considerations allow us to
identify the important pre-conditions for beneficial monetary
unification, it is important to recognise that they should not be
regarded as preventing monetary unification in West Africa if they
are not satisfied.
Throughout the study, sufficient emphasis is placed on
providing a substantial critical, quantitative and qualitative
discussion to enable us establish the nature and case for currency
unification for West African monetary and economic integration and
overall development.
1 0
1.3 DATA AND INFORMATION PROBLEMS
The severity of the problems of collecting and collating data
and information for a study of this scale - involving sixteen
developing countries with varied but generally low levels of
development and with marked historical, political and socio-economic
orientations - needs no further demonstration. Data and information
in the majority of the LDCs are generally very scarce and even where
available are hardly well documented, systematic and reliable. Of
course, for the rather objective on-looker and/or especially for an
objective study not initiated by them, national authorities are
forced by political pressures and mistrust to regard all information
and data as classified for security reasons.
At the regional level, however, the study has relied on four
main sources for its background data and information: national
central banks and fiscal authorities; the WACH Secretariat
(Freetown, Sierra Leone); the EGO WAS Executive Secretariat (Lagos,
Nigeria); and the African Centre for Monetary Studies - ACMS (Dakar,
Senegal). The major difficulty with national data sources is up-
dating. Because of the lack of adequate computer facilities, data
in the Economic and Financial Review bulletins of most central banks
are more than five years in arrears. Besides, differences in
reporting languages as well as in the categorisation of data heads
provide additional difficulties. In West Africa, the francophone
countries are particularly more discrete with their published data
and information than the anglophone states. Data and information
from the WACH, ECOWAS and ACMS are obtained essentially from
published and unpublished traditional reports and bulletins as well
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as from reports and papers presented at organised seminars and
conferences.
In this respect, the author was particularly fortunate to
obtain substantial data and information through and from the Bank of
Sierra Leone where he works and which is sponsoring this study. The
frequent reference to developments in Sierra Leone is therefore
understandable but this does not in any way bias the conclusions of
the study.
Undoubtedly the most important sources of data and information,
especially in terms of standardisation, reliability, originality and
freshness are the IMF, World Bank, Commonwealth Secretariat and
other related organs of the United Nations. Financial statistical
data for example are obtained almost exclusively from the IMf's
periodic specialised publications (eg International Financial
Statistics - IFS; Government Finance Statistics - GFS; Balance of
Payments; Article IV Consultations; and Country Reports).
These sources are also supplemented by such specialist periodic
magazines and/or news bulletins on Africa (eg West Africa; Africa
NOW; African Business; Africa Confidential) and South (the Third
World magazine).
Throughout the discussion, efforts are made to ensure that
supporting data and information are not only reliable but are also
as current as possible.
1.4 PLAN OF THE STUDY
The study is divided into 10 chapters. In Chapters 2 through
6, we analyse the socio-economic structural disposition of the West
African economies. This background information is substantially
policy-oriented and is deemed necessary to the understanding and
appreciation of the scope and modalities of the currency unification
proposal as a solution to the problems of development and economic
integration in West Africa. To put it differently, these chapters
together, carefully discuss the extent to which the member
countries' structural and institutional characteristics have
inhibited development and integration in general and/or can impair
currency unification even when it is established.
Chapter 2 provides a brief survey of the region's geo-physical,
economic and socio-political features and in particular discusses
the disparate levels of resource endowment, industrial development,
political instability and, income and growth.
Chapter 3 analyses the extent of economic co-operation in West
Africa. It is hardly necessary to make a fresh case for West
African economic co-operation or integration since, as will be shown
in the chapter, there has been no lack of activity in recent years
on this front. The need for economic co-operation and integration
among LDCs in general is an assumption and does not need
demonstration. Indeed, like most other developing countries, West
Africa has emerged from the first and second UN development decades
as the region registering some of the lowest rates of growth, and
the indications are that many of the problems especially of the
1970s look like becoming larger and more difficult in the rest of
the 1980s. The main emphasis in this chapter however is on the
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reasons for the lack of real progress in economic integration in the
context of the ECOWAS and the likely implications for monetary
integration at the community level.
In Chapter 4 we analyse the present structure of West African
trade. While trade between developed countries characteristically
represents the major part of the total trade of these countries,
that among LDCs in general amounts to only very small proportions of
total trade. The bulk of LDC trade is with the developed countries.
This pattern is characteristically true of West African trade.
However, the intensity of the member countries' extra-regional and
intra-regional trade structures and relations have varied
significantly since the era of political independence. It is useful
to identify these patterns and to try to understand the determining
factors and mechanisms in order to perceive the scope and prospects
of monetary integration, especially for intra-regional
specialisation. Clarification of the monetary obstacles, in
particular, for the expansion of intra-regional trade is stressed.
This trade is basic to monetary and economic co-operation and
integration and through its enhancement member countries are more
likely to restructure their monetary, financial and overall economic
structures and thus break the existing exclusively mutual structures
of domestic consumption and production, a phenomenon that is the
heart of the West African economic problem.
West Africa's overall external monetary and financial relations
and the payments and adjustment problems they occasion, and which
are emphasised in this study, create a need for extending and
deepening the scope for monetary and economic co-operation among the
member countries. 	 In this perspective, the 'new' role required of
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the region's money and banking system in its intermediation activity
at the regional level goes beyond the characteristic need to enhance
intra-regional trade which in itself provides little scope towards
handling the region's payment problems in respect to total trade.
In essence, West Africa's money and banking systems are required in
their potential role to co-operate more closely in dealing with
problems arising from deficiencies in international reserve assets
and from the need to use the region's internal and external monetary
resources more efficiency for national as well as regional
stabilisation and growth. The fundamentals of such co-operation
involve, first, the need for the money and banking institutions to
improve in their rudimentary character and function and gear their
operations more to West African needs; and second, the need for the
institutions to enhance the process of the co-ordination and
harmonisation of the institutional monetary and financial
arrangements and policies of the member countries towards the
achievement of currency unification.
To deal in part with these issues, Chapter 5 describes and
analyses the money and banking system in West Africa in terms of its
evolution, historic fragmentation and performance, as well as in
relation to the disparate structure of monetary policy framework
among the member countries.
In Chapter 6 we will examine West Africa's balance of payment
problem and adjustment mechanisms. Manifestations of
disintegration in exchange rate arrangements and other adjustment
policies commonly adopted in the region are analysed, ie exchange
controls and payments restrictions.
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Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive survey of the different
conceptualisations of 'monetary integration' and outlines its
position as a roughly parallel theory to the stage theory of
economic integration. Most of the discussion reviewed on this
recognise there is a strong relationship between monetary
integration and economic integration although the debate is whether
the former should precede or follow the latter. To the extent that
in practice monetary integration continues to be regarded as the
ultimate stage of economic integration, ie completing the
integration of trade and economic relations into a fully economic
and political union, monetary integration among countries in the
early stages of economic integration thus becomes an impracticable
option. While the different monetary integration conceptualisations
identify both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the
transition towards monetary union, it is the hypothesis of the study
that for West African monetary integration a less traditional
analytic approach towards the currency unification objective is
needed. Indeed, a clearer understanding however of the processes,
modalities and potential net benefits and constraints associated
with each conceptual route towards monetary unification is also a
significant prerequisite for appreciating its achievements in West
Africa.
Thus, the analytic review of the literature on optimum currency
area theory in Chapter 8 is important as it provides specifically a
basis for identifying those conditions and constraints that are
considered necessary for a beneficial currency area formation
between member countries. The empiricism of these conditions in
relation to ECO WAS is tested although, as indicated earlier, the
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failure of the ECO WAS to satisfy them should not be regarded as
preventing currency unification among the member states.
Chapter 9 characterises the proposed West African monetary
union and argues the case for a single common currency in West
Africa in line with the analyses of the previous chapters.
Available options for currency unification and the associated
transitional problems are identified and discussed. The case for
currency unification in the region is strengthened further as we
critically assess the operational experiences of the WAMU and WACH
and prove the inability of either scheme to improve the performance
of the member economies or induce economic and/or monetary
integration among them. Both institutions are examined in the study
as practically the most important obstacle for realising the
currency unification option for ECOWAS: WAMU, because it has existed
for long more as a form of monetary convenience and source of socio-
political unity among the francophones and between them and France,
and the union is more or less in the process of expanding its
membership to include new and former members of the CFA franc zone;
WACH, because those member states which strictly regard their
'independent' monetary systems as the symbol of national sovereignty
are distrustful of any new monetary integration ideas likely to
threaten that sovereignty. In either case, the point, however, is
that monetary sovereignty is already sufficiently threatened
throughout the region. The relevant question therefore is simply
whether this aspect of nationalism can be allowed to continue,
albeit at the increasing expense of the member countries or whether
the apparent loss of national sovereignty would not better serve
17
their interests and that of the West African region as a whole if
sovereignty were restored to them in a concerted West African form.
Finally, it is argued in the chapter that an outright creation
of a practically new currency for West Africa (by name and design)
is much preferred to a system of variable exchange rate unification
(le with variable exchange margins) as this is by far less likely to
insulate the member economies from the already rising incidence of
illegal commodity and currency exchange practices that are strongly
associated with foreign exchange shortage and the disparate levels
of currency inconvertibility. Chapter 10 outlines the summary and
conclusions of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES OF WEST AFRICA
2.1 INTRODUCTION
A realistic appreciation of the opportunities, constraints and
prospects of monetary and economic integration requires the initial
systematic identification of participating countries in terms of
relevant country/regional characteristics (eg geo-physical setting,
economic structures, monetary and financial systems, socio-political
systems, growth and development perspectives), the structure of
interrelationships among them and the relative importance attached
to each feature in determining a meaningful and workable integration
strategy. The critical issue then is whether with respect to
national and regional policy objectives, optimum or at least any
viable integration should comprise countries which in terms of
inherent characteristics are compatible because they are homogenous
relative to those characteristics that need to be maximised; or
because they are complementary; or because they are non-
complementary but still believe they would best fulfil policy
objectives, in a hierarchical system of functional independence
which most countries would prefer. The initial problem is to choose
from an almost infinite number of such integration characteristics
to determine the path towards integration or identify those which
constitute difficulties that are to be encountered after
integration.
In essence, the basic features that characterise the West
African countries are typical of most other LDCs and the rapid
changes in them, especially since political independence, have
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formed the basis for the rising interest in economic and monetary
integration in recent years. In West Africa many of these
developments are increasingly irreversible, thereby posing some of
the most formidable problems of development and integration. As
already indicated in Chapter 1, a clearer analytic understanding of
these so-called structural realities and constraints is essential to
fully appreciate the type of monetary integration that is advocated
in the study as well as the urgency in the timing of such
integration.
This chapter, as a first step, attempts to highlight the basic
geographical, economic and socio-political setting of the West
African region with a view to isolating some of the main background
structural features that have immediate bearings on trade, monetary
and financial patterns, and adjustment policies, all of which are at
the heart of the integration process. We shall be concerned with
trends over time as with developments currently or recently
apparent. . The areas stressed in the chapter include the
geographical delimination of West Africa - in particular, ECOWAS,
its climate, vegetation and resource endownment, trends in
production, income and growth, and recent political developments.
2.2 GEOGRAPHICAL DELIMITATION
The geographical individuality of West Africa, in terms of the
constituent countries, has been defined differently, depending
mainly on grounds of historical, pure geo-physical, political and
ethnographic backgrounds as well as on what the specific research
intentions are on the region. As Plessez (1968) points out, West
Africa is merely a geo-political expression and should not convey
20
the impression that it is already a single international region or
market area.
Conventionally, West Africa is delimited as the area bounded by
the Atlantic and lying south of the Sahara and west of the Cameroon.
Geographically, this area is designated as stretching northwards
from the Gulf of Guinea towards the southern margins of the Sahara
and eastwards from the Atlantic coastlands towards central Africa.
Alternative conceptions of West Africa have also reflected
linguistic, cultural and botanical differences as well as relief.
Rimmer (1984, p 1) has observed however that many of these
distinctions can be questioned and their significance appears
uncertain. That West Africa as conventionally defined is more
closely circumscribed owes more to diplomacy and adminstration than
to geography or ethnography. In this respect, the major determining
influence on the limitation of West Africa has been the colonial
designation of the region into the Afrique Occidentale Francaise
(AOF) or French West Africa and the British West Africa. This
distinction clearly excludes the more southerly countries of
equatorial Africa (ie Cameroon, Zaire, Chad, Gabon and the Central
African Republic). Thus, except for Cape Verde (which comprises a
horseshoe of ten volcanic islands about 450 kilometres west of
Senegal and which became the sixteenth member of ECO WAS in 1977),
all sixteen member states which make up the ECOWAS also compose the
West Africa of conventional definition. The national boundaries of
the community members are shown in Figure 2.1.
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In terms of physical size, ECOWAS is a vast region and its
sixteen member countries cover an area of some 6.1 million square
kilometres (2.3 million square miles) or about 25 times the size of
the United Kingdom, two-thirds the United States of America, about a
fifth of the total area of Africa, smaller than Brazil but larger
than Western Europe. Nearly half of this area is in the Sahara
desert, enclosed within the borders of Mauritania, Mali and Niger.
The remainder extends, on the mainland, roughly about 1300
kilometres (800 miles) between about 5° and 18 0N and 3,200
kilometres (2000 miles) from west to east.
The contrasting sizes of the West African countries vary from 4
and 11 thousand square kilometres in Cape Verde and the Gambia
respectively, to a huge land mass of 1267 thousand square kilometres
in Niger. Niger, Mali (1240 thousand square kilometres), Mauritania
(1031 thousand square kilometres), and Nigeria (924 thousand square
kilometres) stand out as fourth, sixth, eighth and tenth largest
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa respectively. The rest of the West
African countries, with Cape Verde and The Gambia also being the
smallest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, have areas of much less
than 500 thousand square kilometres per country. The three land-
locked countries of Mali, Niger and Burkina together with
Mauritania, account for over 62 per cent of the region's total area
(see Table 2A).
2.3 DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS
Population statistics in West AFrica, indeed, as in many other
developing countries, are subject to rather wide margins of error,
induced partly by administrative shortcomings, along with some
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popular aversion to enumeration and, as much, by the different
environments as well as by a desire to inflate population figures
for political reasons rather than adapting them to some viable
economic use. Moreover, in many LDCs, census enumerations are not
only absent or few and far between, but even where they are carried
out, they are often based on grossly inadequate maps which are
generally indispensable for accurate and reliable delimitation of
population areas.
However, in West Africa, population censuses have been an
important feature of practically all countries, except Benin and
Guinea. For instance, Ghana has held three census enumerations
since World War II (1948, 1960 and 1970); the Gambia (1963 and
1973); Guinea-Bissau (1950, 1960, 1970 and 1979); Liberia (1962 and
1974); Sierra Leone (1963, 1974 and 1985); and Nigeria (1952,
1962/63 and 1973). The unreliability of census counts in Nigeria
for instance resulted in the annulment of the second and last
counts.
Despite the obvious misrepresentations of census enumerations,
the rate of population growth that is evident in all member
countries over the years is a highly important factor in any
assessment of West Africa's economic trends, not only because it is
rapid, but also because it is likely to remain relatively rapid in
the immediate years and in cases compounded by considerable rates of
urbanisation. The combined estimated population of the sixteen
countries of the sub-region of about 205 million (mid-1983)
represents about one-third of all Africa. It rose from about 153.4
million in 1981. Excluding Cape Verde, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau -
for which data were not readily available, these combined population
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estimates had risen by about one-third each decade from 76 million
in 1960 to 100 million in 1970 and 134 million in 1980. World Bank
estimates indicate that West Africa's total population would rise
still to around 274 million by the year 2000.
As Table 2A further illustrates, there is as in size, a marked
uneveness in population distribution, densities and general growth
rates across the West African countries. Population sizes in the
region in 1981 varied from over 87 million in Nigeria to under one-
million each in Cape Verde, the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Estimates
of annual rates of increase for the decade of the 1970s range
between 0.9 pe cent in Cape Verde to 5.1 per cent in the Ivory Coast
(the highest in Africa). Except for Cape Verde where population
estimates are seriously affected by recurrences of droughts and
migration (about 6000 Cape Verdians are estimated to be emigrating
annually since the 1973 drought) and Guinea-Bissau with population
figures available only for 1970-78, virtually no country in West
Africa has shown a population annual growth rate of below 2 per cent
throughout the decade. No less than twelve countries, representing
over 95 per cent of the region's total population, recorded rates in
the range of 2.5-5.1 per cent during the decade. Rates of 3.5 per
cent in Liberia, 3.3 per cent in Niger, 3 per cent in Ghana and 2.9
per cent in Guinea were some of the highest both in West Africa and
in the whole of Africa. The high estimates for the Ivory Coast are
affected by large scale immigration. The overall average for West
Africa in the decade was 2.68 per cent and this almost equalled the
African average of 2.72 per cent. While this rate compared
favourably with the United Nation's estimates of 3 per cent annually
for the region in the first half of the decade, it compared
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unfavourably with corresponding rates of 0.1 per cent in the United
Kingdom, 1.0 per cent in the United States, 2.1 per cent in India
and Brazil and zero per cent in West Germany.
Population densities in the region have varied from less than
two persons per square kilometre in Mauritania to over 90 in Nigeria
in 1981. Cape Verde (75 persons), Gambia (54 persons) and Sierra
Leone (50 persons) are the only other countries with densities of 50
persons and above. Mali, Mauritania and Niger, which together cover
57.6 per cent of West Africa's total land mass have an average
population density of less than four persons. Their combined
population of 14.2 million, represents 9.3 per cent of West Africa's
total population. The average of 35 persons per square kilometre
for West Africa in 1981 compares with 104 in China, 210 in India, 25
in the United States, 12 in the USSR and 228 in the United Kingdom.
At first sight, the dangers that are indicated by a high'
population growth may seem negated by the relatively low population
densities in West Africa. Important as they are, population
densities per se tell little about the so-called 'carrying capacity'
of land, a concept which tries to relate a given area of arable and
cropped land to that level of population which depends on it for
welfare and development. The emerging index -the 'critical density
of population' - denotes the 'human carrying capacity of an area in
relation to a given land use system .—; it is the maximum
population density which a system is capable of supporting
permanently in that environment without damage to the land' (Allan,
1977). We have found this concept useful for West Africa in this
Study since a fair assessment of the region's cultivable land area
relative to its growing population is important not only because
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this area is small relative to total land mass but also because in
the immediate years, the area is more likely to remain constant in
size or diminish through threatening desertic conditions while the
corresponding rate of population growth remains relatively rapid.
Table 2B ECOWAS:Critical Population Densities, 1980
Total	 Critical Density
land	 Arable and	 Population (Persons per 100 ha
'000' Cropped Land	 '000'	 or per sq km of arable
ha	 '000 ha	 % mid-1980	 and cropped land)
Benin	 11,262	 1,795	 15.9	 3,479
	
194
Bourkina
Fasso
	 27,420	 2,563
	 9.3	 6,161	 240
Cape
Verde	 403	 40	 9.9	 295	 738
Gambia	 1,130
	 270
	 23.9	 574	 213
Ghana
	 23,854	 2,760	 11.6	 11,500	 417
Guinea	 24,586	 1,570	 6.4	 5,425	 346
Guinea-
Bissau	 3,612	 285	 7.9	 773	 271
Ivory
Coast	 32,246
	 3,880	 12.0	 8,262	 213
Liberia
	 11,137	 371	 3.3	 1,873
	
505
Mali	 124,000	 2,050	 1.7	 6,699	 327
	
Mauritania 103,070
	 195	 0.2	 1,523
	
781
Niger
	 126,700	 3,350
	 2.6
	 5,532	 165
Nigeria
	 92,377
	 30,385
	 32.9	 84,732	 279
Senegal
	 19,619	 5,225
	 26.6	 5,703	 109
Sierra
Leone
	 7,174
	 1,766	 24.6	 3,474	 197
Togo	 5,679
	 1,420	 25.0	 2,578	 182
ECOWAS	 614,269	 57,925	 9.4 148,583	 257
Sources: FAO Production Year Book, 1981
World Bank Atlas, 1983
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Thus Table 2B illustrates that out of a total land area of
614.3 million hectares in West Africa, only 57.9 million or 9.4 per
cent was arable and cropped land in 1980. This means that more than
90 per cent of West Africa, though occupied by more than half the
number of countries, is practically uncultivable or that to make any
part of it arable would require huge land development expenditures
which these countries cannot readily provide. The estimated
critical population densities also indicate that West Africa's total
population of more than 150 million is crowded in an area less than
one-tenth of its total land mass. Compared with the 'nominal'
population densities in Table 2A the critical densities more than
clearly highlight the population problems faced by West African
countries in an effort to feed their people.
For instance, in Mauritania, instead of two persons per
'nominal' square kilometre about 782 people are now more likely to
struggle for land survival within a comparable area of arable and
cropped land. In Cape Verde, it is 738 instead of 75; 505 instead
of 17 in Liberia; 417 instead of 49 in Ghana; 346 instead of 23 in
Guinea; and 327 instead of 6 in Mali. For the region as a whole,
the 'man pressure' on a square kilometre of land area has increased
over seven times from a 'nominal' average of 24 persons to a
'critical' average of 257 persons. The relative scarcity of arable
and cropped land in many of the countries has led to the existence
of pockets of high density settlements in areas like the south-
eastern part of Nigeria, the Mossi plateau in Burkina and in
Senegal's goundnut basin.
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The worst hit are countries of the drought-stricken Sahel
Region, namely, Cape Verde, (Chad), the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Burkina, whose combined land mass of 4023
thousand square kilometres or 65.5 per cent of total West Africa
(excepting Chad) is reduced by 96.6 per cent to 136.9 thousand sq
kms of arable and cropped land and serving a population of over 26
million or 18 per cent of total West African population. This means
a widening of the Sahel's average population density from around
seven persons per square kilometre (nominal) to over 193 persons per
square kilometre (critical). Geographically, a greater part of
Sahel countries comprises arid tracts whose inhospitable environment
precludes normal .economic development, thereby subjecting the
countries to some of the most serious demographic pressures.
Relatively high fertility rates are the principal factor for
the rising population growth rates in West Africa. In contrast with
trends in a large segment of the developing world, where a decrease
of 12-15 per cent in the crude birth rate has been recorded since
1960, a decline of about 2 per cent over 1965-83 is recorded in
several West African countries (Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone and Togo). Increases of over 2 per cent, except in
Benin where no change is recorded, have been registered in the rest
of the region (eg Niger 8 per cent and Liberia 6 per cent). Crude
birth rates range between 43 (Mauritania) and 52 (Niger) in 1983
compared with 44 (Ivory Coast) and 51 (Nigeria) in 1965.
Mortality rates have also been high in West Africa. Although
crude death rates do appear to be declining in practically all
countries - in line with the global decline - these declines in most
countries are still low compared with the average registered through
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the developing world as a whole. In 1965-83 the highest declines
were registered in Ghana and Ivory Coast (35 per cent) compared with
the lowest - 9.8 per cent - in Guinea. Life expectancy, infant
mortality and child death rates have improved over the last two
decades but are still among the worst in the world. For instance,
life expectancy (male) has improved by 8-18 per cent in 1965-83
with the number of years in 1983 ranging between 37 (Sierra Leone)
and 57 (Ghana). Infant mortality and child death rates have in
general dropped substantially over the period by more than 20 and 30
per cent respectively (except in Sierra Leone where the decline is
14 and 22 per cent respectively).
Compounding the effects of rapid population growth is the high
degree of urbanisation in recent years, particularly towards the
mining areas and certain of the principal urban centres. With
deterioration of ecological conditions in much of the region and
falling trends in real incomes in the rural sector relative to the
urban, the growth of urban centres has produced significant changes
in the population distribution of these otherwise rural economies.
The World Bank estimates that the ratio of urban to total population
in West Africa in 1981 ranged between 11 per cent (Burkina) and 37
per cent (Ghana), compared with 5 per cent and 23 per cent in 1960
for both countries respectively. Urbanisation in West Africa has
been induced by several factors including the search for relatively
higher and stable wage incomes, recognisable political action and
the exploitation of the 'extended family system', easily regarded as
the developing countries' equivalent of the social security system
in many developed industrial countries.
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These demographic trends, continuing overall growth and
urbanisation pose increasing pressure on West Africa's modest health
and education facilities, and on the limited wage employment
opportunities.
2.4 POLITICAL CHANGE
By 1900 the 'partition of Africa' was complete. In West
Africa, four countries (Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone)
were under British colonial rule; nine (Benin, Burkina, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo) were under
French administration, while the two lusophones (Cape Verde and
Guinea-Bissau) became Portuguese possession. In contrast, Liberia
remains unique in that the country was created as long ago as 1847
as an independent state for the settlement of freed slaves, mainly
from North America. Political independence in the rest of the
member countries (except Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau in 1975) was
achieved between 1957 (Ghana) and 1965 (Gambia).
However, most counties, especially the francophones - except
Guinea - are still politically and economically very closely related
with the past colonial masters. Strong post-colonial links between
France and several of the francophones are sustained within the WAMU
and the so-called Conference of France and Africa (also known as the
Franco-African Summit). On a collective basis, all West African
countries are associated with the EEC - through the Yaounde and Lome
Conventions - which further enhances the colonial historical
relationships. To a large extent these relationships have continued
to influence most of West Africa's external trade, monetary and
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financial patterns and will undoubtedly influence the process of
currency unification in the region.
Table 2C ECOWAS: Political Change
Capital	 Year of
City	 Independence
Immediately
Legal Status
Type of Cgrent
Government'
Benin l Porto 1960 Autonomous member Military, 1972
Novo French community
Burkina2 Ouagadougou 1960 Autonomous member Military, 1982
French community
Cape
Verde
Praia 1975 Overseas province
of Portugal
Constitutional
Gambia Banjul3 1965 British Colony &
protectorate
Constitutional
Ghana4 Accra 1957 Military, 1981
Guinea Conakry 1958 French Overseas Military, 1984
Territory
Guinea-
Bissau5
Bissau 1975 Overseas province
of Portugal
Military, 1980*
Ivory Abidjan 1960 Autonomous member Constitutional
Coast French community
Liberia Monrovia 1847 Private Colony Military, 1980
Mali Bamako 1960 Member State, as Military, 1979
Sudanese Republic
of Fed of Mali
Mauritania Nouakchott 1960 Autonomous member Military, 1984
French community
Niger Niamey 1960 Autonomous member Military, 1974
French community
Nigeria Lagos 1960 British Colony &
protectorate
Military, 1985
Senegal Dakar 1960 Member state of Constitutional
Fed of Mali
Sierra
Leone
Freetown5 1961 British Colony &
protectorate
Constitutional,
1969
Togo Lome 1960 French UN Trust Military, 1967*
Territory
Notes:	 1	 Formerly Dahomey
2	 Formerly Upper Volta
3	 Formerly Bathurst
4	 Formerly Gold Coast
5	 Formerly Portuguese Guinea
6	 The name Freetown means - free settlement area for
liberated slaves, the other was Libreville in Gabon
7	 Year indicates installation of current government
Military Head of State through some governments have
introduced constitutional rule or elections.
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The most important characteristic feature of West Africa's
post-independence political scene is that it has been extremely
volatile, complex and in cases, very violent. There are three major
developments. The first is its militarisation. All but three of
the indigenous governments which constitutionally replaced the
colonial administrations (Gambia, Ivory Coast and Senegal) have been
replaced through unconstitutional means - generally by military
take-over. Including Togo, where Black Africa's first military
take-over occurred in 1963, eleven of the sixteen West African
governments are presently military. Among these, the worst affected
are Nigeria where the latest coup in August 1985 marked the sixth
(including the 'Biafra' Civil War, 1975) military take-over since
independence in 1960, and Ghana where more than five successful and
abortive military take-over attempts have taken place, beginning
with the first successful coup in 1966. This changing pattern of
West Africa's political scene is illustrated in Table 2C.
. Secondly, even those few countries which have managed to
sustain constitutional rule for longer years without fundamental
changes have also had to contend with successive military/civil
take-over attempts (as was the case in Sierra Leone in 1969 and 1974
although there were two different military governments in quick
succession in 1967/68; and The Gambia in 1981), civil strife,
political discontent and unrests, thereby making their political
scene equally shaky and unstable. In Senegal, for instance, apart
from the strong political opposition from the country's thirteen
opposing parties, the main source of political tension for the
ruling constitutional Parti Socialiste has been the threatened
withdrawal of the southern province of Casamance in order to create
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an independent state on its own. Such a new state would mean
depriving Senegal of its most economically productive agricultural
enclave. In addition, as in Nigeria during the Biafra War, the
Casamance threat does provide an important source of irritation and
friction between Senegal's major tribes.
In the Ivory Coast, apart from the frequently reported 'anti-
government activities' which have included the unforgettable Gagnoa
clash of 1970, the major source of political tension in the ruling
constitutional government has always evolved out of the choice for a
likely successor to the 'ageing' President Houphouet-Boigny who has
been President of the Ivory Coast since independence in 1960.
The third significant development in West Africa's post-
independence political scene is the long history of outstanding
political disputes between several countries. These disputes,
mainly over territorial boundaries, are sporadic and sometimes very
serious and have resulted to protracted border closures and
temporary suspensions of diplomatic relations. The most serious
inter-state conflict in West Africa, however, is between two of the
region's poorest countries - Mali and Burkina - and its cause has
developed from a 25 years dispute over the mineral rich Agacher
border zone. This conflict has not only brought the two states
before the International Court of Justice at the Hague in 1983, it
has also resulted into two 'wars' between the two countries, in 1975
and 1985. Other important disputes, though of relatively minor
scale, have included conflicts between Ghana and Togo, and Sierra
Leone and Liberia, mainly over the reported use or protection
(though many a time unproven) of political dissidents to destabilise
each other's government.
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Furthermore, even some of the existing military governments
have also reported frequent counter-coup attempts (eg Burkina 1983,
Guinea 1985, Ghana 1985, Liberia 1986, Niger 1974, 1975 and 1976,
and Nigeria 1985) since their installation.
This catalogue of political developments in post-independence
West Africa has not only adversely affected national economic and
political stability and performance, but at the regional level, it
has also provided a major source of a high degree of suspicion and
mistrust among the political leaders. In the first place, the pre-
eminence of a high incidence of internal political fragility has in
part prevented some of the most affected countries from identifying
and/or fully implementing clearly defined political ideologies and
economic framework. In most countries therefore, high priority is
given to very shortterm, ad hoc and insufficiently appraised
economic policies and development programmes. It has, in many
instances (eg Sierra Leone), also triggered off large-scale
displacement of productive population for purely military and
political purposes and has induced a substantial diversion of
financial resources from productive to the practically non-income
generating defence spending. Even though declining, defence
expenditure constitutes a significant proportion of central
government spending in many countries (eg Nigeria, 17.9 per cent in
1978; Burkina, 17.1 per cent).
	 In Liberia, the ratio actually
increased from 2.7 to 13.5 per cent in 1978-82. In 1968-78,
military expenditure has represented as much as 7.1 per cent of GNP
in Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, and 4.2 per cent in Nigeria (see
Table 20).
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Table 2D ECOWAS: Central Government Defence Expenditure
Defence expenditures as a Military expenditure
% of total expenditure 	 as a % of GNP
1972	 19781	1982
	
1968	 1978
Benin	 -	 -	 1.6	 2.0
Burkina
	
21.8
	 17.1	 1.2	 3.4
Cape Verde
	 -	 -	 -	 -
Gambia	 0.0	 -
Ghana	 8.0	 5.3
	 6.2	 3.0	 0.4
Guinea	 -	 -	 3.3	 -
Guinea-Bissau	 -	 24.0	 -	 -	 7.1
Ivory Coast	 7.2	
-	 1.3	 2.2
Liberia
	 -	 2.9	 13.5
	 1.3	 1.1
Mali	 -	 18.6	 8,4	 2.0	 3.5
Mauritania	 -	
-	 -	 1.4	 7.1
Niger	 -	 6.1	 -	 1.0	 0.8
Nigeria	 40.2 17.9	 -	 5.9	 4.2
Senegal
	
-	 10.7	 9.1	 1.9	 2.2
Sierra Leone	 -	 7.8	 -	 0.7	 1.0
Togo	 -	 9.6	 7.1	 1.2	 2.8
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 1985; and
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1981
Notes:	 1	 1977 for Burkina, Niger and Togo; 1979 for Liberia
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Finally, there is no doubt that these political developments
have serious implications for sustaining regional economic and
monetary co-operation and integration. Already, in the WAMU,
Burkina was prompted by its conflict with Mali to veto the latter's
re-entry into the union in 1982. Sub-regional economic groupings
like the Mano River Union (MRU) and the Communaute Economique de
PAfrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) are virtually in financial and political
disarray, resulting mainly from the frequent occurrence of mistrust
and suspicion among the member countries. Thus, political
instability in West Africa is one important reason for looking at
the future of regional co-operation and integration in a mood of
apprehension than optimism.
2.5 CLIMATE, RESOURCES AND SECTORAL PERFORMANCE
2.5.1 Climate, Vegetation and Resource Endowment
West Africa's climatic and vegetational environment is pre-
eminently tropical, constituting very broadly the coastal forests
and the northern savannas further away from the equator. A more
precise description of the region's topography is that as one
journeys northwards from the coast, it is of sandy coastlands,
followed immediately by a belt of tropical forests punctuated in the
centre by wooded or tree savannas, immediately followed by an
extension of another belt of undulating grasslands or dry savannas
studded with trees, and finally by the Sahara desert.
Each vegetational zone runs parallel to the coast and each
results from distinctive climatic conditions ranging from high
temperatures, high rainfall (2000 mm or over per year) and high
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humidity for most of the year in the forest area to a dry season
increasing to five or more months and sparse rainfall (500-1000 mm a
year) as one travels away from the coast into the landlocked
countries on the edge of the Sahara.
Generally, most West African countries traverse these climatic
and vegetational dimensions by stretching inland across the forests
and tree savannas into the dry savannas and the desert.
Significantly, nearly half of Mauritania and the most northern parts
of Mali and Niger are embedded into the desert, while most of the
coastal countries stretch inland across the forest zone and the
savannas (eg Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone). Liberia
is the only West African country that is predominantly within the
forest zone and without savannas, although here too, as in some
other coastal countries, climatic conditions are distinctly of two
seasons: a rainy season between May-October and a dry season between
November-April. Rainfall in the drought-stricken landlocked
(Burkina, Mali and Niger) and other Sahel countries (eg Cape Verde,
Guinea-Bissau) is extremely scarce to the extent that in Cape Verde,
for instance, it rains on average about twice a year.
The interaction of climate and topography in West Africa is
such that most of the region's soils are depressingly delicate,
substantially deficient in organic materials, and in general only
moderately fertile. Countries with the heaviest rainfall (eg
Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone) also experience the severest
leaching of soils. In all countries, the dry season is partly
characterised by an extended spell of gusty desertic conditions
bringing with them the l harmattan s - a cool, dry, droughty,
vegetation - withering, and skin-cracking dusty winds. Furthermore,
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the absence of frost in most parts adds to the acute problems of
pest control, while the tropical nature of the climate itself
exaggerates the problems of wide ranging bacterial, parasetic and
endemic diseases (eg malaria, elephantiasis, schistosomiasis).
These contrasting climatic conditions and topography represent
the most powerful explanations for the great diversities in
population growth and distribution, resource base and economic
opportunities and performance both within and between the West
African countries. In terms of agricultural resources, the
available arable land in the region is of varying fertility, ranging
from the rich rain forest belt in the south to the poor and dry
semi-desert in the north. Consequently, the primary agricultural
activity ranges from the production of a wide range of tree and root
crops (eg cocoa, coffee, palm trees, kola nuts, rubber) in the
coastlands and rainforest areas to that of grains and mixed cereals
(eg cotton, millet, sorghum, groundnuts, beans) and animal husbandry
in savanna areas. Generally, the southwestern rains are more suited
for rice and tree crop production although rice is grown in most
countries in the region. Tree crops are generally perennials while
grains and mixed crops are mostly annuals.
The endowment of West Africa in other natural resources is
equally impressive. Vast reserves of fish resources and enormous
potentials for hydro-electric power are available in many coastal
countries. Most importantly, there are also extensive deposits of a
very wide variety of mineral resources in most countries (eg
diamonds, gold, bauxite, iron ore, rutile, manganese, coal, natural
gas and petroleum).
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A basic distinctive feature of West Africa is that the
exploitation of these primary resources is geared generally for
export outside the region than for domestic consumption and the
value-added pre-export levels are extremely low and rudimentary.
Although on average each West African country is endowed at
economically viable proportions with more than one or two types of
agricultural and/or mineral products, performance on resource
exploitation has substantially varied between them in recent years.
In some countries (eg Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone), production
emphasis has drastically shifted from traditional agriculture to
mining and this has affected sectoral and overall economic
performance trends in recent years. The geographical distribution
of West Africa's major agricultural and mineral products is shown in
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.
2.5.2 Sectoral Performance
Although this section is devoted to a critical review of the
basic trends and problems of agriculture and mining, it will also
highlight similar developments in the manufacturing, transport and
communications sectors.
2.5.2.1	 Agriculture 
The principal feature of the economic structure of West Africa,
in common with the majority of LOCs, is that it is predominantly
rural in character and in nearly all countries agriculture has
remained the dominant source of livelihood, employing over three-
quarters of the labour force. Three other important features of
West African agriculture are worth mentioning. Firstly, there is a
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high incidence of overlapping in agricultural productivity between
the West African countries in terms of the variety of crops
cultivated, animal husbandry and fishing activities. This is
explained essentially by the overlapping variations between
countries in climatic conditions, vegetation, other topography, and
cultural preferences.
The second feature relates to the dichotomy between non-
monetised or subsistence and monetised sub-sectors. In most
counties, the subsistence sector accounts on average for more than
half of agricultural production and labour force, while the
monetised sub-sector is generally smaller and is mainly oriented,
directly or indirectly, towards exports. The emphasis on export
crops through huge capital expenditure, bank financing, increased
production incentives and marketing facilities is generally for the
mobilisation of foreign exchange earnings. However, by encouraging
a continuous drifting of population away from the food producing
subsistence sector, this emphasis has also. had the consequential
effects of intensifying food shortages and thereby increasing the
propensity for food imports. Despite the widely held objective of
food self-sufficiency, food production per capita is still low in
most countries, except the Ivory Coast and to a lesser extent
Senegal, and in the last two years, Ghana. In many countries (eg
Sierra Leone) the foreign exchange expenditure on food imports is by
far greater than the corresponding revenue from agricultural
exports.
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Table 2E	 ECOMAS: Major Export Crop Performance, 1948-1981
Annual Av
1948-52 1955	 1960 1965 1970 1975	 1980 1981
Cacao
ECOWAS exports (million MT) a .408 .391	 .541 .954 .752 .694	 .672 .695
(million dollars) -	 332.3 379.7 610.2 1034.1	 2009.5	 1211.8
% share of world , 58.6 54.2	 60.7 72.6 70.4 64.3	 65.6 57.4
% share of Africa° 82.9 82.2	 84.2 87.6 87.8 88.1	 87.8 • 85.4
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports - -	 24.4 19.9 20.5 9.0	 5.9 4.7
Ghana Ivory Coast
Principal exporter (X of ECOWAS) 59.1 53.5	 56.0 50.3 48.2 46.4	 40.4 51.9
Coffee
ECOWAS exports	 (million MT) .065 .104	 .168 .189 .244 .282	 .239 .248
(million dollars) - -	 9.3 11.4 186.1 315.7	 759.8 568.5
% share of world 3.4 5.0	 4.9 5.1 6.0 7.3	 6.1 6.7
% share of Africa 23.1 23.9	 26.1 21.7 22.8 24.2	 27.0 26.5
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports - -	 0.7 0.6 6.3 2.7	 2.2 2.2
FWAc Ivory Coast
Principal exporter (% of ECOWAS) 91.6 81.4	 81.0 92.3 83.5 90.9	 86.2 87.2
Cotton
ECOWAS exports (million MT) .016 .034	 .032 .030 .084 .059	 .132 .102
(million dollars) - -	 19.5 15.7 43.6 58.5	 219.7 164.7
% share of world 0.7 1.4	 0.8 0.7 1.8 1.3	 2.8 2.2
% share of Africa 2.7 5.6	 3.0 2.7 5.6 6.1	 18.6 15.6
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports - -	 1.4 0.8 1.5 0.5	 0.6 0.6
Nigeria Mali
Principal exporter (X of ECOWAS) 79.7 100.0	 89.3 58.6 22.0 31.3	 38.4 36.7
Groundnuts (shelled)
ECOWAS exports	 (million MT) .502 .618	 .714 .916 .562 .113	 .057 .021
(million dollars) - -	 146.1 171.2 103.5 54.7	 25.1 15.7
% share of world 64.0 68.6	 72.0 62.4 53.5 11.4	 4.8 1.8
% share of Africa 87.3 83.6	 86.2 78.4 73.6 27.0	 23.9 8.5
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports •	 - -	 10.7 9.0 3.5 0.5	 0.1 0.1
Nigeria Gambia
Principal exporter (% of ECOWAS) 54.3 65.3	 43.8 61.8 58.8 49.8	 71.4 51.7
Groundnut Oil
ECOWAS exports (million MT) .062 .121	 .167 .253 .265 .221	 .086 .037
(million dollars) - -	 59.6 87.0 88.5 166.5	 71.6 38.4
% share of world 33.7 32.2	 54.9 62.5 60.5 52.0	 19.5 11.8
% share of Africa 82.3 83.2	 88.4 91.7 89.7 59.3	 71.6 50.6
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports - -	 4.4 4.6 3.0 1.4	 0.2 0.1
FWA Senegal
Principal exporter (X of ECOWAS) 93.7 71.8	 72.1 61.2 52.8 87.3	 85.3 54.3
Palm Kernels and Nuts
ECOWAS exports	 (million MT) .568 .626	 .626 .556 .342 .250	 .137 .103
(million dollars) - -	 101.9 94.6 53.0 44.9	 37.2 25.9
% share of world 74.4 79.2	 86.7 87.3 76.8 75.8	 68.1 77.1
% share of Africa 79.8 85.6	 94.2 94.3 90.6 91.3	 94.0 96.6
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports - -	 7.5 5.0 1.8 0.4	 0.1 0.1
Nigeria
Principal exporter (X of ECOWAS) 65.6 70.3	 71.6 78.5 57.4 66.9	 72.5 54.1
Palm Oil
ECOWAS exports (million MT) .180 .204	 .205 .167 .035 .152	 .097 .077
(million dollars) - 43.0 41.4 7.8 57.8	 54.7 39.3
% share of world 37.8 36.6	 34.8 31.6 3.9 6.2	 2.7 2.2
% share of Africa 55.3 55.5	 54.9 67.7 19.1 63.9	 81.1 86.2
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports - 3.2 2.2 0.3 0.5	 0.2 0.2
Nigeria Benin Ivory Coast
Principal exporter (X of ECOWAS) 90.2 90.7	 91.1 91.9 42.5 84.6	 83.3 58.5
Rubber
ECOWAS exports (million MT) .046 .070	 .107 .121 ,159 .144	 .110 .112
(million dollars) - -	 7.9 5.7 67.3 72.0	 147.1 124.2
% share of world 2.1 3.2	 4.4 4.6 6.0 4.4	 3.4 3.7
% share of Africa 77.1 70.3	 73.3 81.2 78.9 76.7	 83.5 80.7
% share of ECOWAS merchandise exports - -	 0.6 0.3 2.3 0.6	 0.4 0.5
Liberia Nigeria Liberia
Principal exporter (X of ECOWAS) 68.8 56.0	 50.4 53.6 53.8 64.2	 69.5 69.8
Source: FAO 'Trade Year Book', various issues
Notes:	 a	 MT = metric tonnes
b	 Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South Africa
c	 French West Africa
-	 not available
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A further general feature of agriculture in West Africa relates
to some archaeological and ethnological evidence that not only is
agriculture itself alien to Africa as a whole but many of the crops
which represent the continent's agricultural mainstay are considered
'exotic', ie they are introduced from abroad, mainly from Asia and
South America (see Hopkins, 1973, p 29). Some of these crops
include cocoa, coconuts, cotton, cassava, groundnuts, plantains,
bananas, sugar-cane, citrus fruits, sweet potatoes, maize, mangoes,
peas and beans. While this piece of evidence (though controversial)
is worth noting, its empirical significance for West Africa is
perhaps little in that agriculture in the region has developed into
a pervasive and long-established activity that almost intuitively
all West Africans have come to accept its existence as an important
part of their livelihood.
The performance of the agricultural sector in West AFrica has
not only dominated the course of most member economies in the past
but holds major implications for their prospects in the near future.
However, growth in the sector has been variable and in many
countries slower in recent years. While in some countries (eg
Ghana) the decline has merely reflected the downward performance of
the domestic economy and, demand conditions in the global markets,
in others (eg Nigeria and Sierra Leone) the decline reflects the
drastic shift from agriculture to mining especially in the 1970s.
The great drought in the Sahel has been a principal factor for the
slow growth of agriculture in those countries.
The overall impact of these developments on West African
agriculture is illustrated in Table 2E, which measures three types
of performance trends: the combined share of West African countries
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in the export of each crop in relation to African and world
production levels; the share of each crop in relation to the
region's total world exports; and the share of West Africa's
principal exporter in relation to the total regional export of each
crop.
West Africa contributes about 57 per cent of the cocoa and over
77 per cent of the volume of palm kernels and nuts entering world
markets. The region's share in groundnut oil and palm oil has
fallen drastically over the years. In relation, however, to the
volume of export products entering world markets from Africa, West
Africa contributes about 85 per cent of cocoa, over 50 per cent of
groundnut oil, 75 per cent of palm kernels, 80 per cent of palm oil
and 80 per cent of rubber. By 1980 Ivory Coast had replaced Ghana
as major regional cocoa exporter. Similarly, Nigeria's position as
the largest West African exporter of cotton, groundnuts and palm
kernel oil has, since the mid-1970s been held by Mali, Gambia and
Ivory Coast respectively.
In the majority of cases, the average share of agriculture,
including livestock, forestry and fishing, in the GDP has declined
very significantly since 1960. As shown in Table 2F, the most
severe contractions have been registered in Ivory Coast where the
ratio has fallen from 43 per cent in 1960 to 27 per cent in 1981;
Niger, 69 to 30 per cent; Nigeria, 63 to 23 per cent; and Togo, 55
to 24 per cent. Of the thirteen countries for which comparative
estimates were available, Cape Verde and Ghana have had substantial
improvements in agriculture as a proportion of the GDP. The
regional weighted average dropped from 48 per cent in 1960 to 31 per
cent in 1981.
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In terms of growth, high rates were experienced in Cape Verde,
from -4.4 per cent in the 1960s to 6.7 per cent in 1970-80; Gambia,
4.6 to 7 per cent; Guinea-Bissau, -2.4 to 1.4 per cent; and
Mauritania, 1.4 to 3.1 per cent. Marked contractions were
experienced in Benin, from 4.9 to -0.3 per cent; and Niger, 3.3 to -
3.0 per cent over the same periods, while in Nigeria, agricultural
growth remained constant at -0.4 per cent.
With respect to cash crops, again the Ivory Coast has achieved
sustained growth throughout the 1970s, due largely to
diversification into products such as palm oil and rubber while
maintaining its more traditional products, coffee and cocoa.
Clearly, agricultural performance in West Africa is heavily
influenced by climatic conditions, vegetation and other ecological
factors as well as by many tropical crops and hum diseases. But
while these factors are important, they do not fully explain the
varying performance in agriculture observed among many West African
countries in the more recent years. Other factors are chiefly the
product of both the increased politicisation of the rural population
and government policy. Principal among these are the rising rate of
urbanisation, induced by the more obvious shortrun political gains,
military and security service requirements, as well as sheer neglect
as in Nigeria and the lack of adequate price incentives and
extension facilities. In countries where the exchange rate has been
adjusted downwards to induced increased export production,
inadequate price incentives for producers are reflected in the
unwillingness by governments to pass on directly to producers
substantial proportions of corresponding currency gains. In this
respect perhaps we may argue for a review of the use of the so-
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called agricultural price stabilisation funds maintained in
countries like Sierra Leone and Ghana.
Policies to improve agricultural production, apart from
exchange rate adjustment, have included the provision of subsidised
agricultural extension services, substantial financial investments
through government, banking and other financial institutions, and
agricultural diversification programmes. In a number of countries,
agricultural resusitation attempts are taking place through the
World Bank Integrated Agricultural Development Projects (IADPs)
which stress the combined improvement of rural life and agricultural
production (mainly subsistence). The basic criticism of these
programmes, however, relates to the amount of investment funds that
go towards actual crop production which is relatively small compared
with that on infrastructural facilities, ie housing, offices, wages
and salaries, etc. Funna (1982) has argued that by concentrating
essentially on effecting qualitative improvements in subsistence
production, combined with somewhat low production targets, the
impact of the IADPs even in food production is bound to be limited.
Despite these individual national attempts, there are clear
indications that the experience of the seventies and early eighties
should lead to a wider appreciation and more concerted
rationalisation of existing West African agricultural programmes and
policies.
2.5.2.2	 Mining 
Although the West African economic structure is predominantly
agricultural, the wide variety of mineral resources traversing the
different countries have equally played an increasing role in
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national development. Geographically, as in agriculture, many West
African countries have immense potentials to exploit more than one
or two types of minerals at economically viable volumes. Like
agriculture, West African mining has had a long historical
perspective with the exploitation of such minerals as gold, salt,
iron ore, bauxite and diamonds in full swing several years before
the colonial era and its commercialisation is also substantially for
export. It is worth noting however that commercialisation of
agricultural production in West Africa is more a reflection of the
general colonial trade policy, especially with the introduction of
'staple exports' which replaced slave exports. Here, the main
features of the 'new' West African economy after the abolution of
the external slave trade in the 19th century were analysed by making
use of 'staple theory', developed specifically to explain the
particular type of growth stemming from diversification around a
well-defined export base (see, for instance, Watkins, 1963, pp 141-
58). In West Africa, however, staple theory was applied to solve
the problem of developing alternative exports to slave exports.
Also, in contrast with agriculture, mining activity in West
Africa has generally involved large and active participation of
foreign capital and control especially because of the extensive
exploration pursuits and large-scale mining which have characterised
the post-independence years. This changing pattern of mining has
increased the role of minerals in West Africa and has transformed
some economies away from their traditional agricultural structures
(eg iron ore in Mauritania; phosphates in Senegal and Togo; uranium
in Niger; and petroleum in Nigeria). This transformation is, of
course, more predominant in Nigeria where, following the initial
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more than sevenfold oil price increase in 1973/74, the oil industry
has completely overshadowed agriculture as the backbone of the
economy and is currently accounting for well over 90 per cent of
national exports. Table 2G provides a list of some of the
expatriate enterprises that have dominated the West African mining
scene over the years. It is noted however that in Ghana and Sierra
Leone, small-scale indigenous alluvial mining accounts for over 30
per cent of total diamonds produced in both countries and around 40
per cent in the Ivory Coast.
Table 2H shows trends in the changing performance, over the
years, of West African mining in terms of volume and the combined
regional share in world mine production of each of the region's
major minerals. The principal regional producer country for each
mineral is also indicated in terms of its share in regional
production. The period 1970-81 is taken mainly because of data
accessibility.
During the period, most of West Africa's minerals suffered
erratic fluctuations (mainly downwards) in relation to world
production quantities. However, as in agriculture, West Africa
contributes the bulk of world production of minerals derived from
Africa, eg gold, diamonds and manganese. Significantly, West
Africa's share in world production of bauxite and uranium in 1970-81
increased from 5.8 per cent to 15.1 per cent and 0.25-9.9 per cent
respectively, while its corresponding share in the production of
most of the other minerals has either stagnated at comparatively
very low levels, or has dropped sharply, eg diamonds from 14.1 to
3.9 per cent; and tin ore, from 3.9 to 1 per cent.
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Table 26 ECOWAS: Expatriate Interests in Mine Operations
Country
	
Company
	
Mineral
Guinea	 FRIA - an international consortium of US,
French, British and Swedish interest
Ghana	 Ghana Consolidated Diamond Mining Company
Lonrho - took over from the Ashanti Gold-
fields Corporation which had been mining
gold since 1897
Ivory	 A private consortium of Mitsubishi and
Coast	 Sumitomo (Japan), British Steel, Usinor
(France) Hoesh Hoogovens (Netherlands)
Bong - a German-Italian mining company„
1965
Liberia	 LAMCO - Liberian-American-Swedish Minerals
a consortium of six Swedish firms, US
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, 1963
Niger	 SOMAIR --- Societe des Mines de l'Air
(French)
COMINAK --- A consortium of Japanese and
French interests
Nigeria	 SAFRAP• ; Shell-BP; AGIP-Phillips; Gulf;
Mobil; Texaco (exploration and production)
Royal Dutch Shell Group - owners of Shell
Nigeria Limited (marketing)
Senegal	 MIFERSO
Sierra . CAST - Consolidated African Selection Trust
Leone Sherbro Minerals - a consortium of British
and American interests - ceased operations
in 1971
Sierra Rutile - a consortium of Bethlehem
Steel and Nord Resources (USA), 1972
Austro-Minerals (Austrian), 1980 - replaced
Sierra Leone Development Company (DELCO)
which closed in 1975 after over 40 years
operations
SIEROMCO - A subsidiary of Swiss Aluminium
Company (Alusuisse)
Togo	 CTMB - Compagnie Togolaise des Mines du
Benin (French), 1961
Bauxite
Industrial
diamonds
Gold
Iron Ore
Iron Ore
Uranium
Crude
Petroleum
-
Iron Ore
Diamonds
Rutile
Rutile
Iron Ore
Bauxite
	 .
Phosphate
Rocks
Sources: Onyemelukwe and Filani, ibid
West Africa, various issues
	7.5 	 45.4	 50.8
	
2.1	 10.4	 14.0
100	 100	 100
Table 2H ECOWAS: Mine Production of Minerals and Metals
1970	 1971	 1972	 1973	 1974	 1975	 1976	 1977	 1978	 1979	 1980 1981
Bauxite
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
3391	 2923	 3077	 4709	 7096	 9436 12234 11944 12783 15450 14326 13623
%share of World	 5.8	 4.7	 4.6	 6.3	 8.6	 12.3	 15.2	 14.1	 15.2	 16.9	 15.0	 15.1
Guinea
Principal producer (X of ECOWAS) 	 76.7	 68.8
	 66.6	 78.6	 86.0	 89.1	 92.5	 91.0	 91.1	 94.8	 93.7	 94.2
Diamonds
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	 5711
	 5645	 5373
	 4042	 4646	 3995	 3422	 3139	 2652	 2516	 2078	 1516
%share of World	 14.1	 13.7	 12.3	 9.6	 10.4	 9.7	 8.9	 8.0	 6.7	 6.4	 4.9	 3.9
Ghana
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS)
	 44.6	 45.4	 49.5
	 57.1	 55.4	 58.3	 66.7	 62.0	 53.7	 48.7	 55.3	 55.2
Coal
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
60	 158
	 341
	 355	 312	 285	 280	 238	 400	 172	 191	 116
%share of World	 .002
	
.01
	 .01	 .01	 .01	 .01	 .01	 .01	 .01	 .005	 .005	 .003
Nigeria
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS)
	 100
	 100
	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Copper
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	 1.95	 4.74 15.05 21.28 20.08
	
6.58 10.00	 7.64	 1.77
%share of World	 .03	
.07
	
.22	 .28	 .26	 .09	 .13	 .10	 .02
Mauritania
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS) . .100
	 100
	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Gold
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
22.4
%share of World	 1.4
Ghana
Principal producer (X of ECOWAS) 	 99.3
	
21.9
	 22.7	 24.5	 20.9	 17.8	 17.4	 15.9	 12.8	 10.2
	
11.0	 10.6
	
1.4	 1.4	 1.6	 1.5	 1.5	 1.5	 1.3	 1.0	 0.8	 0.9	 0.9
	
99.1	 99.2	 92.5	 91.4	 91.7	 95.2	 94.1	 97.7	 99.5	 99.4	 100
Iron Ore
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
33.8
	 35.6	 34.6	 36.2
	 39.4	 28.4	 30.2	 27.2	 27.7	 29.3	 26.0	 28.4
%share of World	 4.4
	 4.5
	 4.4	 4.3
	 4.4	 3.2	 3.3	 3.2	 3.2	 3.2
	 2.9	 3.3
Liberia
Principal producer (S of ECOWAS)	 66.0	 69.0	 66.4	 65.0	 65.2	 64.8	 68.8	 63.9	 75.1	 67.9	 66.8	 69.4
Manganese Ore
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
399	 467
%share of World	 , 2.0	 2.2
Ghana
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS) 	 100	 100
509
	 290
	 252	 409	 312	 292	 317
	 254	 250	 233
2.4
	 1.3	 1.1	 1.6	 1.2	 1.2	 1.4	 1.0	 0.9	 1.0
100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Crude Petroleum
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
52.8
	 74.1
	 89.8	 100.9 110.0
	
95.8	 102.3 103.4	 93.4 113.7 100.3	 69.9
%share of World	 2.3	 3.1
	 3.5
	 3.5	 3.9	 3.6	 3.5	 3.4	 3.0	 3.6	 3.3	 2.5
Nigeria
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS)
	
100	 100	 100
	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
- Phosphates	 :.
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
2.6	 3.3	 3.3
	 4.0	 4.4	 3.5	 3.9	 4.9	 4.6	 4.8	 4.3
	 4.2
%share of World	 3.1	 3.8	 3.5
	 3.3	 3.6	 3.2	 3.6	 4.2	 3.7	 3.6	 3.1	 3.0
	
Togo	 Senegal Togo
Principal producer (X of ECOWAS) 	 58.0	 52.0	 58.4	 56.8	 58.0	 51.5	 53.0	 58.3	 61.5	 60.8	 68.1	 52.7
Rutile
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
44.1	 11.9
% share of World	 10.5	 3.0
Sierra Leone
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS)	 100	 100
Salt
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
151	 196	 222	 210	 237	 210	 213	 216	 219	 195	 195	 195
% share of World	 0.11	 0.14	 0.15	 0.14	 0.14	 0.13	 0.13	 0.13	 0.13	 0.11	 0.12	 0.12
Senegal
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS)	 77.9	 59.2	 60.9	 57.9	 63.3	 63.3	 66.7	 60.0	 67.3	 71.8	 71.8	 71.8
Tin Ore
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
8.0	 7.4	 6.8	 5.9	 5.5	 4.7	 3.8	 3.3	 3.1	 2.9	 2.7	 2.4
% share of World	 3.9	 3.6	 3.2	 2.9	 2.7	 2.1	 1.7	 1.6	 1.4	 1.3	 1.2	 1.0
Nigeria
Principal producer (X of ECOWAS)	 99.5	 99.0	 99.0	 98.8	 99.2	 99.0	 97.6	 99.0	 95.8	 96.6	 95.7	 95.8
Uranium
Total ECOWAS ('000' Tonnes)
	
46	 431	 3077	 2623	 2712	 1305	 1460	 1441	 2062	 3616	 4129	 4366
%share of World	 .25	 2.3	 15.7	 13.2	 14.2	 6.4	 6.2	 5.1	 6.1	 9.6	 9.5	 9.9
Niger
Principal producer (% of ECOWAS)	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
Source: Institute of Geological Sciences, World Mineral Statistics, various issues
Notes: 1 Tonnes expressed in metric units, each unit approximately 7 barrles on average for crude petroleum
2 Coal consitutes sub-bituminous only
3 Phosphates constitute both rock and aluminium phosphates
- No production, negligible or not available
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Crude petroleum increased marginally from 2.3 to 2.5 per cent after
reaching a peak of 3.9 per cent in 1974. Oil exploration and
seismic research is actively being pursued in most of the coastal
countries especially Ivory Coast, which is already producing small
quantities of crude, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana and Sierra Leone. Some of
the major producers of West Africa's minerals, include Nigeria
(petroleum, coal and tin); Guinea (bauxite); Ghana (diamonds, gold);
Liberia (iron ore); Niger (uranium); Togo (phosphates) and Sierra
Leone (rutile).
As a share of the GDP, mining (industry) has improved from 11
to 30 per cent in 1960-81 for West Africa as a whole (Table 2F). As
the table shows these percentages vary between countries. By 1981
mining had represented over 30 per cent of the GDP in Nigeria,
Guinea and Niger, and less than 20 per cent in most countries.
Between the last two decades, mining has shown substantial growth
only in Guinea (from 2.3 to 14.1 per cent). It has declined very
sharply in most other countries, especially Mauritania (from 14.1 to
-4.0 per cent) and Nigeria (14.7 to 6 per cent). Negative growth
rates of -2.2 per cent and -3.6 per cent were registered in Ghana
and Sierra Leone respectively for 1970-81.
Rapid depletion and the insufficiency of investment capital
have largely accounted for the declining performance of the mining
sector in most of the affected countries. In some countries like
Sierra Leone, Ghana and Liberia where the smaller and more valuable
minerals (gold and diamonds) are mined, smuggling is also a major
factor. In Sierra Leone in particular, Funna (1982 and 1983) has
also stressed the lack of meaningful contribution from the
expatriate mining companies and has therefore argued for
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'institutionalising' the capacity of government in its contractual
mine negotiations with these companies. As in agriculture, the
basic constraints for the mining sector are the product of
government policy which now requires rationalising on a regional
basis. Clearly, in Sierra Leone, the increased government
participation in mining activity (ie through nationalisation;
partial or majority equity participation; and joint ventures) has
not improved the performance of the mining sector in recent years.
2.5.2.3	 Industry and Manufacturing 
Another important characteristic of the West African economies
is the weakness and rudimentary nature of industrial and
manufacturing processes. Historically, West African manufacturing
depended largely on the small household unit and concentrated on
such activities as black-smithing, gold-smithing and pottery with
little import-input content. 	 Production was essentially for
domestic consumption although several finished products most of
which now form part of the region's imports were traded in border
markets. These manufacturing processes were severely constrained by
the indifferent and biased colonial policies as well as by the
conservatism of expatriate enterprises most of which were merely
agents of colonial administration (see for instance, Hopkins, 1973).
Few new manufacturing processes and opportunities have
developed in West Africa since the introduction, during the .colonial
period, of the so-called 'first stage processing' which in essence
was conceptualised into the 'import-substitution' industrial
strategy. Historically, this form of industrialisation had always
started off with the processing of agricultural raw materials and
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simple manufactures essentially to replace imports, but quite often
with a margin for exports.
Modern manufacturing in West African is still a first stage
processing activity that is heavily biased towards the processing of
agricultural raw materials. A few minerals have been added to the
list (see Table 21). It is dominated by low technology and light
industries and consists mainly of the production of consumer goods
and simple manufactures. Food, beverages and tobacco, textiles,
clothing and footwear constitute the main manufacturing components.
A few countries like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Senegal have
relatively advanced and diversified their manufacturing industries
to include much heavier assembly industries for the production of
more durable and capital goods, eg tiles, cement, building
materials, vehicles and cars.
With the notable exception of Senegal, the share of the
manufacturing sector in total production of West African countries
is generally below 15 per cent (see Table 2F). There is evidently a
considerable variation in the share of this sector in the GDP among
individual countries. There are a few countries like Benin,
Burkina, Ivory Coast, Mauritania and Niger whose manufacturing
sectors have performed relatively better between 1960-81 in relation
to the GDP. In Ghana and Togo, the manufacturing sector has
deteriorated badly (in growth terms) over the last two decades.
Nigeria has probably one of the most advanced manufacturing sectors
in the region (the other being Ivory Coast), but the ratio of
manufacturing output to GDP has been diminished by dominance of the
oil sector. In growth terms, the manufacturing sector has slowed
down in virtually all countries between the sixties and the
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seventies, except notably Nigeria where it grew marginally from 9.1
to 12.4 per cent.
Table 21	 ECOWAS: First-Stage Processing of Selected Primary
Products
Raw Material	 Processing Activity
	
Processed Product
Palm kernel
fruit
Cotton Seed
Rubber latex
Cocoa pod
Coconut
Groundnut
Cassava
Paddy rice
Coffee
Logs
Raffia
Hides and
skin
Tin ore
Bauxite
Diamonds
Gold
Nut-cracking and oil-milling
Ginning
Crepe making
Extraction and sun drying
Kernel extraction and drying
Shelling an oil milling
Peeling, grating and roasting
Hulling
Extraction and drying
Saw-milling
Fibre extraction and drying
Tanning
Cassiterite separation/smelting
Dressing/smelting
Dressing
Smelting
Palm kernel and
palm oil
Cotton lint
Crepe
Cocoa beans
Copra
Groundnut oil
Gari
Rice
Coffee
Sawn timber and
plywood
Coir
Leather
Tin
Bauxite/aluminium
Diamonds
Gold
Source: Onyemelukwe and Filani, op cit, p 77
58
The basic problem of the manufacturing sector in West Africa is
the extent to which the inherent import-substitution strategy can be
rationalised to reduce the import-input content and/or improve upon
existing value-added levels of exports. No doubt, the existing
structure of manufacturing production reflects the relatively low
level of economic development in the region, as well as the
undiversified nature of most economies. Conceivably, backward and
forward linkages of manufacturing processes either within the sector
or in relation to the other sectors of the economies are severely
limited and national markets are relatively small. Given the
importance of market size as a pre-requisite for meaningful
rationalisation and fuller realisation of the linkage effects of
manufacturing activities, there is no doubt that meaningful inter-
member country industrial linkages are required and can only be
achieved through concerted planning within the framework of regional
co-operation.
2.5.2.4	 Transport and Communications 
The development of basic infrastructures in an economy - power,
transport and communication - has to anticipate and precede growth
in the rest of the economy. Their adequacy and efficiency must be
analysed therefore not only in terms of the physical availability of
such facilities in fixing the size of the market in geographical
terms, but also, in relation to the underlying costs in defining the
depth of the market in social, political and economic terms.
Indeed, in all three respects, the marked deficiencies and sparse
pattern of West Africa's infrastructural facilities are apparent in
all member countries.
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In power supply for instance, there is a great dependence on
petroleum imports and rising cost of these in recent years has
increased the incidence of power black-outs and exaggerated the
heavily skewed rural-urban power distribution pattern across the
region. The cost of rural-urban transportation facilities has
increased correspondingly and this has had serious implications for
the flow of goods and services between these two areas. Of course,
in nearly all countries, infrastructural facilities are concentrated
mainly in the principal cities as against the rural areas.
An equally important feature of West Africa's infrastructural
system is the notable lack of meaningful intra-regional linkages.
Air and shipping facilities between West African countries are
limited either by the lack of indigenous ownership and/or control in
them or because they are concentrated mainly on overseas routes.
Intra-regional inland road links are poor and generally impaired by
frequent border closures which are basically the product of badly
managed customs/immigration procedures and inter-state conflict.
Moreover, the problem of the inadequacy of intra-regional
telecommunications links is such that telex, cable and telephone
messages necessarily have to be channelled through overseas transit
centres, notably Britain and France.
These infrastructural deficiencies in West Africa have
obviously been recognised by the UN Economic Commission for Africa
(ECA) in its 1978-88 Transport and Communications Decade, as well as
by the Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) Lagos Plan of Action
(1980). Consequently, the ECA's Global Strategy has recommended in
particular, the improvement of inter-country transport through the
simplification of border-crossings, adoption of bilateral reciprocal
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arrangements on vehicle movements, harmonisation of transport-
oriented financial arrangements, standardisation of travelling
documentation, and further experimentation with 'appropriate
technology' in solving West Africa's transport problems. It cannot
be denied that even where the need to improve their infrastructural
facilities is sufficiently recognised, the efforts of most West
African countries are severely impeded by the huge capital
expenditures and executive capacity involved. Although geophysical
obstacles have often made intra-West African transport development
for instance prohibitively expensive, the logic of economic
integration in the sub-region demands a balanced transport and
communications network. While high intra-regional transport costs
may give 'natural protection' to a number of small-sized enterprises
which outweighs the benefits of economies of scale, by the same
token, poor communications, involving time-consuming procedures and
insufficient information sharing, can only retard economic growth
and regional co-operation. The absence of a satisfactory integrated
transport and communications system in West Africa represents
another important constraint for the expansion of intra-regional
trade and industry.
2.6 INCOME AND GROWTH
Although there are serious conceptual and empirical differences
and problems regarding the definitions, computations and comparisons
of GNP and GDP estimates, especially as they pertain to the LDCs
(see for instance, Rimmer 1984, pp 19-62), the fact remains that in
West Africa not only are the absolute levels of income low, but the
rate of economic growth in nearly all economies in the seventies has
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been slow relative to that in many other developing countries.
Moreover, in many West African economies, growth rates have
generally been slower in the seventies than those registered by the
same countries in the preceding decade and the evidence of the
levels of economic performance achieved so far in the early eighties
points to a worsening future unless of course the crucial role of
domestic policies and regional co-operation and integration is more
fully appreciated.
As shown in Table 2A, eleven of the sixteen West African
countries fall within the World Bank's conception of 'low-income'
countries in 1981 (GNP per capita of less than $410), all of which,
except Ghana, are further classified into the World Bank's
conception of 'least developed' countries. The five remaining
countries fall within the 'middle income' range (GNP per capita of
$410 or more). Those five countries (Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Liberia,
Mauritania and Senegal) account together for 68.8 per cent of total
West African population and for 85.9 per cent of total GNPs. For
Nigeria alone these proportions are 57.1 and 72.2 per cent
respectively.
The disparity in per capita incomes between the West African
countries is such that the highest of $1,200 (Ivory Coast) is more
than six times the lowest of $190 (Guinea-Bissau and Mali). There
are only three countries (Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Liberia) with a
per capita income of more than $500. The West African average of
$685 may be compared with estimates for the same year of $12,820 in
the United States, $9,110 in the United Kingdom, $2,140 in Brazil
and $5,670 in Trinidad and Tobago. In three countries (Ghana, Niger
and Senegal) the average annual growth rate in per capita income in
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1960-80 was negative, while for the rest of the countries (except
Gambia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Togo) the rate fell well below 2
per cent.
Another important feature of West Africa's income patterns is
the high level of interpersonal inequality. Estimates of Gini
coefficients of income equal ity for five countries - Benin, 1959;
Ivory Coast, 1959 and 1970; Nigeria, 1960 and 1967; Senegal, 1960;
and Sierra Leone, 1968 - range between 0.45 and 0.60 (0.34 in
Niger). A coefficient of between 0.7 and 0.8 was estimated for
Nigeria in the mid-1970s. The share in total income of the lowest
40 per cent is estimated at 10 per cent or less in the Ivory Coast,
Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone (Rimmer, 1984, p 47). In Sierra
Leone (1967-68) the 'lowest 20 per cent' receive only 5.6 per cent
of total income compared with a share of 52.5 per cent by the
'highest 20 per cent'. These estimates may be compared with 4.5 . and
42.8 per cent in the United States (1972) and 7.3 and 39.2 per cent
in the United Kingdom (1979) (World Bank, World Development Report,
1983). What greater income inequality signifies to those countries
experiencing it may be debatable. Certainly for West Africa,
greater inequality points to marked differences in earnings between
rural and urban population and between the different sectors of the
economies, as well as to serious lapses in government fiscal and
monetary policies, all of which help to further explain the existing
production and consumption patterns in the region as a whole.
Growth rates in West Africa have deteriorated from a range of
1.1 per cent (Cape Verde) and 8.5 per cent (Togo) in 1960-70 to -0.2
per cent (Ghana) and 6.2 per cent (Ivory Coast) in 1970-81. Growth
has been particularly weak in Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
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Liberia, Mauritania and Sierra Leone, all of which recorded growth
rates of less than 3.0 per cent in the seventies. Only three
countries - Ivory Coast (6.2 per cent), Mali (4.6 per cent), and
Nigeria (4.5 per cent) - have recorded through the seventies rates
of over 4.0 per cent.
The generally slow and in many cases declining rates of growth
described above can be explained differently. Notably, the
impressive growth rate in the Ivory Coast was achieved chiefly on
the strength of its agricultural sector, while that in Nigeria is
not surprisingly a result of the boom in its oil industry. Many of
the slow growth countries have been plagued by drought of increasing
frequency and severity. In other countries such as Liberia and
Sierra Leone, growth has been inhibited by declining or stagnating
production of the principal export commodities - iron ore, rubber
and diamonds. This is also true for Ghana, once the world's largest
cocoa producer. In yet many other countries, growth has been
severely-disrupted by continuing internal conflict and political
instability.
Furthermore, West Africa's recorded slow rates of growth are of
even greater concern as account is taken of the relatively rapid
growth of population. Again only the four countries with the
highest growth rates have registered rates significantly higher than
the rate of population growth. In the rest of the countries,
population has either grown much faster than economic growth or both
rates are marginally the same (see Table 2A).
Given these trends in West Africa's overall economic
performance, certainly the structure, appropriateness and timing of
economic management policies could not'have remained neutral. In
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practice it is the nature and application of these policies in most
countries, especially in respect of resource management, that have
also accounted for the varying growth rates among them. In general,
however, the slow and declining growth rates in the region can also
be explained first, by the apparent failure of the import-
substitution industrialisation strategy through which there has been
little foreign exchange savings; second, by the superficiality of
economic plans most of which have lacked feasible projects,
supporting economic surveys, adequate inducements for private sector
investment, implementation discipline and sufficient financing; and
third, by sheer neglect of the traditional agricultural sector.
2.7 CONCLUSIONS
In general, the level of development of any region is largely a
function of the structure of its economy.	 And the level of
development itself is reflected in the structure of the economy.
West Africa, in the socio-economic sense, is typical of an
underdeveloped area, exhibiting the common characteristics of
underdevelopment. This chapter has highlighted the extent of
diversity and similarity that exist between West African countries
in these basic structural socio-economic characteristics in terms of
geo-physical conditions, natural resource endownment, political
conditions and economic performance.
These features, as already indicated, are fundamental in
explaining and understanding the need and scope for integration in
West Africa as well as the issues affecting its effectiveness.
Indeed, for the individual West African micro-state, economic
integration is now a sine qua non for improving resource
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exploitation, sectoral performance, the predominantly subsistence
economy, international relations and bargaining conditions and,
hence, for enhancing growth and development. The highly undeveloped
character of input-output relations and the evidently lacking socio-
economic complementarity within and among West African economies
provide even stronger reasons for striving towards effective
economic integration within the region.
There has, of course, been no lack of efforts or continued
interest in economic co-operation or integration among West African
countries especially after achieving political independence in the
late fifties and early sixties. In general, however, many of the
schemes are either defunct, not functioning or. barely surviving.
Many of the reasons for this can be traced from the foregoing
discussion of the main structural dispositions of the member
countries. There are two other important factors that are also
applicable to LDC economic integration in general. The first is the
fact that often the short-run effects of integration are not
favourable and the expected gains from integration may not accrue
for a long time, and in any case, these gains are generally
uncertain, difficult to quantify and sometimes less tangible than
the potential costs of integration. The second reason for the slow
progress and apparent failures of LOG economic integration is
attributed largely to the outright adoption of the conventional
integration framework, ie customs union formation. The discussion
in the next chapter illustrates and discusses these points in
relation to West African economic integration. In essence, the
chapter outlines the potential benefits of economic integration, re-
enforces the need for more effective integration among the member
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countries and, at the same time, analyses the major factors that
have severely impeded effective integration within the institutional
framework of the ECOWAS.
CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The discussion in this chapter is divided into two broad parts.
The first section looks briefly at developments in the traditional
theory of economic integration and outlines the fundamental reasons
extended for the limited practical relevance of the theory for
economic integration among developing countries. The discussions on
this issue have more recently stressed the relevance of the
'dynamic' rather than 'static' effects of economic integration in
analysing the need and potential gains of economic integration among
LOCs.
In the second section, we will firstly survey the progress of
economic integration in West Africa in relation to its institutional
build-up up to the Senegambia (1981) which represents the latest
integration grouping in the region. Secondly, and more importantly,
attention will be focussed on the progress of economic integration
within the institutional framework of ECOWAS which, agreeably, has
been very slow and substantially ineffective in realising its
objectives. The key factors that are responsible for this and which
also have immediate bearings on the future perspectives of economic
integration in the region as a whole are analysed. In this respect,
the factors stressed are the economic disparities among the ECOWAS
member states and the polarization tendencies, the high incidence of
political fragility and ambivalence, financial constraints as they
affect the members' budgetary contributions to ECOWAS, the question
whether ECOWAS can and should coexist with the three relatively more
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active sub-regional economic groupings - the CEAO, MRU and
Senegambia (see Figure 11) - and external influences.
In so far as the future of ECOWAS is concerned, the study
emphasises that this can not be improved without instituting
meaningful and realistic monetary relations among West African
countries. In dealing with this hypothesis, the discussion in this
chapter is important in two respects. Firstly, it demonstrates in
part the apparent limitations of theoretical pre-conditions in
dealing with those empirical issues requiring effective integration
in West Africa. Secondly, the factors identified as the main
constraints for economic integration are basically those factors
that have also reflected the narrow scope and equally slow progress
in monetary integration in the region and on which further
developments in monetary integration in West Africa also depend.
The problem of the co-existence between ECOWAS and other lib-
regional economic groupings, in particular the CEAO, is specifically
significant for realising the proposed institution of a single
common currency to embrace the whole of ECOWAS. This is because
within the CEAO, which comprises half of ECOWAS membership, there
already exists a common currency arrangement - the CFA franc - that
has lasted long among all its members but one - Mauritania.
3.2 THE TRADITIONAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
3.2.1 Static Effects of Economic Integration
The post-war years have been characterised by widespread
enthusiasm for the formation of economic co-operation and
integration schemes both among the developed and the developing
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countries. This enthusiasm is derived from a complex of motives and
sentiments. In Western Europe, it began with the search for
permanent peace and world order and was later transformed into the
need for the so-called 'market-integration'. This concept in itself
is considered wide and complex but the main emphasis as is derived
from the Treaty of Rome has been the establishment of supranational
organisations for the creation of a common market within the
European Economic Community (EEC). Integration according to this
broad objective distinguishes five consecutive stages - the free
trade area (ETA), the customs union (CU), the common market (CM),
economic union (EU) and total economic integration (TEL) (Balassa,
1976).
In the Eastern bloc, the formation of the CMEA (Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance) in 1949, within which 'socialist
integration' is conceptualised, was not in the beginning considered
as a process of economic integration. As Simai and Garam (1977)
have observed, the CMEA in its initial objectives served as an
instrument for promoting economic co-operation among its members but
purely as a defence function against trade embargo policies existing
at the time. The formation of the CMEA, instead, came mainly as a
reaction of the East European countries to the Marshall Plan and to
the policies of the United States at the time, thus stressing
political elements in CMEA integration. However, since the late
sixties and early seventies (the period when the word integration
was began to be used in official CMEA documents) socialist
integration has set itself the aim of 'achieving rapid economic,
scientific and technical progress in all members and of raising the
material and cultural standards of their peoples through deep
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structural changes in the economy in accordance with the objective
requirements of scientific and technical progress' (Ezenwe, 1983, p
42).
In LDCs also, historic, socio-political and economic
considerations have combined to explain the enthusiasm for economic
integration among them, designed initially in the hope of achieving
satisfactory and lasting solutions to their trade problems. Thus,
in the early postwar period, economic integration among developing
countries was considered primarily as a way of extending the policy
of import-substitution on a regional scale. In more recent years,
the urge for a broader conceptualisation of 'development
integration! for LDCs has been strengthened by the serious
limitations of the import-substitution policy itself and the multi-
dimensional pattern of the development constraints in LDCs.
Consequently, economic integration among LDCs is considered as one
of the policy options available to them and as part of an overall
strategy for economic development.
Politics, economic folklore and misconceptions account for some
of the rising enthusiasm for integration (Robson, 1971, p 9).
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that a properly conceived
economic integration scheme provides a number of potential
beneficial consequences, which are discussed in the literature under
two headings: static effects and dynamic effects. Static effects
refer to the welfare gains or losses from a marginal reallocation of
production and consumption patterns, under given assumptions - eg
economies of scale are disregarded; the terms of trade are constant;
prices adequately reflect opportunity costs; and trade is balanced.
On the other hand, dynamic effects refer to the various possible
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ways in which integration affects the rate of growth of GNP of
participating countries. A comparative schema of both types of
considerations is presented in Table 3A.
The primary concern of the traditional theory of economic
integration as been to evaluate the desirability of customs unions
from the world's welfare viewpoint and using static effects as
criteria (Yu-Min Chou, 1967, p 19).
Under given assumptions, the normative implications of the
pioneer work of Viner (1950) distinguish between two effects of a
customs union: trade creation and trade diversion. In this limiting
case, Viner uses the term trade creation to describe a shift of
production from the dearer to a cheaper source, whereas trade
diversion involves a shift from the lower cost producer outside the
union to a higher cost source to supply within it. He points out
that trade creation raises the home country's welfare, while trade
diversion lowers it so that if on balance the trade creation effect
is predominant, there is an increase in efficiency in the sense that
through the geographical reallocation of production, more can be
produced from given resources. In other words, as Spraos (1964)
interprets the concepts, trade creation means that the same world
output of a community can be obtained for a smaller sacrifice of
alternatives whereas in trade diversion the same output can only be
obtained at the cost of a longer sacrifice of alternatives. Viner
suggests that a customs union formation should be judged to have a
'good welfare effect' or 'bad welfare effect' according to which
effect is predominant and concludes that a predominantly trade
creating customs union benefits at least one member country and the
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world as a whole, while a trade diverting union injures at least one
member country and the world at large.
Thus in its simplest form the Vinerian analysis leads to the
important conclusion that a customs union raises the world's welfare
if its trade creation effect outweighs its trade diversion effect.
Therefore to predict the welfare effects of a customs union, it is
necessary to determine the relative strengths of the forces
influencing trade creation and trade diversion. The analysis
further implies that trade creation, from the point of view of free
trade, is a move in the right direction whilst trade diversion is a
move in the wrong direction. The former occurs when the constituent
economies are competitive in products, rather than complementary,
prior to the formation of a customs union.
Viner's basic conclusions have been commented on by later
writers. Meade (1956) suggested that the trade creation and trade
diversion effects should not be measured in terms of the size of
trade diverted only. A better method, according to Meade, would be
to compare the product of trade diverted multiplied by the rise in
its cost, and the product of trade created multiplied by the fall in
its cost.
Viner's confinement to production effects - assuming demand
curves of zero elasticity and supply curves of infinite elasticity -
was commented on by Gehrels (1956). He introduced the consumption
effects of a customs union as 'the response of consumers to the drop
in import prices caused by the tariff removal (p 61). Gehrels
conceived of positive consumption effects only which should be added
to trade creation effects in evaluating the gains or losses of a
customs union.
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Table 3A Schema of Static and Dynamic Considerations for Economic
Integration
Static_____
	 Economic	 Dynamic
Considerations 
	 Integration Scheme —) Considerations
High Level of
	
Increased Economic
	
Planned Dissimilarities
Pre-integration
	
Bargaining Power
	
(Potential Gains from
Trade
	
Specialisation)
Existence of High
Pre-integration
Tariffs
Good Transport and
Communications
Network
Need for Communication
and Transport Links
Increased Intra-Area
Trade (Eliminate
Smuggling) Establish
Standard Measures and
Uniform Grading
High Per Capita Income,	 Increased Purchasing
Capital Formation,	 Power Density
Purchasing Power
Density
Dissimilarities -	 High Rate of Capital
Relate to Developed
	
Formation Due to
Economies - Countries
	
Increased Net-savings
Already Specialised -	 and Local and Foreign
No Gains from
	
Investments
Integration
Increased Production in
Domestic and Export
Sectors and Increased
Consumption
Expand Employment
Opportunities
Economic Growth and
Development
Source: Kanu, S M B, 'Economic Integration and Development in West
Africa', unpublished PhD dissertation, University of
Reading, 1976, p 36
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Lipsey's (1956, p 211) basic criticism of the Vinerian analysis
also stressed the important omission of the consumption effect but,
unlike Gehrels, he suggested that 'in general, the consumption
effect, like the production effect, can work either to raise or to
lower welfare'. Lipsey (1957 and 1960) demonstrated further that
national and even world welfare may be improved by a trade diverting
customs union if a favourable consumption effect outweighs an
unfavourable production effect. He argues that this criticism of
Viner is valid not only because union members are going to increase
the total consumption of intra-union goods through mutual trade
while reducing their consumption of extra-union goods but, also,
because Viner's analysis assumes that commodities are consumed in
some fixed proportions without reference to changes in relative
prices. Since a customs union changes relative prices, this should
lead to some substitution between commodities that would tend to
increase the volume of intra-un ion imports and diminish both the
volume of imports obtained from third countries and the consumption
of an individual member country's home produced commodities.
Scitovsky (1958) on the other hand considered such effects as
increased competition, economies of scale, change in the volume and
location of investment, and terms of trade.
The full schema of static effects which emerge from these
elaborations of the traditional integration theory is as follows:
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i
Trade	 Consumption and
Creation —4Production
A	 Inter-Country Substitution
Trade	 Consumption and
-- Diversion I—) Production
Consumption
B	 Inter-Commodity Substitution	 _____> and
Production
C	 Terms of trade changes with the rest of the world.
The justification for this schema is argued on the basis that
consumption effects will themselves cause changes in production. In
general, either of these effects (inter-country and inter-commodity
substitution) will cause shifts in both consumption and production.
The emphasis on the static effects in the traditional theory of
economic integration is considered inevitable on two counts. The
first is that it is consistent with the static approach in
international trade theory whereby economic integration is conceived
as 'that branch of tariff theory that deals with the effects of
geographically discriminatory changes in trade barriers' (Lipsey,
1960, p 261). Secondly, and more significant, it is consistent with
the relative importance of adjustments likely to occur once a group
of developed countries decide to integrate. Furthermore, as Balassa
(1965, p 16) explains, the theoretical literature of economic
integration has dealt almost exclusively with customs unions of
industrial economies, where the problem has not primarily been one
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of economic development but of relatively marginal adjustments in
production and consumption patterns. However, in view of the
structural characteristics of LDCs as were outlined earlier in the
case of West Africa, their patterns of production and consumption
are such that substantial adjustments and rationalisations are
required in them for the furthering of development and regional
integration. It is basically in this respect that the traditional
theory is rendered less relevant for LDC economic integration.
3.2.2 Dynamic Effects of Economic Integration
Most of the writers who have considered the problems of
development in LDCs and therefore the potential role of economic
integration in solving these problems have strongly indicated the
limited relevance of the traditional theory on this front (see for
instance Meir, 1960; Allen, 1961; Seers, 1965; Cooper and Massell,
1965; Myint, 1965; Balassa, 1965 and Jaber, 1971). They have
pointed out several arguments in support of this view and which
Jaber (1971, p 256) has summarised as follows:
First, economic integration in the case of LDCs should be
treated as an approach to economic development rather than as a
tariff issue. Accordingly, it combines various aspects which could
improve the international trade position as well as the level of
economic development of LDCs.
Second, the emphasis should be put on dynamic rather than
static effects in evaluating the desirability of economic
integration among LDCs. The present economic structure is not
acceptable and each LDC is trying individually to introduce positive
changes. These changes are not marginal but structural. Their net
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effect will not be felt over a short period of time. Accordingly,
any evaluation of economic integration schemes should concentrate on
potential or dynamic effects, such as:
(a) the economies of scale brought about by the enlargement of
the market size;
(b) the external economies which reduce costs;
(c) the polarisation effect which refers to the cummulative
worsening of the economic position of a member state of
some regions in the integrated area due to concentrated
trade creation or attractiveness of production factors;
(d) the effect on investment allocation; and
(e) the effect on economic efficiency and smoothness of trade
transactions due to the changes in the degree of
competition and in uncertainty and unilaterality of trade
policies of member states.
There are understandably minor variations among the writers on
the extent to which these arguments can be carried through in
support of LOC integration without worsening world welfare.
However, the general reformulation and extension which they have
suggested for the standard theory for LDCs rests on three strands of
thought: first, that customs union theory should contribute to a
more equitable distribution of income; second, that trade diversion
might be inevitable in a developing country; and third, that the
standard theory must incorporate dynamic aspects.
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The necessity of these conclusions is explained in several
ways.	 Firstly, Viner considers trade diversion a negative
production effect which necessarily reduces welfare. The
limitations of this effect appear once the existing economic
structure of LDCs is considered and in a dynamic setting.
In the first place many writers have argued that trade
diversion is basically taking place in LDCs through the import-
substitution industrialisation strategy. The choice then is between
trade diversion . in favour of the domestic producer at any cost and
trade diversion in favour of the most efficient producer in the
region. In general, however, there seems little doubt that a
pattern of industrialisation that is based on greater specialisation
within the region will be more economically rewarding than one based
on production by each country for its own domestic market,
especially for the smaller countries (Mikesell, 1963).
Another version of this argument is that the rate of growth of
domestic demand for small LDCs individually does not readily assume
optimum capacity of output or, indeed, allow for a large volume of
quantity demanded which would enable domestic firms to achieve real
cost reductions over a reasonable time period. Thus economic
integration among LDCs would therefore make this process of trade
diversion more efficient in terms of reducing real costs over a
shorter period (Bhambri, 1962, p 245).
Secondly, in most LOCs there exists a situation of generally
low productivity, and in some sectors marginal productivity might
approach zero. Also, unemployment is not uncommon. If trade
diversion moves labour from low productivity to more productive
activities, it will bring about a welfare gain. The evaluation of
80
integration among LDCs should not therefore be confined to
production and consumption effects; income and unemployment effects
are equally important.
Thirdly, when imports of most LDCs are disaggregated, trade
diversion appears to occur only in non-durable, and to a less extent
in durable, manufactured consumer goods. In a static situation, no
trade diversion or creation is likely to occur in their imports of
capital goods which in most cases represent a very significant
proportion of total imports. In a dynamic situation, it is argued
that a higher rate of growth conceived by an economic integration
scheme would require a larger investment. Since a large portion of
this investment is imported as capital goods, the level of imports
of integrated LOCs might then increase. In any case, the long run
impact of a regional trading arrangement is not to decrease trade
with the rest of the world at any cost but rather to rationalise and
change its pattern and then enlarge it.
However, some writers (see for example Bhambri, 1962, and
Linder, 1967, p 127) have argued more specifically that economic
integration among LDCs should aim at trade diversion from the
developed countries. Hence, the effectiveness of such economic
integration then is to be indicated by the success of such trade
diversion process.
Finally, trade creation, like trade diversion, should be looked
at in dynamic terms. The dynamic trade-creating effect results from
the increase in income of the integrated area and through the
foreign trade multiplier. It is argued that this effect would be
large enough to outweigh the dynamic trade diversion effect of
economic integration among LDCs. Kitamura (1966, p 53) states,
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'The income effects, so far as trade with the outside
world is concerned, will clearly tend to increase
considerably the scope for beneficial exchange of goods
with third countries, and this secondary trade expansion
may very well more than offset the possible initial
reduction of this particular type of trade'.
While recognising the limited relevance of the traditional
theory to LDCs, it has also been argued that the theory has made
some generalisations, albeit in judging the desirability of economic
integration in developed countries, which can apply to LOCs as well
(see for instance Allen, 1961). Viner, for instance, has raised the
issue of competitiveness and complementarity in product markets and
has suggested that the more the partners are competitive
(complementary) in the sense of producing similar (dissimilar)
products, the more (less) favourable economic integration would be.
Makower and Morton (1953, p 35) added that with larger cost
differences among partners the gain from economic integration would
also be larger.
The traditional theory has also held that, in general, the
larger the size of the customs union, the larger the gains in
welfare; inadequate transport facilities tend to limit the gain from
economic integration among LDCs; the higher the initial tariff rates
and the lower the common external tariff, the larger the welfare
gain of economic integration; a customs union is more likely to
raise welfare the higher is the proportion of intra-union trade and
the lower the proportion of extra-union trade; and a customs union
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is more likely to raise welfare the lower is the volume of foreign
trade as a percentage of GNP of member countries.
As in the case of the production effects, the relative validity
or reality of these generalisations for LDCs has also been discussed
in the light of the existing economic features of LDCs. For
example, being specialised in primary products, LDCs tend to be more
competitive in the Vinerian sense. Nevertheless, this general state
of competitiveness, on balance, limits the welfare gain of economic
integration among them. The fact is that most LDC primary products
are export-oriented, consequently economic integration among them,
in these circumstances, would not bring about a sizeable expansion
of their intra-group trade. Clearly the criterion of
competitiveness and complementarity can not particularly be relevant
to LDCs unless it is given a different conception as in the case of
the trade diversion effect. Moreover, where GNP is taken as a
measure of the size of a union to determine the size of the welfare
gain, the implication is that the gain from integration among LOCs
is small or even negligible. Such gain depends not only on the
given size of the union but also on the rate at which it increases.
There is sufficient empirical evidence to show that mutual trade
among LDCs is small and rarely growing. The obvious implication is
that welfare gains from static effects will be small in their
economic integration process. While the implications of some of
these generalisations may appear plausible in the static case, some
may not be accepted at face value. Perhaps the more critical
implication of these generalisations is that the 'possibility of a
universal theory of customs unions and economic development is
automatically ruled out' (Linder, 1967, p 32). Consequently some
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writers have suggested a specific approach to deal with economic
integration of LDCs which, in essence, accepts industrialisation as
a legitimate policy goal and considers how membership in a customs
union may enable a developing country to achieve more economically
the ends served by protection (see for example Cooper and Masse]],
1965, p 462).
Robson (1983) has observed that there is also no automatic case
for economic integration among a purely random group of LDCs nor is
there a generalised path or concept of the type of integration
process these countries must follow. Nevertheless, the general
conclusion is that integration among LDCs must integrate both the
static and dynamic considerations if it is to address itself to the
multidimensional problems of the member countries' development
efforts. Both these considerations and problems are better
understood only if full recognition is taken of the several and
varied issues and structural features which characterise the
integrating countries and which also pose the most serious
constraint to the progress of co-operation and integration among
them.
To the extent that the problems of integration are related more
to their causality than their symptoms, the principal issues that
become more apparent in evaluating its progress among LOCs therefore
include the following:
(a) the incompatibility of political systems with integration
in general or with the machinery selected for implementing
integration;
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(b) problems of political relations between integrating
countries, frequently with territorial implications (ie
geopolitical problems);
(c) differences among member countries in the level of
industrial development achieved and in their potentials or
capacity for such development - the main expression of
which is the dissatisfaction of some members with the
distribution of benefits and costs of integration;
(d) other differences in economic structures which affect the
machinery and therefore the objectives of integration;
(e) the difficulty in determining an appropriate scope and
direction of regional trade, development and
specialisation in operational terms;*
(f) the lack of a clear vision of the implications for
integration of the growth and operations of foreign
enterprises on the pattern of regional trade and
productivity.
Accordingly, some writers like Andic, Andic and Dosser (1971),
for example, have added a new composite evaluation criterion -
development creation - and significantly generalise the minimum
structure of standard stages of economic integration into a
multiplicity of different arrangements involving preferential
tariffs product by product or country by country both within the
grouping and towards outside countries.
While the combination of static and dynamic considerations may
have provided the urge and setting for the formation of general
economic groupings among LDCs, in practice the experiences of most
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of the major groupings that have emerged (see Table 3B) have been
very disappointing. The constraints are generally common to all
although in some instances the relative importance of each
constraint has varied between groupings. For example, the reasons
for the final collapse of the East African Community in 1977 were
mainly the product of polarisation effects as Tanzania and Uganda
equally resented the skewed distribution of trade,
industrialisation, services and other integration benefits in favour
of Kenya, the most developed and industrialised member of the
Community. The experiences of the Andea, CARICOM, CACM and LAFTA
have indicated the critical importance of such issues as
incomprehensiveness and the lack of clarity and precision in legal
provisions dealing with aspects of community justice, defence,
supranationality, infrastructures, distribution of gains and costs
as well as the problem of trying to sustain enthusiasm for
integration. In the Andean, these issues precipitated the 1974/76
crisis and also led to Chile's withdrawal from the grouping in 1976
(Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979).
After ten years of its existence, many of these and other
obstacles that have tended to impede the progress of economic
integration in other Third World groupings have already begun to
surface in the ECO WAS. No doubt, important lessons can be drawn
from the experiences of these groupings. For the rest of this
chapter we will examine the performance and problems of economic
integration in West Africa.
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Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger,
Senegal, Burkina
People's Republic of
Congo, Cameroon, Gabon,
Central African Republic,
Equatorial Guinea (1983)
(Chad withdrew in 1968
but was readmitted in
1983)
Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Mexico, Paraguay, Bolivia
Uruguay, Columiba, Peru,
Eduador, Venezuela,
Guatemala, Honduras,
Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
El Salvador
Iraq, Jordan, Syria,
United Arab Republic
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
Singapore, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Indonesia,
Thailand
Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Guyana, Barbados,
Belize, St Lucia, St
Vincent, Grenada, St
Kitts-Nevis, Dominica,
Antingua, Montserrat
Chile, Columbia, Peru,
Venezuela, Ecuador,
Bolivia
Table 38 Major Economic Groupings Among Developing Countries
Year of
Formation
	
Grouping
	
Membership
1959	 West African Customs Union (UDEAO)
replaced in 1972 by the West
African Economic Community (CEAO)
under the Treaty of Abidjan
Equatorial African Customs Union
(replaced in 1964 by the Central
African Customs and Economic
Union UDEAC)
1960 Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) - established
under the Treaty of Montevideo)
Central American Common Market
(CACM-established under the
Managua Treaty)
1964	 Arab Common. Market - established
under the Council of Arab Economic
Unity (CAEU)
1967	 East African Community (EAC -
created under the Treaty for East
African Co-operation but was
dissolved in July 1977)
Association of South-East Asian
Nations (ASEAN)
1968	 Caribbean Free Trade Association
(CARIFTA - became the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) in 1973)
1969 Andean Common Market or Andean
Group (set under the Andean Pact;
also known as the Cartagena
Agreement)
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Table 38 continued	 Major Economic Groupings Among Developing
Countries
1975	 Economic Community of West African Benin, Cape Verde, Sierra
States (ECOWAS - established under Leone, The Gambia, Ghana,
The Treaty of Lagos)	 Guinea-Bissau, Senegal,
Guinea, Mauritania, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Burkina,
Togo, Ivory Coast,
Liberia
1983 Economic Community of the States
of Central Africa (ECSCA)
Angla, Burundi, Cameroon
Central African Republic,
Chad, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome,
and Principe, and Zaire
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3.3 THE EMERGENCE OF ECONOMIC GROUPINGS IN WEST AFRICA
3.3.1 Sub-regional Groupings
As already noted, several efforts have been made on economic
co-operation in West Africa during the post-independence years,
especially by the francophone countries (see Table 3C). However,
apart from the ECOWAS and its Clearing House (WACH), the Mano River
Union, Senegambia, and the exclusively francophone CEAO, most of the
schemes that have emerged are either defunct or barely functioning.
Also, excluding the above schemes, the rest of those that are
marginally operating either reflect simple primary commodity
arrangements or are based on the implementation of specified
projects and cannot therefore be strictly defined as economic
integration arrangements. Besides, other groupings like the CPA
(Cocoa Producers Alliance), APC (African Groundnut (Peanut) Council,
and the IACO (Inter-African Coffee Council) are extra-regional in
that membership in them by West African countries is shared with
outside countries, especially in Africa.
The most significant feature of West African economic
integration (critically the most important threat to ECOWAS) is that
much of the efforts towards integration have come from among the
francophone countries. Of the fifteen groupings listed in Table 3C,
combined francophone and anglophone membership is in no more than
seven (three of which are project-related and are also in a state of
paralysis), the rest are exclusively francophones. Although some of
these all-francophone schemes have ceased operating, eg the UDAO and
UDEAO, or are hardly operational, eg Entente, the evidence is that
francophone West Africa has advanced much faster in economic
integration than anglophone West Africa.
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This skewed pattern of economic integration in West AFrica has
been historically explained on two grounds. It was partly because
the francophones, unlike the anglophones, had the advantage of
geographical contiguity (see Figure 2.1). But a more important
explanation has been that the French Union, of which French West
Africa was a part, was (and still is) more closely knit politically
and economically than the British empire to which the British West
African countries belonged. Indeed both the French West Africa
(AOF) and British West Africa (BWA) had similar institutional
arrangements commonly shared among the respective colonies - eg
common currency, transport, trade, production, defence and other
services - but not in the method of political administration by and
over the constituent colonies.
Significantly, the AOF had a 'government-general' that was
based in Senegal to administer over the territories and its common
currency and customs arrangements have survived. Moreover, it is
generally believed that most of the francophone economic
integration efforts even after independence have been largely at the
instance of France's continued interest in strengthening the French
Union. By contrast, after independence, the common institutional
arrangements among the BWA countries - eg the West African pound,
West African Airways Corporation and West Africa Cocoa Research
Institute - were dissolved and each country established its own
institutions. Certainly for these countries, political and/or
economic integration has been overshadowed by the stronger urge to
maintain and sustain national sovereignty at all cost.
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Of course, some writers have however argued strongly that unity
(or integration) under such colonial groupings as the AOF and BWA
was illusory and therefore operationally disintegrating for West
Africa, so that strong foundations were not laid for the enhancement
of a deeper need and sense of economic integration in West Africa
after independence. Hazlewood (1967, p 3) argues that the unity
under these institutions was for 'the administrative convenience of
the colonial power - a unity of Europe in Africa, reflecting the
hegemony of the metropolitan country over its various colonies. It
was not to be expected that, with the removal of Europe from the
scene, the unity would necessarily continue'. Ezenwe (1983, p 6) on
the other hand, maintains that even in the case of French West
Africa, the sequence of measures introduced by France long before
independence to support the French Union - eg the Assemblies (1952),
the loi-cadre (1956); territorial distribution of power (1956) and
the alternative choices open to the colonies in the 1958 French
Constitution - complete independence, independence within the French
Community or absorption as a 'Department of France' (1958) - had a
destructive effect on the integration that had been established
between the French colonies.
This factor apart, West Africa as a geopolitical expression
presents a formidable challenge to received integration theory and
practice.	 Despite the dynamic conceptualisation of economic
integration, free-trade-area, customs-union and common-market
objectives have characterised both the sub-regional groupings and
the ECOWAS, and it is in the areas of implementation of these
objectives that little success has been achieved.
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The first customs union of West African states (Union Douaniere
de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (UDAO) failed because of over-ambitious
goals, inflexible provisions and a complex and dilatory machinery,
especially in the system of revenue collection and fiscal
harmonisation. Similarly, the failure of the second West African
customs union (Union Douaniere des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest or
UDEAO) which replaced the UDAO in 1966 was attributed largely to the
lack of compliance by the member countries (faced for the most part
with serious budgetary problems) with the so-called three principles
of the Union - free exchange of goods and persons between member
states, the establishment of a common external customs tariff, and
the sharing of customs receipts amongst all member states (see for
instance, Ezenwe, 1983 and African Research Bulletin, 2347A). In
the CEAO, the replacement for the defunct UDEAO in June 1972, the
establishment of a common external tariff intended for 1985 is still
to be achieved, while in the MRU, there has been little progress in
implementing the union's two phased customs union programmes.
In the CEAO, however, there has been mutual agreement to
simplify and harmonise the structure of customs duties and other
indirect taxes. Fiscal compensation in the CEA° is payable to
member states in respect of the revenue losses deemed to be incurred
as a result of the provision of intra-CEAO preferences under the
regional co-operation tax (Taxe de Cooperation Regionale - TCR) for
traded manufacturers of 'local origin' (the expression 'goods of
local origin' is intepreted variously but with emphasis on the
source of the traded commodity as well as on the proportionate share
of domestic/indigenous input content on its manufacture. For a more
detailed description, see for example, Mano River Union Commission
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on Industry and Trade, July 1976). These losses are defined as the
difference between the duties that would be imposed on a product
imported from a third country not subject to the droit de douane and
the duties imposed under the TCR regime. The driot de douane is a
relatively small component - presently 5 per cent - of the aggregate
fiscal import duties charged by the CEA° member states. The
required interbudgetary transfers are affected through the Community
Development Fund (FCD). But the common industrial policy, intended
to have been established within three years of the CEAO's creation,
is also yet to be realised.
During its first ten years of existence, the MRU, in contrast
to the CEAO, has nonetheless taken more significant strides in
infrastructural build-up between its member states. These include;
in the transport and communications - the Union Bridge between
Liberia and Sierra Leone was commissioned in 1976; in trade - the
adoption of harmonised customs and excise legislation,
administration and procedures in 1981; in project and industrial
development - the implementation of feasibility studies for a Union
Basin Development Project and for the establishment of an industrial
development unit; and in manpower training - the establishment of
Union training institutions on maritime, telecommunications and
postal services, customs, forestry, excise and trade statistics.
Unlike the CEAO, the MRU does not possess a common monetary
system as each member country operates its currency and monetary
arrangements without sub-regional co-ordination. The CEA() on the
other hand has had the advantage of entrenching the already existing
CFA franc common currency system within its operations although this
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system also has hardly enhanced the process of economic integration
among its members.
More specifically, progress of integration within the MRU and
the CEA() has been constrained by issues of disparate political and
socio-economic positions as well as by the suspected unfair
distribution of integration costs and benefits, especially in terms
of the flow of mutual trade.
In most cases, suppressed socio-political differences and the
increasing level of disparate national economic development and
interests between member states, as their respective domestic
economic social, and political problems escalate, have given rise to
open inter-state conflicts. In the MRU, this situation has resulted
to frequent border closures and, in one instance, to the temporary
. suspension (le immediately after the military take-over in Liberia
•in 1980) of Union activities. 	 With military regimes (still
relatively unsettled) in Guinea and Liberia and a constitutional
government in Sierra Leone, the political life of the MRU depends
essentially on the level of co-existence, balance and understanding
between the ideologies and operational framework of these different
leadership structures. The recurring political discord, especially
between Sierra Leone and Liberia, has severely strained the
ratification and implementation of MRU Protocols and Decisions,
while budgetary contributions to the Union Secretariat are
increasingly short and have lagged far behind the due dates. For
instance, by the end of 1985, budgetary arrears in the MRU had stood
at around $7.25 million (ie Guinea, $4 million; Sierra Leone, $2
million; and Liberia, $1.25 million).
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In the CEAO, despite its intentions to promote economic co-
operation and development among its member states on a rather more
cautious, equitable and balanced basis (Treaty of Abidjan, 1973)
than its preceding groupings, integration efforts are more seriously
impaired by the inherent conflict of interests between its
relatively more developed coastal countries (ie Senegal and Ivory
Coast) and the less developed, semi-desert landlocked members. As
is illustrated elsewhere in the study, trade between these two
groups of countries is evidently skewed, with the smaller states
resenting Ivory Coast and Senegal's political and economic
dominance. In the defunct UDEAO, for instance, Ivory Coast was
accused of exporting predominantly manufactures to the smaller
states while importing mainly raw materials and animal products from
them, thereby making its industrial and manufacturing base much
stronger at the expense of the other members.
Integration efforts between The Gambia and Senegal were urged
as far back as the 1960s mainly on the grounds that geographically
The Gambia, wholly surrounded by Senegal, except on its seaward
margin, cuts an 'irrational intrusion' in Senegalese territory,
which provides a significant outlet for a high incidence of
smuggling and other illegal exchange and trade practices. It was
argued further that for both countries, the geographical intrusion
had meant the inability to exploit more fully the agricultural, port
and ancillary facilities of the Gambia River. Before the
Confederation in 1981, (which recreated what was Senegambia, 1765-
83), several co-operation agreements had been signed between the two
countries following a UN Report in 1964. These included a Defence
Pact (1964), Cultural Agreement (1967), a trade agreement (1970),
96
and a Convention (1976) on which the Gambia River Development
Organisation (OMVG) was established in 1978.
However, unlike other West African economic groupings, the
Senegambia was created purely on military rather than economic
expediency, following Senegal's military intervention in the take-
over attempt in The Gambia. Consequently, the economic
conceptualisation of the Senegambia is still undefined as both
member countries have indicated different forms of economic
integration for Senegambia. The Gambia supports a confederation
without loss of any form of sovereignty, while Senegal has opted for
a move towards an integrated state and a new country - Senegambia
(West Africa, 24 August 1981). For now, the smouldering fear is
that once the dust (ie military expediency) finally settles, The
Gambia may wish to reassert its political sovereignty, thereby
bringing the grouping to a premature end.
As far as the monetary integration aspect of Senegambia is
concerned, there is still an'element of uncertainty as to the
adoption of the proposed monetary union. Meanwhile three
alternatives are available. Firstly, The Gambia could maintain the
dalasi freely convertible into the CFA franc (which circulates
widely in The Gambia already) at an irrevocably fixed rate.
Secondly, Senegal may withdraw from the CFA zone and then re-enter,
together with Gambia, as Senegambia. In the process, the dalasi
would be replaced by the CFA franc or a new Senegambia currency.
Thirdly, The Gambia would enter the CFA franc zone as a full member.
The adoption of either options has implications for The Gambia in
respect of its sterling relationship, while for Senegal, the
implications are for its membership in the CFA franc zone.
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Certainly the infusion of the dalasi into the CFA franc system by
any means seems more logical and practical, although where this is
achieved, it will further strengthen the influence of the
francophones in determining the course of monetary unification for
ECOWAS. In the event the two states continue to exist autonomously
within Senegambia, it is apparent that Senegal's relatively more
developed and export-oriented industrial sector would threaten the
sustenance of the confederation through marked polarization effects.
Although the achievements of these three sub-regional economic
groupings from the point of view of their stated objectives may not
have been encouraging, yet their continued existence as rival
integration schemes, poses the biggest potential danger facing
ECOWAS and therefore needs priority attention.
3.3.2 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
3.3.2.1	 The Lagos Treaty and Aims of ECOWAS 
The inception of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) on 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria, came after many years of
hestitation, vacillation and politicking that lasted over a decade
(see Table 30). Despite continued support from the United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) - through Resolutions 132 (8)
and 145 (7) passed at the Seventh Session, Nairobi, 1965, and
thereafter, a series of organised research and conferences on
economic integration in West Africa - the transition towards ECOWAS
was marred firstly, by the 'great Francophone-Anglophone divide' in
West Africa; and secondly, by a long impasse (1968-72) which
resulted from a series of internal political unrests in some of the
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more active countries, especially Nigeria (see Chapter 2, especially
Section 2.4).
Finally, a 'shuttle diplomacy' by Nigeria and Togo and the
adoption of the Nigeria-Togo WAEC (West African Economic Community)
proposals in 1973 by the first ministerial meeting to comprise all
but one (Cape Verde) of the sixteen West African countries led to
the birth of ECOWAS in 1975. A draft ECOWAS Treaty in line with the
WAEC objectives was drawn in 1974, adopted by a Ministerial Council
in January 1975, and was signed and ratified by a Lagos Summit (May
1975) represented by eleven countries. By the end of 1975, the
Treaty was ratified by fifteen member countries, and Cape verde
adhered soon after.
In broad terms, the Lagos Treaty committed the sixteen ECOWAS
member states to the gradual elimination of customs duties and,
quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade; the
establishment of common customs tariff, free movement of persons,
labour and capital; and the harmonisation of agricultural,
industrial, fiscal, monetary and overall economic policies.
Specifically in Article 2(1) of the Treaty the member states
aspire:
1 ...	 to promote co-operation and development in all
fields of economic activity, particularly in all fields
,
of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy,
agriculture, natural sciences, commerce, monetary and
financial questions and in social and cultural matters
for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its
peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic
stability, of fostering closer relations among its
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members and of contributing to progress and development
of the African continent.'
To this end the Treaty further provides that the Community
shall, by stages ensure:
(a) the elimination as between the member states of customs
duties and other charges of equivalent effect in respect
of the importation and exportation of goods;
(b) the abolition of quantitative and administrative
restrictions on trade among member states;
(c) the establishment of a common customs tariff and a common
commercial policy towards third countries;
(d) the abolition as between member states of the obstacles
to the free movement of persons, services and capital;
(e) the harmonisation of the agricultural policies and the
promotion of common project in the member states, notably
in the fields of marketing, research and agro-industrial
enterprise;
(f) the implementation of schemes for the joint development of
transport, communication, energy and other infrastructural
facilities as well as the evolution of a common policy in
these fields;
(g) the harmonisation of the economic and industrial policies
of the member states and the elimination of disparities in
the level of development of member states;
(h) the harmonisation, required for the proper functioning of
the Community, of the monetary policies of the member
states;
100
Table 30 Genesis of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
Date
	
Meeting	 Main Features of Meeting
November 1963
	 Lagos Conference on
Industrial Co
-ordination in West
Africa
January 1964
	 Inaugural Speech by
	
Introduced idea of Free
President William	 Trade Area in West
Tubmian, Liberia	 Africa
August 1964
	 Meeting between Ivory Issued Communique
Coast, Sierra Leone 	 supporting President
and Liberia in	 Tubman's proposals
Monrovia
October 1964
	 Bamako Conference on 	 ECA/FAO sponsored meeting on
Co-ordination of	 regional industrial location.
Industry Proposed the establishment of
a multilateral Iron and Steel
industry
February 1965
	 Interim Committee of Agreement for creation of an
Ministers	 interim organisation for
Economic Co-operation; signed
in Freetown in May, Interim
Secretariat established in
Monrovia in Sept; Mr Donald
George (Sierra Leone) as
Admin Sec
August 1965
	 Interim Committee of
	
Discussion of issues relating
Experts
	
to co-ordination of
industries
October 1966 ECA/West African	 Discussion on regional
states meeting in 	 economic integration; first
Niger	 anglophone-francophone
meeting comprising all West
African states except Cape
Verde and Guinea-Bissau;
recommended multinational
programme for development of
power supplies
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November 1967
	
1st meeting of
Interim Council of
Ministers in Senegal
April 1968
	
Monrovia Conference
of West African Heads
April 1972
	
Nigeria-Togo Heads
of State meeting
December 1973
	
First Ministerial
meeting in Lome, Togo
Table 30 Genesis of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) continued
Date
	
Meeting
	
Main Features of Meeting
April-May 1967 2nd ECA/West Africa
meeting in Ghana
Articles of Association or
co-ordination and harmonis-
ation of macro-economic
policies and on intra-
regional trade expansion
drawn; Interim Council of
Ministers established with
temporary secretariat in
Ghana
,
Preference expressed for a
West African Common Market
rather than free trade over
a customs union
Attended by 9 of the 14
states, (Gambia, Ghana, Mali,
Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania,
Nigeria, Senegal, Burkina
Fasso); adopted protocol
establishing a West African
regional grouping; commission
-ed preparation of draft
treaty (Liberia and Senegal)
and list of priority studies
(Nigeria and Guinea)
Revived discussions on
details of a WAEC
Attended by all West African
except Cape Verde. Adoption
of the Nigeria-Togo proposals
1 Community institutions
2 States in co-operation on
trade, customs,
immigration, monetary and
financial arrangements
a A preparatory stage - 2yrs
b elimination of tariff and
fiscal charges - next 8yrs
c Setting up a CET - next
5yrs
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Accra Meeting of
Experts and Jurists
Second Ministerial
meeting in Monrovia
Liberia
Lagos Summit of Heads
of State and
Government
May 1975
February 1974
January 1975
Table 3D Genesis of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) continued
Date
	
Meeting
	
Main Features of Meeting
3 Industrial harmonisation
4 Natural resources
5 Intra-West African
payments arrangements
6 Infra-structural links -
transport and
communications
7 Mechanism for settlement
of disputes
November 1976 Lome Heads of State
Summit
Draft Treaty of ECOWAS drawn
Adoption of Draft Treaty
Treaty was signed and ECOWAS
launched; by December all
15 signatures had ratified
the Treaty and Cape Verde
adhered in 1977
Five protocols signed;
Nigeria chosen as ECOWAS
Secretariat; Ivorian as 1st
Secretary General; Niger
chosen as Secretariat for
ECOWAS Fund for Co-operation,
Development and Compensation
Note:
	
For more details please see Onwuka (1977); Africa Research 
Bulletin and West Africa, (various issues, 1966-77)
103
(i) the establishment of a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation
and Development; and
(j) such other activities calculated to further the aims of
the Community as the member states may from time to time
undertake in common; (Article 2(2)).
In Article 12, the priority concern of the Community is a
customs union, to be established in the course of a transitional
period of fifteen years from the definitive entry into force of the
Treaty. Within this customs union, the Treaty provides that customs
duties or other charges with equivalent effect on imports shall be
eliminated; quota, quantitative or like restrictions or prohibitions
and administrative obstacles to trade among the member countries
shall also be removed; and the coma= customs tariff in respect of
all goods imported into the member-states from third countries shall
be established and maintained.
Accordingly, in Article 13, the implementation of the
essentials of a customs union - the elimination of all tariff and
non-tariff barriers to trade - is timetabled into three stages:
(a) a period of two years (to 1981) within which member states
are not required to reduce or eliminate import duties;
(b) a period of eight years (to 1989) over which member states
must adjust and ultimately eliminate their import duties
on intra-community trade; and
(c) a period of five years (to 1994) over which the common
external tariff is to be established.
The Treat also stipulates a timescale for the implementation of
those other aspects that are closely related to trade liberalisation
and customs union.
104
Significantly, however, apart from providing for general 'co-
operation in monetary 	  matters' (Article 36), and the creation
of a Committee of West African Central Banks to oversee the payments
system within the Community (Article 38), the Lagos Treaty, unlike
the Senegambia Confederation Pact, does not commit the ECOWAS
signatories to monetary union.
On the Community's organisational structure, the Treaty
establishes five institutions: the Authority of Heads of States and
Government; the Council of Ministers; the Executive Secretariat; the
Tribunal of the Community; the Technical and Special Commissions.
Other important Treaty provisions include the appointment of an
External Auditor of the Community's accounts; and the establishment
of a fund for co-operation, compensation and development as a
mechanism for the equitable distribution of the benefits and costs
of integration. The Fund •is to be financed from members'
contributions, income from community enterprises, external receipts,
and subsidies and contributions from all other sources (Articles 4-
11, 38 and 50).
3.3.2.2
	 Benefits and Progress of ECOWAS 
The economic case for the establishment of the ECOWAS, in
common with other LDC economic groupings, hinges on the assumption
that the size of the market is of paramount importance for large
scale production. Through the concepts of trade creation and trade
diversion, the ECO WAS member states, especially the smaller and
relatively less economically developed and diversified countries
like Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone
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and Togo, should be able to stimulate their production capacities in
a relatively more efficient manner. Concurrently, ECO WAS should
create a single potential market of over 150 million consumers,
covering an area of 6,143,000 square kilometres (see Table 2A) for
each producing country. Through the economies of scale, this vast
market area should create opportunities for specialisation,
efficiency, expansion, employment and growth.
In addition, ECOWAS should, within the context of positive
rather than negative integration, be capable of evolving and
implementing a concerted development framework that would improve
upon a wide range of monetary, fiscal and general economic
activities such as transport and communications, industrial
capacities, food production for domestic consumption, trade,
solutions for climatic, social and demographic obstacles, etc.
Effective co-operation on industrial location and competition, for
instance, would reduce the level of non-complementarity in
production processes, while that on trade would expand the currently
low level of intra-regional trade, averaging less than 10 per cent
of total foreign trade. It should also reduce the high incidence of
smuggling and other illegal trade practices which have constituted
an effective source of foreign exchange leakages in many countries.
An integrated transport and communications network on the other hand
should reduce the extremely high international transactions costs
and help to bring member countries much closer than as present.
Presently, over 75 per cent of airline, shipping and
telecommunications services in West Africa are directly or
indirectly under expatriate influences with hardly any directional
or beneficial control by West African countries. In general, an
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effective ECO WAS should be able to reduce the general economic
disparities among the member states and also generate closer
political co-operation between them, a sine quo non for the
achievement of full economic integration.
Because of its multidimensional context, involving, through
traditional and dynamic effects, various changes in the political,
legal, ideological, general economic and socio-political
superstructures, it has been quite difficult to derive a generally
acceptable method or quantitative indicators in determining the
degree or progress of regional economic integration among a group of
countries. This situation is acknowledged by a number of eminent
integration analysts including Verdoorn and Von Bochore (1972),
Beyarslan (1977), Shishkov (1977) and Ivo Fabric (1977).
Following the pioneering work of Balassa (1967), empirical
studies aimed at measuring the Vinerian production effects of
integration conclude positive integration if a significant trade
creation effect is found. Beyarslan in particular, criticises this
approach on two counts. The first is that the approach is confined
only to the foreign trade sector (X - M) in the income-expenditure
model of:
	 Y = C+I+G+X- M,
where the variables represent income, consumption, investment,
government, exports and imports respectively.
This method, Beyarslan analyses, tries to show that it leaves
no room for the analysis of monetary and income policies which
converge towards the expanded four sector Keynesian system. Since
economic integration is sought in labour, money, bond and commodity
markets, its gross effect should be seen in a diminishing of the
price, wage, interest rate and bond yield differential between the
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integrating countries. This wide conception also takes care of
Beyarslan's second objection that the above approach does not
provide for a direct measure of integration because it takes no
account of 'merging' labour, commodity, money and capital markets.
Shishkov advises that attempts at measuring the degree of
regional economic integration must be preceded by a clear conception
of what integration is. Once this is clear, its progress can then
be determined by the degree of unity in all aspects of its
reproduction framework as well as by indirect indices such as
synchronization of individual synthesizing economic processes and
the alignment of levels of certain structural indices of economic
development. The fuller the integration of the member economies,
the freer the movement of commodities, capital and manpower of the
integrated area and more conditions are present for the alignment of
economic development levels.
The ECOWAS Treaty does make provision for the realisation of a
high level of integration between the West African countries
especially in the areas of commodity and labour markets. The money
and capital markets in the region as are discussed elsewhere in the
study, are still rudimentary. After only a few years of existence,
it may be obviously inappropriate to attempt any quantitative
measure of the progress of ECOWAS in line with the above approaches.
The first eight years of the grouping (1975-83) have only witnessed
gradual progress in institutional-building which has only meant
'putting flesh on the bones of the Treaty' (Robson, 1983). In this
connection, the Community has adopted several important protocols
and decisions on a number of community issues relating to
compensation, rules of origin, free movement of persons, priviledges
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and immunities and on non-aggression, yet significant progress has
still to be made in providing operational content to these as well
as to some of the more general provisions of the Treaty. In
particular, there has already been a substantial delay in bringing
into operation the second stage for trade liberalisation, which
involves the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. This
implies a corresponding delay in establishing a community CET and,
hence, in realising the overall objective of creating a West African
Common Market.
In the meantime, however, most of the ECO WAS economies have,
irrespective of integration, continued to stagnate or deteriorate,
while intra-community trade has also remained relatively low and
stagnating in relation to overall external trade. A very pertinent
question at this point is to ask what the problems of ECO WAS are
regarding its performance and future survival. The more serious
these problems are, the more critical are the implications for
monetary unification within the institutional framework of the
ECOWAS.
3.3.2.3
	 Outlook and Problem Areas for ECOWAS 
Despite the evident potential advantages of economic
integration in West Africa there are many issues needing urgent but
very cautious treatment if these advantages are to be realised.
Like integration itself, these issues are complex and
multidimensional, ranging from the more general technical and
administrative difficulties, which are common to all forms of
integration, to the more structural constraints that are perculiar
to Third World integration groupings in general and to West Africa
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in particular. As in several other regional economic groupings, the
ECOWAS is equally vulnerable to the critical issues of political and
ideological differences among the member states, their ethnic and
cultural diversity, their different levels of development, the
incompatibility of their economic structures, the low level of trade
among them relative to overall foreign trade, poor information,
transport and communications facilities within and between them and
so forth. For ECOWAS in particular many of these problems are
already posing increasing difficulties for its continued existence.
However, in the brief discussion that follows, we regroup these
problems in order to enable us to isolate those that are considered
most crucial in determining the Community's future development.
3.3.2.3.1
	
Economic disparities and polarisation tendency 
In the previous chapter, we outlined some of the most salient
characteristics and structural deficiencies of the West African
economies. While many of these are common to all the member
economies, we also observed that between them there are marked
disparities. In an integration scheme that is without a mechanism
to critically identify these disparities and then design a policy of
agreed convergence, there is the obvious likelihood that the gains
from integration will be polarised in a few partners. This tendency
has several debilitating consequences for the integration process.
First, it could lead to stagnation in the small and less prosperous
member states. In other words, as in the case of the East African
Community, growth in these partners is less likely to improve while
that in the more prosperous members will tend to expand as
integration progresses. This is because as the skewed distribution
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of gains and losses, and the patterns of trade and development
levels persist, the originally less developed and less fortunate
member states will continue to remain net losers as a result of
their inability to attract the positive effects of integration,
notably, rising investment opportunities and expanded trade. The
ultimate result is gross dissatisfaction, and rising mistrust and
suspicion among member countries, and eventually, the collapse of
the grouping.
With the relatively sharp divergencies in the levels of
development in the West African scene, especially as between the
more developed and open coastal economies and the less developed
landlocked Sahel economies, the polarization tendency is quite
conspicuous in the region. In particular, the polarization effect
would tend to widen the development gap between countries such as
Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Ghana and to a less extent, Liberia
on the one hand, and the rest of the region on the other.
Certainly, the most critical aspect of the polarisation effect
within ECOWAS is the extent to which Nigeria (representing about 57
per cent and 62.6 per cent of total GNP and GDP respectively; 75.9
per cent and 67.5 per cent of total exports and imports
respectively; and 40.5 per cent of intra-Community exports but less
than 10 per cent of corresponding imports) would be willing and able
to 'spread out' in favour of the community as a whole.
Furthermore, with the likelihood that some lowly placed ECOWAS
member states or more importantly, the francophone group, could both
do better from outside the Community, the high degree of commitment
that is required of each member state to the Community may disappear
very rapidly unless the polarization tendency is carefully and
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critically analysed and then solved within the context of an
equitable distribution of the integration benefits and costs.
3.3.2.3.2	 Political fragility and ambivalence 
Apart from the member countries' conspicuously differing
political background and ideologies, the long chain of fresh and
recurring socio-political internal unrests and inter-state conflicts
(mainly border disputes) combine with the rising degree of
militarization to pose a very serious threat to the future of
ECOWAS. Political instability is now more of an endemic feature of
all the member states of the Community. In retrospect, political
instability in the ECO WAS members had already had its historical
impact during the evolution of the Community. For instance, the
inability by Mali and Niger to host ministerial conferences, Sierra
Leone's absence in the 1968 Heads of State Summit and the 1968-72
impasse were a spill-over effect of the political unrest in those
countries at the time. Furthermore, the Community experienced a
long period of inactivity immediately after its inception following
the overthrow in 1975 of one of its main architects, General Gowan
(Nigeria).
While the frequent occurrence of internal political unrest
continues to militate against the progress of ECOWAS, there is also
the ambivalent attitude of political leadership when it comes to
transforming into action their verbal and/or written commitments
towards Community decisions. This 'feet-dragging' syndrome is
already manifesting itself in the slow process of ratification and
implementation of the protocols.
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As of 1981, only one out of six Protocols signed since 1978 has
been fully ratified; three have been ratified by only four
governments (still needing three to make them operational); one by
five and one by no government. In the case of the fully ratified
and therefore operational protocol on the free mobility of persons,
a number of countries, eg Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria, are
still to implement it. This may be understandable since, in the
absence of strict observance of the immigration laws and regulations
in force in the various countries and, given the under-development
of West Africa, serious political, social and economic difficulties
in any one country may force or cause massive migration from that
affected country to a neighbouring or more prosperous state. Such
uncontrolled mass movement is bound to provoke hostilities against
the immigrants, especially at times of economic adversity in the
immigrant country. It can also result into forceful repatriations
or expulsions of immigrants, thereby further accentuating inter-
state hostilities (eg Nigeria's mass expulsion of Ghanaians in 1982-
84). By 1985 only two out of eleven protocols have been ratified by
the minimum of seven member states required to make each protocol
effective.
3.3.2.3.3
	 Budgetary arrears 
An initial success story to the credit of ECO WAS members was
the agreement to the method of financing the Community - members'
contributions to ECOWAS' operational budget were worked out on the
basis of members' economic strength, with the richer members of the
Community paying more. Financial contributions have however been
most irregular with the majority of member states still owing
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substantial proportions of their allocated commitments. The extent
of debt commitments by each member country as on the 10th
anniversary of ECOWAS (May 1985) is shown in Table 3E.
The increase in total arrears of more than 117 times from WAUA
123,000 to WAUA 14.5 million by the end of May 1985 corresponded
with a rapid rise in the number of owing countries, from one
(Liberia) for 1978 to all the 16 members for 1985. Only three
countries - Guinea, Ivory Coast and Nigeria - were fully paid-up as
of May 1984. Annual budgetary arrears for Liberia, Guinea-Bissau
and Burkina have accumulated each year from 1978, 1979 and 1980
respectively, while for most of the other countries, the growth in
arrears became more consistent since 1982.
Financial difficulties apart (scarcity of foreign exchange),
the consistent growth of arrears in budgetary contributions to.
ECO WAS both in terms of value and in the number of debtor members
also raises vital questions about the perception of member countries
regarding the beneficial role of ECO WAS, about the willingness to
meet the transition costs towards the realisation of the Treaty
objectives, and about their interest in the community and enthusiasm
for integration in general. But more recently, however, the ECOWAS
Secretariat has also been accused of financial mis-management as
well as of an indulgence in exceptionally high Secretariat
expenditures, estimated at more than two-thirds of its annual budget
(West Africa, 3 December 1984, p 3449). While answers to these
reasons cannot be found unless there is a resurgence in the ECOWAS
spirit, it is noteworthy that the pattern of growth in budgetary
arrears over the years has not suggested any anglophone/francophone
divide.
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3.3.2.3.4	 Co-existence 
The rather slow progress of ECOWAS has also been attributed to
the existence of integration schemes within the Community. As
indicated earlier, the objectives and integration strategies of
these inter-governmental organisations vary widely, sometimes
tending to highlight the historical differences between groups of
countries. In the absence of any effort to ensure that they work in
harmony, they undoubtedly represent a considerable dissipation of
energy and an escalation of budgetary strains.
The critical question for ECOWAS is whether it should or could
co-exist with these sub-regional economic groupings or whether there
can be a continuing role for them if ECO WAS is successful. These
questions relate more to the relationship between ECOWAS on the one
hand, .and the CEAO, MRU and Senegambia, on the other. For these
sub-regional groupings, the concern is whether they . in turn should
harmonise and then merge their objectives and programmes within the
wider context of ECO WAS or continue to operate independently of
ECO WAS but with the assurance not to encroach on the respective
commitment to ECOWAS of their member states. Obviously, the most
logical approach would be for the sub-regional groupings to dissolve
and then allow the member countries to concentrate on the ECO WAS
objectives and aspirations. This option appears more difficult for
the CEA() - mainly because of the entrenched historical and monetary
relationships between its members as well as between the Union and
France - than it is for the relatively less integrated MRU and
Senegambia both politically and economically.
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Arguments against co-existence are based strongly on grounds of
economic rationality for eliminating institutional overlaps and
conflicts of integration objectives. Assiduously over the years,
the ECA, for instance, has pursued the formation of regional
economic groupings on the sound principle that it is only through
collective action and the welding of small units of tenuous
viability into larger, more operational entities that Africa can
hope to survive in the modern world. Within ECOWAS, the merging of
the CEAO, MRU and Senegambia was firmly supported by Guinea, Nigeria
and the Council of Ministers during the Sixth ECOWAS Summit held in
Conakry, Guinea in 1983. The most conspicuous dissenting country at
the meeting was Liberia whose President Doe argued that 'we must
realise that a small group of countries can promote economic co-
operation and integration more rapidly than a larger group ...
Countries that are more or less at the same level of development
when grouped together will find it easier to agree on specific
projects which would be impossible if there were wide differences
between these countries'.
There are arguably a number of pragmatic considerations that
would tend to favour the co-existence between ECOWAS and the smaller
sub-regional groupings. Firstly, it is perfectly possible for a
smaller economic grouping to exist within a larger unit as is
manifested in the BENELUX and EFTA/EEC relationship. It is noted
however that these two organisations, especially EFTA which is
basically a trade grouping, do not possess any of the supranational
features of the EEC. In contrast, the three most important economic
sub-regional groupings in West Africa do to a large extent possess
the same supranational features as ECO WAS except that the CEA()
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operates within a central common monetary system for its members,
while in the Senegambia, the initial initiative is for economic and
monetary integration.
A second reason is based on the argument that it may not be
advisable to do away with organisations that are already
functioning, as long as those belonging to them wish them to
continue. One important advantage is that it gives the members a
stronger bargaining position with the politically and economically
stronger member of the larger grouping, than they might have
individually. Undoubtedly, there can be stronger cohesiveness
within a smaller than a larger grouping.
The position of the ECOWAS Treaty on this issue is more
cautious than definite. In Article 59(1) the Treaty states that:
1 ... member states are permitted to be members of other
regional or sub-regional associations, either with other
member states or non-member states, provided that their
membership of such associations does not derogate from
the provisions of this Treaty':
and (Article 59(2) and (3)):
1 .. to the extent that pre-ECOWAS sub-regional
agreements, which can claim immunity against the Treaty
provisions are not compatible with the Treaty, the member
states concerned should take steps to eliminate the
incompatibilities'.
During this period of lack of meaningful political cohesiveness
in ECOWAS, the smaller groupings cannot be expected to favour a
weakening of their own special arrangements. A merger is
economically and politically sound but until ECOWAS shows concrete
signs of developing effectual measures for monetary, fiscal and
industrial harmonisation, there can be no positive strides towards
this end.
3.3.2.3.5	 External influences 
As a corollary to the coexistence problem, the future of ECOWAS
is also dependent on its external relations with governments,
international organisations and multinationals, all of which have
tremendous influence on activities within the ECOWAS economies. The
impact of international organisations, especially the UN and its
organs, has been felt mainly in the agricultural sector and in the
institution of structural adjustment policies, while for the
multinationals, their operations, for the most part, are in mining,
industry and general commerce. Much of the external influence has
been expressed in terms of financial assistance and actual
investment.
If the assumption that a regional grouping has potential to
represent a stronger economic bargaining power for its members is
accepted, it is likely therefore that West African countries,
especially the smaller and less economically and politically
powerful, may stand to gain more if international aid donors and
investment agencies are approached within the wider context of
ECOWAS.	 The significant presumption here is that these
international institutions may, out of experience, be more ready and
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willing to assist clearly defined integrated projects. Here also,
ECOWAS has had the problem of competing with both its member
governments as well as with sub-regional groupings. The critical
point is the extent to which ECOWAS, national governments and sub-
regional groupings can reconcile between that form of external
assistance that is required to promote more ECOWAS integration
efforts and that which is needed for the more immediate national
development projects or sub-regional integration. The intention in
this case must be the rationalisation of external aid, debts and
investments with a view to avoiding unremunerative duplication while
increasing efficiency in their utilisation, thereby increasing the
positive effects of integration.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have tried to outline the
traditional theory of economic integration and the extent to which
its conceptualisations appear inadequate in formulating the type of
economic integration that could be more appropriate to LDCs relative
to their development problems. Three major reasons have been
advanced: first, the traditional theory is based purely on static
assumptions and analysis that are associated with integration in
developed economies; second, integration in LDCs is conceptualised
as a strategy for development rather than a customs union issue; and
finally, the standard theory fails to recognise or give adequate
attention to the role of protection and policy harmonisation which
is significantly crucial to the economic integration of LDCs.
Consequently, the reshaping of the standard theory in line with the
requirements of economic integration for LDCs has stressed a variety
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of 'dynamic' factors which should encourage the adoption of
comprehensive socio-political and macroeconomic and structural
policies geared to promoting growth and structural change.
Admittedly, economic integration in West Africa has been even
more a question of trying to realise standard theory objectives; ie
free trade areas, customs union, and common markets. In essence,
problems of development - eg balance of payments adjustment,
economic planning, agricultural and industrial rationalisation,
socio-political instability, overall monetary and financial
instability, and the establishment of close intra-regional economic
relationships - are not adequately addressed in the Lagos Treaty.
That the Treaty has no institutional provision for monetary
unification per se within the context of ECOWAS is understandable.
Little progress has been made in the monetary analysis of
integration possibilities either through incorporation of monetary
mechanisms into customs union theory or into the extensions to
integration in LDCs. Yet the role of monetary unification in
realising this objective cannot be ignored as it underwrites the
integration of trade relations and, product and factor markets, and
expands the domain for better exploitation of internal and external
scale economies.
The problems of West African economic integration as outlined
in this chapter relate more to supranationality, political
instability and changing perceptions. The survival and future
success of ECOWAS depend on these factors as well as on its
relationship with the CEAO, MRU and Senegambia. For ECO WAS to be
effective, these issues are of critical importance.
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Meanwhile, as the expansion of intra-regional trade is a prime
concern for West African economic integration, the next chapter
describes and analyses the patterns of West African trade with two
major objectives in mind: first, as another test for the performance
and effectiveness of West African economic integration, since
economic integration is perceived to lower the ratio of foreign
trade to total intra-regional trade; second, to identify the main
problems of trade, especially intra-regional trade, with a view to
clarify more particularly those that are monetary in nature. As
noted above trade unification and monetary integration are closely
interdependent and the greater the extent to which this relationship
is developed and improved among the West African countries, the
better it is for each country and for regional economic integration.
CHAPTER 4
DIMENSIONS OF WEST AFRICAN TRADE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The basic feature of West African trade relations is that they
have remained more outward- than inward-oriented, which represents
one of the major obstacles to the West African development efforts.
Indeed the historical foundation of this flow pattern can be drawn
from the structure of the three earliest forms of West Africa's
trading contacts with the rest of the world, namely, the trans-
Saharan trade, which began as early as the year 1000 BC; the
generally 'triangular' Atlantic slave trade, which flourished up to
the mid-19th century; and 'legitimate' commerce, which was designed
(through the Staple Theory) to fill the trade vacuum that was
created as a result of the official abolution of the slave trade
(see for example, Hopkins, 1973).
In essence, this feature of West African trade has reflected
two relatively mutually exclusive patterns of trade demand in each
West African economy: a domestic market demand that is exclusively
dependent on foreign imports of goods, services and capital, and a
foreign market demand that is decreasingly dependent on West African
primary raw material exports. In particular, the consequent
northward orientation of West African trade flows reflects the large
and critical dependence on trade with the developed industrial
counties and as a result, trade among West African countries has
remained generally small and stagnating in relation to total trade.
As recent trends have clearly shown, there exists no automatic
means by which these two demand forces which, for West Africa,
determine the pressure for production and export as well as for
providing consumer, intermediate and capital goods in the region as
a whole, can be brought into balance with the forces determining the
needs in industrialised countries for imports from the region or
indeed those influencing their supply of exports to the region. In
both instances, there are, in other words, 'limits' especially to
the capacity of industrialised countries as a whole to absorb the
West African exports, irrespective of whether they are exported in
an unprocessed or a fully processed state or export to the region at
meaningful preferential commercial basis.
• Two other striking developments in West Africa's trade
relations are first, the declining but relative persistence of trade
with traditional export markets (that is, with former colonial
powers) and second, trade between some countries is justified in
most part by colonial and liguistic links. In most cases, these
features characterise more noticeably the trade patterns of the
francophone countries.
The patterns and problems of West Africa's trade as a whole are
by and large a direct reflection of the member countries' basic
geopolitical and socio-economic structures reviewed in Chapter 2.
This however raises two important questions: first, whether these
structural characteristics, especially in so far as their influence
on intra-regional trade is concerned, provide obstacles that are
wholly 'natural' or 'artificial'; and second, whether any policy
measures could or should be adopted to change the existing trade
orientation with a view to improving the regional position.
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The obvious failure of ECO WAS so far is the inability of the
Community to influence and/or expand intra-regional trade, or, to
influence the external orientation of the members' trade relations
or, indeed, to enhance the generative impact of trade on the
members' economic development process. Thus, while extra-regional
trade has developed on very large scale and has been the economic
nerve centre of each West African country, corresponding trade among
them has remained on a relatively small scale, representing on
average less than 5 per cent of both total exports and imports.
Within this structural disposition of West African trade, there
are nonetheless a number of pertinent fundamental implications for
the pursuit of monetary unification in the region. The main focus
of this chapter therefore is to describe and analyse these inherent
features. Section 4.2 examines the patterns in total trade; Section
4.3 analyses the structure and growth of intra-regional trade while
the problems affecting this trade are discussed in Section 4.4; and
Section 4.5 analyses the relationship between trade and economic
development in West Africa, ie in terms of foreign trade/GDP or GNP
ratios. Section 4.6 provides the conclusions to the chapter.
4.2 PATTERNS OF EXTRA-REGIONAL TRADE
4.2.1 Growth and Distribution
The last 10 years of colonial administration marked the
beginning of the rapid rise in West Africa's external trade, as
both merchandise exports and imports doubled, in value terms, from
less than one billion dollars at the beginning of the decade to more
than a billion dollars by 1960. This rising trend continued each
year during the next two decades (though with marginal fluctuations
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between years) to the extent that by 1980, exports had increased to
US $34.17 billion, compared with $26.24 billion for imports.
Between decades, the value of exports rose by 74.4 per cent, from
$0.78 billion to $1.36 billion in 1950-60; by 118.4 per cent in
1960-70; and by over eleven times, from $2.97 billion to $34.17
billion between 1970 and 1980. The corresponding import bills
increased from $0.67 billion in 1950 to $1.58 billion in 1960, $2.80
billion in 1970, and $26.24 billion in 1980, representing percentage
increases of 135.8, 77.2 and 837.1 respectively. Significantly,
both exports and imports have shown a declining trend in the early
eighties but the illustrations in Table 4A and Figure 4.1 indicate
how the relationship between the two trends became increasingly less
tenuous especially during the last decade as import values exceeded
export values by considerable margins.
In growth terms, the total value of West Africa's merchandise
exports in 1950-80 grew by an average annual rate of around 6.1 per
cent in the fifties, 8.5 per cent in the sixties and 31.7 per cent
in the seventies, while corresponding rates for imports were 9.3 per
cent, 6.4 per cent and 26.5 per cent in the three decades
respectively. In volume terms, the average annual growth rate for
exports was around 7.5 per cent in the 1960s and 6.2 per cent in the
1970s, compared with 5 per cent and 7.8 per cent for imports over
the two periods respectively.
These West African trade trends may be compared with
corresponding trends in the world's overall trade. The value of
world exports increased by 7.1 per cent (5.8 per cent in volume) in
1965-60 and 9.4 per cent (7.9 per cent in volume) per year during
the 1950s and 1960s respectively, and further by 20.7 per cent (5.5
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per cent in volume) a year in the 1970s. The corresponding value of
world imports grew by 7.4 per cent (6.4 per cent in volume), 9.4 per
cent (8.4 per cent in volume), and 20.5 per cent (5.4 per cent in
volume) over the three decades respectively.
They also compare with trade trends by non-oil African
countries (excluding South Africa) whose combined export values grew
at an average annual rate of 6 per cent (6.3 per cent in volume),
5.8 per cent (3.5 per cent in volume) and 17.8 per cent (6.0 per
cent in volume) respectively. The corresponding import value grew
at 6.3 per cent (4.7 per cent in volume), 7.5 per cent (6.4 per cent
in volume) and 17.2 per cent (2.0 per cent in volume) during the
same period.
It is important to note however that West Africa's external
trade trends, especially since the early 1970s, were tubstantially
influenced by Nigeria's trade which had by 1980 increased several-
fold since 1973 because of oil, and by 1983 accounted for 69 per
cent and 50 per cent of the region's total exports and imports
respectively (see Table 48). The effect of this extraordinary
growth in Nigerian trade has the tendency of downplaying the
deteriorating performance of the region's export sector and the
consequent widening of the import-export gap between 1970 and 1980.
In general, as also shown in Table 4A and Figure 4.1, though still
showing rising tendencies throughout the reviewing period, the
absolute value of the rest of West Africa's merchandise trade was
reduced drastically, thereby depicting much higher trade deficits as
well as much lower and declining trends in the region's share of
world and non-oil African (excluding South Africa) trade.
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Excluding Nigeria, West Africa's share in world trade declined
steadily from 0.91 per cent in 1950 to 0.34 per cent by 1980 for
exports, and from 0.84 per cent in 1950 to 0.46 per cent for
imports. These percentages compare with an overall average of over
1 per cent as a share of world trade and between 30 and 117 per cent
as a share of non-oil African trade when Nigeria's trade is
included. The table shows that total trade in West Africa has
stagnated at less than 2 per cent of the world's overall trade.
Table 4A also shows rising regional net trade surpluses between
1970 and 1980 which merely reflected the rising oil revenues from
Nigeria, and to a less extent, the marginal rise in coffee export
revenues following the relative improvement in international coffee
prices during this period. But the exclusion of Nigeria's exports
reduces this net surplus position to a worsening net deficit
position. Trade performances by Ghana, Ivory Coast and Senegal have
also influenced the trends in West Africa's world trade. The
importance of these four most developed and economically the largest
countries - Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana and Senegal - is such that
their combined share of the region's total trade is over 90 per cent
of both exports and imports. Of the remaining 12 countries, only
Liberia and Togo have shown some improvement in their respective
regional trade shares (see Table 4B).
As in absolute trade values, the proportion of West Africa's
merchandise trade in world trade compared with combined shares held
by the non-oil developing African countries as well as with those of
other regional economic groupings in LDCs, all of which, as in West
Africa, have remained equally low. The share of non-oil developing
Africa in fact fell from 3.8 per cent in 1950 to 3.5 per cent in
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1960, 2.6 per cent in 1970 and 1.6 per cent in 1980 for exports,
while the corresponding shares in import trade also dropped from 3.5
per cent in 1950 to 3.2 per cent, 2.5 per cent and 1.9 per cent in
1960, 1970 and 1980 respectively. Except for the ANDEAN, whose
combined share in world trade was much higher, ranging between 1.63-
3.84 per cent in 1950-80, comparative shares by such other groupings
as the defunct EAC, CACM, CARICOM and the UDEAC all stagnated at
much below one per cent during the same period (see Table 4C).
Finally, the downward trend in West Africa's import payments in
the early 1980s has largely reflected the imposition of tighter
monetary and fiscal restrictions on imports by many countries,
especially the anglophones - Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
4.2.2 Changing Composition and Direction
Export production in West African countries as we have
indicated already, has been concentrated on a narrow range of
primary commodities, generally between one and three, with little or
no meaningful domestic value-added. This narrow range has in sum
accounted for over 50 per cent of total export earnings in the
majority of countries in the region. For a number of countries,
especially those without mineral resources, the enclave of the so-
called 'staple' export commodities introduced as part of
'legitimate' commerce has continued to preponderate in their
principal exports such that in many, the composition of exports has
in general, changed very little over the last three decades.
However, in countries where minerals have been exploited
extensively, their importance in relation to total export earnings
has outpaced that of traditional agricultural products. Table 40
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indicates the major products exported by each West African country
since 1970 relative to the country's total exports.
In particular, Gambia and Ivory Coast depend almost entirely on
agricultural products, whereas in Nigeria, Niger, Guinea, Senegal
and Togo, increased mineral exploitation and export has
substantially depleted the agricultural export base. As was
illustrated earlier (see Tables 2E and 2G), in some of these
countries, notably Nigeria, leading positions in agricultural
production has been lost to other countries. This remarkable
decline in agriculture has caused the combined value share of West
Africa's eight principal agricultural export commodities in total
exports to drop from 52.9 per cent in 1960 to 15.6 per cent in 1975
and 9.7 per cent in 1980 (Table 4E). By contrast, the combined
proportionate share of mineral exports in total export value has
increased by more than forty times, from less than 2 per cent in
1960 to over 70 per cent in 1980. Consequently, the index of
fluctuations in West Africa's export earnings tend to be much higher
in mineral exporting countries than those with substantial export
dependence on agricultural products (see Table 40).
It can be noted also that a limited number of West African
countries, notably Ivory Coast and Nigeria, have in more recent
years added a few manufactured or semi-manufactured goods in their
export base. Examples are cotton textile goods from Ivory Coast and
fuel oils from Nigeria. In each of the countries where such
expansion has taken place, the list of commodities is also usually
very short; this is, in part, a reflection of the problems of
competitive industrial production among West African countries.
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Benin
Burkina
Cape Verde
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea 2.3
0.9
69.7
2.1
1.7
67.8
11.6
5.4
2.8
Coffee
Palm products
Bauxite 19.8	 71.6	 72.9	 17.1	 15.9
71.7	 56.6	 61.9	 10.5	 8.1
33.2
20.5
18.0
22.0
27.3
12.6
24.2
18.7
13.7
Senegal 13.3
16.3
18.8
37.1
7.8
3.1
1.2
32.6
22.4
7.0
3.7
Sierra Leone 53.3
10.6
16.8
56.8
6.0
5.9
62.6
4.0
5.2
64.6
17.4
6.5
Togo 39.6
11.8
7.9
24.5
41.8
17.5
Groundnuts & Oil
Phosphates
Petroleum products
Fish & Shell fish
Diamonds
Cacao
Coffee
Phosphates
Cacao
Coffee
	
49.1	 65.7	 48.4	 8.9	 7.4
	
71.8	 68.7	 80.7	 14.2	 13.5
	
83.8	 88.5	 59.3	 18.3	 10.1
Table 40 ECOWAS: Export Commodity Concentration and Index of Fluctuations in Export Values
Prinicpal Exports
Export
Percentages Share
in Total Exports
1970	 1975	 1980
Values
Percentage Share of
Principal Exports
in Total Exports
1970 1975 1980
Index of Exp2rt
Fluctuations'
1955-65 1965-79
Cotton
	
15.4
	
22.7
	
15.1
Palm productsa
	
35.1
	
19.3
	
8.0
Cacao
	
16.6
	
9.5
	
20.6
Cotton
	
25.7	 16.3	 43.9
Fish
	
36
Groundnut products 95.1	 84.3	 54.2
Cacao
	
64.3	 59.3	 60.7
Wooda
	
7.9	 8.3	 5.1
	
67.1	 51.5	 43.7
	
10.1
	
20.6
	
25.7	 16.3	 43.9
	
27.3
	
19.7
36
	
17.0d
	
95.1	 84.3	 54.2
	
17.6
	
19.3
72.2	 67.6	 65.8	 5.5	 6.3
Guinea-Bissau Palm products	 13.6	 9.1	 17.6
Groundnuts & oil	 54.0	 57.4	 25.7	 67.6	 66.5	 43.3	 17.3	 15.4
Ivory Coast Coffee
Cacap
Wood°
Liberia	 Iron Ore	 70.1	 74.5
Rubber	 16.9	 11.7
Diamonds	 13.0	 4.7	 100.0	 90.9	 75.8	 10.4
Mali	 Coton	 21.0	 33.9	 48.2
Groundnuts	 14.4	 15.2 . 2.3	 35.4	 49.1	 50.5	 13.9	 14.6
Mauritania
	
Iron Ore
	
84.8	 82.3	 77.8
Fish	 8.2	 9.2	 22.0	 93.0	 91.5	 99.8	 73.2	 59.3
Niger	 Uranium	 18.5e 60.8	 76.3	 18.5	 60.8	 76.3	 73.2	 59.3
Nigeria	 Crude Petroleum	 57.5	 95.8	 95.3
Cacao	 15.0	 3.7	 0.9	 72.5	 99.5	 96.2	 77.5	 84.3
52.7
17.4
5.7 13.3
Source:	 IMF and World Bank Trade statistics, ibid
FAO Trade statistics, ibid
Commonwealth secretariat, ibid
Institute of Geological Sciences, ibid
Notes:	 a 3rd year is 1978
b 3rd year is 1979
c 1975
d 1965-77
e 1971
f Index provides an indication of the relative magnitude of fluctuations
in total merchandise export values and have been calculated like coefficients of
variation
Not available
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Table 4E	 ECOWAS: Share of Principal Agricultural Export
Commodities in Total Community Export Earnings
(Per Cent)
1960
Including Petroleum
1965	 1970	 1975 1980
Excluding Petroleum
1960	 1965	 1970	 1975 1980
Cocoa 24.4 19.9 20.5 9.0 5.9 24.6 20.9 27.0 25.6 23.4
Coffee 0.7 0.6 6.3 2.7 2.2 0.7 0.6 8.2 7.8 8.8
Cotton 1.4 0.8 1.5 0.5 0.6 1.4 0.9 1.9 1.4 2.6
Groundnuts 10.7 9.0 3.5 0.5 0.1 10.8 9.4 4.6 1.4 0.3
Groundnut
Oil 4.4 4.6 3.0 1.4 0.2 4.4 4.8 3.9 4.1 0.8
Palm Kernels 7.5 5.0 1.8 0.4 0.1 7.5 5.2 2.3 1.1 0.4
Palm Oil 3.2 2.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 3.2 2.3 0.3 1.4 0.6
Rubber 0.6 0.3 2.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.3 3.0 1.8 1.7
Total 52.9 42.4 39.4 15.6 9.7 53.2 44.4 51.2 44.6 38.6
Petroleum' 1.82 5.0 24.0 64.8 74.9 - - - - -
Source: See Table 40
Notes:	 1 Based on Nigerian exports
2 1962
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As already noted, the import component of West African
countries' external trade has one common characteristic, namely, the
almost equal importance of capital and consumer goods. This feature
reflects the continued dependence on imports for domestic
consumption, production and capital formation, although the degree
of dependence in terms of these import uses differs between
countries in relation to their level of industrial development.
That is, consumer goods usually account for the greater part of
total imports by the less industrially developed (eg Cape Verde,
Gambia and Burkina), while capital goods (as industrial inputs) form
a good part of imports in the more industrially progressive - eg
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal. Some of the most prominent
imported inputs include raw materials for the brewing of beer and
spirits and intermediate goods for paper, chemicals, textiles,
confectionary, building and construction, and allied industries.
THe varied importance of imports (and exports) in terms of IMF/World
Bank groupings is shown in Table 4F.
The most important change in the import structure of the
majority of West African countries, especially since 1974/75, is the
rising level of fuel imports (in terms of import value).
	 As
expected, fuel imports are lowest in Nigeria, and have, as a
proportion of total imports dropped from 12 per cent in 1970 to 2.3
per cent in 1980. In virtually all other countries, notably, Benin,
Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo, the share of fuel
imports to total imports has more than trippled over the same period
to the extent that, excluding Cape Verde, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau
for which complete data was not available, fuel imports have by 1980
accounted for an average 13.2 per cent of total import value
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compared with 5.6 per cent in 1970. In Sierra Leone, for instance,
the actual percentage cost of crude petroleum and platformate to
total import value rose from 7.2 per cent in 1971 to 16 per cent and
43.5 per cent in 1980 and 1983 respectively.
On a regional basis, imports of manufactured goods have
accounted for nearly two-thirds of total imports (10.8 per cent for
exports) in 1980, while imports of foodstuffs averaged around 15 per
cent (28 per cent for exports). Imports of raw materials and
intermediate products have shown little expansion in relative terms
since 1970; this is a reflection of the generally slow technological
industrial progress in the majority of countries.
Geographically, the direction of West Africa's external trade,
as already noted, is still largely towards the Western industrial
markets both directly and indirectly through multinational firms.
The share of trade with the more traditional markets (France and the
United Kingdom), though having declined or fluctuated widely
especially in the case of regional imports during the last decade,
is still relatively significant (in terms of non-oil trade), while
corresponding trade with non-traditional markets like Japan, West
Germany and the United States has increased substantially.
Together, the group of twenty industrialised developed
countries (see World Bank Direction of Trade classification) has
regularly accounted for around 70 per cent and 85 per cent of West
Africa's exports and imports respectively (Table 4G). The table
also shows that within this group, the share of imports to the more
traditional EEC markets has remained relatively stable, averaging
around 50 per cent of total imports, while the proportion of exports
taken by them has almost halved, falling from 63.9 per cent in 1970
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to 34.9 per cent in 1981, although it experienced a more than
sevenfold increase in value terms. As the table indicates, this
shift, especially in the case of exports, is by and large a
reflection of Nigeria's petroleum exports which are mainly directed
to the United States (and the Carribbean) for refining and
distribution purposes. In 1980 for instance around 60 per cent of
Nigerian crude went to the United States compared with 30 per cent
to three European countries combined - France, West Germany and the
Netherlands.
On the other hand, West Africa's trade with Asian, centrally
planned, and other African countries, as also illustrated in Table
4G, is generally low, standing at less than 10 per cent for each
group of countries. The share of imports from Asian countries,
especially China and India, has however risen to 10.8 per cent in
1981 from 4.7 per cent in 1970. It can of course be argued that the
sluggish trade relations between West African countries and other
LOCs, in particular, the non-oil, developing African countries,
reflects more directly the close similarities in production and
industrial capacities, although the lack of patriotic demand for
each other's manufactured goods as well as infrastructural problems
have also played a significant part.
Another very important trend in West Africa's external trade
relations is the continued decline in the proportion of trade held
by the two most important former colonial 'masters' - France and the
United Kingdom. In particular, noticeable shifts have occurred
since the second half of the 1970s as illustrated in Table 4H. The
share of exports to the United Kingdom has dropped drastically from
12.6 per cent in 1975 (19.9 per cent in 1970) to 4.0 per cent in
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1983, reflecting mainly the spectacular drop in Nigeria's exports to
the United Kingdom from 28.3 per cent in 1970 to less than 2 per
cent by the end of the seventies. It must be noted that the decline
in Nigerian exports to the UK is mainly because both countries are
oil producing (extracting the same type of crude) and also because
Nigeria's more traditional exports to the United Kingdom (ie
agricultural products) have shrunk following the general decline in
Nigerian agriculture since oil extraction was stepped up. In
addition, Ghana's exports to the United Kiudom have also fallen in
the last decade. By contrast, the drop in the share of imports from
the United Kingdom both at the regional and country (Nigeria and
Ghana) levels as shown in Tables 4H and 41 is not as spectacular as
that for exports.
Table 41 Ghana and Nigeria: Trade with the UK
GHANA	 NIGERIA
	
Exports	 Imports	 Exports	 Imports
$m	 %	 $m	 %	 $m	 %	 $m	 %
1970 107 23.4 97 23.6 351 28.3 325 30.7
1975 117 14.5 119 15.0 1130 14.5 1389 23.0
1980 221 19.2 226 19.6 320 1.2 3079 18.8
Source: Table 4H
It must be recognised also that by the second half of the seventies
the United Kingdom's other traditional trading countries in West
Africa - Gambia and Sierra Leone - had commenced looking elsewhere
for alternative trading markets, while the conspicuous lack of
preference by the francophones for the UK market is also worth
noting.
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By contrast, France has generally had stable trading relations
with West Africa in terms of proportions held in total exports and
imports. As is also illustrated in Table 4H, both export and import
shares have stabilised at around 14 per cent and 16 per cent per
annum respectively. This is due mainly to France's consistent trade
relations with the francophones, especially trade with Ivory Coast
and Senegal.
As in trade between the UK and Ghana and Nigeria, France's
share of trade with these two major francophone countries in the
region has increased in value terms but declined in relative ratios.
In 1960s, France provided 70 per cent of Ivory Coast's imports and
took 53 per cent of exports. In Senegal in the same year, 69 per
cent of the imports came from France and 82 per cent of the exports
went to that destination. Between 1970 and 1980, as shown in Table
4J, the share of both countries' exports to and imports from France
dropped considerably. In the Ivory Coast, exports to France
declined to 32.6 per cent in 1970, 27.3 per cent in 1975 and 24 per
cent in 1980, while imports from France dropped from 46.1 per cent
in 1970 to 39.3. per cent and 41.5 per cent in 1975 and 1980
respectively. Similarly, in Senegal, the share of exports to France
fell from 54.6 per cent in 1970 to 32.1 per cent in 1980 while that
of imports from France declined from 51.3 per cent in 1970 to 33.7
per cent in 1980. The proportions for Senegal remained higher than
the Ivory Coast's but still below the 1960 level. The main factor
could be the general drop in export revenues from the two countries,
as well as the greater level of economic diversification that has
taken place in Ivory Coast.
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Table 4J	 Ivory Coast and Senegal: Trade with France
SENEGAL
Exports	 •	 Imports
$m	 $m
IVORY COAST
Exports
	
Imports
$m	 $m
1970 83 54.6 99 51.3 153 32.6 179 46.1
1975 223 48.4 241 41.3 323 27.3 443 39.3
1980 153 32.1 355 33.7 714 24.0 1251 41.5
Source: Table 4H
Unlike the UK, the share of France's trade with West Africa as
a whole, though declining, has remained comparatively much higher,
especially in the amount of exports to the French market. From
Table 4H, it is observed that exports to France dropped from 14.4
per cent in 1970 to 9.9 per cent. in 1981, while the corresponding
level of imports from the French market fell only marginally from
17.5 per cent in 1970 to 15 per cent in 1981. Comparatively, both
France and the Uk have managed to sustain their import trade ties
with West Africa at about the same levels.
The higher ratio of West African trade with France is also
accounted for by the increasing trade with Nigeria whose (oil)
exports to France in 1970-80 rose more than twenty-five times to
$2728 million, while imports from France also increased by more than
fortyfold from $35.4 million to $1483 million over the same period.
The improved trading relations with Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Guinea
have in particular caused West Africa's exports to the United States
to rise from 12.8 per cent of total exports in 1970 to 36.7 per cent
in 1981, although the share of imports has fallen marginally to 8.7
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per cent from 12.3 per cent. Nigeria accounts for 93.3 per cent and
64.9 per cent of these US export and import shares respectively.
The share of West Germany's trade in West Africa has generally
stabilised at around 10 per cent a year for both exports and
imports, while Japan's share in imports has increased mainly because
of the rising volume of imports of motor vehicles.
4.2.3 Factors Affecting Extra-Regional Trade
The analysis both in Chapter 2 and in this chapter so far has
clearly demonstrated West Africa's substantial resource potential in
agricultural as well as in mineral products. It is true however
that since independence many countries in the region have depleted
their resources to the extent that this has largely accounted for
the remarkable drop in export earnings. In the Sahel countries,
export performance has generally been affected by severe drought and
other climatic conditions. Factors like the high incidence of
political instability and inadequate information and communications
infrastructures also combine with restrictive trade policies by the
developed industrialised markets to impair the expansion of West
Africa's export market which is structurally restricted to raw
material products. But even for some of those countries where
export performance has improved, the full realisation of export
potential has been severely affected by a combination of
deteriorating terms of trade and the adoption of restrictive
domestic monetary and financial policies. Indeed, against the
background of an increasingly difficult foreign exchange situation
over the last few years, imports have (through artificial measures)
decline steadily in most countries.
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It must be noted however that in general, movements in West
Africa's raw material export prices, and hence, in the terms of
trade have been rather selective. Table 4K indicates that apart
from the sharp increases in crude oil prices (1973/74 and 1978/79)
which favoured Nigeria's terms of trade, there were also substantial
improvements in the prices of other major export commodities like
coffee, cocoa and phosphates. This latter movement thus also
favoured the terms of trade of major producers like Ghana, Ivory
Coast and Togo, whereas the long slide in mineral prices (primarily
copper and iron ore) worsened the terms of trade for countries like
Liberia and Mauritania. The deteriorating terms of trade for such
countries as Gambia, Senegal and Sierra Leone could also be
explained by the drop in market prices for groundnut products and
palm products.	 ,
Table 4K ECOWAS: Principal Export Comyodity Price Trends
Average Annual Growth Rate (Per Cent)
1960-70	 1970-80
Cocoa 3.5 7.5
Coffee 0.8 3.9
Cotton 0.1 -2.2
Groundnuts 0.1 -3.5
Groundnut Oil -0.1 -3.1
Palm Oil -1.7 -2.4
Rubber -6.0 1.3
Timber	 (Sapelli) 1.0 0.4
Bauxite 5.6 2.2
Iron Ore -3.9 -13.0
Petroleum -2.2 18.2
Source: World Bank, 'Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa:
An Agenda for Action' (1981).
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The income terms of trade on the other hand improved more
substantially in the 1960s than in the 1970s for virtually all
countries in the West African region. Especially for countries like
Niger and Nigeria, the income terms of trade improved markedly even
in the 1970s but deteriorated very significantly for Benin, Liberia,
Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Togo and Burkina. Since income terms of
trade are related to export volumes, their deterioration in these
countries was apparent as growth in export volume dropped
significantly during the seventies. The only notable exception was
Nigeria, where despite the substantial decline in the annual average
rate of growth of export volume, from 6.5 per cent in the 1960s to
0.5 per cent in the 1970s, the corresponding escalation of oil
prices caused the income terms of trade to improve from 7 per cent
to 16.9 per cent over the two decades. Thus, while the substantial
increase in Nigeria's net barter terms of trade accounted for the
improvement in the income terms of trade, in most countries, it was
their deterioration which also worsened the income terms of trade.
Eventhough net barter terms may not have had quite a substantial
influence on West Africa's overall export performance, there is
nonetheless an increasing worry that this situation may worsen in
the near future, particularly when reference is made to the World
Bank's expectations for an acute drop in world prices for many of
the region's major export products by 1990 (see World Bank, 'Sub-
Saharan Africa: Progress Report on Development Prospects and
Progress', Report No 4630, 6 July 1983). It is also true that a
substantial decline in the corresponding prices of oil would dampen
this effect considerably.
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It is a fact that in general, import values in West AFrica, in
common with the rest of the world, have gone up not so much as a
result of increased import demand but mainly as a spillover effect
of oil price increases. This has induced massive increases in
import unit costs. For example in most West African countries, as
already discussed, the proportion of national expenditures on
petroleum imports in relation to total imports has more than doubled
since 1973/74, although the actual amount of petroleum consumed in
volume terms may have •been reduced or has remained relatively
constant. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the country's absolute
minimum energy requirements of crude petroleum and platformate at
288,170 long tons cost $5.99 million in 1971. By 1975, a reduced
quantity of 214,738 tons cost $20.18 million, representing an
increase of over 236 per cent in value terms. In 1981 the cost of a
lesser quantity of 203,726 tons was over $70 million.. Consequently,
in most countries, the diversification in the choice of external
trading partners has been influenced by the search for new sources
of comparatively more favourable commercial opportunities especially
for the supply of cheaper oil and consumer imports. But on the
whole these efforts in the search for additional markets outside the
traditional areas are still subject to serious geographical and
commodity constraints that need more critical attention.
The regional pattern of West Africa's international trade is
thus institutionalised in two ways. The first, through the Treaty
of Rome and the Conventions of Yaounde and Lome, provides for
special trading arrangements between the West African countries as
part of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group and the EEC.
The EEC/ACP arrangements are intended to increase the exposure of
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the ACP countries to additional financial, trade and investment
linkages with the EEC bloc, thereby giving them increased
opportunities for accessibility to international trade financing
credits to help offset part of their trade losses. The arrangements
are also meant to diversify ACP trade among Western European
countries. For West Africa in particular, the EEC/ACP arrangements
should also help to further sustain the traditional francophone and
anglophone trading links. Anglophone links are further enhanced
through the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) arrangements.
The second form of institutionalised regional trading relations
between West Africa and the outside world is through inter-
governmental technical co-operation agreements with countries like
the USSR and the People's Republic of China.	 However, these
arrangements featured only in the 1960s and early 1970s, and they
required in essence the recipient West African countries to barter
part of their commodity exports in exchange for economic and other
technical assistance from each donor country. The intention, as in
the import-substitution strategy, ironically, was to provide foreign
exchange savings in settlement of the corresponding repayment
obligations.
Between 1961 and 1972, the Republic of China, for instance, had
signed trade-linked technical co-operation agreements with more than
half of the sixteen West African countries under study: Gambia in
1966 and 1968; Ghana in 1968 and 1971; Ivory Coast in 1962 and
1967; Liberia in 1961, 1965 and 1967; Niger in 1962, 1963, 1966 and
1972; Senegal in 1963 and 1969;.
 Togo in 1964 and 1970; and Burkina
in 1964-66, 1970 and 1972. It was essentially the termination
and/or abrupt abandonment of these arrangements - as repayment
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arrears began to mount in respect of both commodity, local currency
and eventually foreign convertible currency obligations - that
accounted for the sharp slow down in West Africa's overall trade
with the USSR and China after 1975 (see Table 4G).
For instance, during the period of these technical co-operation
agreements, the share of Ghana's trade to the centrally planned
countries rose from 5 per cent to 24 per cent between 1960 and 1965.
Exports dropped from 12.8 per cent in 1975 to 7.4 per cent in 1980,
while the corresponding level of imports from them only ranged
between 2.2 per cent in 1975 to 3.0 per cent by 1980. Similarly,
Nigeria's exports to these countries has fallen to 0.1 per cent by
1980, as imports dropped to around 1.4 per cent. Gambia's imports
from the centrally planned countries declined from 17.2 per cent to
6.1 per cent over the review period. The overall share of West
African trade by centrally planned countries in 1975-81 dropped from
2.4 per cent for exports (2.0 per cent for imports) to 0.7 per cent
(1.6 per cent).
4.3 PATTERNS OF INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE
4.3.1 Growth and Distribution
As noted in the last chapter, the ECO WAS Treaty has envisaged
the establishment of a customs union within the Community. This
implies that all customs duties and other charges in imports from
member countries should be eliminated and a common tariff against
third countries is adopted. It also implies, in line with standard
economic integration theory, that achieving a customs union would
enhance trade among the member states. But, as already noted,
scarcely any meaningful progress has been made in dismantling
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tariffs within the Community as well as in concertedly attacking
some of the more structural factors which have adversely affected
the expansion of intra-regional trade. Negotiations in this
direction have largely been unproductive, partly for genuine
reasons, such as the potential loss of customs revenues, especially
for countries largely dependent on customs duties, but also for less
genuine reasons that have to do more with the desire to protect
national sovereignty. The result is that ten years after the
signing of the ECO WAS Treaty, trade regulations within the Community
have remained virtually unchanged from what they were before the
Treaty. In the event, the existence of the organisation has hardly
provided any significant impetus to intra-regional trade promotion.
The magnitude of this trade as a corollary of the substantially
entrenched extra-regional trade has remained strikingly low and is
still substantially rudimentary in structure. Based upon past
trends, there are hardly any visible tendencies for its improvement
without any meaningful monetary and economic integration.
In terms of magnitudes, the level of intra-ECOWAS exports and
imports has increased individually by more than sevenfold, from less
than $100 million in 1970 to between $700-$800 million by the end of
1983. Exports have risen from $86 million in 1970 to $870.9 million
in 1983, while the corresponding level of intra-Community imports
has risen from $76 million to $756.8 million. However, if estimates
for Nigeria are excluded on account of over 90 per cent of the
country's exports being crude oil, intra-ECOWAS exports are lower
but rising rather more steadily over the fourteen year period; from
$79 million in 1970 to $589.9 million in 1983. In contrast,
because of Nigeria's low level of intra-Community imports, its
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effect on the trend of total intra-Community import trade is
disproportionate. The level of intra-ECOWAS imports (excluding
Nigeria) has risen by more than nine times in 1970-83 (7.5 times for
exports) from $72 million to $654.8 million.
Table 4L shows that the level of intra-ECOWAS trade has been
consistently below 5 er cent of overall trade for either exports or
imports.
When the Community began in 1975, its member states sold on
average 4.1 per cent of their total exports to other member states.
That ratio has only risen marginally to 4.2 per cent by 1983 after
dipping a little between 2.9-3.7 per cent in the intermittent years.
There is a similar situation on the import side. If one also
excludes estimates for Nigeria, total intra-ECOWAS exports rose to
9.1 per cent of total exports or 0.67 per cent of Community GDP
(includes GNP estimates for Cape Verde, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau).
Total intra-ECOWAS exports, including Nigeria, is 0.99 per cent of
Community GDP. The Community's merchandise exports to the rest of
the world amounted to 22.6 per cent of GDP in 1983. Among the 16
member states there are no signs of a levelling off in the fraction
of GDP devoted to intra-Community trade. Only Senegal has devoted
more than 5 per cent of GDP to intra-Community export trade. The
ratio in 1983 for each member state is shown below (per cent):
Benin 0.95 Gambia 3.6 Guinea 0.02
Burkina 3.0 Ghana 0.2 Guinea-Bissau 0.4
Liberia 1.0 Nigeria 0.4 Ivory Coast 4.2
Niger 4.4 Senegal 5.3 Sierra Leone 0.1
Togo 4.2
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Table 4L ECOWAS: Intra-Community Trade as a Proportion of Overall Trade, 1970-1983
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
EXPORTS TO COMMUNITY
1976	 1977	 1978	 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Benin 17.2 9.8 11.9 12.7 14.0 32.3 13.6 14.7 12.5 7.8 7.9 15.1 23.8 10.5
Burkina 48.8 53.6 59.5 52.2 47.6 50.4 21.2 36.9 48.6 48.0 61.1 74.4 30.0 27.3
Cape Verde - - - - - 5.0 10.0 - 6.7 13.3 - - -
Gambia 1.5 4.6 2.2 1.6 1.4 3.4 4.9 6.0 5.5 8.9 21.7 25.7 20.4 16.0
Ghana 0.4 0.9 1.1 2.2 0.7 2.0 1.6 1.4 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.9 0.6 0.9
Guinea 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Guinea-Bissau 2.5 5.0 3.3 - 1.0 13.4 14.5 9.5 9.1 9.5 11.5 12.4 4.9 5.0
Ivory Coast 4.7 4.7 6.6 7.6 9.4 12.7 7.8 7.4 6.5 8.7 8.8 10.3 10.9 12.2
Liberia 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.2 - 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.1
Mali 65.8 62.2 56.6 40.9 32.4 32.5 23.4 18.7 7.6 9.1 8.1 10.7 5.0 4.9
Mauritania 2.4 2.8 - 0.1 0.2 0.2 4.2 - - - - - - -
Niger 32.1 33.9 33.6 33.2 33.5 22.2 26.0 18.6 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.7 21.4 18.8
Nigeria 0.6 1.8 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.0
Senegal 1.0 23.0 0.7 24.9 17.3 15.2 11.4 17.9 21.4 16.2 27.8 28.8 23.8 23.4
Sierra Leone 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 2.0 2.3 1.0 1.1 - - - - 0.9 0.8
Togo 2.1 2.7 2.8 3.9 2.2 5.6 6.2 3.9 9.3 11.8 19.0 18.5 12.3 12.5
ECOWAS 2.9 4.0 3.3 4.1 3.2 4.1 3.3 .	 3.7 3.6 3.0 2.9 3.6 3.6 4.2
Excl Nigeria 4.6 6.2 5.4 7.5 7.3 8.7 6.6 7.0 5.6 6.4 7.9 9.0 8.7 9.1
IMPORTS FROM COMMUNITY
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Benin 9.5 10.1 8.7 10.2 11.9 6.6 5.1 4.4 3.3 4.6 4.8 4.2 2.5 3.9
Burkina 22.7 20.6 22.7 19.8 20.0 22.0 19.5 16.4 15.0 21.7 26.8 28.4 30.0 28.4
Cape Verde - - - - 0.5 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.1
Gambia 3.3 5.4 6.3 6.2 5.5 5.8 3.1 3.7 5.5 3.4 5.3 7.1 6.1 6.4
Ghana 2.8 3.5 5.5 6.3 9.8 8.6 11.6 11.7 11.3 13.0 17.0 15.2 16.8 15.0
Guinea 1.4 3.9 1.8 1.3 1.7 0.8 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.6 2.6 2.6 4.3 4.3
Guinea-Bissau 0.4 0.3 0.6 - 0.3 2.0 2.9 2.2 1.3 3.7 5.3 7.5 3.6 3.2
Ivory Coast 2.9 3.6 4.9 3.9 7.2 7.2 4.6 5.3 4.8 4.4 4.6 5.5 6.2 6.5
Liberia 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.7 3.1 0.8 0.9 2.6 2.0 2.3 1.5 1.7 0.3 0.3
Mali 16.5 19.9 20.1 18.2 15.5 26.6 24.2 27.3 28.7 28.6 29.7 35.8 37.5 32.4
Mauritania 5.9 5.8 2.0 22.2 19.2 19.1 11.6 17.2 9.5 14.1 11.5 12.4 6.3 6.6
Niger 13.2 10.9 13.6 12.4 16.1 3.0 14.5 21.2 16.4 10.4 8.4 10.8 20.0 25.3
Nigeria 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.2
Senegal 2.1 1.7 8.0 9.5 8.6 6.1 7.2 6.4 6.8 10.2 9.8 5.1 5.1
Sierra Leone 4.0 6.4 8.9 4.9 10.3 25.3 14.7 27.7 10.2 - 0.5 1.0 2.2 2.9
Togo 7.0 6.1 5.1 5.1 5.9 4.7 3.4 2.7 2.8 14.5 19.1 16.1 3.4 2.9
ECOWAS 2.7 2.8 3.4 4.3 5.4 4.0 3.0 3.5 2.9 4.0 3.9 3.6 3.5 4.3
Excl Nigeria 4.1 5.0 5.8 7.0 9.1 9.0 7.3 8.7 7.4 8.2 9.4 10.1 6.9 7.3
Source: World Bank, Direction of Trade Statistics
Notes:	 - Not available, nil or negligible
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Table 4L also shows that the relative importance of the various
ECOWAS member countries to overall regional trade varies widely. In
relation to overall trade, by far the largest exporter and importer
in the region is Burkina Fasso. Exports from Burkina to the
Community have represented over 70 per cent (1981) of the country's
total exports. Both imports to and exports from Burkina almost
levelled off at 28 per cent of total trade in 1983. Benin, Ivory
Coast, Senegal and Togo are the next largest exporters to the
Community, while Mali, Ghana and Niger are the next largest
importers in intra-Community trade. While these countries have
increased their level of intra-ECOWAS trade in relation to overall
trade since 1975, in some member states, shifts which occurred in
the commodity composition of their trade in the 1970s, coupled with
the effects of deteriorating climatic, political and economic
conditions accounted for the substantial drop in intra-Community
trade. Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone are among
those countries that have devoted the lowest percentage of overall
trade to intra-ECOWAS trade . In terms of total national imports,
percentages in Nigeria and Liberia are also among the least in the
region, averaging far less than 2 per cent of total imports.
However in value terms, the distribution of intra-ECOWAS trade
shown in Table 4M singles out Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Senegal as
major exporters, and Ghana, Ivory Coast, mall and Senegal as
principal importers. Nigeria is by far the largest exporter, having
on average accounted for over 40 per cent of total intra-Community
exports since the commencement of ECOWAS. Exports from Ivory Coast
have ranged between 15 - 34 per cent of total exports. On the
import side, Ghana is the largest importer and takes on average,
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over 14 per cent of total intra-regional imports. By contrast, Cape
Verde is the least exporter and importer, having accounted for
around 0.1 per cent of both total exports and imports. Between
these variations, most countries in the region have shown intra-
regional export and import shares that range between 1 and 3 per
cent of total trade.
A vital feature in the pattern of distribution of intra-ECOWAS
trade, as also observed from Table 4M, is the relative importance of
the francophone countries in terms of the degree of dependable
participation. This feature is significant as these countries
(except Mauritania and Guinea) belong to the West African Monetary
Union (WAMU), a grouping which, as already noted, is characterised
by the use of a single common currency and a common central bank
among member states. Besides, it will be discovered in the next
section that much of the francophones' intra-Community trade is
between themselves with each country having generally less trade
relations with the rest of the ECOWAS member states. Together, the
nine francophone states have accounted for over 50 per cent of total
intra-regional trade. In 1983, their share in total exports was
64.6 per cent (or 95.4 per cent excluding Nigeria) and 69.7 per cent
(or 80.5 per cent excluding Nigeria) in total imports. The
principal participants amongst them, undoubtedly, are the more
developed states, Ivory Coast and Senegal. By contrast, the share
of the two lusophone member states in both exports and imports has
remained rather negligible, ranging between 0.07 per cent for
exports to 0.26 per cent for imports in 1983. While the combined
share of intra-Community trade (exports plus imports) by the seven
WAMU member states has risen from 7 to 12 per cent of their overall
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foreign trade in 1970-81, for the remaining nine ECOWAS member
countries, it has remained particularly small. This is the case
especially for Cape Verde, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria, whose
combined intra-ECOWAS trade has accounted, on average, for less than
2 per cent of overall exports and imports. Trade among the
anglophones, except for import of Nigerian petroleum, is also
strikingly low.
4.3.2 Intra-Regional Trade Matrices
The direction of intra-ECOWAS trade flows and the resulting
inter-country net trade balances are illustrated in three trade
matrices: Table 4N for 1970-75 (the pre-ECOWAS period), and Tables
40 and 4P for the periods 1976-80 and 1983 (showing trade trends
since the establishment of ECOWAS). 	 A number of pertinent
observations can be made which characterise both country and sub-
regional trade positions.
The first which, like the rest, derives largely from the
divergent historical and geo-political orientations of the member
states as well as from the relatively wide disparities in economic
development levels between them, relates essentially to the
continued dominance of the more advanced member countries - Ghana,
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal and to a lesser extent, Liberia. The
conspicuously skewed direction of trade as the Tables show is that
of the 16 member states only Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal and, to
some extent Liberia are predominantly net exporters while the rest
of the Community, especially Ghana, are net importers with widening
trade deficits throughout the 14 year period.
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In the review period, which also coincides with the rising
importance of oil, Nigeria's intra-regional trade surplus rose from
a cummulative total of $390.90 million in 1970-75 to a similar total
of $1136.60 million for the period 1976-80, representing a
percentage increase of 190.8 per cent. Corresponding surpluses for
Ivory Coast and Senegal rose by 120 per cent and 100 per cent
respectively over the two periods. Over 50 per cent of Nigeria's
surpluses (and of Ghana's corresponding deficits) arose from trade
with Ghana, while the bulk of Ivory Coast and Senegal's trade has
essentially been in respect of their trade links with other
francophone member countries, notably Benin, Burkina, Mali and
Niger. The main difference between the three net exporters however
is that trade between Ivory Coast and Senegal and the rest of the
region is more diversified, both in the variety of traded goods and
in the number of member trading partners than that between Nigeria
and the rest of the region which has depended more generally on oil
exports, with Ghana being the major taker.
While there is a reasonable flow of trade between countries
bordering each other, the matrices also indicate the relative
dependence of the landlocked member states (le Niger and Mali) on
the coastal states. More importantly, the matrices do stress the
dominance of the francophones in intra-ECOWAS trade. They
illustrate that trade between this group of countries is
consistently higher than that between them and the other members of
ECOWAS, except to some extent trade with Nigeria.
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Table 4Q ECOWAS: Performance of Sub-Regional Groupings in Intra-
ECOWAS Trade
Exports	 Imports
CEA()
	
1974	 1983	 1974 1983
1 Share in Intra-ECOWAS trade ($m) 248.5 562.0 237.1 515.2
2 Share in Intra-ECOWAS trade 04) 60.2 64.5 72.4 68.1
3 Intra-CEAO trade ($m) 197.6 356.22 146.8 358.68
4 3 as a percentage of 1 79.5 63.4 61.9 69.6.
Exports
	
Imports
MRU
	
1974 1983	 1974 1983
1 Share in Intra-ECOWAS trade ($m) 5.18 11.49 13.45 23.28
2 Share in Intra-ECOWAS trade (%) 2.1 1.3 7.6 3.1
3 Intra-MRU trade ($m) 1.57 7.26 2.07 9.29
4 3 as a percentage of 1 30.3 63.2 15.4 39.9
SENEGAMBIA
Exports
1974	 1983
Imports
1974	 1983
1 Share in Intra-ECOWAS trade ($m) 126.88 144.36 110.02 56.37
2 Share in Intra-ECOWAS trade ($m) 13.4 16.6 11.3 7.4
3 Intra-Senegambia trade ($m) 5.41 5.35 5.95 4.82
4 3 as a percentage of 1 4.3 3.7 5.4 8.6
Source: As in Tables 4N, 40 and 4P
On a sub-regional basis each of the three economic groupings
discussed in the last chapter (ie CEAO, MRU and Senegambia) has
since its inception shown (in value terms) some improvement in its
share of intra-ECOWAS trade, although it can be argued that as in
the ECOWAS community at large such performance could not have been
inspired purely by membership to either group. Table 4Q shows that
the value share of the CEAO and MRU in total intra-ECOWAS trade as
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well as the proportion of the respective intra-union trade have
both more than doubled between 1974 and 1983. In percentage terms
however, the share of intra-union trade in the CEAO's total ECOWAS
export trade dropped from 79.5 per cent in 1974 to 63.4 per cent in
1983 while that of the MRU more than doubled. The CEAO's declining
trend can be attributed to the rising cost of Nigerian oil exports.
On the other hand, intra-Senegambia export trade, dominated largely
by Senegal, has also declined as a proportion of the confederation's
combined exports in total intra-ECOWAS exports. In the Lusophone
group, Cape Verde has depended more exclusively on trade with
Guinea-Bissau, while that of Guinea-Bissau appears relatively more
diversified, involving trade links with Gambia, Guinea, Liberia and
Senegal.
4.3.3 Coffmodity Composition
A great deal of intra-ECOWAS trade is concerned with farm
crops, particularly foodstuffs and re-exports of imports from
outside the region, although in more recent years, oil from Nigeria
and simple manufactures, especially from Ivory Coast and Senegal,
have also shown increasing importance. As discussed in Chapter 2,
ecological variations in most of the countries have resulted in some
broad specialisations and therefore in the promotion of
interdependence through intra-regional trade. This is particularly
the case with such countries as Nigeria, Ivory Coast, .Ghana, Guinea
and Sierra Leone. The smaller countries like Benin and Togo, which
also span several latitudes of forest zone and grassland, also
produce a wide variety of staple foods according to the range of
ecological zones they traverse. A contrasting situation occurs in
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the more arid countries - Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and
Burkina Fasso - devoid of humid tropical environments characterised
by root-crop and tree-crop economies. There is therefore greater
intra-regional trade flows involving a greater variety of food
staples in the first group of countries than in the second. The
arid countries have however traded such commodities as livestock
products, grains and dried and smoked fish in exchange for coastal
consumer products, including simple manufactures.
In recent years, the rapid disappearance of many of these
traditional exchange commodities among West African countries has
been increasingly replaced (apart from oil) by re-exports of
foodstuffs and such commodities as textiles and light consumer
durables, the bulk of which tend to be traded in the more
convertible regional and extra-regional currencies, especially in
the border market centres. This high incidence of re-export trade
has more serious foreign exchange implications for several countries
in the region, especially the less convertible countries. This is
also true for trade even in the simple manufactures - eg cotton
cloth, soap, tobacco, matches, plastics, and confectionaries -
which, as already noted, have a high import-input content. On the
whole, with extra-regional trade so deeply entrenched within the
industrial and agricultural production and consumption demands of
the West African countries, it is expected that the range of
indigenous goods that enter intra-regional trade has to be extremely
narrow. On the whole, this range (including even re-exports and
simple manufactures) is almost exactly the same for all countries.
The flows of agricultural foodstuffs have been affected during the
last few years, especially that of rice, by the weakened
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agricultural positions of the grassland countries. At the same
time, the establishment of similar industries almost everywhere
aggravates competition and is liable to further reduce intra-
regional trade flows in future. Although modest in absolute terms,
these flows are important and extremely vital for several infant
industries as is shown by the partial use of their actual production
capacities.
4.4 FACTORS AFFECTING INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE
4.4.1 Non-Monetary Factors
At the beginning of this chapter the question was posed whether
the common tendency of West AFrican trade being more outward- than
internal-oriented, or, indeed, whether the consequent small and
stagnating proportion of intra-regional trade is structural,
political, economic, financial or monetary, or, just 'natural' or
'artificial'. Some of these important considerations have already
been highlighted in this chapter as well as discussed in the
preceding chapters. They undoubtedly constitute the major
constraints not only for the expansion of intra-regional trade but
also for the overall development process.
It is thus recognised by now that the problems of trade and
economic relations with developing regions and countries and those
of intra-regional West African trade are not dissimilar: the low
level of economic development, the need for changes in production
and consumption structures, the paucity of information, transport
and communications network, inadequate and limited competence in
trade promotion, the large and dominant foreign cleavage in import
and export trade, historic ties, border closures, road blocks and
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other non-tariff barriers, and negative attitudes of nationalism.
These factors broadly represent the so-called non-monetary obstacles
which, in combination with the monetary and financial constraints,
inhibit the expansion of intra-regional trade. Special concrete
efforts are therefore necessary to fully appreciate them to identify
possibilities for co-operation in trade, finance, industry and
agriculture. This will require a degree of economic co-operation
not yet, perhaps, sufficiently recognised or accepted by West
African states.
Hopkins (1973) has stressed that the low level of intra-West
African trade should be attributed to the achievement of political
independence which as he puts it, 'led to the erection of barriers
to the internal flow of goods and services, the claims of
territorial sovereignty providing in this instance more than a match
for the ideals of pan-Africanism% One very important implication
deriving out of this tendency is the lack of enthusiasm for
countries to make their economic and production structures
relatively complementary to one another. Most of the trade policies
pursued in the region do not discriminate in favour of intra-
regional trade and many countries have simply acquiesced to the
status quo in which foreign trade is the most important
consideration and therefore the most favoured in national policy
making, no matter its costs.
Perhaps one would have expected a number of socio-economic
factors to have a positive influence on intra-West African trade.
These include the socio-cultural inter-country linkages which
resulted form the division of ethnic groups following the colonial
frontier demarcations of the region (eg the Fullahs between Sierra
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Leone and Guinea; the Ewe between Ghana and Togo; the Vi, Mende and
Kissi between Liberia and Sierra Leone; the Gambia and Senegal,
though two different countries with different political backgrounds,
are ethnically the same); those associated with the large-scale
intra-regional migration; and the range of ecological variations.
This expectation is built on the assumption that at least the flow
of local products would be encouraged as migrants and ethnic
settlements would have a tendency to retain their eating habits,
traditional values and life style no matter where they are; thereby
enabling major immigrant countries like Nigeria (until the recent
mass repatriations of 1981-84), Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and
Senegal to gain through trade in huge quantities of foodstuffs and
other delicacies. While this logical sequence holds, it should also
be expected that its realisation in practice, at least in West
Africa, is dampened by the close similarity that exists in the
consumption patterns of the countries and therefore in the domestic
production of staple (or very close substitutes) food items.
It also needs to be recognised that while the close trading
relations which exist among the francophone states may be justified
by their close colonial and linguistic links, the likelihood exists
that this pattern could change towards greater intra-regional
diversification once a common currency operates throughout West
Africa. In fact, as will be discussed later in the study, intra-
WAMU trade is excluded from the West African Clearing House
arrangements. The direct implication is that more than half of
total intra-regional trade is automatically excluded from the
existing all-embracing monetary integration scheme.
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4.4.2 Monetary and Financial Factors
The analysis of West Africa's financial system in a later
chapter will try to divulge in some detail the nature and structural
foundations of this second set of factors which have in many
respects deterred the extent of mutual trade in the region. The IMF
(1980) reckons that these are factors that must of necessity assume
increasing importance of a deterrent to intra-West African trade
once the first subset of obstacles discussed above are alleviated.
But to the extent that the complete elimination of these non-
monetary barriers, many of which are structural in design, as a
first step, is seemingly cumbersome and practically difficult and,
because they are in many ways closely related to the monetary and
financial obstacles, it is argued that the alleviation of both sets
of obstacles should be considered simultaneously. The distinction
between monetary and non-monetary restrictions may be somewhat
arbitrary if only because impediments to the flow of finance
ultimately influence the flow of trade. But the means by which
currency arrangements can affect the channels of trade are of
immediate relevance to this study.
	 The deficiency of these
arrangements among West African countries has substantially led to
various forms of illegal exchange of goods and currencies.
In general, monetary and financial obstacles inhibiting intra-
West African trade are to be found not only in the fact that there
are a considerable number of national currencies, but, more
importantly, in the fact that there are differing degrees of
monetary control and financial practices. The widespread adoption
of foreign exchange control and other import restrictions,
especially among the former sterling area countries, has permitted
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the currencies of these countries to remain overpriced, 'which
cancels out significant cases of comparative advantage' (Balassa,
1965, p 31). Furthermore, all West African currencies, except the
Liberian dollar (which is the same as the US dollar) and to a lesser
extent, the CFA franc, are grossly inconvertible, which makes them
always in large supply on the parallel market. Some of the most
inconvertible currencies like the Ghanaian cedi, the leone and the
Guinean Syli command lower prices vis-a-vis the official rates for
the more convertible currencies. However to the extent that
virtually all West African currencies are overvalued even vis-a-vis
each other, the expansion of intra-regional trade along the lines of
fully liberalising it, adopting a common trade policy, and/or common
tariffs with respect to goods of overseas origin would also imply
substantial downward adjustment of each currency if persistent
payments problems are to be avoided.
The implications for intra-West African trade of the lack of
convertibility between currencies is illustrated as follows. Let us
consider Sierra Leone's currency, the leone, which is convertible
into a 'master' currency, say sterling, after a delay of time, Ti;
and suppose that sterling has to be reconverted into another master
currency, say the French franc, after another delay, 1 2 ; and that
the French franc is convertible into another sub-currency, the CFA
franc, after a delay, T3; then the aggregate waiting time to convert
the leone into the CFA franc is the time it takes to go through the
exchange transactions route, Ti + 12 + 13, which is graphically
represented:
13
Sterling	 French franc
T2
Leone	 CFA franc
Each of these delays involves costs and profit margins that are
expressed in real costs and rents accruing to the banking systems
and passed on through currency margin differentials to the
transactor and ultimately, the trader. This exchange problem is
compounded by the inadequacy of formal banking and currency market
facilities to enhance the execution of intra-regional currency
transfers without having to go through extra-regional currency and
institutional transit facilities.
As already indicated, the nature and deleterious effects of
these monetary and financial factors on the domestic economies as
well as on the West African region as a whole will be analysed later
on. Meanwhile the inhibiting effects of the West African Monetary
Union on the expansion of intra-West African trade can be related
further to, firstly, the limit set on any meaningful monetary co-
operation (eg exchange rate adjustment and/or realignment) between
the union and those outside it; and second, the limit set on the
ability of members of the union to pursue independent monetary,
financial and development strategies which would be a pre-requisite
to any meaningful development of complementarities to promote
intra-West African trade.
Also, while in the anglophones trade is largely distorted
through the adoption of very tight exchange controls and payment
restrictions, a different bias distorts trade relations in the WAMU.
The ready availability of the French franc, in contrast with other
currencies, makes it natural to conserve drawings on the common pool
of scarcer currencies for more urgent requirements, where the cost
differentials between France and other countries are greatest. The
discrimination is implicit but it may have a great impact on the
pattern of trade.
4.4.3 Unrecorded Trade
Another significant aspect of the pattern of intra-ECOWAS trade
is that much of it is 'underground', taking the form of illegal
trading and smuggling and is therefore unrecorded. There are no
precise figures for its level but most estimates agree that this
trade is substantial and may be several times bigger than the
,
recorded trade.
The items of unrecorded trade are wide ranging. Apart from the
more obvious local foodstuffs found in the markets physically
convenient to sellers but technically on different national
territory from their own (this trade is only an incidental extension
of local commerce across frontiers), it also involves the smuggling
of some of the most valuable export products (eg diamonds and gold)
and an assortment of durable and non-durable consumer goods
manufactured both in the region and outside it.
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the continued
existence of unrecorded trade in West Africa as well as for its
expansion in recent times can be found in the wide disparities in
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trade and exchange rate policies among the member countries.
Because of he concomitant effects of the divergent practices on
domestic prices, customs duties, the convertibility of national
currencies and the supply of basic commodities, there has been a.
tendency to take across borders goods from countries with highly
restrictive trade and monetary practices for goods from those
countries with more liberal trade and monetary systems.
In this respect, the most adversely affected are the anglophone
member states which also are the ones maintaining tighter trade
restrictions even with their ECOWAS neighbours and non-convertible
currencies. Typified by Ghana's experience, these countries have
also experienced the most frequent and widest fluctuations
(generally downward) of their national exchange rates as well as a
rising shortage of international liquidity. Consequently,
unrecorded trade has usually involved smuggling out the products of
the more affected countries in exchange for either the convertible
CFA francs or Liberian dollars, with which the 'underground' traders
would buy goods the importation of which is prohibited or severely
restricted in their own country. Alternatively, since trade is
generally transacted in relatively convertible regional currencies,
the foreign exchange earnings are also smuggled into the more
restrictive countries to finance the black market activities which
further disequilibrates the official exchange rate and steps up the
incidence of smuggling.
It is generally acknowledged that on this course of events, the
francophone countries are more generally the major beneficiaries.
For example, it is common knowledge that a significant part of Togo
and Benin's imports of wines and spirits, cigarettes and embroidery
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ultimately end up in Nigeria, while Niger has made no secret of the
fact that its economy depends heavily on imports from Nigeria (since
Niger is the nearest landlocked country to Nigeria), almost all of
them through the underground market.
In general, the underground economy in West Africa has had its
adverse impact on the incentives for the member countries of ECOWAS
to implement trade promotion aspects of the Treaty. The fact is
that eventhough the movement of national products is not approved of
officially, in almost all cases these products are to be found in
most national markets. Yet, the large size of the underground trade
cannot be reasonably blaimed for the lack of impact by EGO WAS on
intra-Community trade. No plausible allowance for the existence of
unrecorded or smuggled exports would remove the impression that
production for export of many of the major commodities discussed
earlier has strongly declined in Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Sierra.
Leone and strongly grown in the Ivory Coast. Strong and meaningful
concerted policies are needed to control the incidence of smuggling.
It is thus in its ability to remove or minimise the existing
incentives for participation in the underground or black market
currency and commodity activities as well as the monetary and non-
monetary obstacles of intra-ECOWAS trade that the new role of
monetary integration in West Africa is further appreciated in this
study.
4.5 TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA
The very low proportions of intra-West African trade in terms
of the GDP/GNP (see Section 4.3) are by implication the direct
result of correspondingly high and rising foreign trade/GDP (or GNP)
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ratios; which further demonstrates, statistically, the strategic
role of foreign trade in West Africa's development process. These
ratios also provide another measure for testing the success of
economic integration as well as the degree of openness of the West
African economies.
Indeed for a fairly large number of LDCs foreign trade/GDP
ratios have risen quite substantially during the last three decades
both in terms of exports and imports and a large part of this upward
trend especially since the 1970s, can be attributed to upward shifts
in oil prices.
IMF estimates (see: IMF, Supplement on Trade Statistics, 1982)
have shown that the median export/GDP ratio for the non-oil
developing countries increased slightly to 16.8 per cent (29.6 per
cent for imports) in 1970 from 16.0 per cent in 1960 (21.8 per cent
for imports) but then showed a significant increase to 20.4 per cent
(32.0 per cent for imports) in 1980.
The observed ratios in Table 4R illustrate the rising exposure
of West African economies to external trade influences since the end
of colonial rule. The marked inter-country variance in the ratios
between 1960 and 1981 largely relates to the divergencies between
countries in their commercial policies and the fortunes of their
exports as well as to changes in per capita incomes.
The ratios of exports to the GDP show that on average
production for exports has typically made up no less than 10 per
cent of the GDP in the majority of the West African countries. In
the major iron ore producing countries - Liberia and Mauritania in
particular - export production has represented over 40 per cent of
total domestic production. The very low domestic demand for export
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products, together with exceptionally huge export surpluses have in
part also accounted for rising ratios in other mineral exporting
countries like Nigeria, Togo, Niger and Guinea. For the region as a
whole, the export/GDP ratios have tended to rise more rapidly in the
1970s than the decades before. The percentage number of countries
where this ratio exceeded 20 per cent has increased from 25 per cent
in 1960 to 44 per cent by 1981.
For imports, the changes in the ratios have been more
pronounced. Traditional import propensities (ratio of imports to
GDP) and import coefficients (ratio of imports to GNE) have been
very high, indicating further that output is specialised for export
sales and also that imports in West African countries have accounted
for an equally large share of aggregate national expenditures.
Between 1960 and 1981 the number of countries with import/GDP ratios
greater than 20 per cent increased from 38 per cent in 1960 to 69
per cent in 1970 and 81 per cent in 1981. Exceptionally high ratios
of over 50 per cent were experienced in Benin, The Gambia, Liberia
and Togo in 1981. In the same year also, all countries in the
region had import/GNE ratios of over 20 per cent, with countries
like Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Liberia and Togo experiencing
ratios of above 50 per cent.
The inadequacy of exports to provide sufficient cover for
corresponding levels of imports is also illustrated in the Table by
the declining export/import ratios in most countries. The Table
indicates that only two countries - Liberia and Ivory Coast - have
managed to show ratios of 100 per cent and above from 1960 through
1981. Nigeria could only maintain such a situation after 1970
following the huge oil revenues. The worst deterioration was in
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Benin and Cape Verde where the ratios fell from above 50 per cent in
1960 to below 10 per cent in 1981 as well as in The Gambia where it
dropped to 22 per cent in 1981 from over 80 per cent between 1960
and 1975. The ratio has exceptionally remained low in Guinea-
Bissau.
Finally, the median ratio of West Africa's total foreign trade
(imports plus exports) to the GDP increased from 34.3 per cent in
1960 to 40 per cent in 1970 and 55.3 per cent in 1981. While the
median export/GDP ratio rose only marginally to 17.9 per cent in
1981, from 15.1 per cent in 1960, that for imports was more
distinct, rising from 21.7 per cent in 1960 to 32 per cent in 1981.
The adequacy of export value in covering import bills has declined
from an export/import ratio of 89.2 per cent in 1960 to 66.1 per
cent in 1981, indicating also the faster growth in import bills.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
The discussion in this chapter on the dimensions of West
Africa's trade relations may be summarised as follows. Firstly,
West African export performance in recent years is judged by
reference to the composition of export commodities (which are wholly
primary raw material inputs), and changes in their relative prices,
as well as to trends in volumes. While export composition in some
countries has changed only marginally, in others it has been greatly
altered - especially in Nigeria, because of the emergence of mineral
oil as the predominant export. In a number of countries, mineral
exports had by the end of the 1970s contributed more than the
traditional agricultural exports.
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Secondly, the composition of West African imports has altered
because of changes in the structures of domestic production and
expenditure and changes in import costs, particularly the cost of
imported fuel.
Although both export and import values have been falling during
the early 1980s, the import-export gap is still wide enough to
impose serious problems for development and growth. Geographically
Nigerian oil has made West African export links as much
transatlantic as with Western Europe. Import ties are however still
more largely with the European Community. On the whole, there has
been considerable diversification of West African trade connections
to the extent that in virtually every country, the trading
predominance of the former metropolitan power, though still
relatively significant to influence national trading and financial
policies, has reduced since the achievement of political
independence.
Another, and generally the most important feature of West
African trade from the point of view of economic integration, is
that intra-West Africa is still relatively insubstantial; only for
two countries - Burkina and Niger - has it really (in terms of both
intra-regional exports and imports) consistently exceeded 15 per
cent of total exports or imports throughout the review period, 1970-
83. Its pattern however reflects the general importance of the
francophones compared with the rest of the countries, especially the
anglophones. Our discussion of West Africa's intra-regional trade
has carefully stressed the monetary and non-monetary obstacles for
its expansion, including of course the fact that much of it is
still 'underground' and therefore unrecorded. Among the major
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constraints emphasised included the relative inconvertibility of the
national currencies and foreign exchange control and other trade and
financial restrictions which have also given rise to overvalued
currencies.
The pattern of West African resource endownment and trading
relations have combined to ultimately determine the divergent
evolution of the various West African economies. The most critical
case for treatment is that of countries suffering increasingly from
falling export revenues and rising import bills. For improving West
African trade performance as a whole, adjustment means cutting
and/or rationalising imports to stress only 'essential' commodities
and services and expanding production and exports, which could also
mean the search for other exploitable natural resources suitable for
export and reducing import demand, especially of foodstuffs and
intermediate technology. Equally important for the West African
economies, most of which are continuously weakening, is the need for
a redistribution of world effective demand in their favour. This in
effect would be accomplished more meaningful through preferential or
relatively sustained prices for raw material exports and capital
imports, through increased financial assistance without resorting to
further accumulation of high debt-service commitments, and through
increased local processing before export to markets that should also
include industrial countries.
In the context of the 'dynamic' approach to economic
integration, the corollary follows that the removal of the
constraints to intra-West African trade and its expansion through an
increase in effective intra-regional demand would enhance the
realisation of the benefits of integration - in particular trade
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creation and trade diversion effects in industrial and agricultural
processes, as well as in carefully and meaningfully conceived
internal and external tariff policies. Thus, the adjustment process
of intra-West African trade requires the formation of a regional
machinery that would reorient and exert a massive influence on
existing consumption and production patterns, ease the information,
transport and communications problems to make feasible both the
movements of goods and persons among the member countries, and,
above all, facilitate intra-regional currency exchange and enable an
improvement in regional convertibility.
We therefore need to emphasise that in line with the main
hypothesis of this study, the role of monetary integration for West
Africa is defined in terms of its capacity to significantly
influence and facilitate these two adjustment processes against
which effective economic integration in the region must be tested.
The need to develop intra-West African trade is fully recognised but
so also is the fact that West Africa's overall trade and financial
relations and the payments and adjustment problems they occasion
create a need to extend and deepen the scope of monetary and
economic co-operation among member countries. In this context, the
role of West Africa's monetary and banking arrangements and
relationships are equally crucial, especially as they are generally
disintegrated, rudimentary and dependent in operational structure
and performance. This feature of the West African economy is
described and analysed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5
MONEY AND THE BANKING SYSTEM IN WEST AFRICA
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The comparative description and analysis of the structure,
instruments, processes and performance of the West African monetary
and banking systems in this chapter is concerned with the
implications of its findings for efforts to achieving effective
monetary and economic integration in the region. In particular, the
interrelated aspects of the monetary integration strategy that is
argued in this study include the very close co-ordination or
harmonisation of domestic monetary policies and banking practices.
This emphasises not only the relevance of the differences in central
banking arrangements in monetary and credit techniques but, even
more important, also stresses the critical importance of the
commercial banking system in the integration process.
The monetary, financial and banking development that has taken
place in West AFrica, like the structures already discussed, has
strong historical perspectives, to the extent that seven of the
francophone West African states have retained a common currency
arrangement that goes as far back as 1948. Even in those countries
where some major institutional changes have taken place in their
monetary systems since independence, eg replacement of colonial
monies with national currencies and the indigenisation of banking
institutions, the structural and operational features of these
systems broadly reflect their colonial foundations. In general
however, West Africa's domestic monetary systems are commonly
dependent, characterised by
	
links with those of the developed
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industrialised countries, in most cases France, Britain and the
United States.
In broad terms, the West African monetary system has two major
differences in its framework within which monetary integration is to
be achieved among member countries. Firstly, Liberia and seven
francophone countries - WAMU - are tied closely to the US and French
monetary systems respectively, given the need for external support
for their national currencies. In this instance external support
for the national currency creates confidence in its value and
stability, while free movement of capital allows access to a highly
diverse foreign capital market so that a large volume of banking
operations is possible. The development of financial institutions
in these countries has sometimes been retarded, as the availability
of foreign capital reduces the pressure that could be exerted with
the adaptation and establishment of financial and banking
institutions capable of making maximum use of domestic capital for
development purposes. In many cases, the national banking system
depends on subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks, and it is
sometimes necessary to modify traditional monetary policies in order
to avoid excess liquidity in the banks or in the branches of foreign
banks, which would flow out of the country. Accordingly, interest
rates in these countries must be brought into line with those
prevailing in world financial markets, and there is not only the
absence of independent monetary policies - especially exchange rate
management, there is also a certain reluctance to invest in domestic
securities, which would contribute to the development of markets.
In the second group of countries, especially three of the
former sterling area countries (Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone),
monetary independence has been achieved, even at the cost of
unrealistic exchange rate policies and inflation rates high enough
to cause uncontrollable distortions in the financial system as a
whole. In this instance the operations of savers and investors as
well as the development of the commercial banks and the
effectiveness of monetary and financial policies are severely
distorted, making it difficult for the entire financial structure to
perform its desired function.
Under monetary unification (implying a fixed exchange rate or
common currency system), forces operating through a country's
balance of payments constitute a significant challenge to the
effectiveness of domestic monetary policies and financial practices.
Increasing economic and monetary interdependence among countries
sharpens the issues in the choice of means available to national
authorities to cope with this challenge. Hence, in West Africa, the
possible responses of each national monetary system to the problems
of monetary and economic interdependence are fundamental to
achieving realistic integration for the region as a whole.
The chapter is divided into five main sections. Section 5.2
describes the evolution of national currencies and banking
institutions and outlines the major structural changes introduced in
these institutions since the achievement of political independence.
Section 5.3 examines monetary policy objectives, formulation and
management, while in Section 5.4, the relative performances of the
banking systems are evaluated in terms of the efficiency of
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financial intermediation and the role of monetary policy through
statistical ratios. The conclusions are provided in Section 5.5.
5.2 THE EVOLUTION OF MONEY AND BANKING
5.2.1 Coinage and Currency
Historically, a reasonable proportion of the commercial
transactions which entered West Africa's pre-colonial exchange
markets were traded by barter, but barter itself was not the
dominant means of effecting exchange. Ethnological and historical
findings have revealed that in the past centuries West African
economies, like most other African economies, had moved from barter
trading to the use of commodity monies (eg cattle, gold dust, salt,
tobacco) which had intrinsic value through the use of money
standards (eg cowry shells, manilla) with little intrinsic value,
even before the introduction of colonial token money (coins and
currency notes) which still form the substantial part of total money
supply (see for instance, Onoh, 1982; Hopkins, 1973; Mundel, 1972;
Latham, 1971; Johnson, 1970; Dalton, 1965; Mladek, 1964; Einzig,
1951).
There was a great similarity in the indigenous currencies used
in the pre-colonial communities of West Africa; reflecting the
relative similarities and cross-frontier intercourse between ethnic
and economic communities. However, the comparative importance of
each 'early money' also reflected the geo-physical features of the
communities. For instance, gold dust was a more dominant currency
in Ghana, while in Gambia, Guinea and Senegal, the main commodity
moneys were kola nuts, rice, corn and cattle. The cowry shell was
probably the most important and widely used money in the region.
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Slaves provided transport and currency especially as between the
coastal and hinterland communities.
In the wake of the Arab conquest came Arab culture and money.
By the 10th century, Arab influence had introduced gold dinars and
silver dihrems in West African communities. The cloth merchants of
Ghana obtained gold from more primitive communities to the south
through the 'silent trade' or 'dumb barter' - a system in which the
two parties would leave their respective. merchandise and then
depart, while the other party would accept and exchange or add to
the price until a bargain was struck. The coming of the European
traders and explorers by the 15th century introduced such commodity
moneys as the Spanish doubloon, the American eagle, Portuguese
manilla and Mexican dollar. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the
English African Company for instance, minted a 'guinea' with an
elephant and castle and soon to be imitated by the crown. The
first issues of the gold ACKEY and silver TAKOE were made; one
ounce of gold was divided into 16 AKEIES and 8 TAKOES	 1 AKEY.
Significantly the pattern of colonial exploration and
administration was typically followed by monetisation. Initially
this was in the private hands of a banking monopoly, later taken
over by the government. The colonial power generally introduced
local currencies. Currency boards, or their equivalent, were set up
and the colony became a monetary satellite of the metropolitan
country. By 1912 the UK silver had become the most important single
means of payment throughout British West Africa and the issuance of
West African currency notes through the West African Currency Board
(West African pound at par with a pound sterling) afterwards
achieved a uniform currency from subsidised coinage to sterling
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currency notes. Monetisation proceeded fairly rapidly in the 1920s
through official demonisation proclamations against the use of
indigenous commodity moneys. Currency systems changed with
independence.
Both the newly created Ghanaian pound (1959) and the Nigeria
pound (1963) were linked to sterling at par, but Nigeria did not
follow the sterling devaluation of 1967. During the Civil War
(1966-72) the Nigerian pound was redesigned to make currency notes
held by the Biafrans valueless. In 1973 the Nigerian pound was
replaced by the 'naira' whose shape was also redesigned in 1979 and
the highest denomination - the twenty naira note - was introduced.
The third and largest currency change in Nigeria was in 1984 when,
as in Ghana's redesignation of currency denominations in 1981, the
obvious change was merely a colour swap between the old and the new
naira notes. In July 1965, the Ghanaian pound gave way to a new
decimal currency unit, the 'cedi', also linked to sterling. This
unit was later (1967) replaced by the 'new cedi', now renamed the
'cedi'.
In Sierra Leone, a new decimal currency, the 'leone' (also
linked to sterling until 1978) replaced the WACB pound in 1963 and
was devalued with sterling in 1967.
In The Gambia, the transition from colonial to post
independence currency system was based initially on a choice between
two alternatives: one, to create an independent system and the
other, to join a common system with Senegal (hence an adoption of
the French franc system) in the event of political association.
However with the creation of the Gambian Currency Board in 1964 in
replacement .
 of the WACB, a new currency, the Gambian pound, at par
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with sterling, was introduced, and followed sterling's 1967
devaluation. In 1971, the Gambian pound gave way to a new decimal
currency, the idalasi', also linked to sterling.
In Liberia, the currency in circulation up to 1950 consisted of
the coins and notes of the WACB. That year, despite the law of 1935
creating the 'Liberian dollar', the WACB currency ceased to be legal
tender and was replaced by the US dollar, an action that was later
(1956) confirmed by legislation. The indigenous Liberian dollar has
been restricted to coin only.
The currency change-over in the francophones especially during
and after the colonial era has not been as varied, chaotic, complex
and political as that in British West Africa. In 1945, the wide
range of commodity currencies in the francophones were replaced by a
'colonies francaises d'Afrique' (CFA), which like the WACB pound
sterling relationship, was initially at par with the French franc
and moved with the latter's subsequent devaluations. Upon
independence, the CFA's original name was changed (but the initials
preserved) to the franc of the 'Communaute Financiere Africaine%
The CFA franc, issued by a common central bank for the
'francophones', the Banque Centrale des etats de l'Afrique de
l'Ouest (BCEAO), is legal tender in all the member states. Serial
markings make it possible to identify the state where the notes have
been issued, and notes issued in one member state that are
intercepted by the bank of issue or governmental agencies in other
states are returned to the branch of BCEAO which originated them.
The amount of notes thus returned are recorded in the credits and
debits between the states concerned. By opting out of the CFA franc
area, Guinea (1962), Mali (1967), and Mauritania (1972) introduced
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their national currencies: the Guinean franc and in 1972, the
'syl i '; the Malian 'franc '; and the Mauritanian 'ouguiya'
respectively.
In the lusophone states, the national escudo in each county was
at par with the Portuguese escudo. The new Cape Verde escudo and
the Guinea-Bissau 'peso' are currently not tied to the Portuguese
escudo.
5.2.2 Central Banks
It was the rapid decline of West Africa's indigenous commodity
currencies, and the increasing circulation of European currencies in
their place as well as the aspirations of colonial administrations
to consolidate their commercial interests in their territories that
led to the introduction of modern banking institutions in the
region. During the colonial period these developments were aided by
the adoption of policies which speeded the demonetisation of the
transitional currencies and were replaced by colonial currency
exchange media. Apart from the deliberate ban on the import and use
of transitional currencies, the colonial masters also encouraged the
adoption of modern money by paying the expanding colonial labour
force in colonial currency and by insisting on receiving taxes and
other payments to the colonial treasuries in such currency. An
urgent need was thus created for the establishment of central
monetary control institutions to manage the supply and circulation
of the colonial currencies.
In the former British African Territories, Currency Boards were
the precursors of the Central Banks. Three Currency Boards were
established, namely, the West African Currency Board (1912), the
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East African Currency Board (1919) and the Southern Rhodesia
Currency Board (1939 and, after 1954, the Central African Currency
Board). Except for very minor differences, these Boards operated on
similar lines.
In general, currency exchanges through the Board were closely
related to the amount of export earnings while additional revenues
were provided to the colonial treasury through profits from
seigniorage and asset investments. The WACB operated from London
while currency distribution centres were the capital cities of the
four colonies and was administered on the Board's behalf by British
Bank of West Africa Ltd.
The prescribed objectives of the WACB were threefold:
(a) the initiation of West African issue of currency;
(b) the assurance of convertibility of local currency into
sterling at a known rate of exchange; and
(c) the provision of revenue to the governments through
sharing in the profit of issue.
The WACB's responsibility was outlined as 'to provide for and to
control the supply of currency to the British West African colonies
and protectorates; to ensure that the currency is maintained in a
satisfactory condition and generally to watch over the interests of
the constituent territories so far as currency is concerned'
(Loynes, 1962, p 41). Through this the Board arrangement was
characterised by fixed parity of local currency with sterling,
automatic issues and 100 per cent sterling coverage.
There was no doubt that the Currency Board System played a
significant role in the monetisation of the barter economies of the
dependent colonies and provided the needed financing for export
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trade. It might be argued also that the excessive inflationary
self-financing that now characterises the monetary operations of the
majority of the former British colonies in West Africa and Africa as
a whole might not have been possible under the currency board
system. Although it never per se integrated the domestic monetary
systems, the Board system can in some degree be looked upon as
having provided some foundation for monetary co-operation among the
member countries.
However, it was long before the Board's weaknesses were
realised. The Board system has generally been criticised on the
following grounds:
(a) it was operationally rigid and institutionally limited, in
that the currency it issued depended only on sterling
earned through export trade;
(b) it was more of a money changing and accounting
institution;
(c) it could not exercise an independent monetary policy;
(d) it had no refinancing programme for the indigenous banks
which experienced financial problems during the early
period of the banking system in the colonies;
(e) it left money supply to be determined largely
automatically by the state of the balance of payments,
and, with its external balance invested mainly in sterling
assets overseas, it deprived the colonies of scarce
resources.
As described by Nwankwo (1980), 'the Board System was essentially no
more than an expatriate sterling, a dependent currency, in all but
name and form the British pound. Besides, the West African currency
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was too rigid to the British pound. Indeed whatever its virtues the
WACB had no room for monetary management'. Other eminent critics of
the Board system include Onoh, 1982; Mohammed, 1980 and Newlyn,
1967.
Undoubtedly, these criticisms coupled with the aspirations of
the newly independent states to express their national sovereignty
in political and economic management triggered the vigorous
agitation for the establishment of national central banks. However
these developments were not without a lengthy controversy among
British experts, many of whom argued forcefully against the
establishment of the central bank mainly on the lack of developed
money and capital market which was perceived to be the pre-requisite
for central banking. .The Central Bank of Ghana was established in
1957, followed by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 1958 and the Bank
of Sierra Leone in 1963. The operations of the WACB were finally
phased out upon the establishment of the Central Bank of Gambia in
'
1971. The central banks immediately assumed the responsibility of
issuing their respective national currencies that replaced the WACB
pounds. However, for a considerable period of time these national
currency issues were pegged to the pound sterling and the Bank's
foreign reserves held in sterling securities. Presently, only the
Gambian dalasi is still pegged to sterling (see, for instance,
Taylor, 1980, for a survey of discussion of the controversy
preceding the establishment of West African central banks).
Among the francophone states, the Banque Central des Etats de
l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO) was established in 1962 as common
central bank for the members of the Union Monetaire Ouest Africane
(UMOA). However before independence, currency arrangements evolved
192
by France for these countries were entrusted to seven different
private banks established exclusively to issue franc notes for
circulation in all the French overseas territories. The Bank of
West Africa (Banque de l'Afrique l'Ouest), which was later reformed
into the BCEAO, was established in 1901. It absorbed the Bank of
Senegal which was established in 1856 with the head office in Paris
and branch offices around the West African territories. The BCEAO
is linked to the French Treasury by an Operations Account and the
four monetary criteria which originally governed its operations are:
(a) the common currency - the CFA franc - issued by the BCEAO
is mutually convertible with the French franc without
restriction, ie freedom of financial transfers within the
system;
(b) convertibility rests on fixed parities among member
countries and the French franc;
(c) member countries apply uniform exchange controls; and
(d) the BCEAO holds its pooled foreign currency holdings in
the 'Operations Account' - a currency account exchange
reserve fund at the French Treasury.
The BCEAO had three early setbacks: the withdrawal of Guinea
(1958); then Mali (1962) and later Mauritania (1972). Mali was
readmitted into the system in June 1984. Both Guinea (1958) and
Mauritania (1973) established their national central banks.
Structurally each member country in the BCEAO has a local monetary
committee to control domestic currency in circulation and the use of
its foreign exchange.
Among the rest of the West African countries, Liberia began
effective central banking in 1974 following the establishment in
that year of the National Bank of Liberia. Hitherto, minimal
central banking facilities were provided by the Bank of Monrovia, a
subsidiary of the First National City Bank of New York. Before the
establishment of their national central banks in 1980/81, both Cape
Verde and Guinea-Bissau had relied on the Lisbon-based Banco
Nacional Ultramarino (established in 1864) for the issue of local
currencies.
5.2.3 Counercial Banks and Other Financial Institutions
Commercial banking began in British West Africa in 1891
following the establishment in Nigeria of a branch by the South
African based African Banking Corporation mainly for the purpose of
handling the import of British silver coins into the territories.
It continued this role until the creation of the West African
Currency Board in 1912. Persistent complaints to the Colonial
Office by African traders for discriminatory treatment by the bank
led to the incorporation of a joint stock bank, the Bank of British
West Africa, (BBWA) (see Okigbo, 1982, p 85) which expanded so
rapidly that by 1910 it had established branches in the four British
colonies and also in Liberia. With the attainment of independence
by the colonies, BBWA was renamed Bank of West Africa (BWA) in 1957
and Standard Bank of West Africa (SBWA), after the merger with Chase
Manhattan Bank and Standard Bank of South Africa. On local
incorporation, SBWA became the Standard Bank Nigeria Ltd (1969) and
later the First Bank of Nigeria in 1979. In Ghana and Sierra Leone,
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SBWA became the Standard Bank (Ghana) and the Standard Bank Sierra
Leone Ltd.
The second expatriate bank which has dominated British West
Africa's commercial banking scene is Barclays which commenced
banking activities under the name Barclays, Dominion Colonial and
Overseas Bank formed in 1926 with branches in the four colonies.
Barclays (DCO) was an offshoot of Barclays Bank, and it emerged from
an amalgamation of the Colonial Bank, first established in West
Africa in 1917, the National Bank of South Africa and the Anglo-
Egyptian Bank. In Nigeria the name of the bank changed to Union
Bank in 1979.
Commercial banking began a little much earlier in the French
colonies with the establishment of the Banque du Senegal in 1853.
Its successor, the Banque de l'Afrique Occidentale (BAO) remained
the largest and important bank in French West Africa until 1924 when
Banque Commercial Africaine was created. A combination of new
issue, commercial banking activities and banker to the French
colonial government placed the BAO in an advantageous position to
expand its banking business more effectively than other joint banks
in francophone West Africa. Other commercial banks later
established in the francophone colonies were the BNCI in 1939, and
the societe Generale and Credit Lyonnais in 1941.
In the last two decades several other commercial banks,
expatriate and indigenous, have sprang up in many countries,
especially in the former British colonies. In Nigeria, the total
number of commercial banks now stands at around 28, about 12 in
Ghana, and 5 in Sierra Leone. By the end of 1978, commercial banks
had established about 585 branches in Nigeria; around 240 branches
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in Ghana in 1980; and 46 branches in Sierra Leone in 1983. While
Gambia's economy and population have been rather too small to
support the spread of many banks (the Bank of West Africa has
dominated commercial banking activities), in Liberia, the country's
open-door economic policy and the totally dependent monetary system
have mainly been responsible for the mushrooming of foreign banks
mainly of US origin. The origin of the oldest and largest
commercial bank in Liberia, the 100 per cent American-financed Bank
of Monrovia, goes back to the early operations of the Firestone
(Rubber) Company and in 1955, it became affiliated to the First
National City Bank of New York. Nearly 10 commercial banks operate
in Liberia, and as in the other anglophone countries, almost all of
these are largely foreign in ownership and operational phenomenon.
In contrast to the situation in British West Africa and
Liberia, the development of commercial banks in French West Africa
has not been as spectacular. French colonial banks were not able to
expand their banking businesses as rapidly as the British banks in
anglophone Africa. Bank branches were few and far between, and the
French colonial governments did not patronise them with deposits as
they did with the BAO. Money transfers through the Post Office were
cheaper than bank transfers, resulting in lower transfer commission
income for the banks. Lending rates were low but the commercial
banks failed to extended much lending because of restrictive credit
policies by the Banque du France which, in supervising the monetary
co-operation agreement between France and its overseas territories,
still exercises substantial control on the operations of banks in
these countries. Deposits also stagnated as deposit rates were
similarly low (Onoh, 1982, p 51). Apart from the BAO, no French
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bank was able to establish branches in all the French West African
colonies. The British banks, by contrast, enjoyed high commissions
through bank transfers as transfers through the Post Office were
limited only to small amounts. They, unlike their French
counterparts, charged high lending rates and more heavily patronised
by governments, the marketing boards and large expatriate commercial
enterprises, mainly in the import and export trade. While the
French banks depended largely on the discounting of bills, British
banks relied more on credit extension.
The growth of central and commercial banks in West Africa has
been followed closely by the establishment, in some countries,
notably Nigeria and Ivory Coast, of a number of other more
specialised banking institutions - ie development banks, rural and
agricultural banks, merchant banks, co-operative and other credit
institutions. These institutions, some of which are central bank
sponsored, are at the moment more relatively rudimentary than the
commercial banks and their operation is relatively lacking in
competition with the commercial banks, particularly in savings
mobilisation. As in the commercial banks, the operations of some of
these institutions are largely supra-national. As expected, their
lending operations are more longer-term than the commercial banks.
Other fast developing financial institutions are insurance and
mortgage companies. Post Office Savings Banks and the Treasury
Deposit Systems (mainly in the francophones) are also important
banking institutions in West Africa. For instance, by May 1982,
over forty insurance companies - mainly indigenous, had been
established in Nigeria.
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Two other important developments in the evolution of monetary
and banking institutions in West Africa include first, the
establishment of two stock exchange markets - the Lagos Stock
Exchange (1960) and the Abidjan Stock Exchange (1976) in Nigeria and
the Ivory Coast respectively; and second, the increasing importance
of the traditional money lenders, thrift societies and co-operatives
whose intermediation activities, though in controversy, are
appreciated in their provision of small-scale financing, especially
for food production and housing within the rural communities. The
growing popularity of traditional lenders, in particular, is argued
on the basis that unlike the formal banking institutions, their
lending is often without collateral and credibility tests;
negotiations with them are relatively short, direct and more
personal as they are conducted on a person to person basis and
without formal documentation.
5.2.4 The Emergence of Indigenous Banks
The most significant characteristic of the West African banking
system is its supra-national orientation both in its organisational
structure and operational patterns. This, in general, represents
the formal extension of the functions, methods and traditions of the
colonial banking systems. The monetary and banking developments
that have taken place during the last decade or so have therefore
broadly reflected attempts at breaking this foreign monopoly with a
view to making the banking systems more responsive to the general
problems of development. This new challenge fully recognises the
importance of the banking sector in the development process.
Financial repression, rather than bringing about a better
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distribution of income, aggravates disparities and hinders the
mobilisation of financial resources (Shaw, 1973).
More specifically, changes in the West African banking systems
in recent years have largely reflected the pressures of economic and
political nationalism, the desire for economic autonomy,
inflationary financing and the integration of the large subsistence
rural economy and the modern urban sector. The inadequacy of the
supra-national commercial banking system in West Africa is explained
by its insistence upon the traditional concept of the commercial
bank as protection against risk of insolvency, liquidity crisis and
monetary depression. Expatriate commercial banks are thus forced to
concentrate their operational roles - the creation of money and
means of payment in the economy, financial intermediation and
service agents - on import-export financing while at the same time
retaining a large part of their reserves and liquidity On foreign
investment both overseas and in their countries of operation in West
Africa. This further implies the concentration of their branch
network and operations in urban centres and/or high productive areas
(mainly in mining localities), thereby exaggerating economic dualism
in their countries of operation (the dual system comprises a barter
(subsistence) economy involving the bulk of small household and
peasant population, indigenous production of staple foodstuffs and
cash crops; and a modern sector or foreign sector that is almost
entirely dependent on external relations).
Some countries, especially the anglophones, were either
overwhelmed by colonial banking or other company legislation which
made it practically difficult for indigenes to establish banks, or
their economies were criticised of providing an insufficient base
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for additional and more competitive banking. In Ghana, for example,
the Company Act of 1906 prevented the establishment of any local
company to carry out any form of banking operations. It was not
until the 1950s that the Act was amended (Onoh, 1982, p 95). In
Nigeria, nationalists strongly condemned foreign banks on grounds of
discriminatory practices against indigenous businessmen by imposing
high and punitive interest rates and commissions (Okigbo, 1982, pp
84-86). In the francophones, the French zeal for centralisation did
not permit the development of indigenous banks.
Until very recently, many of the banks in West Africa, by being
wholly branches of overseas banking institutions, had their
policies, management structures, operational procedures, lending
criteria, business volume, interest rate and commissions procedures
and investment preferences guided largely by conditions and
practices prevailing in their countries of origin. Where they
operated locally beyond the basic function of accepting and re-
issuing deposits, the banks' credit and other intermediation
activities concentrated largely on the financing of foreign trade
and providing working capital for expatriate enterprises.
One obvious result has been excess liquidity in the net
positions of the banking systems in several countries. The
orientation of the commercial banks in these countries has been
blamed for this biased lending pattern on the grounds that
indigenous operators could not provide the types of collateral
required by the banks; that the banks are not prepared to venture in
unfamiliar areas of financing; and on the associated issue of
creditworthiness. The banks for their part have, in defence, also
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complained about the paucity of bankable projects submitted for
their consideration by indigenous enterprises.
As the West African economies expanded and became more open and
therefore more vulnerable to external and internal socio-economic
developments, government disatisfaction with the domestic banking
system became increasingly extended to the operations of central
banks. The perennial complaint has been that the central bank
functions have also tended to reflect the strong influence of
foreign financial and banking practices, especially in the
formulation and implementation of monetary policy. In other words,
central banks in West African countries, as indeed in several LDCs,
have in recent years been criticised for lacking selective and
innovative use of traditional monetary policy instruments; firstly
to help the commercial banks and other financial institutions to
play a more significant role in terms of national economic
development priorities; and secondly, for the central banks
themselves to initiate various forms of development assistance.
In this regard, monetary policy should be co-ordinated with
financial policy. For example, legal reserve requirements for the
commercial banks can serve as a means of influencing the structure
of bank lending, in terms of the maturity structure, the conditions
on which loans are made, and the economic sectors to which they are
directed.	 The aims of this policy would be to increase the
proportion of lending to the basic productive sectors, with longer
maturity periods, and to serve agriculture, industry, and other
sectors not offering a high rate of return but have generative
development capacity.
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While in most countries, many of these criticisms of the
banking system do hold, it has to be recognised that where a country
suffers from political instability, lack of concrete and consistent
development policy objectives, inflation, an overvalued exchange
rate, artificial interest rates and prices, or if it is burdened by
inflexible legal, political and social structures, fundamental
problems can arise for the introduction of financial reforms to
expand and improve the functioning of the banking system. Political
and administrative pressures by governments, especially as regards
the availability of credit from the banking system, have
substantially worsened central bank's position in West Africa and
have also tended to negate the banks' nominal autonomy, which for
them is perceived as the pre-requisite for efficient functioning.
In such conditions, and especially where central banks have also
complained of receiving wrong and inconsistent signals from the
Treasury, central banking measures cannot have more than modest
impact in promoting the wider objectives of economic growth, income
distribution, exchange rate stability and financial infrastructural
development.
The changing pattern of the West African banking system -
which for some countries (eg Nigeria, Ghana) had begun since its
initial formalisation during the colonial era, while for others, in
the post-independence years - can be viewed in two main
perspectives: first, in its organisational and management structures
and second, in the objectives, structures and formulation of
monetary policy.	 The second aspect is discussed in the next
section.	 Meanwhile, the major step in transforming the
organisation, management and operations of national banking systems
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in West Africa has been the growth of indigenous banks which can
also be viewed in two perspectives: the establishment of new wholly
indigenous banks to break the monopoloy of foreign banks, and the
nationalisation (wholly or partly) of foreign banks.
Effectively, indigenisation of the West African system began
with the establishment of the wholly-indigenous central banks and
the direct and relatively automatic replacement of the colonial
central banking arrangements. Except the BCEAO which still has
direct representation by France in its Board of Directors,
management profiles in most central banks are wholly indigene and
equity capital is entirely local. In most cases this development
has been followed by the creation of wholly indigenous commercial
banks, development banks, rural banks and a variety of savings
institutions. However, the growth of indigenous commercial banks
has been generally slow in all countries, except in Nigeria where
more than 100 indigenous banks were established in the 1940s and
1950s (Onoh, 1982, p 96), although this rapid expansion during this
period was also accompanied by a high failure rate - eg in 1954, 16
out of 25 indigenous banks collapsed due mainly to poor management,
inadequate capital, depressive economic and regulative (legal)
conditions (Agu, 1984, p 71). By 1978, indigenous banks in Nigeria
had represented 46 per cent of the total number of commercial bank
branches, although this reflected a marginal drop from 49.5 per cent
in 1972, as well as around 29 per cent of the commercial banking
sector's total assets/liabilities (Okigbo, 1981, p 113).
In Ghana, the Ghana Commercial Bank established in 1953, and in
Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone Commercial Bank formed in 1972,
represented practically the only wholly indigenous banks. The
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emergence of indigenous banks in the francophones as already
indicated has been severely restricted by restrictive controls by
France.	 In Liberia, commercial banks are generally wholly
expatriate while in Cape Verde, the financial system consists of one
monetary financial institution, the Bank of Cape Verde (and one non-
monetary financial institution, the Caixa Economica Postal), which
performs the roles of central, commercial and development banks.
Other approaches towards indigenisation have generally
comprised the complete nationalisation of expatriate banks (Benin,
Guinea and Guinea-Bissau), or the acquisition of large percentages
of their equity either by government or by the general public. In
most countries equity participation by governments has ranged
between 40-60 per cent of share capital. In Nigeria and Sierra
Leone, for instance, inspite of minority (Nigeria) or zero (Sierra
Leone) equity participation in the alien dominated banks, both
national governments have taken and exercised the right to appoint
nationals to head the Boards of Directors of such banks. Moreover,
by local incorporation, alien-dominated banks - eg Barclays and
Standard - have been forced to transfer their Head Offices from
their parent banks overseas to their country of operation. In
Nigeria, the indigenisation process has also resulted in bank
mergers as well as in change of names of foreign banks. For
instance, Standard Chartered Bank only holds 38-40 per cent interest
in First Bank of Nigeria, while Barclays Bank International has
around 20 per cent stake in Union Bank of Nigeria. Banque Nationale
de Paris (BNP) holds about 25 per cent interest in Union Bank for
Africa.
	 In several other countries, many foreign banks have
retained their original names even after indigenisation. In 1973
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the BCEAO transferred its head office from Paris to Dakar in
Senegal.
5.3 OBJECTIVES, FORMULATION AND INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY
Two major divergencies are investigated in this section: those
divergencies in the objectives and formulation of monetary policy,
and divergencies related to the choice and use of monetary policy
instruments. These distinctions are most germane to the problems
and limitations of managing national monetary systems in West
Africa.
5.3.1 Objectives and Design of Monetary Policy
In West Africa, the role of monetary policy has been extended
alongside the more conventional objectives of maintaining monetary
(price and exchange rate) stability, full employment and economic
growth to incorporate the newly perceived 'development and
promotional pheonmene. These phenomena suggest the importance of
pursuing monetary stability, not only as an end of economic policy,
but also as a means to an end - the acceleration of financial
development. Monetary policy in West Africa has therefore assumed
the broader responsibilities of enhancing the monetisation and
monetary integration of the economy through direct or indirect
promotion, mobilisation and allocation of domestic savings; through
the development and maintenance of financial institutions and
instruments; and through the design and conduct of balance of
payments adjustment policies.
These objectives of monetary policy are usually implicit or
explicit in the central banking legislation and are usually broadly
defined as:
(a) price stability
(b) high rate of employment
(c) rapid economic growth
(d) balance of payments equilibrium and stabilisation of
financial system.
However in practice, some countries have either emphasised
these objectives differently or they have more explicitly added
other objectives. In Ghana, for instance, the stated objectives of
monetary policy in 1975 were to improve the allocation of financial
resources, to strengthen the balance of payments, and to mitigate
domestic inflation. In Nigeria, part of the stated objectives
constitutes the regulation of commercial banks credit to the private
sector while in the BCEAO, monetary policy objectives, especially
after 1975, have stressed the adjustment of global liquidity of the
member economy in relation to the evolution of the monetary
situation of each state and of the union, and in relation to
development needs; and to ensure a better use of member countries'
resources within the union (Ouattara, 1978).
. Against this broad interpretation of monetary policy, modern
central banking legislations in West Africa are virtually similar
(with the exception of the National Bank of Liberia which does not
issue currency) in specifying the traditional as well as the broad
developmental and promotional roles of the central banks. In most
instances, the inclusion of the developmental functions has required
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a series of amendments to the legislations initially enacted for the
establishment of the central banks. To the extent that the twin
roles of monetary policy - monetary stability and economic
development - are not mutually exclusive (although in practice, some
conflict appears to have emerged), the central banks in their newly
perceived functions have concentrated on one or more of the
following: the mobilisation of domestic financial resources,
contribution to sectoral development, encouragement of productive
agricultural and industrial investment, regulation of the money
supply to maintain the relative value of the currency, contribution
to the balance of payments, and financial adviser to the government.
In time, some of the amendments which followed on the central
banking legislation, in particular, in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra
Leone were influenced largely by:
(a) the increasing difficulties in economic management as the
economies grew and the money supply and inflationary
tendencies expanded correspondingly,
(b) the growth in international trade and its attendant
complexities, eg foreign exchange shortage,
(c) the increasing burden of public debt management as central
banks became more active underwriters of both domestic and
external government debt instruments,
(d) the need to control, supervise and guide an expanding bank
and non-bank financial sector towards the broad
development objectives.
Consequently, one of the principal tasks of monetary policy in these
countries in the more recent years has been exchange rate and
foreign exchange management.
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There is no clearly apparent line of demarcation in most
central banking legislations on the question of who has
responsibility for monetary policy formulation between the bank and
the government, except in the case of some banks - BCEAO, The Gambia
and Nigeria. Within the framework of the UMOA (WAMU) Treaty and the
BCEAO statutes, the responsibility of defining the monetary and
credit policy to be pursued by the union is entrusted with the
Council of Ministers in the monetary union. The BCEAO as the
Issuing Institute is entrusted with the implementation of monetary
and credit policy. In the context of the policy adopted by the
Council of Ministers as well as of the rules of intervention
established by the BCEAO, the adjustment of the Bank's assistance to
the programmes and special needs of the member states of the union
is affected in each member state through autonomous national bodies
akin to the National Credit Council in France. These statutory
measures are meant to allow a decentralisation of the decision
process as well as to facilitate the diversification of
interventions according to the needs of each member state. There
also exists a Banking Control Commission which supervises the
operations of commercial banks, a function which is undertaken
mostly by central banks in other countries.
In Nigeria, the central bank legislation makes the Federal
Executive Council the final arbitrator on a conflict of opinion
between the Bank and the Ministry of Finance in respect of the
pursuance of monetary and credit policy, and specifically entrusts
the responsibility of policy formulation upon the Bank. In the
Gambia, however, the government is empowered by the central bank
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legislation to prescribe, through the Ministry of Finance, the
monetary policy to be adopted by the Bank.
However, in spite of the provisions of the legislations, the
practices still differ. Traditionally, monetary and credit policy
formulation is expected to be the prerogative of the central banks
and the extent to which banks are given a free hand to discharge
this important responsibility determines the degree of autonomy
enjoyed by them vis-a-vis the government. In all cases nonetheless,
it is supremacy of the government which has remained inviolable
both in the formulation of monetary policy and in the apparent use
of monetary policy instruments. The Treasury plays an important
role in the short-term credit market in the BCEAO countries mainly
in discounting custom's bills to the public. This practice is not
common in the rest of the sub-region.
5.3.2. The Choice and Application of Monetary Policy Instruments
A great variety of emphasis exists within West African states
regarding the assignment and relative use of monetary policy
instruments. It is obvious however that traditional monetary policy
instruments, viz, variable interest rates, open market operations,
variable deposit requirements, credit controls and moral suasion are
still relied on to a large extent. Although there appears to be no
rule of thumb as to which policy instrument to apply, the relevance,
appropriateness or the degree of importance attached to each
instrument tends to vary directly with the peculiar characteristics
of the economy concerned as well as the prevailing economic
problems. More specifically, differences in the overall approach to
economic policy (le economic planning philosophy) tend to manifest
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themselves more noticeably in the differing use and reliance on
monetary policy instruments.
Generally, it can be said that countries with a substantially
less-market-oriented approach to economic planning tend to rely
fully on the use of more formalised and comprehensive quantitative
control mechanisms such as overall and selective credit ceilings.
Consequently, a relatively greater degree of official (government)
intervention is required because of the allocative function of these
instruments. By contrast, pricing mechanisms in monetary policy
such as the use of variable deposit ratios and frequent adjustments
in the cost of credit are very rarely employed in these countries
but correspondingly more in the relatively more market-oriented
planning countries. Charges, commissions and several other bank
control mechanisms are more often fixed or guided by the monetary
authorities than the government.
This broad dichotomy is relatively apparent in West Africa as
the general approach to overall economic planning has varied between
completely comprehensive planning procedures in non-market oriented
countries such as Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and to a less
extent, Ghana, and a type of planning in such countries as Gambia,
Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, that relies quite frequently on
the working of market forces and private initiative, although this
does not exclude some degree of public ownership and private
monopoly participation in selected enterprises. In between these
two categories are the WAMU member states for which planning in many
respects mirrors the French system of 'planification'. These
countries, together with Mauritania, confine themselves to
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macroeconomic planning in which only strategic enterprises are
partly or fully state-owned.
Against this background, and from the divergent stress on the
more specific objectives of monetary policy, West African states
have tended to differ somehow on the emphatic use of monetary policy
instruments. More specifically, perhaps, for countries such as
Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the heavy reliance on the
more conventional instruments (even in terms of functional
definition) has been influenced, strongly, by the desire to control
the overall supply of money (even where such target is proven
misguided) rather than to perform specific allocative function.
Generally, while these traditional instruments are available and
have been variously applied in the region, some countries have
relied primarily on rediscount ceilings (WAMU states), on
quantitative/overall and ' sectoral credit ceilings (Ghana and
Nigeria), reserve requirements and/or discount and advances policies
(The Gambia and Liberia) or liquidity ratios (Sierra Leone). Moral
suasion and interest rate policies have also featured in the region,
but mainly in Liberia (moral suasion) and the former sterling area
countries. From this varied choice, the four main general
instruments of monetary policy employed by most central banks in
West Africa are:
(a) the discount rate
(b) liquidity reserve requirements
(c) direct/selective credit controls
(d) moral suasion.
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In Guinea, monetary expansion is largely influenced by fiscal
controls, as the government, because of its over-riding share in
overall economic activity, generates large surpluses which are then
deposited at the central bank. A special credit committee operating
under the auspices of the central bank is set up with responsibility
to review requests submitted by the specialised banks for credit
from the central bank to ensure that they conform with the overall
economic policies and priorities set by the Government. There is no
statutory limit on the central bank credit to specialised banks
which are neither subject to reserve requirements and liquidity
ratios, nor are interest rates used to influence the volume and
allocation of credit.
However, because in the majority of West African states the
public sector is the major employer and therefore the major
borrower, monetary policies have in general been accommodating and
have only become relatively more restrictive under the emerging
pressures from external imbalances and inflationary tendencies which
have required stabilisation programmes in several countries. In
these programmes (notably the IMF programmes), one of the major
policy stresses is to restrict domestic lending as well as to
correspondingly stimulate domestic saving. But as is often the
case, the consequent concern for the control of money supply poses
an important problem in the sense that the traditional tendency for
over-liquidity of the banking system must also be taken into account
as should the cash holdings from households and enterprises both of
which constitute a decisive factor in the growth of money supply (in
particular, currency in circulation).
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Although as already mentioned evidence of utilisation of the
traditional instruments of monetary policy is observable in all West
African central banks (except in Guinea), there are a number of
constraints that have severely restricted their efficiency not only
in West Africa, but among LDCs in general. These limitations are
exhaustively covered in the literature (see for instance Aschheim,
1961; Newlyn, 1967; Bain, 1970; Eshag, 1971; Cramp, 1971, Fisher,
1976; Furness, 1978; and Ghatak, 1981).
In general, the scope and effectiveness of monetary policy and
its instruments are severally circumscribed in circumstances where:
(a) the money and capital market (or financial infrastructure)
is very narrow, under-developed or rudimentary; ie the
number of financial intermediaries is limited and both the
volume of traded securities and the number of potential
transactors are very restricted;
(b) the commercial banking system, in particular, is
excessively liquid and currency in circulation is of
comparable magnitude with bank deposits;
(c) the general private sector demand for bank credit is not
interest elastic;
. (d) there is a large unorganised money market;
(e) there is hardly any prior careful assessment of prevailing
economic conditions within the economy; ie there is no in
depth, reliable and objective national economic surveys
relating to such economic indicators as unemployment,
price fluctuations, payments imbalances, structural
distortions, growth and overall economic performance, all
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of which are individually responsive to changes in
monetary policy;
(f) the application of monetary policy is inappropriately
timed, or excessively directed to day-to-day/very short-
term issues, or is specially tailored to favour very
personal uneconomic ventures; and
(g) there is visible tension and unhealthy co-ordination
between fiscal and monetary authorities in their design
and implementation.
It is particularly emphasised that while open market operations
is constrained under conditions of limited financial markets and
traded securities, the discount rate and liquidity reserve ratios
(ie cash ratio and/or (less liquid) reserve ratio) are both more
directly restricted by the excess liquidity of the commercial banks.
Moral suasion (also known as jawboning) is effective only where
there is perfect understanding, mutual respect, co-operation and
professional discipline between the central bank and the other
banks. Ghatak (1981) stressed that the prescription of quantitative
limits on bank credit (the chief form of direct monetary controls)
could only be effective if used as an integral policy package deal
programme aimed at ensuring a fairer mobilisation and distribution
of financial resources, adequate protection for depositors and the
banks, and effective control of the base of the banks. These
conditions characterise the West African banking system and in
essence make it generally underdeveloped and rudimentary.
In the wake of the renewal of the WAMU monetary co-operation
agreement with France (which existed since 1962), BCEAO's means of
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action in the application of its monetary policy underwent
considerable change in 1975. However, the rediscount facility still
predominantly dominate the monetary policy instruments of the BCEAO.
Changes in the modes of BCEAO intervention through rediscounting
have nonetheless included the abolition of rediscount ceilings and
quotas previously available to the banks and businesses, although
rediscounting for the banks is still restricted to a variable
maximum credit limit (presently 45 per cent) on the ratio of a
bank's total credit. Annual limits on central bank financing are
fixed for each member state (ie country rediscount ceilings)
depending on each state's production, price, liquidity, balance of
payments, external reserve balance and the ability for debt
repayment as well as on the total external reserves of the union as
a whole. Reserve requirements in respect of the liquidity ratio
were also abolished in 1975, although the possibility exists should
the need arise, for the BCEAO to compel the commercial banks to
maintain required reserves expressed as a percentage of either total
deposits or of total credit extended by them.
Furthermore, to carry out qualitative control, in addition to
priority refinancing or refinancing loans at preferential rates
(agricultural credits, credits to small and medium-sized
enterprises) the BCEAO may require banks to observe liability ratios
(coefficient de tresorerie) or to allocate a specific portion of
their liabilities to financing national enterprise needs
(coefficient de division des risques). Control over credit
distribution operates through the 'prior authorisation' required
before extending any credit which would increase the volume of
outstanding credits awarded an enterprise beyond the ceiling set for
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each country. Credit limits as of 1982 stood at CFA 100 million for
Ivory Coast and Senegal, and CFA 30 million for the other member
states.
As in all West African countries, interest rate policy has not
been an active instrument of monetary policy in the BCEAO countries
despite the legal authorisation given to the Governor of the BCEAO
to vary interest rates; taking into account both the domestic and
international money market conditions. Nonetheless, similar to
other West African countries, the BCEAO group prescribes interest
rates for bank lending and borrowing. Lending, savings, and
discount rates are identical among the member countries of the
BCEAO. The discount rate currently stands at 10.5 per cent.
Interest rates have remained relatively low and stable and have been
adjusted only three times since 1960 (1973, 1975 and 1980). As in
the rest of the West African region, these rates have remained
generally negative in real terms following the corresponding higher
rates of inflation. In 1980, for instance, the real discount rate
was -4.1 per cent in the Ivory Coast but 1.7 per cent in Senegal;
the real savings rate was -7.1 per cent in the Ivory Coast and -1.3
per cent in Senegal; and the real lending rate was -1.6 per cent in
the Ivory Coast but 6.7 per cent in Senegal. Until very recentty
(1985/86), commericial banks in the WAMU states were allowed to pay
interest on current accounts. The interest on time and savings
deposits in these countries is currently 12 per cent.
In contrast to the BCEAO countries, the anglophone states, in
particular, the four former sterling area countries (FSA) have
adopted a much wider range of monetary policy instruments, although
in practice the effectiveness of many of these has been found
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seriously wanting in each country. The most important reason is
that commercial banks in non-BCEAO countries normally have excess
liquidity and therefore rarely need central bank support.
Selective credit control has taken different forms including
the imposition of priority credit ceilings as between the government
and the private sector on one hand, and between the different
economic sectors. In Ghana and Sierra Leone, selective credit
ceilings have been mainly at the instance of the IMF conditionality
requirements which accompanied their stabilisation programmes. With
minor differences in terms of broad categorisation, the most
favoured priority sectors are agriculture, export trade,
manufacturing and transport and communications as against the less
favoured sectors of general commerce (import trade). In 1980 credit
to agriculture represented 53.1 per cent of total bank credit in The
Gambia, and in Ghana, credit to the agriculture and export trade was
60 per cent of total credit.
Sectoral credit allocation in the FSA countries has also been
in the form of special credit guarantee schemes initiated by the
central banks. These schemes are generally aimed at steering credit
to support indigenous small-scale businesses outside the import
sector. The risk exposure of the commercial banks in providing such
credit is minimised through specific indemnity guarantees by the
central banks in the event of default by the borrowing enterprises;
eg 66.6 per cent in Sierra Leone and 75 per cent in Ghana and
Nigeria. Other special credit control measures have included
ceilings on loans and advances (overdraft facilities) and advanced
(or special) deposit requirements. Mandatory cash margins against
imports (up to 100 per cent of total import value) are required in
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Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, a commercial bank's credit hold in
government debt instruments is required to be, at least, equivalent
to 25 per cent of total deposit liabilities, while in Nigeria, the
banks are required to buy stabilisation securities from the central
bank with 50 per cent of the excess of individual savings account of
20,000 naira. In Sierra Leone, special deposits have taken the form
of 'sterilised' local currency equivalent of private sector import
or external debt payment arrears held in banks while awaiting
foreign exchange availability.
Liquidity restraint measures have included the imposition of
minimum liquidity and cash reserve ratios, although the latter is
usually employed as supportive and temporary instrument depending on
the extent of the commercial banks' excess liquidity position. The
ratios are generally based on the deposit liabilities of banks.
However, the basket of assets and liabilities allowed for the
purpose of satisfying the ratios has varied between countries. The
liquidity i. atio is usually defined to include the variety of
government securities (eg treasury bills, negotiable certificates of
deposit and any other first class bills held by the commercial
banks). In Ghana this ratio has also included sectoral lending.
The cash ratio typically relates the bank cash holdings to total
deposits. In some cases differential percentages are prescribed for
different categories of deposit as well as the volume held, while
,
the composition of the assets for the reserve ratio, which are being
held by the central bank are usually in the form of cash and
government debt instruments.
The range of the liquidity ratio is from 25 per cent in Ghana
and Nigeria (1980/81) to 40 per cent in Sierra Leone (1984), while
that of the cash ratio is from 6 per cent in Liberia on demand
deposits, 5 per cent on time and savings deposits to 40 per cent in
Ghana. In general, however, these ratios have in practice fallen
well below the actual ratios. In Sierra Leone for instance, the
actual liquidity ratio has ranged between 66 and 85 per cent in
1978/79 compared with a 40 per cent legal minimum requirement.
Additional liquidity restraint mechanism similar to the
liquidity ratio has been introduced in Nigeria where commercial
banks' credit held in government debt securities must be over 25 per
cent or equal to 10 per cent between adjusted capital funds and
their loans and advances. Dividend squeeze is imposed until this
condition is fulfilled.
Similarity of interest rate philosophy prevails among West
African countries in that the central banks prescribe both the loan
and deposit rates rather than leaving them to be determined by
market forces. The rates seldom change except in Liberia, and all
countries (except Liberia) peg their rates on given percentage
points above the standard discount rate, which stands at 6 per cent
in The Gambia and Nigeria, 19.5 per cent in Ghana, and 12 per cent
in Sierra Leone (1983). Interest rates in West Africa are generally
lower than the rate of inflation, giving rise to negative rates of
return in real terms.
In Sierra Leone, major adjustments of interest rates in general
have only occurred three times (1975, 1977 and 1979), twice in
Ghana (1975 and 1980) and Nigeria (1975 and 1979), and once in The
Gambia (1980) since 1970. In Liberia, lending rates tend to move
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in tandem with New York rates. In Ghana where the rise in the rate
of inflation is highest in the whole region (eg rising from 2.9 per
cent in 1970 to 123 per cent in 1983) the real discount, savings and
lending rates were all negative in 1980 at -36.6 per cent, -38.1 per
cent and -31.6 per cent respectively. These compare with real rates
of -0.7 per cent, -1.8 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively in The
Gambia in the same year. The real discount and savings rates in
Sierra Leone in 1980 were 0.9 per cent and -1.1 per cent
respectively, whereas in Liberia and Nigeria, the real savings rates
were -5.8 per cent and -1.2 per cent respectively in the same year.
All West African countries have rudiments of open market
operations, although these also have not constituted an effective
instrument of monetary control because of the absence of developed
financial markets as well as the marked absence of variation in
interest-sensitive debt instruments to encourage brisk open market
operations. Nonetheless, in Ghana, for example, the Bank of Ghana
Act, 1963, permits open market operations in treasury bills and
medium- and long-term government securities. By mid 1985, the
number of traded securities in the Lagos Stock Exchange had risen to
181 from 4 and 168 in 1961 and 1982 respectively (West Africa, 9
December 1985, p 2582).
Central banks in West Africa, notably the FSA countries and
Liberia, have also relied substantially on moral suasion. But the
rapid expansion in the banking system of most countries as well as
the increasing threats of politicisation and inflation have
compelled most central banks to rely more on stronger direct
controls. The current practice however is to supplement this
instrument by resorting to punitive measures for non-compliance. In
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Ghana, for instance, defaulting commercial banks have been forced to
place special reserve deposits (equal to twice the amount by which
the commercial bank's lending exceeds the credit guideline) with the
central bank. These deposits are not interest-bearing and are also
not eligible to form part of the cash reserve requirement. Nigeria
imposes, first a 'strong warning', and then a 'levy' of one eighth
of one per cent on the excess credit with the same increase every
month of violation up to the maximum of 1 per cent. In Sierra
Leone, non-conformity with submission of periodic 'schedules' by the
commercial banks in 1982 resulted to the temporary withdrawal of
interest payment on interest-bearing deposits ('excess deposits')
held by the central bank for the Sierra Leone Commercial Bank, and
this represented a loss of revenue amounting to over Le 1.0 million
that year to the commercial bank.
Credit controls are also important in Cape Verde. Interest
rates have changed only once in Mali (1977) and Guinea (1978),
whereas in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, no interest rate adjustment
has taken place since independence.
As in the case of its objectives, many of these instruments of
monetary policy are prescribed in the central bank legislation of
most countries. This procedure is frequently supplemented by the
issue of monetary policy circulars, usually annually, in which
quantitative and qualitative guidelines are prescribed. Policy
circulars have featured more prominently in Ghana and Nigeria.
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5.4 EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE WEST AFRICAN BANKING SYSTEM
5.4.1 Financial Development and Economic Growth
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the structural
changes that have taken place or which are urged in the West African
banking system since the achievement of political independence,
have, in common with other LOCs, emphasised the need for both
central and commercial banking institutions to be expansive,
selective and innovative in their respective functions and practices
with a view to enhance the development efforts of the member
economies.
Recent literature on economic development, together with
numerous empirical studies on the basic theoretical conclusions,
have focussed considerable attention on the process of financial
intermediation and its impact on economic growth, and the general
hypothesis is that financial institutions in general are a necessary
adjunct or catalyst to the general development process (see for
instance Bhatia and Khatkhate, 1975; Shaw, 1973; Goldsmith, 1969;
Gurley and Shaw, 1967, 1956 and 1955). Improvement in financial
intermediation in this context denotes the development of credit and
capital markets and of domestic financial institutions as well as a
substantial improvement in the monetisation of the economy through a
rise in the proportion not only of money but also of the total of
all financial assets relative to gross national product (GNP).
However, this basic conclusion regarding the role of financial
institutions in economic growth and development is not without
recognisable conceptual controversies: 'monetarist' versus
'Keynesian' (see for instance, Friedman, 1983; Auerbach and Rutner,
1975; and Sims, 1972); 'demand-following' and 'supply-leading'
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(Patrick, 1966); and in the savings-investment process - 'financial
repression hypothesis' (Shaw, 1973; McKinnon, 1973; and Cameron,
1972) and the 'structuralist hypothesis' (Gerschenkron, 1962).
Purely from the point of view of developing countries, the
importance of financial institutions or more specifically, the
'financial superstructure' (ie the set of financial institutions,
intermediaries and instruments) is appreciated broadly in terms of
the extent to which it can influence the elimination of the major
constraints of development, ie, balance of payments, savings and
absorptive capacities. The nature of these constraints and the
manner in which they interact in relation to given
investment/capital inflows relationships are formally discussed
within the framework of the 'dual-gap' or 'multi-gap' formulations
'developed and elaborated during the sixties (see for instance
McKinnon, 1964; Bruton, 1969; Chenery, 1969; Taylor, 1971). This
financial intermediation, Goldsmith (1966) observes, is manifested
in facilitating the 'migration' of funds by the financial
superstructure to the best users; ie, to the place in the economic
system where the funds will yield the highest social return. This
process will accelerate economic growth and hence, improve overall
economic performance.
The acute shortage of domestic savings and foreign exchange,
together with low absorptive capacity, have been recurring problems
for rimy developing countries, especially since the seventies. By
definition, the significance of savings as an upper bound on
investment, given an amount of foreign capital inflows, is
acknowledged, both in the modern capital-oriented growth models and
in the dual-gap analysis. Many of these models, which adopt a
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variation of the Harrod-Domar framework do assume that the marginal
savings ratio must be higher than the average savings ratio if per
capita output is to grow. Thus a savings gap appears when the
domestic savings rate falls below the level necessary to permit the
investment required to achieve a target rate of growth while imports
are adequate. Hence, if the maximum possible domestic savings are
limited by the marginal savings rate (Sm),
Savings (t) = So
 + SmYt
then investment can be undertaken up to the limit imposed by the sum
of savings plus foreign capital inflows (F):
Cs = I t - F t
 - SmYt = 0
where So is the amount of savings at the initial year; I t , Ft and Yt
represent investment, foreign capital and national income in time
(0 respectively. The savings constraint, Cs, is therefore a
function of the general level of investment capital formation, the
amount of foreign capital inflows and the marginal propensity to
save.
On the assumption of fixed input-output coefficients and
limited possibilities for export expansion, a foreign exchange
shortage on the other hand becomes an almost absolute constraint on
growth in that even if domestic savings were available in sufficient
amounts to allow an increase in investment, the absence of the
required complementary foreign exchange makes such an increase
impossible (the neoclassical answer to this 'structuralist' view
has always been to stress the role of relative prices and, in
particular, exchange rate adjustment as a means of overcoming any
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foreign exchange shortage. See for instance, Findlay, 1973 and
Diamond, 1978). With imports (M) expressed as:
Mt = Mo MYt Mit
where M is the marginal import coefficient, the foreign exchange
constraint (C) is defined as a function of total import requirements
and total capital inflows (F t
 + Xt) where Xt represents the level of
exports:
Cf
 = Mo + MI t + MYt - Ft - Xt = 0
Recognising partly the practical limitations of the 'two-gap'
or 'multi-gap'	 formulations and then the complexity of the
development process in general, Taylor (1971) demonstrates that
with forward timeflow, an economy passes through three phases of
development constraints. The first is when constraints such as
foreign aid shortage and insufficient absorptive capacity (Ca = l o -
aY 0 = 0; where Ca = absorptive capacity constraint; a = marginal
absorptive coefficient) and the savings limit are binding. The
second phase is when both the savings and the overall balance of
payments constraints are binding, and in the final phase, when the
economy would coast into terminal conditions with only the balance
of payments and investment floor constraints become binding.
However, the experience of developing countries indicates that
several variants on this sequence are possible. For instance, an
initial phase can exist, with absorptive capacity and balance of
payments binding or there can be the omission of both the second
and/or final phases with all the constraints interacting at almost
the same time. Nonetheless, if domestic savings were large enough
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to finance any otherwise feasible investment, the major constraint
on investment expenditure would be the balance of payments restrict-
ion. Plentiful savings early in the development period may imply
that the balance of payments and absorptive capacity constraints or
foreign aid limit would bind. If savings were initially binding,
but then become more plentiful afterwards, the sequence:
• (Cs, Ca) = (Cf . Ca) = (Cf, Ci) and
(Cs, Ca) = (Cf. Ci)
where C i
 is the lowest bound on investment, would be possible. The
probable movement of these constraints over time is graphically
illustrated by the arrows in Figure 5.1.
The role of the banks in tackling these development obstacles
is obviously difficult and complex. There are serious practical
conflicts in their operational desires; first to support national
development and second, to sustain themselves by acquiring and
protecting adequate liquidity and profitability positions amid
relatively more restrictive and protected financial markets. There
are even more complicated problems where the achievement of monetary
integration within a group of countries require substantial co-
ordination and/or harmonisation in the banks' operations.
There is no single optimum method of evaluating the extent of
financial development that is required for real development.
However, on the elimination of the development constraints the role
of financial institutions lies not only in their ability and
willingness to manage the structures of their assets and liabilities
in a manner that will provide appropriate and adequate financing to
generate foreign exchange, but also, to support and facilitate the
226
z
Savings
Constraint (Cs)
Balance of Payments
Constraint (Cf)
	
..c._
Absorbtive Capacity
Constraint (Ca)
..-..-.).
Upper bound on F
Lower bound on
Investment (Ci)
I
I
CAPITAL INFLOWS (F)
Fig. 5-1. Problem constraints on economic development.
creation of money and the payments mechanism that could minimise
foreign exchange transaction costs, and hence, boost domestic and
foreign trade relationships. On the savings-investment process,
financial intermediation must raise the level of savings and at the
same time induce investment programmes. Consequently, the higher
the ratio of total financial assets in relation to real assets (ie
financial inter-relations-ratio - FIR) the more significant the
importance of financial institutions and instruments in the economy
(see for instance, Goldsmith, 1966, 1969; Revell, 1973). Goldsmith
(1966) has observed the FIR to range between 1-1.5 in developed
markets or mixed economies, and between 0.66-1 for developing
economies. He has further observed that first, the ratio increases
with expanding industrialisation up to a certain level and then
remains fairly stable; second, the influence of financial
institutions in the financing process is similarly linked to the
development of an economy; and third, among financial institutions,
the share of commercial banks falls after the early stages of
industrialisation. These results, Goldsmith concludes, demonstrate
the occurrence of a direct and visible relationship between
financial development and real development.
Clearly, one fundamental problem in attempting a comparative
application of the FIR concept to different economies is the
composition of the 'financial superstructure' and 'financial
infrastructure' (see Revell, 1973, p 9). In the context of West
Africa, the extent of this problem is initially in the
classification of financial institutions and in some cases the
composition of financial assets and liabilities. There are
different types of banks and non-bank financial institutions
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operating in the region ranging from all purpose banks to
specialised institutions. These institutions could be classified in
four main categories, viz, commercial, merchant, development banks
and non-bank financial institutions. However, for the purpose of
classification, BCEAO has only two categories, namely, banks and
non-bank financial institutions, but in particular, the latter does
not include insurance companies, trust and pension funds. Apart
from Nigeria, merchant banks are not a common feature of the West
African financial system although their functions are variously
performed by the development banks and non-bank institutions.
Financial underdevelopment in West Africa is largely manifested
by the smallness and thinness of credit and capital markets,
especially medium-term and long-term markets. This tendency is made
more worrisome by the fact that where these exist, their operational
activities are dominated by the government, a situation which has
also affected the rate at which domestic savings are mobilised.
Significantly, one result of financial underdevelopment is the
tendency for most governments, government entities and private
enterprises to borrow in foreign capital markets where they can
obtain medium-term and long-term credit - credit that is unavailable
or prohibitively expensive at home. A second consequence is perhaps
most immediately relevant to the day-to-day conduct of monetary
policy because it increases the risk and cost of deficit financing
by the public sector. This relates to the huge budget deficits run
by the government and the bulk of which is bank credit. The
implications of these issues for the balance of payments are
particularly significant in small developing countries where budget
deficits are generally monetised.
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5.4.2 The Extent of Financial Intermediation
5.4.2.1	 Bank Per Capita 
As already indicated, the expansion of the West African banking
system in terms of both the number of commercial banks, their branch
network and their operations has been influenced in part by the wave
of indigenisation as well as by the rising demand for their
services, especially the public sector. In most countries, in
particular, the FSA countries for which data was more readily
available, the number of established commercial banks has more than
doubled since the end of the colonial system. This has been
accompanied by a substantial rise in the branch network.
For instance, in Nigeria before independence in 1961, there
were only five commercial banks. By 1972, this number had more than
trippled to 16. It reached 19 in 1975 and by August 1985, it had
increased further to 28. The number of corresponding branches has
risen from 367 (including 9 agency offices) in 1972 to 436 in 1975;
585 in 1978 and over 700 by 1985. In Ghana, the number of
commercial banks has increased to around 12 while the number of
corresponding branches has risen from 19 in 1952 to about 237 at the
end of 1980 (African Economic Digest, September 1981). In Sierra
Leone, although the growth in banks and their branches has been much
slower, there are at present 5, compared with 2 on achieving
independence, and more than 45 branches (including 3 agency offices)
are currently being operated.
In terms of per capita densities, the overall banking habit in
West Africa is generally at a low ebb with a large proportion of the
population, especially the rural population, remaining either
unbanked or grossly under-banked. In Sierra Leone, for instance,
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the bank branch per capita is over 75,000; it is over 1.25 million
in Nigeria, and above 45,000 in Ghana. This awkward situation is
worsened further by the markedly uneven distribution of bank
branches between the rural agricultural areas which account for a
significant proportion of GDP and the urban centres which are
substantially net capital exporters. In Sierra Leone, for example,
more than three-quarters of the banks' total 47 branches are
concentrated within the capital city and the provincial
headquarters. Although the banks have often stressed the lack of
adequate commercial activity and operational security arrangements
in the rural areas, the high per capita bank densities lower the
performance of the banks in the savings mobilisation and
monetisation processes.
5.4.2.2	 Monetary Survey 
A comprehensive survey of monetary developments in any economy
implies essentially the consolidation of the accounts of all
financial institutions with a view to measure 'money' and its
determinants, and to indicate its relative impact on the economy.
In this study however, within the narrow range of its financial
superstructure and infrastructure, the size and expansion of the
West African financial system is further examined only in relation
to the performance of the commercial banks relative to developments
in government obligations, money supply, in the sense of currency
plus demand deposits, and quasi-money bank liabilities. The array
of assets available to savers is generally limited to time and
savings deposits, although in the WAMU states, money supply also
includes chequing deposits in the Post Office accounts as well as
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deposits at the treasury since these have the character of deposits
held by the commercial banks.
Undoubtedly, monetary developments in the region since 1970
have, as in the case of developments in the real sector - eg income,
trade, balance of payments, etc - distinctly attested to the adverse
impact of external events, notably, the series of oil price rises as
well as to the rising dependence by governments on 'new money' for
the financing of recurrent budgetary and non-budgetary expenditures.
Government securities (ie domestic long-term and short-term bonds
and bills) which constitute the largest single asset held by non-
bank financial institutions have grown very markedly over the
seventies. For instance, in Nigeria, short- and long-term bonds and
bills (as defined in the IMF, Government Finance Statistics, Table
E, Lines 1 and 2) have increased by more than sixty times, from
28.4 to 1765.6 million naira in 1972-77; by more than fifty-eight
times, from 72.7-4254 million cedis in Ghana between 1973-81; and
nearly three times in Sierra Leone in 1974-77. In these countries,
treasury bills have constituted the major debt instrument by the
central government. Moreover, the slower rate of economic growth
experienced in most West African countries has automatically forced
rapid expansion in government deficits, a feature which also
explains the relative stickiness and low rates of interest rates in
the member countries. Thus competition in the demand for bank
credit is significantly between public sector borrowing against
continued decline in private sector credit requirements.
Table 5A	 ECOWAS: Commercial Banks' Deposits, Assets and
Liabilities
(billion dollars)
Demand	 Quasi-	 Demand Deposits
Deposits	 Money	 Plus Quasi-money	 Assets	 Liabilities
1970	 0.9	 0.7	 1.6	 0.1	 0.2
1971	 0.9	 0.8	 1.7	 0.2	 0.2
1972	 1.1	 1.0	 2.1	 0.1	 0.2
1973	 1.4	 1.4	 2.8	 0.2	 0.2
1974	 2.3	 2.3	 4.6	 0.4	 0.3
1975	 3.4	 3.3	 6.7	 0.3	 0.4
1976	 5.3	 4.2	 9.5	 0.5	 0.5
1977	 7.4	 5.0	 12.4	 0.7	 0.6
1978	 7.1	 5.7	 12.8 .
	
0.6	 0.9
1979	 8.8	 8.3	 17.2
	
'0.7	 1.2
1980	 11.8	 11.4	 23.2
	
0.7	 1.4
1981	 10.7	 11.3	 22.0
	
0.7	 1.3
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics
Notes:	 1 Data not available for Cape Verde, Guinea and Guinea-
Bissau in all cases; for Benin in the case of
Assets and Liabilities; and for Sierra Leone in
respect of liabilities
As shown in Table 5A, both money supply, and the assets and
liabilities of the commercial banks (also known as deposit money
banks in the francophone states) have grown almost without
interruption since 1970. Aggregate assets rose from $0.1 billion in
1970 to $0.3 billion in 1975 and by nearly $0.7 billion each year
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between 1979 and 1981. The corresponding level of liabilities
increased to over $0.4 billion and $1.3 billion in 1975 and 1981
respectively from $0.2 billion in 1970. There has been a fairly
even spread between demand deposits and quasi-money with both
liabilities rising respectively from $0.9 billion and $0.7 billion
in 1970 to $3.4 billion and $3.3 billion in 1975, and $10.7 billion
and $11.3 billion in 1981. This rise in the two deposit instruments
resulted in a more than thirteenfold increase in total deposits of
the banks from $1.6 billion to $22 billion during the last decade.
These trends are graphically represented in Figure 5.2.
Over the same period, total domestic credit rose by around
thirteenfold, from $2.98 billion to $38.43 billion, providing a
fairly substantial deterioration by $2.74 billion in aggregate net
foreign assets. Similarly, total money increased from $2.62 billion
in 1970 to $32 million in 1981, representing a more than twelvefold
rise (Table 5B).
As Table 5C suggests, in growth terms, aggregate money supply,
on average has behaved in three phases. The first, up to the mid-
1970s, showed relatively low and stable rates of monetary expansion.
The crucial phase of rapid monetary expansion in practically all
member countries (ie mid-1970s and early 1980s) reflected the short-
term impact of the oil price crises on domestic prices, costs and
overall public expenditures. The third phase (ie 1975/76-1980 and
1982-83) was generally one of relative decline in monetary
expansion, reflecting the tighter fiscal and monetary controls which
followed the events of the early 1970s and the second phase.
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0Source : Table 5A.
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Fig. 5-2. ECOWAS : Commercial banks deposits, assets and
liabilities, 1970 - 1981.
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Although monetary growth in most countries has been high and
rising, the 14 year review period has also depicted some major
differences between countries in the magnitudes of money supply and
its determinants. The trends are relatively more erratic in Ghana
than in most of the member countries, notably the French-speaking.
More specifically, perhaps, the divergent trends can in part be
explained by the high incidence of political change in countries
like Ghana and Nigeria as well as by a high degree of exchange rate
instability (eg Ghana).
For instance, commercial bank assets and liabilities have
fluctuated more widely in Ghana than in most countries. The average
annual expansion in total money supply during 1970-83 ranged 9-33
per cent between countries, with Nigeria and Ghana recording the
highest rates at 33.4 per cent and 29.3 per cent respectively. The
marked increase' in the commercial banks' liabilities during 1970-81
resulted from the very high national growth in demand deposits and
quasi-money, which varied between 17-47 per cent and 15-51 per cent
per annum respectively. Both liabilities grew by more than 30 per
cent a year in Benin, Ghana and Nigeria, although growth in demand
deposits in these countries was marginally higher. Quasi money, on
the other hand, grew much faser than demand deposits in the rest of
the countries, with Mali (51.4 per cent) and Benin (44.3 per cent)
recording the highest growth rates. Significantly, Sierra Leone
recorded the lowest growth in quasi-money during the period.
The general acceleration in domestic credit expansion in the
region worsened net foreign assets positions in virtually all
countries except Benin, Niger, Nigeria and Togo where both
instruments increased simultaneously during the twelve year period.
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An examination of the distribution of credit between the government
and the private sector in each country indicates that there are some
countries which have relied consistently on the monetary authorities
and the deposit money banks to finance their increasing
expenditures, although in general the proportion of credit held by
the government had risen substantially in practically all countries.
The governments of Ghana, Mali and Nigeria have consistently taken
more than 40 per cent of the available domestic credit. In Sierra
Leone, this share increased remarkably from Le 2.46 million ($2.9
million) in 1970 to Le 463.86 million ($395 million) in 1981. On
the other hand, the governments of Benin, Ivory coast, Niger and
Bourkina Fasso have depended much less on domestic credit expansion,
a situation that generally reflects the restrictions imposed by
France within the WAMU monetary arrangements.
As between the francophone and anglophone countries, the
statistics show that government borrowing from the banking system is
more predominant in the latter than in the former group of
countries, depicting in part the basic differences in economic
structures, the extent of government expenditure and budgetary
deficits. In addition, the dominance of excess assets held by the
governments of the majority of the francophone states with the
banking system, including the treasury, also reflects the practice
of these governments in attempting to balance their current accounts
in transfers and trade every year. Although there is no clear-cut
pattern observable in the West African economies, one may, in trying
to explain the supremacy of private sector credit over government
credit in the francophones, note the argument that as an economy
progresses, the public sector tends to lose initiative to the
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private sector and the volume of private sector credit tends to
exceed that of the government. The extent of private sector credit
in relation to public sector credit is also an indicator of the
degree of openness of an economy. In this respect the economies of
the francophone states have tended to be more open than their
anglophone counterparts as they are lacking in many of the very
loose budgetary expenditures and tight trade and exchange
restrictions that characterise economies like Nigeria, Sierra Leone
and Ghana.
The rationing of credit to the private sector may have serious
effects on overall economic activities if the government sector is
too small compared with the private sector, although in this respect
also, there is no clear-cut pattern observable in the data. It is
apparent however that those countries which have substantial net
public credits with the monetary authorities are relatively more
privatised than centralised. Furthermore, the excessive dependence
on central bank credit ('new money') without being matched by
rational and productive economic activities have also endangered
monetary stability and proved injurious to some economies. Indeed
in Sierra Leone where the growth in the central bank credit to the
Government has been above 30 per cent a year since 1975, serious
implications have been evidenced in more recent years in a high
incidence of parallel and black market activities funded to a large
extent by rising and uncontrolled government expenditures,
especially in wages and salaries in the civil service, in an
occasional conflict between the Bank of Sierra Leone, the Treasury
and the IMF on the extent of the 'ways-and-means advances', and in
the apparent violation by Government of the Bank of Sierra Leone
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(Amendment) Act of 1970 (Article 34) regarding the limits of central
bank financing of government.
Under ideal circumstances, money supply aggregates should
expand in the same direction as the volume of goods and services in
the economy and this growth should be distributed between real
growth and prices. Unfortunately, the experience in West Africa is
such that money supply has been increasing very rapidly whereas
growth in the GDP has remained comparatively very low. At the same
time consumer prices have in countries like Ghana, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone, accelerated equally as fast as the money supply (see
Table 5D).
5.4.2.3	 Financial Intermediation and National Development 
As noted earlier, the relative importance of financial
intermediation both in relation to enhancing the spread of the
banking habit and overall economic development is usually measured
in terms of the extent of currency holdings outside the banking
system and in the relationship between financial assets of all kinds
- currency, bank deposits, shares, government securities, trade
credits, etc - and the GDP and GNP. These relationships help to
indicate the various roles of money as well as the assessment of the
changing role and size of the financial superstructure in the
development of an economy.
The relationship of currency in circulation to money supply
attempts to measure the extent to which people and institutions want
to hold money for either transactions or precautionary purposes
while that between money supply and the sum of demand deposits plus
quasi-money indicates the extent of the banking system's involvement
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in the settlement of financial transactions and other money
transfers. Thus, an increase of currency to money supply denotes a
decline in the involvement of the financial system in the process of
development of the economy.
These ratios are shown in Table 5E for 13 of the 16 member
countries of ECO WAS for which data was available. First, as an
estimation of the size of the financial system, the financial assets
ratio (defined in this study as total money supply, M1, over the
GDP) has been rising in practically all financial systems in the
region during the last decade. In Ghana, for instance, the ratio
rose from 17.9 per cent in 1970 to 26.1 per cent in 1977, before
declining to 19.9 per cent in 1981. Similarly, in the Ivory Coast,
it rose to 33.7 per cent in 1977 before sliding down to 25.3 per
cent in 1981. In Benin, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo in
particular, the financial system as a share of the GDP expanded from
below 20 per cent to over 30 per cent. In general, the ratio has
ranged between 9.3 per cent in Burkina in 1970 and 40.5 per cent in
Togo in 1981. These figures compare with India (0.35), Ethiopia
(0.15), Japan (1.40) in 1960 and the UK (1.70) in 1961 (see
Goldsmith, 1966, p 9), indicating therefore that financial systems
in West Africa have been assuming increasing importance in the
national economies as they developed.
Secondly, this phenomenon is demonstrated further firstly, by
the increase in the propensity to hold near-money (ie the ratio of
quasi-money to the money supply) from 28.5 - 35.4 per cent; secondly
by the drop in the proportion of money held outside the banking
system (ie currency in circulation ratio) from 36.3 - 31.5 per cent;
and thirdly by the relatively high demand deposits ratio, which
243
U flZr Gt Ca
0 0 w•	 -•• 1:11 < C CD CD
(D
Vt
C CO CD CD	 COCO
00 -s COLD CD7 -I	 -s -s
C
-C
CT 0(0 Da 0 A 3 -I 7 CT
CD
•	 • CD (e,	 po
-. 0. 1:10 gib LT1
1	 0' 13/ 0.
•-••
-n
A 01 A LTI C./1 C.../	 Al•-•
 NO Ul	 CO .0. at 01 
A
A NI 0 01 CO
o	 o
•-••
oo CD
•-•
7
•	 •113
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
Al CO (.11 CV CO
	 CU •	 •	 •	 •La NO IV 01
Oa 7 N<
<fl co 4. 01 4. A A 4. co	 4. .0.01 1)1 .0. •-•
-6. cu 7
al 01 Vi-0	 V
.	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
(JJ
.	 .	 .	 .
CO	 CIC
-D
CD	 17 aes
141 03 A 01 (J1 NO La	 0 0 (JI 1.11 ta
- col 0 .0. UI fIj.	 CJ1 IV .0. 4J. CI) A (.../ 0(0I-. 7 7(D
+• CD a
7
A
010 10 n-• NO NO CO (0 CO
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
JO. Ln Co Lci
•	 •	 •	 •
(1)	 1-1
.<
CD 
c+
W
-n
NO C.11 CO 4.• 1)1 01)11)110 10 ON UI (11C 7
n QI L•J Ca A La 01(- (.../ cri .o.
0 03 -1 CU
IV 0 cn co co CO Ca	 01
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
‘11
.	 .	 .
COO CI
-11 -0 CD
0-1 7
7(-1 lw 41 0010  La IJI	 1)1 vik<CD fl
-s
•••C CD Ul La La A A 011 	 La A 1.11 A NJ
c-1 (D0,
0 CI 7
C
CI
<
Le1
re
fh
(11
‘C) Lo)
1)1 CJ1
.o. tyl ON CD C.../ CO CO
•.0 `,1 CTI V1 NI C1/
(4.1	 LoJ 01 N3 A
U1 CO 0 CO
LO 1-•••
01.0. A A
ki3
nJ	 re
CO
7n-•
CD CD
"I 7 n
a
ori
C, ..J C,C,UIC,.CD.CUOI
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
lw	 Lel n.)
.	 •	 •	 .
10
0.
	
C
0	 -•
IV ON A 1.3101)11)111)10 CO n••1 (J1 cri
CCUI
CD
a
CI 0 a
C	 0
+ • p01 co )--•
•	 •	 1	 •	 1	 1	 •
ru CO La n.1
•	 •	 •	 •
AnI	 7
-•• CI 0 X CO CO (AN I-.	Cl	 A 0 CO n3 •-• 0.
CD 'S "0 0-1
CD 1••• 1-••	 1•••• CDC c
CD - 1/1
O. Co CI lw	 01
•	 •	 i	 •	 1	 1	 •
A NJ 01 CO
•	 •	 •	 •
CO
••••4	 0
7 go
0.,-PO.
-•• fD
03
Di7
01 113 CV La	 (.1 CO O rt.) La	 In
c+
0)09 Pr 1n•	 1-••	 Pn• •-•C 7 Cu7 + Ca.1 CO
CU CU
	 CA.)	 lw CO
•	 •	 1	 •	 1	 •	 •
CA l'13 CO CO
•	 •	 •	 •
COV	 '0
7 Oa CL CO IV CO	 1 C.TI 001 V Ul 	 -•••CD 7
0/ CL 0.I	 CD
0
-• 1n•	 I•••• (N.1 1n• 1••n•
C0 VI
e-•
CO O.
CD 0
0. CO CO CO	 (.4	 cr,
•	 •	 •	 1	 •	 • ex I-. 0 Lel•	 •	 •	 • .0C
In	 641In Cu CD 03	 4. Q.) n0	 W• V	 Q.UI
A 7 N-CC0. <al NJ W NJ) 1.n• 1-600. 0 co 0 c.4 CO at 0 6•-• 1.-• 0 4. CO 30.CD
ID 13
•	 •
cn 0
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
.0. vs Ul	 V 10 CV
•	 •	 •	 •
NJ (7	 •••.1 ...I	 0CO	 7
co
OC
u13 IV W N3 N) n••• IV	 ow
ro
en. -I
VI OA
re
o6 0
7J
at
-0
CO .0.
•	 •
03 •••4
0 co I	 6-• -.4 1-4 at
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
•••1 1:0 Ul Ca 0 V
0 co M
•	 •	 •	 •
I	 03 I	 ••1
CO
co1-•
7 -1O. 0-1 La 41. la ON	 1-•	 Ul 1.11 La 00 CO
-.6. es .	 . •	 •	 1	 •	 1	 • . ••••1
.0 in .0. 1n• CO CD	 Ca	 CO. 4. 01 Oa ch
CD -646
-0 CD 1)1 11301	 (44	 VI Crt Cn	 IN) .C3CO	 C
-6. •	 •	 I	 •	 • •	 •	 •	 • Do3 7 Co CO 10 1)1	 ru	 co 01 0 1.13 La	 LA0 0(DC
Cl
o
-o
L11 L11 NJ ••• 1	 1.11	 CO V
•	 •	 1	 •	 •	 • --a 01 I-. 4.•	 •	 •	 • tO	 07
1.01 NJ 141 ••••1 ••••1	 Ln	 •••4 ut	 CD
CD 0.
cu CD
1-•0 a ••••1 .1). CO	 4.,	 uD ON	 L•4 CO7 CD •	 • •	 •	 6	 •	 •	 •	 • •	 •	 •	 •
CD 7 CO 0 IJ1 0	 0	 03444 Coo-6441.47.0
-• VI
-
n-•
co 03
.	 .
03 1‘) 4. 1-6 tO •-.4 06	 .p.
.	 .	 .	 .
CO
0.0
r-
4. 01 W• 03 6-• 0. .0.C(13
t-•
71 00 4.11 CO
•-••CD 0 CO CO•	 • CO NJ•	(...1 1.71	 V•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 • .O.	 Cl•	 •	 •	 • CO030. (D Cil Co tO t43 03	 6-6 na co CO 03 IV
CD 1-•	 NJ lw N3	 W• n-•V N./
•	 •
Cl V	 1-•	 VI
•	 •	 1	 •	 1	 1	 •
V CV CO A
•	 •	 •	 •
CO
••••n -11
CO Cl .0.	 Cl CO •••4 0 a
(106-•CO Co 6-•	 I-.CO 01	 V	 UI L.) 6-• 6-66-6 0 C...6 CO 7r)
•	 •
NJ .0.
•	 •	 •	 I	 •A 01	 6-•	 01 •	 •	 •	 •01 CO 6-• Ca IN
•n•
":1
NJ n•••• IV IV	 NI 1-•
crs
•	 •
10	 •-•	 m .43
•	 •	 •	 •	 •
Lri Lei at Co
•	 •	 •	 •
CO
•••.4
VI
co CO CU	 co 0 0 0 at m Ul CD
UI
1‘) •-•
CO 03
NJ IV
••••• ON	 fa	 L•J
n-•	 CV
01 01 CO W CO
•	 •
CO 0'1
•	 •	 1	 •	 1	 •	 •
CO	 •••.I
•	 •	 •	 •
N.) 4. I-.
La (V NJ NJ (-'NJ NJ •••• La NJ(-'
A I-.
•	 •
NO CV CO CAI A "-a I-.
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
0 CO CO A
•	 •	 •	 •
CO
0 4. (UNJCOU1COCO NJ U,.CD01-' CO
N) Col WI W. IJJ NJ W IV 0-• NJ IV L•J 1•••
W•
•	 •
1-• NJ CO 1w 0 IV (51
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
CO L..	 6-•
•	 .	 •	 .
NO
(PI 03 01 n3 n3 c.n 4. Ca La COC1 CU 1-•
244
stood at above 30 per cent in 1970 and in 1981 (calculated from
Table 5B).
As a percentage of the GDP, currency in circulation is still
high in most West African countries, varying between 23.2 per cent
in Liberia and 64.5 per cent in Mali in 1981. The overall deposits
ratio has improved a lot more remarkably in most countries -
especially Gambia, Mauritania, Senegal and Benin - than the
propensity to save which, though rising, is still below 10 per cent
throughout the region except in Nigeria where it has risen fastest,
from 6 per cent in 1970 to 12.9 per cent in 1981. These two ratios
are lowest in Mali and Niger.
In addition to factors already discussed, the relative
efficiency of the West African banking system in financial
intermediation is further inhibited by existing banking legislation,
most of which are inadequate, inflexible and have therefore been
overtaken by current demands in the role of the banks they govern.
Furthermore, the high default rate increases the level of
conservatism of the banks in granting loans and this may also
explain their excess liquidity problem.
Another perennial problem that affects banking efficiency in
West Africa is the interest rate philosophy which is generally
common in the region in that all the member countries have a low peg
interest rate which has led to negative yield on savings. The
resulting incidence of dis-intermediation - as the rational investor
realises the consequence - could lead directly to large speculative
demand for money and hoarding in some of the region's most valuable
minerals (diamonds, gold) rather than the savings being held by
institutions that would channel them into productive activities.
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Consequently, the magnitude of the currency ratio reflects the
degree of hoarding and the relative efficiency of the interest rate
policy in West Africa. Of course, this ratio is also influenced by
illiteracy about the banking habit, low personal incomes, insecurity
and the incidence of tax evasion. On a seasonal basis, the currency
ratio is observedly high during crop and festive periods. The
hoarding of high currency denominations in particular is influenced
by the high incidence of illegal currency and commodity operations
especially in boarder market centres. This tendency greatly
distorts the money supply measures in most countries; a reason why
this study would not favour the issue of high currency denominations
in West Africa unless where the rising incidence of currency
counterfeiting and illegal trafficking often to take advantage of
the different inconvertibility levels, are controlled.
Another skewed pattern of financial intermediation already
highlighted regarding the allocation of credit to the various
sectors of the economy is fully illustrated in Table 5F. The table
indicates unsatisfactory availability of credit to agriculture other
than 'general commerce' which principally involves import-financing
and some aspect of export-financing.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has attempted to describe and analyse the monetary
and banking systems of the West African sub-region on a comparative
basis.	 It provides the groundwork for further comparative
statistical tests later in the study on the performance and
efficiency of the national monetary systems. Obviously, the greater
the degree of disparity between them, the greater the problem of
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achieving the level of common consensus required for regional
monetary unification. Without pre-empting the results of the more
specific comparative statistical analysis to be undertaken, it can
be stated that in general while the structural features of the West
African economies do not allow further extension in the banking
practices and the application of the arsenal of monetary and
financial instruments without being more selective and innovative,
it has also not been possible to achieve monetary stability in limy
countries.
Several of the factors responsible for this have emanated
substantially from domestic as well as external monetary relations.
More significantly, the fragmented monetary and banking arrangements
reviewed in the chapter exhibit various dimensions of financial
illiquidity, lack of currency convertibility, market strength, and
acceptability. The CFA franc with effective convertibility into key
currencies (through the French franc) and the US dollar in Liberia
coexist with eight other currencies all of which are very
inconvertible. The structural set-up of the corresponding monetary
and banking arrangements leads to three basic monetary systems in
the sub-region: the CFA franc system, whose definitive basis is the
trade-off between exchange and convertibility guarantees by France
and variations in the member states' freedom to control monetary and
financial policies, trade and payments, and the conditions of pooled
reserves; the uniqueness of the situation in Liberia where the
National Bank of Liberia does not discharge one of the traditional
duties of the central bank, ie the issuing of currencies; and the
former sterling area within which, in common with the rest of the
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remaining countries, monetary and banking systems have also differed
quite significantly in structure, management and practices.
Despite the relatively common structural changes introduced
throughout the sub-region since the attainment of political
independence, it can also be concluded that on their own the
national monetary and financial systems can no longer cope with the
problems of development as these are continuously taking new
dimensions. The foreign exchange gap, as defined by the excess of
import payments over export earnings (see Chapter 4) and the
savings-investment gap (Table 5G) constraints have grown out of
proportion in virtually all countries in the sub-region.
As in trade and production, the divergent institutional and
operational structures of money and banking in West Africa have not
complemented each other. Government holdings in banks are
particularly dominant, ranging from 100 per cent (nationalisation)
in Benin, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to 48.2 per cent in Togo with a
mean of 51 per cent overall. These changes have reflected on the
indigenisation of the banks' management as well as their operational
mechanism. Although foreign banks are still predominant,
particularly in Liberia and some countries in the BCEAO, their
activities are commonly subject to directive of the monetary
authorities.
The West African banking systems have been characterised by
steady growth of resources (assets and liabilities) and the
expansion of activities in general. However, while interest rate
policies seem to be similar in philosophy, the major instruments of
monetary policy differ significantly between countries. The
discount rate and re-discount ceilings that dominate the instruments
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utilised in the BCEAO are not very effective in the FSA countries,
in particular, mainly because of the excess liquidity position of
the commercial banks. Consequently, much use is being made of
selective credit controls (guidelines and sectoral allocations).
Liquidity reserve requirements are less effective, also for reasons
of the commercial banks' liquidity position, while the lack of
efficient capital market limits the use of open market operations.
Furthermore the FSA, in contrast with the other countries, have
supplemented the instruments of monetary policy with special schemes
such as loans guarantee schemes, and dealings in stabilisation
securities to the commercial banks (in Nigeria) while the management
of interbank funds, where banks could benefit from the excess
reserves of each other, is in operation in the BCEAO.
Outside the less effective West African Clearing House
arrangements, and the related West African Bankers Association
formed to initiate correspondent relationships between the
commercial banks in the sub-region, there is little co-ordination
and/or interdependence between the West African money and banking
systems. The fundamental consideration for monetary unification is
the nature and extent to which the divergent banking structures and
instruments of monetary policy can be harmonised. In principle,
this should not be too difficult if only because all of them are
equally structurally rudimentary, dependent and increasingly
inefficient relative to coping with existing monetary, financial and
overall economic problems. Harmonisation also has important
implications for the disparate payments adjustment mechanisms that
characterise the sub-region and these are examined and appraised in
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE POLICIES IN WEST AFRICA
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The discussion in this chapter is devoted to a closer
examination of two interrelated institutional arrangements in West
Africa: first, the balance of payments, and second, exchange rate
arrangements and the extent of trade and payments restrictions.
With the growth in import costs since the late 1950s, the balance of
payments of West African countries have moved into worsening
deficits. The rising import trends, together with worsening export
performance and external developments, especially since the
beginning of the last decade, have for most countries, forced
tremendous drain upon their international liquidity positions. This
in turn has forced the adoption of varied exchange rate adjustment
policies and stricter exchange and payments restrictions across the
region, in particular, the non-BCEAO countries (except Liberia).
These institutional arrangements are at the heart of achieving
monetary union. The critical point is that at the pre-union stage,
the potential member countries are able independently to adjust
trade and/or capital flows and hence monetary flows through the
foreign exchange market, either directly through trade restrictions
and exchange controls or indirectly by altering their international
competitiveness through exchange rate adjustment. The range of
action available to a member country once a union is formed,
especially as it affects intra-union transactions, is narrowed
considerably in that a balance of payments equilibrium and a high
degree of monetary and fiscal policy harmonisation and
252
liberalisation become the principal ingredients for the process of
monetary integration, including the penultimate objective of
achieving convertibility within the region. Assuming an absence of
externally-oriented disturbances, the period of transition towards
monetary union should enable those member states with less severe
balance of payments problems and payments restrictions to achieve
appropriate equilibrium in their external accounts. At the same
time the transition phase should also allow those with deepseated
and in some cases structural exchange and payments problems to
design and implement appropriate adjustment programmes.
It is required in this respect for each member country, at the
outset, to clearly identify and appreciate the extent and nature of
the payments problems affecting it and the adjustment policies
adopted so far in order to achieve both internal and external
balance. It is not often that these payments adjustment mechanisms
have achieved their desired purpose in these countries. Yet, unless
where potential members of monetary integration are assured of the
potential integration benefits, membership for some becomes even
more stuttering mainly for fear of potential detrimental
reallocation effects.
In this context, the discussion in this chapter is divided into
two broad sections: Section 6.2 analyses trends in the balance of
payments as well as some of the major factors that have influenced
the persistent deficit positions. Section 6.3 examines the nature
and efficiency of the two major foreign exchange policies commonly
practiced in West Africa as instruments of adjustment policy,
namely, exchange rate adjustment, and exchange controls and payments
restrictions. Conclusions to the chapter are in Section 6.4.
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6.2 BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY
6.2.1 Trends in the Balance of Payments
In West Africa, as in several other developing countries, the
structure of the balance of payments and the extent of its problem
for the member states have reflected the small, open nature of the
economies, the rudimentary stage of development, the dominating
influence of primary production and the heavy reliance on foreign
factors of production. This is manifested in the large share of
merchandise exports and imports and the dependence on the outside
world for services and capital. In most countries in the region,
the balance of payments has persistently registered deficits in
practically all its major components, reflecting by and large the
rapid growth in imports which has not been matched by export growth
and the marked deterioration in capital inflow which usually took
the form of grants, direct foreign investment, and to a lesser
extent, official concessional loans.
As in other economic indicators already reviewed, the obvious
distortion in the combined balance of payments performance of the
West African countries is Nigeria whose massive petroleum export
revenues have since the 1970s transformed the total trade balance
(and indeed, the overall balance of payments) of the West African
region into rising surplus from rising deficit positions. As shown
in Table 6A, the regional trade balance improved from a deficit of
$224 million in 1965 to huge surpluses of $7934 million and $3212
million in 1980 and 1983 respectively. Excluding Nigeria, the
combined trade deficit worsened from $87 million in 1960 to $2533
million in 1980 and $2477 million in 1983, with a large part of the
deterioration taking place after 1974. There are however, a few
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exceptional countries like Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Liberia
where the balance of trade has fluctuated between deficits and
surpluses, reflecting movements in the terms of trade and the
general economic diversification.
As in merchandise trade, the Services Accounts of virtually all
West African countries, with the exception of Senegal, have
registered large and growing deficits since 1970. Deficits are
recorded on all the major lines of services, eg freight and
merchandise insurance, investment income, foreign travel and
government-related transactions. These deficits have reflected the
strong dependence of the economies on foreign supply and/or
management of these various services, in particular, freight,
shipping and air travel facilities. At the same time, the usually
net overall surpluses registered by many countries in the major
elements of 'unrequited transfers' (ie migrant transfers, expatriate
remittances, government-related transfers) have been more than
matched by the rising negative balances in these areas by Ivory
Coast and Nigeria.
These developments in the goods, services and unrequited
transfers accounts, as illustrated in Table 6B, have forced the
regoinal overall current account to deteriorate by more than tenfold
from a deficit of $502 million in 1970 to $6898 million in 1981. By
contrast, the structure and movements in the capital accounts
(consisting of net flows of investment as well as net other private
and official flows which are essentially drawings and amortization
on short-term and long-term loans), although differing among member
countries, have generally registered surpluses. In many countries,
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Table 6A	 ECOWAS: Balance of Merchandise Trade
(million dollars)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Benin 1 -8 -13 -20 -31 -164 -706 -438
Burkina 5 -7 -22 -31 -107 -269 -151
Cape Verde -1 -2 -1 -7 -14 -38 -96 -84
Gambia -2 -3 -1 -2 -1 -12 -132 -62
Ghana 82 22 -38 -130 -47 17 - 176
Guinea - - 1 1 -22 -55 57 112
Guinea-Bissau -4 -7 -7 -11 -23 -31 -44 -47
Ivory Coast 18 37 26 41 81 54 -43 543
Liberia - 17 14 30 64 62 55 -1329
Mali - - - -24 -14 -123 -234 -237
Mauritania - - - 34 33 15 -92 -252
Niger .	 -1 -4 - -13 -26 -10 -28 -50
Nigeria 80 -10 -129 -30 181 1734 10467 5689
Senegal -63 -112 -59 -34 -41 -122 -575 -399
Sierra Leone -19 9 -19 -16 -59 -211 65
Togo - 4 -11 -18 -10 -48 -215 -324
Total 110 -72 -216 -224 83 1113 7934 3212
Excluding Nigeria 30 -62 -87 -194 -98 -621 -2533 -2477
Source: See Table 4A
Notes:	 - Not available
however, notably Benin, Gambia and Burkina, these surpluses are not
offset by the deficits in the other areas of the balance of
payments, resulting therefore in overall balance of payments
deficits. The region's overall balance of payments have worsened
from a surplus balance of $54 million in 1970 to a deficit of $66
million in 1980.
Most countries in the subregion have a good agricultural and/or
mineral resource base (Chapter 2) which if efficiently exploited and
barring inhibiting political and economic influences should achieve
and sustain comfortable balance of payments positions. However, many
of the factors which have influenced the rising deterioration in the
balance of payments in recent years are both exogenous and
endogenous, reflecting natural events and changes in the
.international economic scene, as well as resulting from the domestic
policies by most countries.
For the sub-Saharan landlocked member countries in particular,
the balance of payments problem has largely been the result of
worsening climatic conditions (ie drought). In general however, the
most common reason advanced for the sharp increase in the trade
deficit is the increases in petroleum prices which have moved
inexorably upward since 1973 (representing a more than tenfold
increase in ten years) and which have had a key pervasive influence
on all prices and other cost-related elements of the balance of
payments. In consequence, payments for imports as already
illustrated, have particularly increased by more than 400 per cent
across the board during the last decade while the share of fuel
imports in the balance of payments problem has grown faster than
that of other goods and services (see Chapter 4).
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Furthermore, industrial expansion and the resulting increase in
investment expenditures have, through corresponding increases in
money incomes, put added pressures on the balance of payments in
several countries, especially Nigeria. Worse still is the evidence
that the share of direct foreign investment which used to be a very
significant component of capital inflows in the 1960s (mostly by
firms in the primary product and import-substitution manufacturing
activities, banking transfers etc) began to decline steadily in the
1970s. For instance, in Ghana, the share of direct investment in
the country in the Capital Account declined sharply from 278.1 per
cent in 1975 to 10.2 per cent in 1982. In other countries, the
ratio has fallen from 18.5 per cent to 4.4 er cent in the Ivory
Coast between 1975 and 1980; in Senegal and Sierra Leone, from 28.2
per cent and 19.8 per cent in 1975 respectively to negative figures
by 1980; from 82.1 per cent (1975) to 50.5 per cent (1977) in
Liberia; and from 108.5 per cent (1976) to 4.7 per cent (1982) in
Nigeria. It has risen however from 5.8 per cent (1975) to 15.9 per
cent (1981) in Gambia; 0.6 per cent (1975) to 3.0 per cent (1979) in
Burkina; and 1.8 per cent (1976) to 5.0 per cent (1982) in
Mauritania (calculated from IMF, Balance of Payment Year Book,
1983). In most of these countries, the decline in the share of
direct investments is also reflected in a significant drop in the
absolute values despite the fact that total capital flows have
increased over the years. The increase in net capital flows is
attributable mainly to the increase in the net flow of loans,
especially from private sources.
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Furthermore, although a precise statistical correlation cannot
always be ascertained, it can be argued that balance of payments
disequilibria in West Africa have been accentuated by rising
government budgetary deficits, the public debt in terms of higher
debt-service payments, and the sharp deterioration in international
liquidity positions.
6.2.2 Government Budgetary Operations
In many ways West African states have broad similarities in
their fiscal structures and policy objectives. Reliance on non-tax
income as a source of government revenue to finance budgetary
operations is low. Practically all the countries have a narrow base
for direct taxation and in consequence, they have relied heavily on
the various media of indirect taxation to raise budgetary revenues.
Fiscal policies are generally development-oriented so that they all
tend to adopt measures which in the main seek to attract and protect
private foreign investment, diversify the economies and initiate a
drive towards industrialisation. Moreover, the majority of
countries have pursued expansionary fiscal policies during the last
decade with moderate to large budget deficits financed mainly by
recourse to the domestic banking system, primarily the central
banks.
Table 6C illustrates the important differences that exist
between countries in their fiscal approaches in relation to the
distribution of governments' current domestic revenue sources as
between tax revenue and non-tax revenue, the distribution of
government expenditure between current and capital expenditure, the
distribution of tax revenue between direct and indirect taxes, the
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proportion of overall budgetary deficits relative to the GDP, and
the way in which these deficits are financed, ie between foreign and
domestic sources. Reliance on non-tax income varies between 7 per
cent of total revenue in Ghana and 45 per cent in the Gambia. Tax
income represents, on average, about 83 per cent of total current
income in the region. Indirect taxes, despite the very low tax
effort prevalent in most countries, provide between 31 per cent
(Nigeria) and 81 per cent (Gambia) of total tax income, while the
proportion of direct income to total income is below 50 per cent in
all countries except Nigeria. Over two-thirds of West African
countries depend on indirect taxation for more than two-thirds of
their total current income.
Equally, the share of capital expenditure (which, unlike
current expenditure, closely relates to a country's future
productive capacity) in total expenditure is over 50 per cent in
only four countries - Gambia (56 per cent), Niger (51 per cent),
Nigeria (63 per cent) and Togo (56 per cent). More than half of
total expenditure in most countries is on current item (eg wages
and salaries, subsidies, purchase of local goods and services for
government departments, etc), a situation which has generally
provided fertile breeding grounds for the so-called 'die-man racket'
(the practice of defrauding government revenues by over-invoicing
government wage bills to include non existent or fictitious names of
persons and/or services) Current expenditure is as high as over 70
per cent of total government expenditures in Mali and Senegal.
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Overall budgetary deficits are a common feature in West Africa
and are as high as around 12 per cent of the GDP in Sierra Leone.
Nearly half of the countries resort to bank borrowing in order to
finance their deficits. In this category, the most notable are
Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Bourkina Fasso. Some
countries, noticeably Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo appear to have depended increasingly
on foreign sources. Legislation in various countries define the
extent to which budgetary deficits may be financed by the central
bank - ranging from 10 per cent in Guinea to 50 per cent in The
Gambia with 20 per cent being the mode in the region (ACMS, 1981, p
28). In practice many of these ceilings are almost exceeded.
These differences in fiscal approaches have serious
implications for domestic money supply, inflation and the balance of
payments, but equally critical for achieving monetary unification
are the consequences for fiscal policy harmonisation. It is obvious
that under these circumstances the elimination of intra-regional
trade tariffs and, in particular, any levelling of external tariffs
will have significantly different economic implications, especially
for those countries heavily dependent on customs duties as a source
of government income, and will thus lead to different levels of
preparedness between countries in order to implement the trade
liberalisation measures envisaged even in the ECOWAS Treaty. This
is so despite the fact that the Treaty's Article 25 makes provisions
for a compensation for loss of revenue due to tariff liberalisation.
6.2.3 The External Debt
The 1970s also marked the beginning of the rapid growth of the
West African external debt burden. In the majority of cases, the
mounting of external debt obligations has been the result of a web
of interwoven internal and external factors many of which are
practically the same as those affecting the balance of payments in
general.	 But for the growth in the external public debt in
particular, the main causes have included the contraction of
hardcore loans to finance expanding government expenditure
programmes (many of these are military and non-income generating),
as well as bad debt-management policies which in many cases have
allowed for the over-invoicing of debt commitments. The consequent
increase in the external debt has for most countries outstepped the
general capacities to borrow and repay as indicated by marked
increases in the debt-service ratios.
The external public debt profile shown in Table 60 indicates a
more than elevenfold increase in aggregate debt between 1970-83,
rising from $2.26 billion to $26.16 billion. As a proportion of
merchandise exports, this debt rose from 75.9 per cent to 126.0 per
cent during the period. In terms of the GNP, it rose, as minimum,
from 4.8 per cent (Nigeria) in 1970 to 17.7 per cent (Nigeria) in
1983. For most countries, it has accounted for over 50 per cent of
the GNP, and has risen up to 158.2 per cent in Mauritania in 1983.
The levels of the debt-service ratio moved from a range of 0.6
per cent (Gambia) and 10.3 per cent (Guinea) in 1970 to 0.8 per
cent (Gambia) and 31.0 per cent (Ivory Coast) in 1983. Debt service
payments as a percentage of GNP accounted for between 0.9 per cent
(Gambia) and 12.9 per cent (Ivory Coast) in 1983 from 0.2 per cent
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(Mali) and 5.5 per cent (Liberia) in 1970. For most countries, the
interest-export ratios were about 8 per cent in 1983 as average
interest rates were almost doubled during the 1970-83 period.
A number of general conclusions can be drawn from the data on
these debt profiles. The first is that among the countries whose
debt-service ratios are particularly high, the low income and in
some cases lower economic growth countries, ie Guinea, Sierra Leone
and Togo, have borne higher percentages, emphasising further that
the least developed member countries are less capable of exploiting
internal and external resources for development purposes. Secondly,
the ratio has also risen steadily and significantly even among the
most developed member countries - Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Senegal -
which may in part reflect their increasing dependence on medium- to
long-term foreign borrowing to finance their industrialisation
(investment) programmes. Nigeria, which takes up around 45 per cent
of total West African external public debt (1983) is rated the tenth
highest country debtor ($12 billion) in the world from a list of
country debtors that is headed by Brazil ($93 billion) (see The
Sunday Times, 3 June 1984).
Thirdly, further classification of the sources of debts into
bilateral (official), multilateral, contractor finance/suppliers'
credit and financial institutions shows that the distribution varies
between countries. However, except Benin, Ivory Coast and Nigeria,
the choice between the various loan sources is importantly between
bilateral (official) which is relatively more concessionary and
multilateral. International financial institutions have provided
over 77 per cent of Nigeria's total debt outstanding, 55 per cent in
the Ivory Coast, 46 per cent in Benin and less than 1 per cent in
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Mali. The proportion taken by each source category in total
regional external debt outstanding in 1981 was 26 per cent
(bilateral), 23 per cent (multilateral), 4 per cent (suppliers'
credit), and 47 per cent (financial institutions) (see Table 6E).
The share of the IMF loans, including credit tranches, Compensatory
Financing Facility drawings and Trust Fund drawings rose to around 5
per cent in 1983/84.
Fourthly, bankers commonly take a ratio of external debt to
exports as a crude indicator of creditworthiness, with a decline in
actual ratios indicating that '(debtor) countries would be within
sight of being able to borrow freely from the banks' (The Sunday
Times, 30 September 1984, p 64). Based on this central assumption,
Table 6E further reveals that at the end of 1981, only four
countries - Nigeria (59 per cent), Liberia (144 per cent), Ghana
(149 per cent) and Sierra Leone (158 per cent) appeared
creditworthy. Alternative credit ratings by the International
Investor Magazine for five countries in West Africa are also shown
in Table E.
Finally, the severity of West Africa's debt burden has not only
precipitated major debt resceduling operations by some of the most
hard-hit countries (Table 6F). It has also placed increasing
reliance upon the IMF, for instance, which as of 30 September 1984,
was supporting economic adjustments in seven West African countries
with a total theoretically available financing of around SDR 403.3
million (Table 6G). Published debt especially in LDCs are known to
substantially underestimate real levels. Yet even the available
estimates for West Africa indicate that over 1970-83, the repayment
burden of the external public debt outstanding and disbursed on each
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member of the population has on average risen by more than seven
times, from $23 to $162 (see Table 6E).
Table 6F	 ECOWAS: Paris/London Club Debt Rescheduling
(million dollars)
Paris Club London Clyb
Country Date (1976-84) (1980-84)1
Liberia 19 December 1980 35 -
16 December 1981 30 -
December 1982 27
22 December 1983 1200 MI
Niger November 1983 70 -
Nigeria July 1983 - 1350
September 1983 - 480
Senegal 12 October 1981 75 -
June 1982 _ •	 77
29 November 1982 74 -
21 December 1983 75 -
February 1984 97
Sierra Leone 15 September 1977
8 February 1980
20 February 1984
39
37
92
_
_
_
Togo 15 June 1979 260 -
March 1980 - 69
20 February 1981 232 -
12 April	 1983 300 -
October 1983 - 84
Source: Jesse Wright, 'Adjustment Policies, Financial Relief with
Sterling Attached', Africa Business, May 1984, No 69, pp
49-55
Notes:	 1 Private sector reschedulings
- Non
Table 6G	 ECOWAS: IMF Stand-by Arrangements as of 30 September 1984
(thousand SCRs)
Date of
Arrangement Expiry Date Total
Undrawn
Balance
Gambia 23 April 1984 22 July 1985 12,830 10,200
Ghana 27 August 1984 21 December 1985 180,000 150,000
Ivory Coast 3 August 1984 2 August 1985 82,750 41,370
Mali 9 December 1983 31 May 1985 40,500 18,500
Niger 5 October 1983 4 December 1985 18,000 8,400
Sierra Leone 3 February 1984 2 February 1985 50,200 31,200
Togo 7 May 1984 6 May 1985 19,000 11,000
Source:	 IMF Survey, 12 November 1984
6.2.4 International Reserves
As total net inflows of financial resources (net transfers and
capital flows) failed to finance fully the growing deficits in the
balance of payments, most countries in West Africa (except to some
extent Nigeria) resorted to fully utilising whatever balances they
held on foreign exchange reserves. In some of the worst affected
countries, eg Sierra Leone, reserve accumulation is terminated and
reserve earnings are planned forward to cover current import
requirements. The extent to which growth in imports outpaced that
in foreign reserves is demonstrated in Figure 6.1 for the perod
1970-83. Total reserves (excluding Nigeria) fell to $65.3 million
by 1983 after rising from $552.8 million to $700.4 million in 1970-
80 (mainly as a result of higher prices of some primary products).
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Table 6H illustrates that by 1983 gross reserves covered far
less than three months of imports in all countries, except Togo.
The average for the region dropped from 7.5 to 1.4 months of imports
between 1975-83. The average ratio of reserves to imports declined
from 0:59 in 1975 to 0.14 in 1983. Similarly, the average ratio of
reserves to total external public debt (outstanding and disbursed)
dropped from 0.51 to 0.08 in 1970-83. By the end of 1983, reserves
were less than 5 per cent of total imports in The Gambia, Ivory
Coast, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
The implications of these declining reserve trends for West
African monetary unification are twofold. First, the extent to
which reserve accumulation can be improved in time to support the
common exchange rate arrangement. Second, whether reserve movements
in'West African countries have responded to different forces (eg
fixed versus variable exchange rate systems, discrepancies between
desired and actual reserves, or monetary disequilibrium situations),
in which case monetary unification in the sub-region requires the
harmonisation of the divergent reserve-demand functions (see for
instance, Edwards, 1984 and 1983; Grubel, 1971). No clear
relationship between reserve movements and these forces is
postulated but the evidence in West Africa is that the degree of
openness and payments variability plays an important role. There
are also no well-defined demand functions as domestic credit
expansion and illegal commodity and currency practices have also
influenced reserve balances in many countries, especially the non-
BCEAO. Undoubtedly, a successful reserve pooling process at the
regional level would put pressure on Nigeria because of oil reserves
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as well as on the existing reserve pooling arrangements of the WAMU
member states.
6.3 FOREIGN EXCHANGE ADJUSTMENT POLICIES
Attempts to arrest and contain the deteriorating foreign
exchange reserve and external payments situation in West Africa have
commonly stressed the role of the exchange rate and the adoption of
selective quantitative exchange restrictions. Consequently, besides
Liberia, other countries in the sub-region have introduced
legislations to control foreign exchange transactions in
collaboration with import control measures. The prime objectives
are to conserve foreign exchange, bring balance in the external
payments situation, and direct imports from 'non-essential' import
items with a view also to facilitate the industrialisation process.
In countries where these 'adjustment mechanisms have featured
most predominantly, eg Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra leone,
emphasis in the implementation of each policy instrument has tended
to vary over the years and between countries, depending largely on
the relative severity of the foreign exchange and payments problem.
In general, however, the intensification of both policies since the
1970s, compared with the previous decade, has been influenced
largely by the collapse of the international monetary system whose
adverse implications for the LDCs in common have been compounded by
the direct and indirect effects of the sharp rise in oil prices and
the expansion of domestic money supply and credit. Against the
background of the structural disposition of the member economies and
circumstances outlined so far in this study, the most challenging
problem of foreign exchange and overall economic management in West
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Africa is the problem posed by the non-convertible, non-trading and
non-intervention structure of the national currencies. Suffice it
to say that even for Liberia and the BCEAO member states whose
currencies are generally convertible, this is not without cost; the
cost emanates from the lack of autonomous exchange rate policy.
After several years of 'experimentation', the main concern for
West Africa is twofold: the relative efficiency of these policies in
terms of the desired objectives, and the scope for regional
harmonisation in order to achieve monetary unification. Indeed, for
most countries, this experimentation has operationally been the most
unpredictable and has introduced a great deal of uncertainty in the
realism of continued pursuance of foreign exchange policies at the
national level without intra-regional co-operation - which is
sufficiently lacking at the moment. These considerations are thus
appreciated by describing and critically analysing each foreign
exchange policy.
6.3.1 Exchange-Rate Adjustment
In practice, West African countries have since independence
attempted to derive some rationalisation of their inability to
sustain an effective independent exchange rate policy through more
or less permanent alignment of parities with those of major
curencies. In some countries, notably the BCEAO, linked parities
have further imposed obligations not to restrict trade and capital
movements within a wider monetary area, while in other countries,
especially the FSA, variation in linked-parities through independent
monetary initiatives has had only marginal or hardly any direct
positive influence on their domestic price, production, foreign
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exchange and growth levels. In contrast, apart from not being able
to ensure compensatory movements of resources into the region,
linked parities have, especially because they are generally 'wrong',
particularly accentuated currency over-valuation and the
transitional and continuing costs of adjustment. With the balance
of payments and foreign exchange situation worsening in virtually
all countries in the sub-region, the key question is whether the
exchange rate systems have been 'right' and 'realistic' or whether
variations in parities have been appropriately undertaken.
As noted previously, the break-up of colonial monetary
structures after political independence did not eliminate the
continued dependence of West African states on the 'master'
currencies and exchange rate arrangements. Although, like every
other member country of the International Monetary Fund, the ECOWAS
countries are permitted to choose the exchange rate arrangements of
their own choice (see IMF, Article IV, Section 2(6), 1979), the
exchange rates which they have adopted over the years have
historically been specified essentially as units of master
currencies, notably the French franc, the pound sterling, and the US
dollar.
A practical implication of such exchange rate dependence is
that as the exchange rates of the major currencies change in
response to speculative capital flows and other factors, the rates
for pegged currencies also follow suit -even though the economic and
financial circumstances of the pegging countries may point in a
different direction and at a different rate. It follows therefore
that for pegging countries, optimal decisions on the exchange rate
cannot be made without first, taking a careful view as to the
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probable future changes in the value of the major currencies to
which they are pegged, and second, appreciating the role of exchange
rate change and its relation to overall economic management.
_
Essentially, these problems, as noted by the Group of Thirty (1982),
arise not only from the nature of the chosen exchange regime itself,
but also from the lags and rigidities in national policy-making as
well as in the response of all the manifold markets affected by, and
effecting exchange rates, and from the conflicts in national and
international interests.
In principle, it is possible for a developing country to adopt
exchange rate arrangements under which the impact of fluctuations in
the major currencies would generally be minimised. As illustrated
in Table 61, alternative possibilities in this regard include a
freely floating exchange rate system, a so-called crawling-peg
system, or pegging to a basket of currencies such as the SDR.
Table 61 Types of Exchange Rate Regimes
Independent Float
Managed Float
	
Group Float
Crawl
SIR
However, since end-1981, this categorisation of exchange rate
regimes has been modified by the IMF basically in line with the
'extent and form of the flexibility that the members' arrangements
permit'. The new classification which is meant to 'facilitate the
implementation of the Fund's surveillance over exchange rate
policies' has defined exchange rate arrangements into three broad
headings:
(a) Currencies that are pegged to a single currency or to a
composite of currencies (including the SDR);
(b) Currencies whose exchange rates although not pegged, have
displayed limited flexibility compared with either a
single currency or a group of currencies; and
(c) Currencies whose exchange rates are more flexible.
• The major dichotomy in this new classification is between
`pegged` and `more flexibility' arrangements, with the intermediate
arrangements characterised by 'flexibility limited' against either a
single currency or a group of currencies. In practice, however,
the available options for LOCs are still limited, owing to various
empirical considerations - including the thinness of foreign
exchange markets in most countries and the institutional as well as
ski?? requirements for the operation of sophisticated exchange-rate
systems.
The weight given to the various factors in the actual choice of
an exchange rate regime in LDCs is widely covered in the literature
(see for instance, Rodrik, 1984; Connolly, 1982 and 1983;
Williamson, 1982; Holden et al, 1979; Lipschitz, 1978; Heller, 1977;
Crockett and Nsouli, 1977; Black, 1976; Laffer, 1973; and Mundell,
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1973). Generally, the question of the optimal exchange rate system
for a small developing country favours the adoption of a fixed
exchange rate regime: firstly, because exchange fluctuations will
probably be exacerbated if the market for the currency in question
is thin; secondly, because the effects of transitory supply shocks -
eg crop failures and other seasonal factors - are cushioned by the
use of reserves under a fixed exchange rate regime; thirdly, because
greater stability of exchange rate will most probably lead to
greater levels of trade and what follows from that greater
production of export goods, the greater the capital inflows,
resulting in greater levels of capital formation.
Also important to the selection of an exchange rate standard
and the determination of appropriate adjustments against that
standard are the potential benefits and costs involved. Firstly,
fixing to a single major currency is from a practical view, perhaps
the simplest option. Crockett and Nsouli (1977, p 129) attribute
four main advantages to fixing the value of a developing country's
currency to that of its major trading partner:
(a) Compared with other alternatives, this system reduces the
fluctuations of the exchange rate between the LDC and the
developed country. This enhances trade between the two
countries by reducing the uncertainties associated with changes
in relative currency values. for the same reason, capital
flows for investment purposes from the developed country may
increase.
(b) To the extent that the exchange rate of the developed country
is more stable in relation to the rest of the world than that
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of the LOC would have been without fixing, trade with and
investment from the rest of the world may be stimulated.
(c) A developing country that chooses to fix its currency to an
external standard, such as that of a major country, gives
expression to its intention to align its policies broadly with
those of the partner country. If the latter policies are
regarded as adequate to the promotion of relatively stable
prices there might be increased confidence in the currency of
the LOG. Consequently, foreign investment may be stimulated.
Furthermore, fixing provides a clear criterion for intervention
in the foreign exchange market.
(d) The disciplinary aspects of fixing can sometimes be viewed as
an advantage if fixed rate acts as a 'lever' for domestic
stability.
There is no doubt that single currency fixing does not have the
same consequences in a world of floating major currencies as in that
(pre 1970s) with stable parities. Crockett and Nsouli (1977, pp
129-30) have accordingly also distinguished four main disadvantages
of the single currency peg system:
(a) Reserve need may increase and movements in the fixed exchange
rate of the LDC will not reflect actual developments in its
balance of payments. Rather, they will reflect development in
the balance of payments of the industrial country to which the
LOG is fixing. Whether or not this will result in greater or
lesser need for reserves depends on the nature of the
relationship between the equilibrium rates of the two
countries.
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(b) Exchange rate fluctuations may interfere with the pursuit of
internal objectives since they are exogenous and independent of
government policy.
(c) To the extent that exchange rates between the currencies of
developing countries are subject to variation, because of their
disparate pegged arrangements, this will be particularly
disadvantageous when many of these countries, being small and
largely open, are trying to attain some of the advantages of
market size by promoting intra-regional trade.
(d) There is a possibility of a tendency towards higher import
prices. Suppliers in the industrial country to whose currency
the developing country is pegged, their strong market position,
as a result of the diversion of trade patterns in their favour,
will increase their ability to claim higher profit margins.
By contrast, the logic behind a basket peg is to attempt to
retain the advantages of a single currency peg while minimising the
disadvantages associated with it, especially the problems associated
with tying a currency too closely to the monetary policy of a single
country.
Crockett and Nsouli (op cit, p 131) maintain that changes in
the exchange rate are intended to measure the hypothetical uniform
change in the exchange rate of a currency against all other
currencies that would be equivalent in its impact on the balance of
payments of the country concerned to the pattern of exchange rate
changes that actually occured. Ideally this measure of a country's
effective exchange rate would take into account a number of factors,
but more importantly its trade and payment structure. This in turn
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must reflect such factors as the price effects generated by exchange
rate changes, the price elasticities for its traded products, the
competitive relationships of its exports in foreign markets, the
pattern of bilateral and/or intra-regional trade, and the effects of
capital flows. In other words, such a measure would involve an
index reflecting the country's weighted trade and payment flows from
and to its trading partners who comprise the basket.
Three trade related indices have been considered, an export-
weighted index, import-weighted index and a bilateral trade index,
all of which determine the exchange rate relative to the share of
trade held by trading partners. Crockett and Nsouli (op cit, pp
131-32) argue that the import-weighted index provides the closest
approximation among the three, although, in essence, they admit that
all three indices have major drawbacks in that they do not take into
account repercussions on prices, substitution.effects, changes in
competitive relations in foreign markets, and effects on the
service, transfer and capital accounts. These drawbacks increase
rather than minimise the costs of peg arrangements. Furthermore,
the use of an unfamiliar peg for a small developing country's
currency might render it less attractive for foreign investment or
where it is too complex, it may pose serious problems of data
collection and processing.
As a third option, pegging to the SDR is a simpler solution and
provides the following stated advantages:
(a) It reduces cross-rates variability between LDCs - desirable in
stimulatinig mutual trade between them.
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(b) It is practically convenient as it has an established value
that is determined and published daily on the basis of exchange
rates in major financial markets.
(c) It is based on trade shares of the five major industrial
countries.
Table 6J ECOWAS: Exchange Rates and Exchange Arrangements
(30 September 1985)
Currency
Exchange Rate
Pegged To
Intervention
Currency
Exchpge
Rate'
Benin CFA franc French franc French franc 50.00
Burkina CFA franc French franc French franc 50.00
Cape Verde Escudo Basket US dollar 87.0472
Gambia Dalasi Pound sterling Pound
sterling
5.00
Ghana2,
Guineai
Cedi
Syli SDR
US dollar
US dollar
57.00
24.6853
Guinea-Bissau Peso - US dollar 163.641
Ivory Coast CFA franc French franc French franc 50.00
Liberia Dollar US dollar US dollar 1.00
Mali CFA franc French franc French franc 50.00
Mauritania Ouguiya Basket US dollar 77.13
Niger CFA franc French franc French franc 50.00
Nigeriai Naira US dollar/
sterling
0.9225
Senegal CFA franc French franc French franc 50.00
Sierra Leone2 Leone SDR US dollar 5.74119
Togo CFA franc French franc French franc 50.00
Notes: 1 Rates as reported to the Fund in terms of currency units
per unit listed; rates determined by baskets of currencies
are in currency units per US dollar
2 Ghana and Sierra Leone appear to maintain fixed parities
to the US dollar.
3 Middle rate in terms of the US dollar as of 6th November
1985
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The significant drawback, however, is that he SDR standard
does not reflect movements in the effective exchange rate quite as
closely as an import-weighted basket. It is argued further that the
SDR peg is favoured the smaller the deviations of its basket from
the import-weighted basket and, the greater the level of intra-
regional trade that will occur.
In practice, the failure nonetheless by most developing
countries to institute more flexible, less dependent exchange rate
arrangements but to maintain for protracted periods the colonial-
currency exchange links and at fixed parities has been explained not
only in terms of power and economic interests in these countries and
the protectiveness of business units. As noted already, it has also
reflected indecisiveness or inadequacies on the part of the LDCs to
fully appreciate, in the light of existing socio-economic
conditions, the potential of the exchange rate as a policy
instrument, the attributes of alternative possibilities, and the
scope and limitations for choice and management.
Typically for West African countries, the role of the exchange
rate as an instrument of monetary policy has been severely limited,
owing to various other empirical considerations including the
underdeveloped nature and thinness of the foreign exchange markets
whose transactions are largely dominated by central bank operations
and with limited forward exchange rate facilities; the
inconvertibility of the national currencies; the high degree of
dependence of the economies on external trade, and in any case, the
inability to influence world demand and pricing of primary export
raw material commodities; the relatively weak domestic supply
capacity that is excessively reliant on imports; private sector
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capital movements that are largely determined by political than the
purely economic factors; and the lack of institutional as well as
skill requirements for the operation of more sophisticated exchange
rates systems.
The historical orientation apart, exchange rate management in
some countries (eg Ghana and Sierra Leone) seems largely a 'hit-or-
miss' affair. Inevitably, often considerable disagreements persist
between the monetary and fiscal authorities, including the
government, as to the choice, direction, timing, extent, relevance
and probable effects of exchange rate adjustments.
Being non-traded currencies, there are, strictly speaking, no
external (extra-regional) demands for and supplies of West African
currencies, which impact significantly on currency prices or
official exchange rates. The types of markets that exist for them
constitute unorganised and largely illegal markets where finance is
generated and allocated for unrecorded frontier and transit trade,
and in which unconventional and rudimentary money and exchange
market transactions are conducted. These activities are even of
substantial proportions, especially as the widespread exchange
controls and payments restrictions become all-embracing and as
official exchange rates diverge very widely from market ('black' or
'parallel' market) rates. Besides, the considerable excess of
internal demand for foreign exchange -including demand by government
and the financial institutions - over available supplies, limited by
balance of payments constraint and the bluntness of exchange
controls, have further exaggerated the informal foreign exchange
market in which national currencies are traded at large discounts on
official rates, allowing the operators to make very huge profits.
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In Sierra Leone, for instance, the two-tier exchange rate system was
introduced in 1982/83 to align the official and market rates as the
latter was rising (in terms of local currency) at over three times
the former.
Table 6J shows that as of 30 September 1985, three of West
Africa's ten currencies were in practice pegged to single currencies
at some fixed parities. The CFA franc is pegged to the French franc
at a fixed parity with no commissions and exchange rate margins for
transfers among them. The Gambian dalasi is tied to the pound
sterling while the US dollar is legal tender in Liberia. • Among the
remaining currencies, Sierra Leone's leone, the Guinean Syli and
Guinea-Bissau's peso are tied to the SDR, whereas two others, the
Mauritanian ouguiya and the Cape Verdean escudo, are pegged to
weighted baskets representing seven (French and Belgian francs,
German marks, Italian lire, sterling, Spanish peseta, and the US
dollar) and nine important trading partners respectively. Nigeria
maintains margins in respect of exchange transactions and pursues an
independent and flexible exchange rate policy with the naira pegged
to an import-weighted basked of seven currencies which determines
the mid value of the US dollar, the intervention currency. The
Ghanaian cedi is not pegged but maintains 'flexibility limited'
against the US dollar. Thus, both as trading and intervention
currencies, the French franc and the US dollar are the most commonly
used in Africa.
Before this perod, a number of countries, noticeably Ghana,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone, had undertaken a series of administrative
changes and adjustments in their par value systems. In the mid-
1970s, Ghana and Nigeria switched from sterling to a US dollar peg.
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However, on 4 April 1974, the naira/dollar link was severed and
Nigeria has since then adopted a policy of 'progressively
appreciating th external value of the naira', although it had at
times been necessary 'to allow the naira to depreciate against the
dollar or sterling in order to reduce the arbitrage margins between
naira/dollar and naira/sterling rates' (Falegan, 1978). Ghana's
link with the dollar has survived although indirectly, the cedi is
said to be 'floating'. In Sierra Leone, on the other hand, the
sterling link was replaced in November 1978 by a link to the SDR
which was later replaced by a US dollar link (1982). On 17 December
1982 a system of dual exchange rates - official and commercial - was
introduced which lasted until July 1983 when the two markets were
merged and a new exchange rate was fixed against the dollar. In
April 1985 the leone/dollar link was replaced by an SDR link but, as
in Ghana, with a relatively fixed parity with the dollar. The rest
of the countries have either retained their colonial currency link
(BCEAO) or have sustained stable post-independence exchange regimes.
The most significant characteristic of the West African
exchange rate systems is the wide margins of discrete or announced
variations (mainly downward) in the international values of the
national currencies. The magnitudes of the nominal varriations for
each currency against (a) the SDR, and (b) the US dollar, are shown
in Table 6K for the period 1970-83, and are graphically illustrated
(against the dollar) in Figure 6.2 for 1960-85.
Of the 10 member currencies, the Ghanaian cedi has been
subjected to the most severe and frequent exchange adjustments.
Between 1967-1984, the cedi was devalued seven times, once each year
in 1972 and 1978, twice in 1983, and three times in 1984.
287
.xe-.
: . - -----
0
.	
.....-n ...n•	 \
../.,
••• n
..," ..
,nn
	  CFA Franc (WAMU)
0--0 Oalasi (Gambia)
	
 Cedi (Ghana)
x	 x Oguiya (Mauritania)
	
 Naira (Nigeria)
.---•—• Leone (Sierra Leone)
-460
-2080
20
10
-10
-20
1960 1970 1975 19 80 19851
1. As of 27 November 1985.
2. Rates are middle rates [see line ae/ag (IMF, IFS 1984): West Africa, 2 December 1985,p, 25411
3. Rates not available for the Escudo (Cape Verde), Syli (Guinea) and Peso (Guinea -Bissau). However the
three currencies depreciated by 111., 201. and 4041. respectively against the U.S. dollar between
1980 and 1985.
Fig. 6-2. ECOWAS : Exchange rate variation vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar.
288
usmozrmac-scn
ccmcomcnomm
- 40 0 r) 0. 7:*
a0=7COI -‘
01 a a 01
	
Igo	 0 •
	
c...)	 Ma	 Cu
CaCoL4(.4
cp CD no no CD CD
I .
(a NJ 0 513 CO iv
CD so Cn Ca CD
PO
CO V Po Pa CO CO
1 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
• s4 Lo Lo Pa 4%WOG' N3,-.co
no	 o	 n+ non+
n+ no cn n4 n+
I	 I • 0 •
	 I •	 • •
• a CA CT
Ma (.4 V CI
no 4u .0. n+ n+ V
I	 •	 •	 •	 I •
	 •	 •
,4 4% CO APO 40
CO 4.0. Cl) CO u)
4% Po Cn cn CD
I o • • •
	 1 • 0 -
up no ma Po CO
ro Pa CO V UD
I imo	 no n4
Aoo• W W n+ ••n•nn
40
•••,1
ma 4.4 n4 no NJ no
• 0 • • • 1-.1%5
CD • I•+ Pa N4 • •
%CI 0 cn pp 4a Pa
u1	 01 CO
no no I i Co no no nO no
no n.) Ln V cn cn Ln Ln
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
no (a .(D 4. cn CD .0. 4. uD
CO cn Ch CO 40 CD r. s cn
I NO o I I no I No I
Ln Lo CD CD Ch no Po PO La
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
No so CD na co (..) L4 no no
ACOODCOWUDvim
1	 1	 1	 1
CD CD CD Cn PO PO Co
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
A ,4 CM W cn mJ
DOA
Mrn
<cm
-a.
00.
cP0
0=
7
0.
(.0 4h Cn U3 so so V
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •EA so cn cn CP '4I% Cl) 40 Po CO 00 no
1n....W0•+
	
01 a (.11 CO 6-•
	IV 1-.5.3
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
Cn Ln 01 4)1 so L4 CD I-50
	
cal CD CD No CD	 CD CD
-= 18••• n •0.
AW0	 a	 Cn
un
ou
oo
otcl
=
CD
tn.
(.11.-• so.	 r
CD CD
III
P. NW
I	 I
W N
= ces I	 I •	 •	 •	 . •	 0 •0.
CD
N) CO .0
cn ..-. -.4
.0	 co
CO	 CD
CD
CD CP
UI
I•4 CO 40 I-4 COC. I	 I •	 •	 •	 I
Ma .0. so
•	 •	 •
CD so noV so so IND 01 .0. cn
CD
z	 112
0	 0
no. 	 c
CD	 5
vo	 CI
CD
O lcumr-. =usesmoo
OC.n.
2272-4.• (4,40
O 0O07- 40	SC
M •-4
n m	
-hmm
	
uosASI
	
non-
Dmm7L4 OM=
	
‘0* -10	 DIN
m-Mo-n 7*-1,
	
CD 0	 75
MMO
	
-(DI	 m amw-rp
CD = 01-1
MOM Nnow
Ou:10.
cr7< CD U'
M
	
m.+.5	 00
=ow <nu
mm=
-m -sow
o n
omo
Iir onm
scmo In m
mooCD M
, Ma 01037
CDI wA
O 00. C
M •
MM In mo nm
M
w ,P
•
 cs,
n-•
	
00 =
 
0	 7
< 7
	
M W	 (D
5 7
7
va
O 10
w w
CD
o-o rt
w o
a z a i-wenn
C Cu 0 M
I	 I	 II
CD CD CDC, n+ 1--•
CD CD L4 00	 CD
VD UD CD A cp yo
IIIWI
	
0 CO 0 (.11	 ln-•
.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
.0. CD No Lo ma a pa
CO CO cn CD uD VD
n4
Lo UD VD PO \AU, (0,
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
0000304.1 0 0cn CD CD L4 4.4.4
1	 III	 1
ma C4 CD cn C O) C
• •	 • •	 • • •
01 4)1 CO so W 4. u0
W W W 01 NO CD A
I	 g ee oo.
4. no CD Cn Ch CD CD
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
CD no uD ND na v3 CD
no CO CM CO so cn W
1
1-••	 I
CD Lo 4% CA Ch Ch
Ch n+410
 40 4040m2 CD
03 40 NO Co CO no Lo
IIIIIII
▪ ..... W
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •WOrmaIrW%0WWAWW01
1III
	 ACOLPIVNNirr
• •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
MCnNnoAnacal
001ANCOCII
1n•
•••J
-.wamo
CD-s
1	 1
cn	 cn
mn	 up
ca
•••/.
4.2
Sr
fril
0 no	 I	 P.,	 Co
Co 4. CD cn	 no CD no Ln
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •
IIivrvcasbos
•••••••
0 CD 4)1(7 I-4 CD 02 4)1 4)1 mos-•wmwv
7 co vat CD 01I 	 Ma 4)1 1-. ms,..14a nocars,
0
no• I	 In•
CD CD PO CD VD 0••• a CO	 CD•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 0	 •
...IN CD Co CD uD Co	 Cn
Lo	 1-+cn cn n-• CD	 so
CO
OCOO	 WOW
•	 •	 •	 0 •	 •	 •
v01 ,4	 no-.40
cn Cn A	 Pogo ,4
CD
cf.
0 II
	 I	 III	 I
= I-+ s-• I	 1•+ 1•+1•n• F+	 Po n-•
CD CD CD A Pa cp up A	 co
•••••••o• 03
cno-“o	 1.44,4201
•	 •	 •	 0	 •	 •	 •
L4 L4 CO L4 Po V V	 cn
L4 cn cn 1--• uD V no	 CD 1- CD so 4.	 uD .0. Cnsr pa c)	 L4 CD CD
CD
= no	 NO 1	 no
CD COCO cO Cn L4 cn	 CD
•	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 •	 0	 •
50
CD
WWw
•	 •	 0	 •	 •	 •
cn cn CD Ch 40 CD CO	 uD
CD Ma CD CO 4% no Cn	 .0.
Ma at Ca	 .0.	 5%)
no V2 co	 us 03 L4
I	 I	 1111 
	 e (a_I	 I
289
Since 1970 when the rate was around 1.02 cedis to Si, tfqt ced i na§,,
as of October 1985 (when it was devalued further from 57 cedi§ to la
to 60 cedis = $1) depreciated 5,782.4 per cent against the LW§
dollar. It has depreciated 2,081.8 per cent against the do ar
since October 1983 when the rate was 2.75 cedi = $1. The average
annual rate of depreciation of the cedi in 1971-83 was 22 per cent
against the dollar and 13 per cent against the SDR.
Another currency with an equally traumatic record of
devaluations (many of them discrete) is the leone. Officially, each
of the links that succeeded the fixed parity leone/sterling ltnk
represented a direct devaluation of the leone: 5 per cent against
the sterling in 1978; 100 per cent and 140 per cent against the
dollar in 1983 and 1985 respetively. The leone's revealed
depreciation against the US dollar since 1970 when the rate as Le
0.83 = $1 to the current rate of Le 6 = $1 is 622.9 per cent.
Average depreciation in 1970-83 was 6.36 per cent and 6.03 per cent
against the SDR and the US dollar respectively.
Other currencies have also shown substantial depreciation in
their international exchange values. In particular, the dalasi has
indirectly depreciated by around 106.6 per cent against the dollar
from a rate of 02.11 = $1 in 1970 to 04.36 = $1 in 1984. This
depreciation is however a direct result of the official devaluation
of the dalasi/sterling rate as well as the dollar/sterling
relationship. In a similar fashion, the peso was down by over 154
per cent against the dollar between 1980 and 1984.
Exceptionally, the Nigerian currency was for several years
allowed to appreciate against the major currencies despite their
devaluations.	 This was mainly a result of the government's
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deliberate insistence upon maintaining the par value of the currency
in terms of gold. The dollar value of the Nigerian pound for
instance depreciated from $2.80 to $3.04 with the dollar devaluation
in December 1971, and the value of the naira, upon its introduction
(1973), was consequently fixed at $1.52. On severing the naira/US
dollar link in April 1974, the appreciation of the naira against
both the dollar and sterling reached a peak of around $1.84 at the
end of 1980. Although no deliberate devaluation policy was pursued
by Nigeria, the market value of the naira in terms of the US dollar
is observed to have fallen by 27.3 per cent in 1980-83 and 7 per
cent in 1983-84. In the period 1970-1984, the naira depreciated by
12.7 per cent in local currency terms or 11.3 per cent in dollar
terms, from a dollar value of $1.40 in 1970 to $1.24 at the end of
1984.
At the other end of West Africa's exchange rate spectrum are
the WAMU countries whose coma= currency the CFA franc, has remained
pegged to the French franc at the fixed rate of ICFAF = 0.02 FE (or
1 FE = 50 CFAF) in 1948. The French franc is the only intervention
currency and transactions in other currencies are carried out on the
Paris market rates between the French franc and these currrencies.
The CFA franc's international exchange value has therefore moved
pani passu with that of the French franc and has thus fallen against
non-franc currencies only on the occasion of discrete or announced
French franc devaluations (eg August 1969, September 1981, June
1982). Thus between 1970-1984, the CFA franc, after appreciating
for most of the time in 1970-1980 against the dollar has
deteriorated continuously by wider magnitudes in the early 1980s.
During the period under review, the CFA franc depreciated by an
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annual average of 3.22 per cent and 3.25 per cent against the dollar
and SDR respectively.
Developments in the exchange rates of the remaining West
African currencies have reflected those of either the SDR or the US
dollar (as the common intervention currency). For the region as a
whole, the early 1980s are characterised by wider margins of
currency depreciation.
Exchange rate variability in the industrial countries is now
evidently related to instability in the capital markets, which in
turn is seriously influenced by fissons of speculative panic in the
futures markets (notably oil prices), expectations regarding future
spot exchange rates, and interest rate parity relationships. By
contrast however, in those West African countries where exchange
rate changes have featured more as a deliberate adjustment policy,
private capital movements are clearly less responsive to exchange
rate variability and interest rate differentials but mainly to such
factors as political instability, smuggling and 'black'/'parallel'
market activities. Because of the continued shortage of official
foreign exchange reserves in relation to the volume of import
requirements, and the fragmentation of financial markets, relatively
few people and businesses have had access to foreign capital
markets. As a result, the size of private capital flows through the
banking systems has remained relatively small and, as mentioned
earlier, recorded capital movements are in many cases largely
dominated by official government-related transactions.
Another revealed phenomenon of the West African monetary and
financial system is that some of the relatively low inflation
countries (see Table 50) such as the CFA franc countries have had
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their currencies more or less permanently pegged to a depreciating
currency in terms of other major currencies - the French franc -
particularly in the last few years. On the other hand countries
with higher rates of inflation - in particular Ghana, Nigeria and
Sierra Leone have had their currencies either directly pegged or
very closely linked to the US dollar whose average effective rate
against major trading currencies since the mid-1970s has appreciated
fairly strongly (between 1979-1980, the dollar appreciated by over
10 per cent against the French franc but depreciated by around 6.1
per cent against sterling). More specifically, a comparison of
Tables 5D and 6K ( e average inflation rates and currency
variations) reveals that the countries with higher rates of
inflation are those which have implemented higher margins of
exchange rate adjustment. The heavy toll taken by such
contradictory movements on internal price developments, capital
movements, and on expansion possibilities, industrial
diversification, and the competitiveness of import-competing and
export-directed activities is probably incalculable but cannot be
ignored in the process of monetary integration.
6.3.2 Exchange Controls and Payments Restrictions
The comprehensive schedule of trade and payments restrictions
commonly practised in West Africa constitutes the imposition of
controls on all types of payments and receipts-controls on imports
and exports, current invisibles, particularly those relating to
exchange allowances for travel, education and income remittances by
or to non residents, as well as on capital transactions. However,
the diversity with which these restrictions are practised in the
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region ranges from the application of relatively none in Liberia to
the imposition of some of the most stringent regulatory programmes
in Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Sierra Leone on
virtually all forms of external transactions. In particular, Ghana
and Sierra Leone have in more recent years pursued stricter exchange
restrictions along with substantial downward exchange rate
adjustments.
The member countries of WAMU have some variety in restrictions
on their respective exchange transactions with countries outside the
union, but in general these restrictions are applied quite
liberally. Among themselves and between them and France, Monaco and
the other Operations Account countries there is complete freedom of
payments for current and most capital transactions. The system of
exchange restrictions in the Gambia and Mauritania is also
significantly less . rigid. West African countries as a whole
maintain exchange prohibitions for selected countries (le South
Africa) in accordance with United Nations Resolutions or for some
other reason (ie Israel).
A comparative summary of the main payments rules and
restrictions adopted in each country is provided in the remaining
parts of this section.
6.3.2.1	 Imports and Import Payments 
The essential features of import controls in the region
constitute the imposition of licensing and/or authorisation,
certification and attestation requirements on the one hand, and
bonuses, surcharges and/or advance import deposits on the other,
many of which reflect sectoral commodity or other exchange
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priorities. For almost all countries, these priorities are laid
down in formal foreign exchange and/or import programmes on the
basis of which import licences/authorisations are issued, exchange
allocations made, and exchange control approvals granted.
The schedule of controls presented in Table 6L demonstrates
that 13 of the 16 member countries adopt some form of import/foreign
exchange programming much of which is on an annual basis.
Individual programmes in the WAMU countries are based on broad
foreign exchange forecasting and planning that takes place within
the context of the group's overall monetary planning.
In general, importers are required to obtain general and/or
specific import licences prior to placing orders abroad. The system
of Open General Licensing (OGL) provides for the unrestricted
importation of items which are neither prohibited nor subject to
individual or specific licensing (SIL). The issuance of specific
import licenses is normally subjected to the formula which allocates
licences according to priority lists/categories of import
commodities with greater emphasis on 'essentials' such as raw
material inputs, spare parts and machinery, public and strategic
commodities such as medicines or petroleum products in most
countries, certain major food items (rice) and other essential
services. The exact composition of the basket of SIL imports
differs between countries in relation to commodity and foreign
exchange allocation. In principle, these imports are given
preference in the allocation of foreign exchange but more often than
not, because of the high incidence of politicisation in such
allocation, they have formed the major source of price/cost and
exchange rate distortions.
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Consequently, some countries have preferred to maintain a larger
percentage of their imports on the OGL system but at the same time
maintaining the flexibility to be able to resort temporarily to
specific licensing for an appropriate range of imports when problems
of balance of payments make such action necessary. Among this group
are Cape Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Mali and Sierra Leone. In
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria stricter rationing of foreign
exchange in import programmes is practised, whereas all imports
without exception are permitted under an OGL in Benin, Ivory Coast,
Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. In this OGL group of countries
payment for approved imports is generally freely available, except
that for payments for imports valued above certain limits, a
declaration, certification or attestation of intent to import is
.normally required. In Mauritania, only holders of import-export
cards are permitted to engage in import transactions, while no
import licence is required in Liberia. Because of the build-up of
commercial arrears (or the 'pipeline' in Sierra Leone) in Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, the automaticity of foreign
exchange allocation in relation to import licence quotas has been
considerably reduced, thus making it less certain for an import
licence holder to be sure of obtaining all or even part of the
licence quota.
In Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the issuance of import
licences, as indeed several other forms of foreign exchange
allocation, has been related to the prior presentation of a tax
clearance certificate by the importer, showing settlement of all tax
liabilities over a given period (the previous three years in
Nigeria). Furthermore, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Nigeria (1978-1984)
297
have variously engaged the services of the Swiss firm, Societe
General de Surveillance, SA (SGS) to provide pre-shipment price,
quality and quantity inspection on all imports. In all countries,
the importation of certain specified goods is prohibited for reasons
ranging from politics (South African imports; Israeli imports in
Mauritania) to those for social, health, public policy, security
and/or infant industry protection requirements. There is no general
system of import controls in Liberia but the importance of some
items (biscuits, brooms, automobile batteries, insecticides, etc) is
subject to licensing and quantitative restrictions to protect local
industry.	 In most countries, imports of essentials such as
petroleum, basic food items and other strategic goods and services
are controlled by government and private monopolies.
About a third of the ECOWAS countries levy import surcharges,
advance import deposits and/or other forms of import fees. In The
Gambia all imports, except those by the government, diplomatic
missions and charitable organisations, are subject to an import tax
of 3.5 per cent of the CIF value unless otherwise specified, while
in Guinea too all commodity imports are subject to import
surcharges, except those by the 'mixed-economy companies' (le
private export/import firms which commonly pay for their imports
with foreign exchange earned from own exports or other own sources
rather than with foreign exchange officially allocated to them).
In Nigeria, rates of advance import deposits required for
several commodities range from 10 per cent of value for raw
materials, 15 per cent for spare parts, 50 per cent for books, food
(excluding rice), medicaments, building materials and capital goods,
200 per cent for motor vehicles and trucks, to 250 per cent for
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motor cars and all other goods, irrespective of origin. In terms of
foreign exchange allocation though, banks in Nigeria are
commissioned (as of June 1984) to sanction 58 per cent of their
foreign exchange reserves for spare parts or raw materials, 18 per
cent for food, and 12 per cent each in respect of firstly commercial
inputs including capital equipment and secondly, invisibles
including educational and medical expenses (African Business, June
1984, p 15).
Sierra Leone imposes a 12 per cent invoice entry fee (IEF), a
12 per cent special licensing fee (ILF) and a 2.5 per cent tax for
the issue of import licences for all imports except for industrial
raw materials, while in Senegal, a 20 per cent tax is imposed on
'non exempt' items only. Finally, in Bourkina Fasso, most
imports are subject to a customs stamp tax of 6 per cent, an import
surcharge of 6 per cent and a statistical duty of 3 per cent. Ghana
imposes a 10 per cent tax (Special Development Tax) for imports
requiring no foreign exchange from official sources while in Sierra
Leone, a 50-100 per cent penalty tax (or forfeiture of goods) is
levied on the invoice value of customs arrivals of imports financed
outside the domestic banking system without prior authorisation.
6.3.2.2
	 Exports and Export Proceeds 
Like imports, most exports in West Africa are also subject to
licensing and/or some form of authorisation systems with the stated
objectives of ensuring adequate supplies, domestic needs, assuring
that foreign exchange earnings therefrom are surrendered, most
preferably through the banking system, re-exports are controlled
and, export receipts are received in an appropriate currency. All
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West African countries, except Liberia, have prescription of
currency requirement, although there are some minor variations as
regards the authorised settlement currencies. In general, however,
settlements of export receipts are restricted to purely the major
convertible international currencies although of course foreign
payments can be settled in a wider range of currencies. In Benin,
Ivory Coast, Mauritania and Bourkina Fasso, all exports are free of
a licensing requirement, although in the first two countries, an
export 'visa' is required. Mauritania permits only holders of
import-export cards to engage in export transactions. By contrast
Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria insist upon the
licensing of all exports, while in the Gambia and Liberia licensing
applies only to a few selected products.
Table 6L further illustrates that the surrender of export
proceeds is required in all countries except Liberia where exporters
are allowed to dispose of their export earnings freely. In a few
countries, notably Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone a prior exchange
commitment regarding surrender obligations is required from the
exporter before export is authorised. In general export proceeds
must be collected and surrender7d within a maximum of 180 days of
shipment. However, in Sierra Lone, export proceeds are generally
due not later than 30 days, or 60 days for diamonds, and 10 days for
coffee and cocoa, unless permission to do otherwise is obtained. A
number of countries, especially Guinea and Sierra Leone, do, perhaps
as an export incentive, allow some selected exporting enterprises to
retain part of their export receipts overseas in order to meet the
cost of some operating requirements so as not to obstruct the
continuity of production.
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Explicit quantitative restrictions on exports are not a popular
feature in most countries, except in Guinea-Bissau where a general
export fee of one per cent of export value and other taxes are
enforced or in Bourkina Fasso, where most exports are, like imports,
also subject to a customs stamp tax of 6 per cent and a statistical
duty of 3 per cent. Most countries maintain export prohibitions for
selected countries, but generally against South Africa. Guinea has
a formal export programme which guides the issuance of export
licences. Finally, in most countries, the export of some of the
main products is a monopoly of state or other appointed agencies.
6.3.2.3	 Invisible Transactions 
With the exception of intra-WAMU transactions which are
permitted freely, and Liberia which imposes no restrictions at all,
payments for and proceeds from invisible transactions are equally
subject to some form of prior approval and/or authorisation. Table
6M indicates that more stringent forms of regulation are applied in
countries like Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria. Payments
for invisibles related to trade are permitted by a general
authorisation when the basic transaction has been approved or does
not require any authorisation (CFA franc states), or as part of the
import licence (Guinea), whereas in the more rigid countries, they
require specific prior authorisation.
Basic exchange allocations are prescribed in all countries
(excepting Liberia) for invisibles affecting travel of different
types - medical, tourism, business, educational, etc. Remittances
of non-resident profits, dividends, interest and royalty are
restricted in Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria.
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They are allowed relatively freely in other countries although in
some cases (Sierra Leone) they are subject to foreign exchange
availability and provided that exchange control permission was
obtained initially for the investment. Exchange allocations are
also maintained for other non-resident income such as wages and
salaries, personal insurance, pension and provident fund
contributions, etc. In Ghana, for instance, expatriate workers are
allowed to remit overseas 40-70 per cent of net salary; 30-40 per
cent in Guinea; varying percentages in Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania;
50 per cent in Niger and Nigeria; and 40 per cent in Sierra Leone.
There are no limitations in the rest of the countries. Furthermore,
the import and export of local currency notes and coin is
unrestricted only in Liberia. It is even prohibited in Cape Verde,
Guinea and Mauritania. Also in all countries, except Liberia,
surrender obligations are stipulated for all invisible earnings.
Purchases of foreign exchange in respect of education, travel
and medical treatment abroad and for private onward transfers are
subject to a 5 per cent tax in Ghana, while in Sierra Leone, all
overseas travel is subject to a travel tax of 10 per cent of the
price of the ticket, payable at the time of purchase of the ticket.
Special airport charges are also levied (eg Sierra Leone) on
travelling passengers.
6.3.2.4	 Capital Transactions 
Table 6M further shows that with the exception of Liberia,
capital transactions in all countries are subject to controls. 	 In
most countries explicit restrictions are maintained over inward and
outward direct investments, overseas borrowing, the issuing and
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offering of foreign securities as well as over the transfer of
proceeds accruing therefrom.	 In principle, capital receipts
normally are permitted relatively freely in all countries but in
practice all countries, except Gambia and Liberia, institute some
form of supervision or controls both for statistical and future
amortization reasons.
	 Borrowing from abroad requires prior
approval/authorization in all states except the Gambia, Liberia,
Mauritania and Sierra Leone. Capital exports are prohibited for
Guinean nationals.
In almost all member countries, foreign direct investment is
guided by formal legislation and/or decrees which provide various
conditions, fiscal and monetary incentives for investment. In
Guinea, for example, the foreign investment law (1962) does not only
grant preferential' tax treatment, but also guarantees against
nationalisation of investments in the industrial and mining sectors.
Among the WAMU countries, capital transactions are permitted freely.•
6.3.2.5
	 Exchange Restrictions on Intra-ECOWAS Transactions 
One significant drawback of the comprehensive set of exchange
controls and restrictions practised by the West African countries is
the absence of any meaningful prescribed preferential treatment for
intra-regional transactions. Only very few member countries grant
some form of express preferential treatment to imports originating
in all the other member countries. In Mali, intra-Community imports
are exempted from individual licensing and require only an import
certificate.	 Imports of Community matches require no prior
authorisation in Niger, while in Sierra Leone, the 12 per cent
invoice entry and licensing fees charged on all imports are reduced
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to 5 per cent in each case for ECU WAS imports. In Senegal, ECU WAS
is exempted from a regulation which prohibits the import of certain
goods from all countries.
Apart from Mali which as in the case of imports also exempts
exports to ECOWAS countries from the usual licensing requirement,
the only countries to provide some aspect of preferential treatment
on exports to Community members are Guinea-Bissau which has a
special regime of restrictions applicable only to exports destined
for the Community, and Nigeria where petroleum exports to member
countries are allowed an increased 90 days credit as against the 30
days general OPEC credit facility (West Africa, 15 October 1985, p
2100).
With the exception of controls on foreign securities, the WAMU
countries are the only group to exempt other West African states
from restrictions on other capital transactions - borrowing abroad;
foreign direct investments, etc.
6.3.2.6	 Scope for Regional Harmonisation 
Indeed, this widespread imposition of exchange restrictions by
member countries without substantially overt preferences for intra-
regional transactions is bound to aggravate the problems related to
regional monetary co-operation. Initially one is tempted to presume
that the geographically distinct francophone and anglophone
countries may stand to gain significantly both from the
liberalisation of trade and autonomous capital movements within
their areas and from the application of uniform discrimination
against extra-West African transactions. In this light, we are
confronted with the problem of trying to validate the implicit
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presumptions, firstly, that gains from free trade and capital
transactions exceed losses through restrictions on them, and
secondly, that substantial trade creation and factor movement would
materialise within them, being colonial common currency areas.
During the pre-independence era, particularly in the 1950s,
nonetheless, free trade and factor mobility within the former
sterling area countries (FSA) and the discrimination against the
franc zone and other countries failed to produce appreciable growth
in mutual trade and in other exchange transactions amongst them
(Nana-Sinkam, 1978). This situation, especially as regards
commodity trade, has hardly changed even after independence. In
fact even in the francophones, with greater freedom of trade and
capital mobility within and amongst them, the quantum and growth of
mutual trade has remained small. Consequently, for the West African
region as whole, reciprocal exports and imports as was reviewed in
Chapter 4, have on average stagnated at less than 5 per cent
relative to total foreign trade. But for the trade in Nigerian
petroleum production, this proportion for some countries (eg Ghana
and Nigeria) is much less.
The rationale for instituting exchange restrictions by many
countries in the region has been partly historical in origin,
especially in the pre-independence era, and political and economic,
afterwards, as these countries strove hard to establish greater
national autonomy in both political and economic management.
West Africa's first experience of exchange restrictions dates
back to the inter-war period when both Britain and France introduced
exchange controls as part of emergency war regulations aimed at not
only protecting the value of sterling and the French franc but also,
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more importantly, as a way of mobilising and controlling the flight
of capital from the former colonial territories where both
currencies were legal tender. The intention apparently was to
finance the war effort.
In the former British colonies, the legislative foundations of
these controls were based first, on the Defence (Finance)
Regulations issued under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939,
which led to the formal establishment of the Sterling Area, and
later, the Exchange Control Act, 1947, which to a large extent
merely 'transmuted the temporary wartime regulations into a
permanent feature of the (UK) economy (Miller and Wood, 1979). This
Act was then distributed to the former colonies (and to other
sterling area countries) in the form of a model Exchange Control
Ordinance which, in Sierra Leone, became operative in 1950 and was
transformed into an Act four years later and further into the
Exchange Control (Amendment) Act, 1965. In Ghana and Nigeria, the
Ordinance was modified into the more detailed Exchange Control Act,
1961 and Exchange Control Act, 1962 respectively. As the economies
worsened in the light of external circumstances during and after the
1970s, and the need to control and regulate trade and capital flows
more directly became an active option of monetary and overall
economic management policy instruments, exchange controls became
more elaborate, comprehensive and demanding in terms of severity,
institutional arrangements and transactions coverage. The
corresponding legal backing constituted the enactment of a series of
amendments (eg 1972, 1974 and 1975 in Sierra Leone) and of several
supporting Orders and Decrees to the legislative provisions of the
1960s.
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However in Nigeria, exchange controls were not so rigid
throughout the 1970s mainly in reaction to positive shifts in the
balance on current payments deriving from the oil price changes.
They have, however, become equally extensive and intensified in the
last few years chiefly through the continuous fall after 1980 in
export sales of oil and the consequential rapid decline in public
exchange revenues to support the uncontrollably rising pace of
import bills, to the extent that on 9 February 1984, imports under
the OGL system were discontinued, thereby leaving in the country
only two categories of imports as against three - prohibited
imports, and imports subject to licensing requirements (SIL).
For the francophones, their closely co-ordinated exchange
controls developed from France's 1939 Executive Orders which created
the Franc Area as an exchange control area .in the form of the
pooling and centralisation of exchange reserves by French Treasury
and of the eskewing of these controls amongst the member countries
of the Area. These controls were reinforced in 1967-68 after a
short spell of interruption to protect the French franc and stop
foreign exchange flights in the wake of France's economic problems
deriving largely from the events of May 1968. Since then the system
of controls has been continuously modified either to discourage the
inflow of short term hot money, or to stop or reduce the flight of
capital, depending on the financial and economic situation of the
national economies. Guinea entered the regime of quantitative
exchange restrictions immediately after independence in 1958.
For the WAMU states in particular, developments in exchange
restrictions have, despite some minor differences at national level,
generally been in line with their conscious efforts at sustaining
308
the economic and monetary relationship among themselves and with
France, Monaco and the rest of the French Franc zone, which in
general constitutes the liberalisation of exchange transactions
among them and the harmonisation of exchange restrictions vis-a-vis
the rest of the world, including the rest of ECOWAS. Despite their
varying economic problems and payments situations this principle has
remained substantially unimpaired, albeit, purely at the instance of
France.
Testing the economic effectiveness of exchange controls,
especially on the balance of payments objective of the imposing
country is by no means easy and straight forward in the light of the
multivariat nature of the balance of payments problem itself.
Factors such as trends in the terms of trade, general inflationary
tendencies and the rising external debt servicing, the rapid growth
in the money supply with its concomitant influence on import growth,
the high import propensities and the slow down on export revenues
and overall economic growth, domestic economic structures and
problems in industrial markets have all combined to whittle down any
economic impact exchange controls may have had on overall economic
performance. Nevertheless, the years since 1975 have witnessed in
some countries (Ghana, Sierra Leone) both a worsening of current
account deficit positions and an intensification of exchange
controls. Similarly, the capital account too in these countries has
shown no predictable improvement in line with the desired exchange
control objectives.
In practice, the ensuing administrative bottlenecks and
consequential corruption apart, exchange controls are known simply
to suppress for some time the fundamental factors underlying the
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balance of payments disequilibrium, and for West Africa in
particular, they have also tended to aggravate some of the
structural distortions entrenched in underdevelopment. These
distinctions include production bottlenecks arising from shortage of
essential imported inputs and spare parts, increased monopoly and
oligopolistic practices, establishment of questionable import-
substitution industries, smuggling and illegal commodity and
currency activities all of which further distort the true balance of
payments position, as well as more pronounced lopsided income
distribution patterns as private profit and property incomes rise
faster than wages and income mainly because of control
inefficiencies and tax evasion.
In Sierra Leone for instance, Dixon-Fyle (1978) has observed
that exchange controls are largely nominal, particularly for
multinational mining firms, with minimal de facto compliance and
enforcement; the foreign multinational firms whose intra- and extra-
corporate transactions have been exposed to the exchange risks have
been able to 'hedge' through a variety of changes in their financial
arrangements (through a cut back on inward capital flows but with
expansive borrowing from local banks); and, above all, that both
exporting and importing enterprises have learned to live with
uncertainty as well as with the new exchange controls and payments
measures rather better than either the monetary or fiscal
authorities themselves.
Furthermore, the greater dependence on administrative controls
on external transactions has produced massive over-valuations of
currencies at their official rates, appreciably so in Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone where the demand for foreign exchange
310
at the officially-set rate by far exceeds the available supply. As
exchange restrictions get tighter in these countries, the high
incidence of currency and commodity black market activities in
circumventing these controls as well as the continuing decline in
official exchange reserve balances have further provided wider
margins between the black market and official exchange rates at an
average ratio of nearly one to three against the latter.
Currency overvaluations can be regarded both as a cause and
consequence of severe distortions in domestic prices. The effects
of strongly overvalued exchange rates tend artificially to lead to
various forms of multiple currency practices or to administrative
rationing of foreign exchange or, as usual, to both. The real costs
of the overvaluation of currencies and its tendency to drive
currency and other exchange transactions outside official markets
equally pose serious implications for West Africa's trading
relations.
Another important factor undermining the effectiveness of
exchange restrictions in West Africa has been the inadequacy of
border policing, which in part is made extremely more difficult by
the very close traditional cultural links between the same or
related communities settling on both sides of national frontiers.
Consequently, it does not require great ingenuity on the part of
financiers or businessmen to devise means whereby, in *effect goods
and capital would move relatively freely between the high
restrictions countries and those with more liberalised exchange
transactions and generally at the expense of the former. There is a
high level of noticeable illegal movements of agricultural and
mineral export commodities, re-export of manufactured imports and
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the lucrative unofficial currency exchange markets along border
areas between Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia, for instance.
Against this background, there are therefore several
satisfactory economic and political bases on which more substance
and cohesiveness can be restored to the West African region simply
by asking for the complete liberalisation of all exchange
transactions. National currencies, we have already noted, exhibit
various dimensions of illiquidity, lack of convertibility, market
strength and acceptability as the CFA franc with 'limited'
convertibility and the generally convertible Liberian dollar co-
exist uneasily with eight other largely inconvertible currencies.
Official capital movements are practically insensitive to national
exchange rate and interest rate changes. At the moment, however,
national interests appear to lie in preserving the 'traditional' but
acquired character of exchange restrictions whose complete
abandonment, many countries fear, may leave their economies more
deeply vulnerable to the already active market speculators, thereby
making them even weaker in terms of deeper balance of payments
problems. At the same time, the continued operation of autonomous
exchange restrictions in the region without regional preference is
an obstacle to the standardisation of exchange rates and other
monetary arrangements, and encourages the operation of parallel
exchange markets which only exaggerate the balance of payments and
foreign exchange difficulties.
6.4 CONCLUSIONS
In the foregoing, we have tried to identify the nature of the
balance of payments deficits in West Africa and the extent to which
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the member countries have differed in realising these deficits as
well as in the use of the exchange rate and exchange controls and
payments restrictions as instruments of adjustment. The general
pattern is one in which for virtually all West African countries,
current account deficits, in particular, have widened and become
more persistent as internal and external revenues are increasingly
outmatched by import volumes, budgetary expenditures and debt-
service obligations. Consequently, the overall balance of payments
position in the majority of countries has become increasingly acute
and desperate. For most countires, other than Liberia and the
BCEAO, the mechanisms of adjustment have featured a combination of
official changes in exchange rate regimes (pegging arrangements) and
parities (exchange rate adjustment), and the imposition of stricter
exchange controls and payments restrictions on all forms of payments
and recipts.
Under conditions actually prevailing in the region, the
expected positive real effects of either single or basket pegs, and
of exchange rate alteration or payments restrictions cannot be fully
ascertained in each practising country. Firstly, in the case of the
BCEAO countries, an important part of imports is not sensitive to
exchange rate movements in the short-run since France is the first
supplier. Secondly, devaluation has tended to exert a depressive
(or deflationary) impact on the overall level of economic growth (J-
curve) together with rising inflationary tendencies. With long
gestation periods for export projects and limited scope for the
effectiveness of orthodox instruments of monetary and financial
policy, the J-curve phenomenon is too easily apt to transform
itself into a U-shaped curve - ie a devaluation action leading to a
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deterioration of the financial situaion and movement to a new
position hardly better than the old (Mogae, 1978).
The conventional view to the avoidance of the U-curve lies in
supplementing currency devaluation with appropriate and adequate
adjustment in the areas of monetary, credit and fiscal policies. As
would be clear from our discussion of the various features of the
West African economies, the main elements of a supporting package
for exchange rate adjustment would therefore include the
mobilisation of higher revenues, moderation in the growth of
budgetary expenditure, measures to restrain the expansion of
domestic money and credit, and measures to ensre economically viable
pricing of public sector goods and services. Ideally, these
measures should not be seen as mutually exclusive, but inter-
dependent, and with a considerable scope for some trade-off options.
Thirdly, in the light of empirical evidence and the Orevailing
experience, the efficiency of exchange controls and payments
restrictions, as is further evaluated in terms of:
(a) the ratios of net foreign assets to monetary assets;
(b) net foreign assets to imports; and
(c) growth rate of net foreign assets, is equally doubtful.
While the ratio of net foreign assets to total monetary assets (ie
net foreign assets plus domestic credit) signifies the extent to
which the issuing currency is covered by foreign assets, in other
words the strength of the local currency, the ratio of net foreign
assets to imports signifies the extent of solvency in connection
with imports (see Table 6H for other ratios). In general the higher
the ratios the better as exchange restrictions are instituted to
ensure maintenance of foreign exchange reserves. Similarly, in
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general, the faster the net foreign assets are growing the better
the economies are doing. As shown in Table 6N, the ratios have
worsened even more in countries with stricter controls, except to a
lesser extent in Nigeria due largely to oil reserves.
Monetary unification in West Africa stresses the critical
importance of the type of exchange rate policy and payments
restrictions practised by each country. Under present
circumstances, the implications for monetary unification are that,
especially for most of the non-CFA franc countries, a much clearer
appreciation is required of the nature and extent of the balance of
payments problem and of the corresponding adjustment programmes.
The immediate conclusion is that the dismantling of exchange
restrictions for instance will be a much greater problem for most of
the non-CFA franc countrise in that these practices are now very
delicately entrenched within their economic systems. In addition,
the extent of exchange rate adjustment that will be required of them
is much greater.
To build solid and formidable economic foundations for monetary
unification in West Africa requires therefore a more rapid
improvement in the balance of payments and international reserve
positions in the individual countries. This prerequisite in turn
must reflect the adoption of adjustment programmes comprising
improved budgetary operations; a more efficient management of the
external public debt; more careful and objective appraisal of
reserve soources and use in order to restore, at least, some of the
comfortable levels attained during the colonial and immediate post-
independence years; and a more practical rationalisation of the
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exchange rate, exchange controls and payments restrictions as policy
instruments.
Monetary unification in West Africa, against the experience of
the member countries since the early 1970s, is easily justified by
much more comprehensive needs than merely stressing the foregoing
expansion of reciprocal trade. From the foregoing analysis, these
arise in the following areas:
(a) diseonomies associated with small, open economies having
structurally weak, dependent monetary systems and
infeasible currency areas;
(b) adjustment and liquidity problems posed by the structure
and performance in external trade, payments and monetary
relations;
(c) low rate of development that can equally be explained by
inefficient mobilisation of domestic resources;
(d) the lack of progress in intra-regional monetary and
economic relationships.
The more definitive monetary unification is towards a West
African common currency arrangement, the more realistic it is for
solving these constraints.
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CHAPTER 7
MONETARY INTEGRATION: CONCEPTS AND MODALITIES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The main task of this research, it will be recalled, is to
appreciate as fully as possible the need for and the process of
achieving a monetary union in West Africa against the hypotheses:
firstly, that monetary union despite its being a difficult objective
is necessary for progress towards economic and political
integration; and secondly, that against the background of sombre
internal and external economic environment, worsening economic and
political structures and threatening economic divergencies between
the member countries, as reviewed in the previous chapters, monetary
union becomes a delicate but very pressing option for improving and
achieving the objectives of ECOWAS. Specifically ., the study is
undertaken on the premise that the absence of a common regional
• monetary policy together with the rapid depreciation of the member
currencies and the violent, uncontrollable, and massive fluctuations
in their external exchange values constitute a major brake on
national development and on the achievement of the integration
objectives of ECOWAS.
Both in theory and in practice, the transition towards a
monetary union in particular, and to monetary integration in general
has been widely debated. As a result several alternative routes
towards monetary integration, especially in relation to European
monetary integration, have been proposed, compared and critically
evaluated. This chapter is intended to survey the conceptual,
theoretical as well as empirical aspects of monetary integration,
including its relationship to economic integration.
It is divided into five main sections. Section 7.2 deals with
the conceptual definition of monetary integration and its
relationship with the concept of economic integration. Two broad
concepts of monetary integration are examined: partial monetary
integration and complete monetary integration. Section 7.3
considers the alternative steps for achieving partial monetary
integration, while Section 7.4 is devoted to the alternative routes
by which complete monetary integration might be achieved. The
last section is devoted to the conclusions.
7.2 CONCEPTS OF MONETARY INTEGRATION
The concept 'monetary integration' has been generally
approached in the literature to comprise two broad categories of
integration schemes: first, the co-ordination among the particip-
ating countries in the use of trade and payments practices,
maintaining the stability or rigidity of exchange rates and the
application of monetary and fiscal policies; and second, the even-
tual creation of an area in which there is complete harmonisation in
all aspects of monetary and fiscal policies and national currencies
are replaced by a uniform money for the entire area.
These broad stages of monetary integration have been discussed
in the literature under different nomenclatures, but the
definitional aspects of each transition component are relatively the
same. Kafka (1969) for instance, distinguishes between 'limited
monetary integration', which may comprise no more than a common
international reserve or mutual credit arrangements or other kinds
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of arrangements conceivable without pegging the exchange rates of
the participating countries to each other, and 'complete monetary
integration'.	 The IMF (1980) distinguishes between 'limited
convertibility' and 'full convertibility'. The process of monetary
integration in this respect is viewed as the movement from a system
where each country or subset of countries within a region has its
own separate currency and exchange arrangement, with differing
degrees of convertibility, but there is unrestricted intra-regional
exchange and use of national currencies to the system where all
countries share a common currency, and consequently, a unified
exchange arrangement. Lamfalussy (1976) has defined monetary
integration to embrace virtually any kind of fiscal or factor market
integration.
The distinguishing nomenclature that is followed in this study
is that between 'complete (full) monetary integration' and 'partial
monetary integration'. Full monetary integration is generally
defined to entail either the direct creation of a common currency
for the integrating countries, the management of which has to be
undertaken by a supra-national monetary authority (Williamson,
1980), or indirectly, through an exchange rate union within which
exchange rates must bear a permanently fixed relationship to each
other, combined with the establishment of a unified capital market
with a permanent liberalisation of all current and capital
transactions (Corden, 1972).
Corden thus distinguishes between two essential components of
monetary integration:
(a) an exchange rate union, which requires that exchange rates
in the area bear a permanently fixed relationship to each
other; and
(b) convertibility (or capital market integration), in the
sense of a permanent absence of exchange controls in
respect of both current and capital transactions within
the area.
Conceptually, Corden has also drawn a distinction between a
'pseudo' exchange rate union and a 'complete' exchange rate union.
He describes the former as an arrangement whereby the various member
countries still retain their national monetary authorities and
foreign exchange reserves and, therefore still determine their own
monetary policies. By contrast, in a complete exchange rate union,
foreign exchange reserves are pooled and there is a central monetary
authority.
From the various conceptualisations of 'partial' monetary
integration, Williamson (1980) has carefully identified seven broad
forms. First, a payments union whereby multilateral clearing and/or
credit arrangements are established for the main purpose of
improving upon currency inconvertibility. The first version of the
Keynes Plan for an International Clearing Union and the celebrated
European Payments Union of 1950-80 provide the major historic
examples of this form of partial monetary integration. A second
form constitutes the partial or complete pooling of international
reserves by the member countries. Robert Triffin (1958) is leading
advocate of reserve pooling. Two other forms include capital market
integration and the adoption of common policies towards external
capital flows both of which are intended to increase the
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liberalisation of capital movements within the integrated area. The
remaining three forms of partial monetary integration - exchange
rate co-ordination, monetary co-ordination and parallel currency -
have all featured very prominently in plans for European monetary
integration which have culminated in the establishment of the
'Snake' in 1972 and the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978.
Several of the proposals for partial monetary integration have
been advanced in the hope that they would enhance not only the
transition towards full monetary union but, also that they would
help in moving to economic and monetary integration. Significantly
the establishment of complex monetary integration is thus considered
an essential condition for attaining full economic integration of
the participating countries. While the characteristic features of
the forms of monetary integration, many of which overlap within the
wider conceptual definitions of monetary integration, will be
discussed in some detail in the next section, it may be useful at
this stage to examine briefly the conceptual relationship between
monetary integration and economic integration as is discussed in the
literature.
The process of economic integration as was observed in Chapter
3 involves in general the abolition of national barriers to economic
and financial transactions between the integrating states with a
view to achieving a greater mobility of goods, capital, and labour
between them. The resulting benefits are expected to stem from
improved resource allocation as well as from the exploitation of
economies of scale involved in the production and consumption
processes at both the national and regional levels.
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In the words of Fritz Machlup (1977, p 18), 'complete economic
integration implies the actual utilisation of all potential
opportunities for the efficient division of labour'. Factors and
goods move freely within the integrated area and ultimately, they
should enter production and consumption at the levels where their
marginal product and/or marginal utility per unit marginal cost are
equal to their respective prices and maintain that ratio in time.
In this optimal setting of interdependence and interrelatedness
between all economic activities, economic efficiency is maximised
and the welfare of all is enhanced.
As economic integration encompasses the three traditionally
distinct areas in which economies can interact - goods and services,
factors of production, and the means of payment - it is required
that the liberation of factors of production and of all goods and
services must be a necessary condition for its realisation. These
flows and the integration of their markets do generate symmetrical
monetary flows, and are bound up with integration of currency and
capital markets. This in turn brings about a high degree of
integration of the real markets. Thus, the essence of monetary
integration in the process of economic integration is seen in the
establishment of arrangements that facilitate external payments and
the most thorough way of doing this is to 'replace separate national
currencies by a common currency' (Machlup, 1977).
In this perspective, Machlup argues,
'trade calls for payments, .—. capital movements call
for the exchangeability of different currencies and —.
migrations .—. call for chances to take possessions
along and to remit earnings. Hence an international
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payments system that allows payments and foreign exchange
transactions without restrictions or controls - in short,
monetary integration - is an integral part of complete
economic integration'. (p 20)
From these interpretations, monetary integration is subsumed in
economic integration. However, the conventional theory of economic
integration treats integration as comprising two related bodies of
theory, namely, a stage theory of economic integration and a roughly
parallel theory of monetary integration. For instance, Machlup's
discussion of the relationship between the two treats monetary
integration as a means of the end of economic integration. Monetary
integration appears in the formation of a theory of integration
among developed market economies. This situation is different
within the context of formulating an integration theory among the
developing countries. In both groups of countries, nonetheless, the
significant observation is that monetary integration tends to arise
at some definite stage of economic integration. This is not
surprising for the developing countries whose integration
formulations are merely the mirror image of conventional, hence West
European strategies.
Integration therefore becomes a problem of strategy: should
monetary integration precede or follow upon economic integration?
This issue is further complicated by the failure of integration
treaties to make explicit reference to or provision for monetary
integration within the economic integration process. In the CMEA
grouping, monetary integration (defined in terms of simultaneous
existence of a collective currency - transfer rouble - a system of
324
multilateral and bilateral settlements in trade and other specified
operations in this currency, and a system of short and long-term
credit arranged respectively by the International Bank for Economic
Co-operation - IBEC, and the International Investment Bank - IIB,
without limiting the sovereignty of the member countries in the
pursuit of independent monetary policies) is within the provisions
of the Comprehensive Programme of socialist economic integration
adopted in 1971 and which determines the character, prospect and
lines of development of the member countries' monetary and financial
systems (see Babashkin et al, 1977).
It is within the institutional framework of the European
Economic Community that more clearly documented competing
explanations of both the processes of economic and monetary
integration and the relationship between the two concepts can be
identified. The Treaty of Rome makes no explicit mention of
monetary integration but does incorporate elements relating to
currency convertibility and policy co-ordination among the Community
states (see for example, Articles 3, 6, 67, 70, 103, 105, 106, 108
and 109).
The theoretical foundation of monetary integration is based
largely on the stage theory of economic integration. Machlup's
discussion of monetary integration, cited above, treats it as a
means to the end of economic integration. Significantly, the wealth
of plans that have emerged out of the EEC's efforts towards monetary
integration have reflected two major divergent views regarding the
strategy and timing, and therefore on the apparent positional
relationship between monetary integration and economic integration.
One view - 'monetarists' - is that positive steps towards monetary
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integration (ie a pseudo-exchange-rate union) as a first step would
develop tensions that would then lead to economic integration - and
hence to a complete exchange rate union (the tensions being the
pressures from surplus countries on deficit countries). The other
view - 'economists' - is that economic integration should come
first; the exchange rate union could then follow without tensions,
and surplus countries would not find themselves involuntarily
financing deficit countries. Corden (1972, p 7) takes the view that
since economic integration is a much bigger step than establishing a
pseudo-exchange rate union, and since the establishment of the
latter will set up tensions to move to the former, the chances of
both being eventually attained are greater if the pseudo-union comes
first.
There may still be divergent views on this question, especially
in relation to the attainment of full European economic and monetary
union. However, in accordance with Machlup, monetary integration
implies the removal of all monetary obstacles to the 'full
exploitation of all the potential benefits of specialisation within
an area' (economic integration).	 In this respect, monetary
integration, especially for the LOCs, whose economies are stil
characterised by the lower stages of economic integration, becomes a
catalyst for development and for improving upon their economic
integration process. Contrasting opinions are hard to find in so
far as the recommended opinion of 'limited monetary integration' for
this group of countries is concerned, except that the principal
objective in this study is to attempt to assess the common currency
approach as a means of improving the ECOWAS economic integration.
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Initially, however, clarity in the transition processes for
either monetary or economic integration is important not only
because of the transitional impact on major economic indicators - eg
unemployment, inflation, production and consumption levels - or of
the costs associated with each stage of the integration process. It
is also because where the various steps are not clearly identified
and decided in advance, the implementation of successive stages and
the whole integration process can be impaired. In the final
analysis the process of economic integration would be reflected in
the developing of substantial improvement and complementarity in all
aspects of economic activity, especially the production and
consumption profiles of the participating countries and a consequent
increase in intra-regional transactions. To underpin the smooth
working of monetary integration, this process should also involve a
narrowing of the differentials in various financial and overall
economic imbalances between member countries.
For LDCs, economic and monetary integration, though distinctive
concepts, are necessarily part of the same process of economic
development. Optimal relationships between the different dimensions
of the two may be less clear-cut but can be quite discernible. At
the same time, monetary integration must be adjudged practicable and
thus justified only where it unambigously underwrites the
integration of trade, product and factor markets and expand the
monetary and fiscal domains. This is because the basic monetary
requirement of an effective customs union or an economic community
is the achievement of current intra-regional convertibility in the
absence of exchange restrictions. This enhances intra-regional
liberalisation of trade flows, capital and labour movements.
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To the extent that exchange rate stability is achieved through
the process of monetary integration, the major implications for the
process of economic integration are routed from the general effects
of fixed or floating rates within the grouping. If the evidently
important monetary obstacles to economic integration are to be
eliminated or minimised from an exchange rate management point of
view, exchange rate realignments and control on monetary expansion
will minimise exchange transactions costs arising out of violent
currency fluctuations and accentuate monetary policy harmonisation.
All of these elements have serious implications for economic
integration through the grouping's price relationships. These
implications are of course evidently far-reaching in groupings among
developing countries because of the high degree of inconvertibility
• that is apparent in many of their national currencies..
While it is agreed that the attainment of monetary integration
would be much easier if there were sufficient economic integration
and similarity among the national economies to justify a uniform,
union-wide monetary policy, it is also certain that achieved
economic integration could also be threatened by the failure to make
progress in monetary integration since it is essentially through
this that the monetary and financial obstacles to regional trade and
production can be minimised or eliminated. At the highest level,
the full realisation of the aims of a common market, namely complete
freedom of goods, services and factors of production, is
substantially enhanced by the fixity of exchange rates between
member states and the replacement of national currencies by a common
currency at a later stage.
	 When exchange rates are not fixed, the
possibility of changes in the values of national currencies vis-a-
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vis each other always exists and can result in substantial economic
and socio-political costs for most member states, especially the
weak ones. Such a situation can be worsened by the existence of a
high degree of divergencies in the convertibility levels of the
member currencies.
Clearly, the consequent uncertainty has adverse effects on
trade and impedes the free movement of goods, services and factors
of production between member states. Even so, exchange rate fixity
cannot be maintained unless the trend in nominal prices and
productivity follows the same pattern in all participating states.
Thus, economic policy integration within a monetary and economic
grouping is crucial because it can secure similar patterns in the
trend of nominal prices and other monetary indices while at the same
time it tends to reduce the margin of differences in Oneral growth
and productivity trends.
7.3 MODALITIES OF PARTIAL MONETARY INTEGRATION
Two types of partial monetary integration arrangements are
reviewed, namely, clearing and credit mechanisms, and exchange rate
co-ordination.
7.3.1 Multilateral Clearing and Credit Arrangements
The major historical example of a clearing and credit payments
arrangements institution as noted previously was the European
Payments Union (EPU), established in 1950 in a post-war European
environment that was characterised by a high degree of bilateralism
and by trade barriers against the rest of the world (the dollar
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area) and within Europe itself. Once assurances were obtained on
issues regarding:
(a) its co-existence with the IMF
(b) its designed transformation into a 'self-sufficient high-
cost soft-currency area' with permanent discriminatory
institutions against the 'dollar area'
(c) British initial opposition to the idea, and
(d) the 'vexing problem' of the special position of sterling,
(Hirscham, 1951), the EPU survived until its replacement
in 1958 by the European Monetary Agreement.
While it existed, the EPU, supported largely by Robert Triffin,
one of its principal architects as a means of preserving the
convertibility of European currencies (Triffin, 1958, 1980), had as
a major objective, liberalisation of intra-European trade and
payments transactions through the institution of 'off-setting' and
'settlement' mechanisms. Through these arrangements, all intra-
European trade was balanced multilaterally and automatic credit was
made available by surplus partners to cover a part of the net
imbalances in mutual trade. Another significant feature of the
Payments Union was the institution of a special contributory
'dollar' fund to finance its capital operations.
There is hardly any quantitative evidence on the EPU's success
in terms of its contribution towards improving intra-European trade.
It is believed however that during its existence, the EPU
contributed to the restoration of the free convertibility of
European currencies; it provided a useful forum for international
consultation and co-operation among the member countries; and in the
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event, it served as a forum for the establishment of trust and a
sense of community after years of nationalist policies and war-time
hatred even among European countries (Grubel, 1981).
Since the EPU, experiments on clearing and credit arrangements
have featured mostly among the developing countries, in accord with
the consensus that these mechanisms provide the only practicable and
desirable means of monetary integration between them. Accordingly,
about nine clearing arrangements (4 in Africa, 3 in Latin America
and the Caribbean and 2 in Asia) covering a total of more than 70
countries, and five credit arrangements (3 in Latin America and 2 in
Asia) comprising 47 countries, have so far been established among
LDCs over the last two decades (see Table 7A)
With the search for some theoretical evidence on their
operational framework probably going as far back as Keynes' plan for
an International Clearing Union in the mid-1940s, the most common
explicit objectives of clearing and credit mechanisms are to
facilitate the settlement of overall reciprocal foreign exchange
positions among the participating countries, to reduce the cost of
monetary transfers eligible for clearing, and to minimise the use of
official foreign exchange reserves for the settlement of intra-
regional balances. The West African Clearing House for instance
acknowledges these broad goals and states them in Article II,
section 2 of its Agreement as:
(a) to promote the use of the currencies of the members of
Clearing House for sub-regional trade and other
transactions;
(b) to bring about economies in the use of foreign reserves of
the members of the Clearing House;
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Table 7A	 Multilateral Clearing and Credit Arrangements Among
Developing Countries
A Clearing Arrangements
(a) Latin America and the Caribbean
1	 Central American Clearing House (5), 1961
Cost Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua
2	 Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)(a) Payments and
Reciprocal Credits System (12), 1965
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colomia, Chile, Dominican Republic,
Eduador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela
3	 CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility (6), 1977
Barbados, Belize, East Caribbean Currency Authority, Guyana,
Jamaica and Tinidad and Tobago
(b)	 Africa
1	 West Africa Clearing House (16), 1975
Benin, Burkina, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo
2	 Grand Lakes Economic Community's Monetary Arrangement (3), 1978
Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire
3	 Central African Clearing House (5), 1979
Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, United Republic of
Cameroon and Zaire
4	 Eastern and Southern Africa Clearing House (18) (b) , 1981
Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
(c)	 Asia
1	 Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) - Union for
Multilateral Payments Arrangements (3), 1967
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey
2	 Asian Clearing Union (7), 1974
Bangladesh, Burma, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
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B Credit Arrangements
(a) Latin America and the Caribbean
1	 Central American Stabilisation Fund (FOEM) (5), 1969
(Membership as in CACH)
2	 Santa Domingo Agreement (12), 1969
(membership as in LAIA)
3	 Andean Reserve Fund (FAR) (5), 1976
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela
(b)	 Asia
1	 Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) (21, as in the Arab League), 1976
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt (suspended 1979), Iran,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAR, Yemen
AR and Yemen PDR
2	 ASEAN Swap Arrangement (5), 1977
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand
Notes:	 (a) Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA) until 1981
(b) Full potential membership as in the Preferential
Trade Area (PTA)
(c) to encourage the members of the Clearing House to
liberalise trade among their respective countries; and
(d) to promote monetary co-operation and consultation among
members of the Clearing House
In general, credit arrangements some of which are linked with
clearing arrangements, are designed to sustain the trend towards
trade and payments liberalisation by providing short to medium term
intra-regional trade and balance of payments financing. The
necessity for such support facilities is made clear as participating
countries facing serious balance of payments disequilibria can
hardly be expected to accelerate their trade and payments
restrictions, especially if such disequilibria were in one way or
another to be associated with the adaptation to the requirements of
economic integration.
These objectives are achieved through direct central bank
interchanges of reciprocal holdings of foreign exchange claims (bank
notes, cheques, money lenders, etc), which are then reported to a
central agent for multilateral clearance and settlement, which
normally involves interim financing by the creditor central banks
repayable at short fixed intervals with mutually agreed interest
rates. The operational sequence actually begins at the level of the
commercial banks which are authorised to channel the exchange
documents acquired through their corresponding central bank; the
banks get immediate credit in the central bank in local currency.
Each central bank in turn sorts out all documents purchased and
mails them to the central banks of the countries in whose currency
the documents are expressed. The Clearing House Office receives a
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copy of each transaction and operates them in the central accounting
system in order to derive periodic net settlement positions of the
participating countries, ie net credits and debits.
Although all clearing and payments arrangements are essentially
designed to facilitate monetary transfers among participants on a
multilateral basis by explicitly contemplating the use of national
currencies, there are undoubtedly some fundamental differences
between them in their specific objectives and in operational
features relating to interim financing, adoption of the unit of
account, the degree of mulitlateralisation of clearings, the
eligibility of transactions, the period and form of final
settlements, and pronouncements concerning exchange guarantees and
default. These divergencies are apparent as each system is
expectedly adapted to the requirements and possibilities of the
underlying regional integration scheme.
Against these major divergencies, seven out of the existing
eight clearing arrangements among LOCs are connected with regional
economic integration and free-trade agreements, the exception being
the Asian Clearing Union, while full multilateralisation
characterises most clearing mechanisms in so far as the clearing of
eligible transactions, the settlement of net balances and the credit
margins granted to and received from the facilities are concerned.
Significantly the LAIA and CMCF use the US dollar in their
clearing house arrangements, the CACH has the 'Central American
Peso' as a unit of account equivalent to US$1, while clearing
arrangements in Asia, West Africa and Central Africa operate on the
basis of units of account closely linked to the SOR (equal to 1
SDR).
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Credit schemes have also differed among countries in several
operational aspects including the automaticity or conditionality of
credit facilities, the form and terms of credit and their
capitalisation. The Arab Monetary Fund and the Andean Reserve Fund
for instance, are institutionally constructed as reserve funds with
over 90 per cent of capital contributions paid in 'hard' currencies.
In the AMF only 2 per cent of capital contributions is paid in local
currencies. Foreign exchange contributions to the Andean Reserve
Fund represent around 2.5 per cent of the combined gross reserve
holdings of members, whereas in the Central American Monetary
Stabilisation Fund, this ratio has varied between 7-40 per cent (del
Valle, 1980). The Santa Domingo Agreement consists of a set of
credit lines which do not require paid-up capital contributions,
while the ASEAN Swap Arrangement provides a short term and
unconditional credit facility. Access to this facility is gained by
a participating member which exchanges or swaps its own currency for
US dollars provided by the other members. Basically, all credit
arrangements require strict convertibility of the claims against
borrowing participants, and, unlike a conventional 'payments union'
(ie the EPU), accessibility to credit is neither automatic nor
extended in terms of exclusively intra-regional imbalances. In all
of them, credit agreements are based on global balance of payments
needs, in line with IMF conditions.
The fundamental question is whether clearing and credit
arrangements constitute a realistic monetary integration framework
among LDCs especially in the light of prevailing development
constraints as have been analysed in the case of West African
countries. There seems little doubt that the dimensions of these
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constraints are such that they cannot be directly attacked by these
arrangements. In present circumstances, clearing and payments
arrangements can not eliminate the obstacles to intra-regional trade
to which they are chiefly addressed and can therefore save little
foreign exchange compared with member countries' global
convertibility currency obligations as intra-regional trade itself
is small relative to total foreign trade and, partly in consequence,
little use is made of regional currencies for settlement of regional
balances. Even in schemes where credit provisions are specifically
laid down, often, the inadequacy of credit funds in providing the
system with flexibility particularly in periods of hard-core
creditor/debtor net positions, and of widespread balance of payments
difficulties puts additional pressure on their credibility and
success rate as an instrument of improved mutual trade, payments
liberalisation and regional convertibility.
7.3.2 Exchange Rate Co-ordination
Exchange rate co-ordination involves an agreement among
participating countries to pursue policies that will limit the
extent to which the exchange rates between their currencies can
diverge (Williamson, 1980). Conceptually termed as 'pseudo-
exchange-rate union', this form of limited monetary integration
constitutes the maintenance of fixed exchange rates within the union
but there is no explicit integration of economic policy, no common
pool of foreign-exchange reserves, and no single central bank
(Carden, 1972).
'The members of the union', Corden states 'might determine that
for accounting purposes, one of their currencies is to be the
reference currency. Alternatively, they might establish a new
accounting currency for the purpose. Then each of the other
partners agrees to keep its exchange rate fixed relative to this
reference currency. Each country has its own foreign exchange
reserves and conducts its own monetary and fiscal policies. If it
finds that it is running out of reserves, then - to make good its
solemn promise - it must engage in a monetary or fiscal contraction
sufficient to restore the reserve position. Every six months or so,
or perhaps much more frequently, the finance ministers or central
bank governors meet and consider whether they wish to change the
parity of the reference currency. If it changes, then all the other
currencies must, of course, move with it' (p 3).
In this regard, the central issue for monetary integration
through exchange rate co-ordination is the choice of a pivot
currency as the reference currency. Then the participating
countries are required either by 'talk' or by 'rule' to define the
central rates of their local currencies relative to this unit. And,
thereafter, some obligation is required of them to restrict
deviations from the agreed central rates, such that any likely
variations through monetary and fiscal intervention policies must be
undertaken only in order to maintain a high level of stability in
the parities.
This requires two further decisions. Firstly, regional
stability in exchange rates may mean either general pegging, or
joint pegging, or joint fluctuations of the integrating currencies
vis-a-vis those of the rest of the world. In other words, as Kafka
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(1969) explains, participating countries must choose between pegging
their currencies to each other and allowing them to float in the
international currency market, or pegging them as before and
adjusting them jointly by deliberate action vis-a-vis third
currencies in the event of 'fundamental disequilibrium' (ie a
disequilibrium which looks like being rather substantial and
irreversible in the medium run) between the region and the rest of
the world, or pegging each currency vis-a-vis all others but
readjusting it in the face of fundamental disequilibrium between
each country and all other countries, including regional partners.
Kafka suggests that because changes in economic conditions differ
between the integrating countries with respect to fundamental
disequilibrium, all but the third option are ruled out. But the
first obstacle, he points out, is the concerted need for a common
conceptual definition of 'fundamental' as opposed to 'temporary'
disequilibria as this is a central issue in the debates on freely
floating and fixed exchange rate systems and the impact on each by
speculative capital flows as an instrument for the stabilisation of
the regional exchange rates.
Secondly, in the event regional currencies are largely traded
on competitive exchange markets thereby necessitating central bank
intervention in order to limit the deviations from the agreed
parities and then sustain exchange rate stability, concerted
agreement is required on a number of issues including:
(a) the structure of central rates;
(b) the margins around the central rates that are to be
defended by interventions;
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(c) the intervention medium; and where intervention is in the
members' own currencies,
(d) the division of responsibility for intervention between
the country whose currency is at the ceiling and the one
whose currency is on the floor.
In the absence of competitive exchange market supply and demand
forces, exchange rate co-ordination requires an assurance that
member countries' published exchange rates remain constant relative
to each other. Williamson (1980) suggests that it may be highly
convenient if the currency against which parities are set is also
the intervention medium so that intra-area exchange rates, which are
the product of published buying and selling rates, are established
directly.
The above features are in themselves a major source of
difficulty that is likely to emerge in sustaining exchange rate co-
ordination. These operational difficulties stem largely from the
apparent limitations on national autonomy on exchange rate
management and the lack of permanence in the co-ordinated
arrangements. The system is highly vulnerable to erratic and
sometimes destablising speculative capital flows and, as Corden
(1972) warns, with each member country having to 'fight for that
common exchange rate most appropriate to its own balance of payments
situation, agreement will certainly be difficult to reach;
bargaining will be hard, and the system will be subject to•
continuous strain'.
Moreover, as Corden adds, each negotiating session for a common
exchange rate will be accompanied by speculation about its outcome
and hence speculative capital movements into and/or out of the
integrated area, and that in so far as the system does not assure
the permanence of the relationships between the member currencies
(implied in 'complete monetary integration'), there is always the
possibility that one or several of the participating countries will
not agree to pursue a national exchange rate adjustment policy (eg
an exchange rate depreciation by a deficit country and the building
of foreign reserves, or appreciation by a surplus country) that may
be required to maintain the agreed parities.
The IMF study (1980) acknowledges these views and confirms that
even where exchange rates are declared fixed or irrevocable, a
certain element of uncertainty would remain resulting primarily from
the fact that, as long as member countries maintain their own
currencies, the possibility that a country may at some time separate
from the system or change its exchange rate cannot be totally ruled
out.
While a policy of deliberate co-ordination of exchange rates is
yet to be a considered option for monetary integration among the
developing countries, in Western Europe, especially within the
institutional framework of the European Community, exchange rate co-
ordination was the sole object of the Snake-in-the-Tunnel scheme
(1972), a significant part of the Werner approach (1970), and it is
an essential component of the current European Monetary System (EMS)
instituted in 1979. These schemes constitute major alternative
conceptual proposals for attaining monetary union and are therefore
discussed in the next section.
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On exchange rates proper, it would not be unfair to say that
even in the EEC, these had never been firmly on the agenda of
Community organs prior to the EMS discussions of 1978. At least up
to the events of 1970-72 which sparked off the urgent need for co-
operation in this area, there was, in principle and in practice, no
perceived need to discuss exchange rate adjustments in a regional
context since intra-EEC exchange rates were assumed to be fixed as
part of the global system of fixed rates then embodied in the
Articles of the IMF Agreement. Negotiations thereafter did not
survive for long because 'there was no attempt to get to grips with
procedures and criteria for adjusting the designed central rates
themselves, nor were there any initiatives for closer co-ordination
of monetary and other domestic economic policies' (Thygesen, 1979).
7.4 MODALITIES OF COMPLETE MONETARY INTEGRATION
Allen (1976, p 4) has drawn a distinction between 'the
characteristics that are essentials for any monetary union and the
additional characteristics that are necessary for the continued and
successful existence of the monetary union'. Accordingly, he has
defined the minimum essential for a monetary union as:
'first, a single currency, or if there are several
currencies, these currencies must be fully convertible,
one into the other, at immutably fixed exchange rates,
creating effectively a single currency; second, .—. an
arrangement whereby monetary policy for the union,
including control of high powered money and regulations
effecting the commercial banks' ability to create money,
is determined at the union level, leaving no national
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autonomy in monetary policy; third, since there can be
only one rate of exchange between an external currency
and the union currency, there must be a single external
exchange rate policy. Towards this end, the national
authorities must relinguish individual control over their
international reserves and invest such control in a union
authority'.
This definition is essentially- in accordance with other
definitions of complete monetary integration, many of which have
emerged in the analysis of European monetary integration (see for
instance, Werner Report, 1970; Corden, 1972; Ingram, 1973). As
already noted, Corden's definition has gone further, however, and
included complete lack of capital controls within the union as a
prerequisite for monetary union. Corden (1972, p 2) has
characterised as 'complete exchange rate' or 'monetary integration',
an 'area within which exchange rates bear a permanently fixed
relationship to each other eventhough the rates may - in unison -
vary relative to non union currencies', and one in which there is
'the permanent absence of all exchange controls, whether for current
or capital transactions within the area'.
In practice therefore all the various definitions of monetary
union (once agreement on setting it exists) have specified three
major requirements - effectively a single currency, an explicit
harmonisation of monetary policies, and a common control of
international reserves. These conditions inevitably require the
creation of a union central monetary authority.
As Allen emphasises, it would probably not be difficult to find
a consensus, in principle, on the necessity of these conditions for
a monetary union, though certainly not on their sufficiency and on
the steps by which the union can be attained. There is no doubt,
however, that the additional characteristics that are necessary for
the success of a monetary union - eg policy harmonisation or
convergence - are more subjective and controversial, varying with
the underlying political and economic conditions and aspirations at
the union and at the national levels. As emphasised by both Allen
and Corden, a workable monetary union requires that the
participating countries, their financial institutions, firms,
households and above all, political leaders and fiscal authorities,
must believe in it and be committed to its permanence and be able to
perceive the net benefits of remaining in the union to exceed the
potential gains from staying outside it.
There are important reasons for stressing these specifications.
As Allen (1976, p 8) explains, the absence of such confidence by
member states on the union would force them to continue to presume
that intra-union transactions would involve exchange rate risk and
risk of discriminatory capital controls. This would reduce their
willingness to hold the other national currencies, to incur debts or
acquire assets with each other's financial institutions, or to even
make viable contracts across national borders of the union. The
resulting separation of national money and capital market
transactions would constitute a failure to achieve the union
objectives and would certainly make more difficult the achievement
of policy convergence as well as its implementation at the union
level. Furthermore, if the union were suspected to be temporary or
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unstable, there would be an apparent reluctance to grant the union
monetary authority significant powers that it might need to operate
effectively.
The other area of major concern for a monetary union is the
'dispute' over the means by which it can be created. As indicated
earlier, the many alternative routes that are available so far in
the literature have essentially emanated from the various arguments
for and against monetary (or currency) unification in the EEC.
These *alternative strategies can be divided into two broad
categories: the 'big-leap' approach, and the gradual approach.
7.4.1 The Gradual Approach
The attainment of monetary union by steps has one important
desired feature, namely, 'automaticity'. This approach involves in
essence the gradual introduction of the components of 'partial'
monetary integration with the hope that the process would eventually
lead to the introduction of the essentials of 'complete' monetary
integration. Consequently, member states may define the sequence
differently and with different elements. Some, for example, may
decide to initially reduce exchange rate margins; at a second stage,
to eliminate exchange rate margins; at a third stage, to pool
international reserves; and at a final stage, to replace national
currencies with a union currency and to establish a central monetary
authority. Alternatively, some member states may decide that they
would enter the union whenever they are ready (ie after attaining
policy harmonisation), or the union may decide that member states
would retain the right to withdraw. The various steps can be
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decided and well planned in advance or they can rest on successive
negotiations.
In the case where all the steps are carefully designed in
advance and a firm commitment to stay in the scheme is available,
automaticity can also be said to be present in this respect.
However, where the member states reserve the right of withdrawal,
they may choose to pursue their own monetary policies at a time
when, perhaps, their national interests are considered to conflict
with those of the union. But as a firm commitment to stay in the
scheme imposes self-discipline on national monetary authorities, it
is likely to lead to full monetary union. On the other hand, if the
various steps are not decided and firmly agreed upon in advance, the
gradual route has the drawback of relying on successive negotiations
for the implementation of successive stages. This in effect
increases the possibility of failure and eventual collapse of the
union as political support may vanish with the changing interests of
the member states. The implication is that timing in the
implementation of successive stages becomes a most crucial part of
the monetary unification process.
Vaubel (1979, p 25) has argued that because graduation lacks
automaticity, relying instead more on discretion, all its different
components (Vaubel describes them as co-ordination strategies),
especially at the initial stages, fail to give the appropriate and
sufficient guidance to the member states on matters of exchange rate
prediction and expectations, wage and price setting, inflation
tendencies, unemployment levels, etc. The key defect of this
approach therefore rests entirely on the problem of expectation
adjustments by the general public. Clearly, the public is bound to
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resent union membership under a situation where its expectations of
government and the monetary authorities' compliance to union targets
are very low. The rationality of the public in terms of risk and
transactions and the loss of national currencies in place of common
currency therefore becomes an additional factor that is equally
crucial for achieving monetary union.
Gradualism towards monetary union in Europe is conceptualised
into three main approaches, namely, the Werner Plan, the Snake and
the EMS.
7.4.1.1	 The Werner Plan 
The concerted step-by-step approach as proposed in the Werner
Report (1970) was specifically defined as follows:
*(a) exchange rate margins are gradually narrowed;
(b) at first some limited financing of deficit countries by
surplus countries takes place;
(c) at some stage foreign exchange reserves are pooled;
(d) and at some stage exchange margins are completely
eliminated; a firm commitment to stay within the
arrangement is made;
(e) then, finally, a single central bank is established.
Thus, in essence, the transition to monetary union envisaged by the
Werner Committee consists of gradually reducing autonomous parity
adjustments and margins of fluctuation between the member
currencies.
Even though the delayed implementation of the first part of the
Werner Plan was attributed to the highly unstable international
monetary conditions prevailing at the time, the Plan, as a concept
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for attaining monetary integration, is operationally limited by the
high element of discretion that is implied in the implementation of
the transition stages. As Corden (1976, p 13) observes, the Werner
proposal is such that until the last stage is accomplished, the
separate national monetary authorities are to stay in existence, and
the right is reserved for the pursuance of independent national
monetary policies for withdrawal from the arrangement if necessary
and for refusal to finance partners in deficit. Commitment for
permanence is clearly lacking and while there remains separate
political influences, trade and financial transactions would
naturally rest on expectations that each authority would follow its
own policies.
Indeed, the broad skepticism about such a strategy is the
requirement for all member states to move in unison in implementing
each step. The main concern here is the likelihood that this may
never happen either because not all members are equally prepared
because of time or simply because others already have firm
alternative commitments for fixing their exchange rates irrevocably
to each other. This in turn leads to another very crucial element,
namely, the degree of readiness at the national level for member
states to go beyond successive stages. Obviously the longer the
time lag between stages, the more likely it is for successive stages
to be overtaken by unforeseen adverse events, thereby forcing the
initial commitment, especially for the more adversely affected
member states, to fade. As it happened, it was apparent that at the
time the Werner Plan was unveiled, France, Britain and Italy were in
particular not ready to participate, and so its adoption was further
slowed down.
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However, aspects of the Werner Plan became visible after the
series of negotiations which followed the 1971 dollar crisis and the
floating of EC member currencies against the dollar. In April 1972,
the EC member states entered the Basle Agreement, which was
basically the 'snake' agreement.
7.4.1.2
	 The Snake Agreement 
• Conceptually, a 'snake' exchange rate arrangement, which has
its origins in the events of 1971 (the Smithsonian Agreements),
involves a scheme in which member countries agree to move towards a
narrower band of fluctuations of the exchange rates among their
national currencies. Once central rates are defined, member
countries are expected to keep their exchange rates linked to each
other so closely that the deviations between them should be within
the width of an agreed intervention margin on either side of par or
the central rate. In theory, the wider the margin, the more widely
national member countries are permitted to diverge between them
without declaration of changes in central rates because of a simple
mathematical cross rate valuation. In practice, member countries
would strive to sustain stability in their exchange rate
arrangements either by directly trading the relevant national
currencies (selling the strongest and buying the weakest member
currencies) to keep them within the agreed band, or by allowing
market forces in the international exchange markets to determine the
band level and the likely form of possible intervention.
The 'Snake-in-the-tunnel' (1972), with a maximum intervention
margin of 2.25 per cent on either side of par, remains one of
historical significance in the evolution of possible routes to
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monetary integration. In addition to the strains created on
currency, political and overall economic systems by the events
during this period (eg the renewed currency crisis, 1972; the Arab
oil embargo, 1974), the scheme was finally abandoned at the
Community level (it became largely a German mark zone), lacking the
'political will (by member countries) to sacrifice national
sovereignty in order to gain the uncertain advantages of a joint
programme of action' (Grubel, 1981).
Tindemans (1976) had advocated specifically for an agreed
system whereby exchange margins between national member currencies
would be steadily narrowed. In contrast to the Werner proposal, the
various steps in this approach would not have to be concerted;
countries could join at their own will. Specifically, a 'two-tier'
Community may emerge; one pair consisting of member countries in the
snake for adhering to a narrower margin agreement, limiting exchange
rate fluctuations and moving towards complete exchange rate union;
and the other tier comprising of those not so taking part.
The Snake scheme is considered more pragmatic and slightly more
practicable than the Werner approach. But this is only in so far as
countries may be more inclined to join it and protect their exchange
rates once they have managed, outside the scheme, to align their
domestic inflation and monetary targets. This supposition is based
on the assumption that realistically, the movement towards exchange
rate union would follow the alignment of economic policies, not vice
versa, or at least the two processes would be simultaneous.
Nevertheless, as in the Werner Plan, the main problem with a
Snake system is that until an irrevocable commitment is made to
staying in it, there can be no certainty that national monetary
350
developments will produce unified monetary targets and stable
exchange rates. 'It is no more than an adjustable peg system 	
(and) there is not even a pseudo exchange rate union' in it (Corden,
1976). And until foreign exchange reserves are pooled and a cow=
central bank is established evidencing some irrevocable commitment
to staying in it, there is certainly not a complete exchange rate
union.	 Furthermore, even when operated in conjunction with
harmonised monetary targets, the snake approach may still be fragile
and practically unworkable as it lacks the operational guarantee
that the agreed monetary targets are consistent with the exchange
rate targets - and in the last resort, participants can opt out.
In practice, these fears became imminent as membership of the
EC 'snake' scheme actually fluctuated between the years. For
instance, the UK participated in the scheme from 1 May 1972 to 23
June 1972; France, 24 April 1972 to 19 January 1974, and 10 July
1975 to 15 March 1976; Denmark, 1 May 1972 to 13 June 1972 and 10
October 1972 onwards; Sweden, 19 March 1973 to 29 August 1977;
Norway, 23 May 1972 to December 1977; and Italy from 24 April 1972
to 13 February 1973. The permanent members of the snake were West
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Between April
1972 and December 1978, parities between the member currencies were
adjusted on nearly ten occasions (Kruse, 1980, pp 111-17; Vaubel,
1978, p9).
7.4.1.3	 The European Monetary System (EMS) 
The EMS, basically a variant of the 'snake' system, was adopted
in 1979 within the EEC as 'a scheme for the creation of closer
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monetary co-operation, leading to a zone of monetary stability in
Europe' (paragraph 1.1, Resolution of the European Council, 5
December 1978). Kruse (1980) provides a detailed account of the
background and operational features of the EMS while various aspects
of its performance and prospects are also appraised in a number of
other reputable studies including Trezise (1979), De Vries (1980),
Masera and Rossi (1980), Cohen (1981) and Ungerer et al (1983).
The EMS was launched with the immediate support of 6 of the 9
EEC nations, Ireland and Italy (generally classified as the less
prosperous among the members) joined some weeks later after 'time
for reflection', whereas the United Kingdom Government expressed a
'spirit of sympathetic co-operation' (El-Agraa, 1980) and still
maintains that joining the EMS is not a 'soft option' for Britain
(Keegan and Hamilton, The Observer, 17 February 1985).
Officially, the main features of the EMS are stated in the
annex to the conclusions of the EEC Pesidency (Bulletin of the
European Communities No 6, 1978) and are grouped into two broad
components:
(a) an agreement about a Community exchange rate regime; and
(b) the creation of a European Monetary Fund and of a system
of mutual credit facilities.
The features also have an indication of measures in favour of
the less prosperous member states. Within these broad categories,
the EMS has the following intentions:
(a) the implementation of an exchange rate arrangement that
would facilitate the minimisation of exchange deviations
between member currencies as well as enhance the co-
352
ordination of the member countries' exchange rate policies
vis-a-vis third currencies;
(b) the issue of a new reserve asset; and
(c) the pooling by members of part of their monetary reserves
and the extension of mutual credits, both of which are to
be consolidated within the European Monetary Fund.
The exchange rate agreement is essentially a system of fixed
but adjustable exchange rates in which parities are fixed vis-a-vis
the European Currency Unit (ECU; the acronym is also the name of an
ancient French silver coin - Cohen, 1981), which consists of a
basket of fixed amounts of the 9 EEC currencies (excepting for the
time being, the Greek drachma). Margins of fluctuation (ie 6 per
cent for the weaker lira on the one hand and 2.25 per cent for the
rest of the me*mber currencies) are allowable on either side of
parity. Intervention by member central banks at these margins is
obligatory and unlimited and can be effected in both participating
and third currencies. The grid of bilateral central rates and
intervention limits is supplemented by a 'divergence indicator'
which provides an in-built early warning signal to indicate that a
member country's currency has begun to diverge too far away from the
weighted average movement of the other member currencies. This
indicator signal would therefore precipitate the need for
appropriate and prompt corrective measures by the affected country
either in the exchange market or by adjusting domestic monetary and
fiscal policies.
The EMS will be supported by a proposed European Monetary Fund
(EMF), the successor of the existing European Monetary Co-operation
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Fund (also known as FECOM by its French initials) in supervising all
Community credits which will be extended for exchange rate and
balance of payments financing. The Fund will be backed by 20 per
cent of national gold and US dollar reserves and by a similar
percentage in national currencies. It will issue ECUs which will be
used as new reserve assets. All mutual credits to support
intervention will be dominated in ECU and interest paid at the
weighted average discount rate in the member countries. The ECU is
the official settlement currency.
Thus, at the heart of the EMS is the ECU; it'serves as the
numeraire for the exchange rate mechanism, as the denominator for
operations in both the intervention and credit mechanisms, as a
reference point for the divergence indicator, and as a means of
settlement and a reserve asset of the member central banks.
Viewed with respect to the 'minimum' requirements for a full
monetary union, the EMS, despite its institutional superiority over
the previous proposals, does lack a key requirement, ie a common
central bank. The EMF is yet to be established. Pending this,
however, reserve pooling within the system is carried out initially
in the form of revolving three-month 'swaps'. An eventual
transformation of an established EMF into a supra-national central
bank would in turn enhance the transformation of the ECU into a
common Community currency.
Nonetheless, its performance since its inception and in
relation to its stated objectives should make the EMS an instructive
example among the variety of proposed routes to attaining complete
monetary integration. Despite more realignments and interventions
and less economic convergence than many of its original protagonists
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had hoped for, the EMS has attained some relative stability in the
exchange rates between the member currencies, compared with the
variability of exchange rates of non-EMS currencies such as the US
dollar, the yen and sterling (Lingerer et al, 1983). Besides,
according to the Ungerer study, this stabilising influence within
the EMS has spread to the exchange rates of the currencies of those
European countries outside the ENS which have close economic and
financial ties to the EMS participants. In contrast, the exchange
rate variability of the major currencies not tied to the EMS -
sterling, the yen and the US dollar - appears to have risen
significantly. These comparative variations are summarised in Table
7B.
Ungerer (1983) concludes that the performance of the EMS during
the period 1979-82 has also disproved a number of contrasting
expectations and fears raised initially against the exchange rate
mechanics in relation to the consequences of strict adherence to a
system of fixed, though adjustable, on economic developments and
policies of participating countries. Some of the most significant
of these 'exaggerated' concerns have centred largely on three
possible risks (Cohen, 1981):
(a) the danger of increased world-wide exchange rate
instability;
(b) the potentials for either deflationary or inflationary
biases in the system; and
(c) the possible erosion of the status of the SDR and the IMF
and the weakening of any impetus towards global monetary
reform.
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Table 7B	 Comparative Variability of EMS and Non-EMS Exchange
Rates, 1974-82
Variability Average Average Av European Round 	 US	 Yen
of	 EMS	 Non-EMS	 Non-EMS	 Sterling Dollar
1 Nominal Effective Exchange Rates
1974-78	 23.6	 28.3	 29.3	 32.6	 21.2	 40.4
1979-81	 20.0	 28.3	 26.4	 42.9	 27.5	 54.2
1982	 21.9	 31.1	 31.1	 20.0	 44.3	 35.1
2 Nominal Exchange Rates Against EMS Currencies
1974-78	 28.5	 34.5	 30.5	 32.6	 34.7	 44.4
1979-81	 14.1	 36.5	 27.8	 44.1	 45.0	 66.6
1982	 26.2	 27.0	 22.0	 21.3	 47.9	 19.9
3 Nominal Exchange Rates Against Non-EMS Currencies
1974-78	 36.3	 39.6	 42.5	 49.6	 34.1	 46.2
1979-81	 44.7	 43.2	 45.7	 56.1	 38.6	 60.5
1982	 34.1	 31.5	 29.2	 26.0	 36.8	 45.5
4 Bilateral Real Exchange Rates Against EMS Currencies
1974-78	 25.9	 31.6	 27.2	 28.1	 33.0	 40.3
1979-81	 16.9	 38.6	 31.0	 53.5	 44.8	 64.9
1982	 21.1	 24.3	 18.3	 15.7	 43.3	 25.2
5 Bilateral Real Exchange Rates Against Non-EMS Currencies
1974-78	 34.4	 35.1
	 36.8	 40.0	 31.5	 43.5
1979-81
	 45.7	 47.1	 49.1	 61.3	 43.4	 67.1
1982
	
30.7	 31.8
	 29.1	 26.2	 36.9	 51.9
Source: Underer, Horst et al,
The European Monetary System: The Experience 1979-82
Occasional Paper No 19, IMF, May 1983
Notes:	 1 Average for 1974-78 and 1979-81
Ungerer notes further that the EMS has so far also disproved
the initial fear that such a system would not sustain for long
because, as the argument went, it would be unreasonable to expect
countries with highly divergent economic developments to be able to
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align their policies to the degree necessary to keep a system of
fixed exchange rates function; that as a consequence, speculative
capital movements would disrupt foreign markets and force
authorities to make sudden and substantial exchange rate changes;
and hence, leading to an exchange rate crisis of a type that
characterised the final phase of the Bretton Woods system.
The ECU, on the other hand, is still in a rudimentary state of
development, with its use manifested mainly in bond flotations and
as a unit of account for settling intra-EEC central bank balances.
Its transformation into an international reserve currency is yet to
gain positive momentum, as pace and confidence appear to be
adversely affected by the lack of sufficient privatisation, policy
convergence and, perhaps, also by the absence of the pound sterling
in the EMS. Its popularisation, it is argued, may be increased
through, for instance, the creation of ECU denominated travellers
cheques and/or using it as an alternative to Eurocurrencies in the
rapidly growing Eurocurrency market. By the end of 1984, the ECU-
denominated bond market represented about 6 per cent of the $46
billion total Eurobond market (The Times, 8 November 1984).
However, a few salient points have been raised regarding the
role of the EMS as a transitional alternative towards monetary
union. Firstly, as in the 'snake', there is no commitment to
irrevocably fixed central rates as the national banks can always
bargain for changes in the central rate. Then the problem is
whether this characteristic strengthens the system by making it more
elastic or weakens it by imposing on the members a smaller pressure
for monetary discipline. A very loose system would result in
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continuous realignments of the central rates, thus causing it to
fail as a step in the direction towards monetary union.
Secondly, the establishment of a divergence indicator as an
early warning device within the EMS is generally accepted as a
significant development and that the prescribed procedures for the
application of the indicator should reinforce pressure for
convergence (Baquiast, 1979, p 53; Thygesen, 1979). It is stressed
nonetheless that when the divergence threshold is crossed and the
authorities of the country concerned are required to promptly
correct the situation by taking adequate measures, or inform the
other countries in the event of failure to apply any corrective
measures, there is no firm obligation that either would be done.
The system establishes only a 'presumption' that action should be
taken. The major question then is whether the mechanism will or
will not be binding in nature. The question is also raised whether
the nature of the required adjustment will be symmetrical or
whether the entire burden will be borne primarily by the diverging
currency, which, more often than not, represents the weakest
currencies in the exchange rate system.
A third concern relates to the ECU. As a 'parallel' currency
the unit's performance, as already noted, has been relatively slow,
limited only to bond flotations and as a unit of account. Hitiris
and Zervoyianni (1983) fear that in its present form, the ECU may
out-compete only the weaker currencies and thus attract its
privatisation only if it has to be a choice between it and these
currencies.
Since its inception, a number of realignments in central rates
have been made and several revaluations and devaluations have been
effected in EMS member currencies. For instance, in September 1979,
the German mark was revalued by 2 per cent and the Danish krone
devalued by 3 per cent against the other currencies in the system.
A further 5 per cent devaluation of the krone was made in November
1979. In 1981, the mark and the Dutch guilder were revalued by 5.5
per cent, the franc devalued by 3 per cent and the lira devalued
again twice, by 6 and 3 per cent. In 1982, both the Belgian franc
and krone were devalued again by 8.5 per cent and 3 per cent
respectively.
Thus, in the light of the foregoing, the debate on the effects
of the EMS on the participating countries and other non-
participating industrial countries has centred around questions
related to the objectives of the system itself and whether it would
be able to achieve these objectives. Apart from the issues on what
exchange rates the EMS should and can stabilise (effective exchange
rates, rates against the Deutschemark, or rates against a basket of
European currencies), questions have also been raised on the
capacity of the EMS to enhance convergence of policy variables
(inflation rates, productivity growth levels, money supply and
credit expansion, interest raes, and exchange rates vis-a-vis the
ECU). These issues have come up at the back of some statistical
indications that European countries' performances were more
divergent at the time of launching of the EMS than of the European
Common Margins Arrangement (The 'Snake'); indications which created
doubts that the EMS may either not survive or may not have any
impact on the performance of the participating countries.
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Table 7C illustrates the level of divergence that still exists
with respect to growth rates in money supply, credit expansion,
interest rates and inflation, and in the changing values of the
member currencies vis-a-vis the ECU. The table does reveal, in
particular, the dominant position of the German mark and the Dutch
guilder both of which have continuously appreciated against the ECU
and the inability by the member states except Germany and the
Netherlands, in dampening inflation expectations. As far as
interventions are concerned, Vaubel (1979, p 15) has emphasised that
'they are incompatible with the principle that everybody has to bear
the full consequences of his actions. They run counter to the
notion of individual responsibility which is a necessary condition
for the functioning of the market's feedback mechanism of incentives
and disincentives. In fixed exchange-rate systems that permit
interference, responsibility for national and overall monetary
policy tends to get lost'.
It is argued further that any deliberate attempts at converging
(downward) in national monetary policies, especially in relation to
the high inflationary tendencies in some countries, would cause a
'severe and quite unnecessary stabilisation crisis with considerable
additional unemployment'. Against this background (the UK may have
provided an example of this expected sequence), monetary policy
convergence would be difficult to achieve and speculative capital
movements would feature in large quantities (Vaubel, 1979, p 18).
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7.4.2 The Big-Leap Approach
The 'big-leap' approach is conceptually defined to favour the
immediate establishment of a monetary union specifically by
setting up a central monetary authority, pooling the members'
reserves, and directly replacing national monies by a common
currency.	 The major operational feature in this case is the
advantage of 'automaticity' as opposed to 'gradualism'. The
emphasis is on the currency substitution strategy and practically
the most vital question in this respect is whether the common
currency should displace the national currencies 'all at once' or
gradually.
On European monetary integration, the 'big-leap' approach has
been advocated for by Roy Jenkins (1977) who said:
'We must now look afresh at the case for monetary union
because there are new arguments, new needs, and new
approaches to be assessed —. Let us suppose at some
stage a currency by a European monetary authority, and
the adoption by this authority of a determined and
relatively independent policy of controlling note issue
and bank money creation. The authority would start by
adopting target rates of growth of monetary expansion
consistent with a new European standard of monetary
stability following the best traditions of our least
inflationary member states —. We have to look before
we leap, and know when we are to land. But leap we
eventually must'.
Roy Jenkins (1979) posed a reminder:
'Just over a year ago, I tried to set out in a speech at
Florence the reasons for re-examining the case for
economic and monetary union—.
I spoke of the so far unexercised ability of the
Europeans to create a currency of their own, based on a
spread of wealth and power comparable with those of the
United States ...
I said that control of a single European currency by a
single European monetary authority could achieve a
measure of anti-inflationary discipline beyond the reach
of most individual . member states'.
Corden (1976, p 12) provides perhaps a more lucid explanation
of the transition process that is implied in the establishment of a
'monetary union all at once':
'The first route is to set up a complete exchange rate
union all at once.	 On one day a central bank is
established in the European Community. It takes over the
foreign exchange reserves of the member countries; and it
acquires the sole right to manufacture the legal tender
and hence base money. If this is seen as a decisive and
irrevocable transformation then expectations will be
immediately adjusted. The great transformation would
have to be clearly decided upon and announced well in
advance.
	 There is then no need for gradualism.
Different governments could still have their own budgets,
borrow and lend, tax and so on, 
	
 1
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In contrast, other variants of the 'big-leap' approach, as far
as the eventual introduction of the common currency is concerned,
have introduced an element of gradualism into the transition
process. Together, these different variants, dubbed the 'currency
competition route' (Hitiris and Zervoyianni, 1983), have been
presented in two broad versions. In the first - 'survival of the
fittest' - all capital controls in the member states are abolished
and all national currencies are accepted for use within the
prospective union. With free competition among national currencies,
only one currency - the relatively most stable - would survive in
the long run and effectively become the union's common currency.
Thus, it is argued, monetary union evolves through the market
process.
The second version suggests the establishment of a'parallel
currency' which would be allowed to circulate alongside national
monies, and if it proved more attractive than national monies, it
would eventually become the union's currency. Here too, a number of
'parallel currency' alternatives have appeared in the literature in
terms of both definition and operational modalities. The common
essential feature is that the parallel currency is seen in all
respects as a 'basket' currency consisting of all national
currencies properly weighted or an entirely new currency with
different weights.
For instance, Magnifico and Williamson (1972) called for the
establishment of a common currency (the Europa in the case of the
European Community) backed by a foreign currency (they suggested the
US dollar), gold and SDRs, as well as by the currencies of the
member countries, to be held by central banks alone or by the
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general public as well. Operationally, each country could still
alter the exchange rate of its currency relative to the common
currency which would be a kind of intermediary. Its rate relative
to the chosen intervention foreign currency would be carrying with
it the various separate currencies of the union and member countries
could if they wished establish narrow margins or permanently fixed
rates relative to the common currency. And the hope, according to
the authors, is that they would do so.
Alternatively, Caincross et al (1974) defined the proposed new
parallel currency that would first circulate side by side the
national monies and gradually replace them, in terms of a bundle of
member-country currencies and always having a value equal to that of
the strongest member country currency.
Perhaps, a more complicated version of the parallel currency
proposal has been presented by the All Saints' Day Manifesto (1975).
The suggestion is for the establishment of a parallel money of
'constant (union) purchasing power'. This precise value guarantee,
the Manifesto argues, implies that the parallel currency would
fluctuate vis-a-vis the national currencies, essentially on the
basis of the rates of inflation in the member states. It would be
issued by the union monetary authority in exchange for the national
currencies at the exchange rate implied by the purchasing power
guarantee and would eventually out-compete the national currencies.
Thus, the new currency would be market- instead of government-
determined, with no restrictions on its holdings by the general
public. The Manifesto explains further that backing for the
parallel currency would firstly be by investments which would have
to yield at least a zero real rate of return to provide the
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necessary assurance, at least initially, and secondly, it would have
to come from the possibility that the union could raise funds by
taxation. As a store of value, this new currency, according to the
Manifesto, is identical to an indexed bond yielding a zero real rate
of interest.
There are varying potential advantages and limitations
regarding each variant of the 'big-leap' approach. As a general
concept, this approach has the advantage of automaticity, avoiding,
according to Corden (1976, p 12), all the problems of transition.
Corden argues further that the 'big-leap' approach wold tend to
converge inflation rates within the union and that wage rate
increase differentials would fall in line only with trends in
production. He claims, however, that any long-term problems of
monetary integration would not be avoided but that the uncertainties
generated by gradual approaches would be by-passed.
The case for the 'big-leap' strategy can be said to rest
succinctly on the political assumption that only a shock can induce
all member governments to accept currency merger at the same time
and that such a favourable political constellation which can be
short-lived must be exploited at once and completely. As Hitiris
and Zervoyianni (1983) put it, '—. it is hard to see how such a
radical change could be accepted by national governments in the
absence of any significant external shock as it implies the
immediate transfer of national powers to central monetary authority,
and an immediate erosion of national sovereignty'. External shock
can be political or military (Corden, 1976, p 13). But referring to
the European Community, Corden states:
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'The fact that the explicit establishment of a monetary
union is politically inconceivable brings home the
element of illusion and of play-acting in the whole
movement ... that espouses the cause of economic and
monetary union. At present it appears that if monetary
union is to be achieved, it will have to be achieved in
some other, more stealthy way'.
Indeed, it is probably against this background that the step-by-step
approach has come to be more popular than the big-leap approach.
The main political objection to such a 'crisis' theory of
history, it is further argued, is that it is too categorical. The
possibility cannot be excluded that disillusionment with monetary
policy would induce governments increasingly to accept piecemeal
unification .engineering (Vaubel, 1979). In addition, this automatic
route may also be very costly for the less prosperous member states
in that as they would have to adjust, say, their inflation rates to
possibly the union's lower inflation rate at once, unemployment may
result if the adjustment of price expectations is not instantaneous.
But it is believed that the obvious situation is to announce this
radical change well in advance in order for expectations to have
time to adjust.
The main advantages of the 'currency competition route' are
centred on the probable advantages of gradualism which in a way
avoids costs which are consequent on a high degree of automatic
adjustment. A parallel currency in particular would preclude
privileges attaching to a particular national currency. Successive
negotiations and discussions, as in the case of the step-by-step
approach, are not necessary. The Manifesto (1975), specifically
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argues that their type of parallel currency approach works without
foreign exchange interventions and, hence, without mutual
interference and moral hazard or ex ante agreements on national
money supply variables. It provides a common standard of value,
store of value and means of payments, thus facilitating market
integration while still leaving control over national monetary
policies with the member governments. Therefore with a stable
purchasing power guaranteed and to the extent that the parallel
currency is market-determined and without being subjected to a
governmentally regulated process, Vaubel (1979) maintains that the
uncertainty associated with national governmental discretion and the
danger of a stabilisation crisis in the monetary unification process
can be avoided.
The crucial element that is implied in these prescriptions is
that if the basket of parallel currency is to become a successful
union currency, it must out-complete both the weak and the strong
national monies. If it is operationally constructed to have a more
stable value than the weak currencies but a less stable value than
the strong currencies, then eventually both itself and the strong
currencies would survive and monetary integration would be severely
impaired. With stable purchasing power guaranteed, and with no
special convenience attached to national monies, it is likely that
risk-adverse economic and financial agents would prefer to hold the
parallel currency in terms of purchasing power rather than the more
unstable national currencies.
Despite these potential attributes of the 'parallel currency',
Corden (1976) states that such a currency might not lead to the
attainment of 'complete exchange rate union'. Referring in
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particular to the Manifesto's 'index-linked' purchasing power
guarantee proposal, Corden's concern is that such an incentive for
the holding of the parallel currency could be too attractive. He
argues that the indexed-currency approach could deprive national
central banks of their inflation tax on the monetary base underlying
that part of the money supply which the market has rejected in
favour of the stable parallel money. This could therefore force
national authorities to raise nominal interest rates on national
money interest-bearing deposits or increase real interest earnings
by eliminating taxes on receipts. They would only be willing to be
deprived of this inflation tax if they accepted the full
implications of monetary unification. Failing to do this would
create a two-tier portfolio holdings - a parallel currency portfolio
balance providing an assumed ex-post zero real rate of interest and
an interest-bearing national currency portfolio balance - whose main
determining factors are the ex-post real interest rate and the
expected rate of corresponding depreciation of the affected
national currency. Secondly, in replacing national currencies as a
%
numeraire for wage contracts, the parallel currency would deprive
the national monetary authorities of the ability to influence the
short-run rate of unemployment.
Another area of concern in the process of currency substitution
is the seignorage issue. It is based on the very likelihood that
the monetary union would be impaired if it gives rise to seignorage
from the creation of international money which accrues exclusively
to the monetary authority whose currency survives as the union's
common currency.
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7.5 CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing has tried to review the main conceptual issues
that are relevant to an understanding of the transitional process
and the underlying implications for the participating members that
are available in monetary integration. Each transitional scheme, in
essence, implies the creation of a given set of 'optimal' monetary
relationships in a more effective framework of regional
institutional infrastructures and the introduction of appropriate
elements of co-ordination in monetary and financial policies.
Whether or not the advantages of political monetary integration
(implying the establishment of a common currency) will more than
offset the corresponding costs is a question that rests on the
degree of the expected political loss of national sovereignty in
aspects relating to institutional building, market integration and
harmonisation of monetary and financial objectives and instruments
of policy. This in itself is largely subjective, depending on the
'will' and interpretation of the political and monetary authorities
of each participating country. Consequently, as Parkins (1972) puts
it, the transition to a monetary union 'contains within it a formula
for discovering whether governments and central banks are yet ready
for the kind of co-operation which such a union would Involve'.
The decisive issue towards the attainment of a monetary union
rests on the elements of 'gradualism' and 'automaticity'. The more
firmly committed participating countries are towards the
establishment of a common currency the greater the incidence of
automaticity in the transitional arrangements. On the other hand
the main drawback of a gradual step-by-step approach is the fact
that member countries implicitly reserve the right to withdraw from
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the scheme, or they may choose to follow their own monetary policies
at a certain time, when, for example, their national interests
conflict with those of the scheme. In either case, the process of
monetary co-operation and its potential advantages are undermined, a
situation which may result in the final collapse of the integration
efforts. At the same time, where the various steps are not decided
and firmly agreed in advance, gradualism has also the drawback of
relying on successive negotiation for the implementation of
successive stages. This situation as is argued, increases the
possibility of failure, as political will to support the scheme may
vanish if member states' interests diverge over time (Vaubel, 1979).
Evidently, in the choice of successive steps towards monetary
union, the Werner Committee (1970) had the initial problem of
evolving a scheme that compromised between the so-called
'monetarists' and 'economists'; both groups were clearly distinct in
the respective definitions of the transitional process to attaining
a European Monetary Union. Conceptually, the economists (or
structuralists) argued that the first step should involve the
setting up of EEC targets, harmonising national economic policies as
an easy way of then fixing exchange rates to lead to the next step
of establishing a Central European Monetary Authority, pooling of
reserves, etc. On the other hand, the monetarists argued that the
first step should be to narrow exchange rate fluctuation margins,
pool reserves, and increase existing credit facilities to member
states. They felt that the need to maintain a fixed exchange rate
would impel policy co-ordination on member states.
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The fundamental concern for monetary integration in Western
Europe has in recent years been the choice among possible routes to
attaining complete exchange rate union (or common currency). In the
literature, the situation is different for the LDCs where the logic
of the conspicuous absence of meaningful discussion on exchange rate
co-ordination clearly suggests that there is harly little scope for
such a scheme: firstly, because of the deep financial, monetary and
economic dependence and disintegration inherent in developing
economies and the low levels of development and economic
integration; and secondly, because LDCs are unlikely to be able to
cope with the relatively high degree of operational sophistication
that is involved in an exchange rate unification mechanism. Indeed,
an exchange rate co-ordination strategy will for the LOCs initially
involve massive exchange rate realignments necessary to reduce the
pronounced elements of currency overvaluation and will be combined
with the need for substantial improvements in regional
convertibility in the context of trade and payments standardisation
and liberalisation. Thereafter, problems of intervention policies,
financial support mechanisms and the confidence factor, as are
already apparent in the EMS, will surface.
Specifically, the implications of the EMS in West Africa
depends on its success or failure in achieving the stability of the
exchange rates of the member countries as well as that of other key
currencies, notably, sterling and the US dollar. It also depends on
the relative success of the system to achieve greater convergence of
financial and economic policies and development in Europe. To the
extent that the EMS succeeds in these respects and in curbing the
member countries' inflation rates, both of which will enhance
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economic recovery in Europe, expand world trade and facilitate the
efforts towards a stable global exchange rate system, there are
combined positive effects for the West African monetary integration
process. The obvious explanations for the likely implications for
the EMS for West Africa relate to the very close trade, financial
and overall economic relationships that exist between West African
countries and Western Europe and the United States.
On exchange rate management, as already noted, West African
currencies are either pegged directly or indirectly (intervention
currency) to either an EMS currency or the US dollar (see Table 6J).
The variability of these currencies on the exchange markets,
therefore, directly causes the variability of West African
currencies. Hence, the ability of the EMS to calm the exchange
market and stabilise the exchange rates of all the key currencies,
including the dollar, would assist exchange rate and monetary
management in West Africa at both the national and regional levels.
Moreover, as has already been shown in this study, West African
countries are also highly dependent on the EMS and other developed
industrial countries (notably the UK, US and Japan) for trade,
services and capital. More than half of the region's total foreign
trade is with the European Community and because of the EMS this
share of trade will be subjected to a fixed or semi-fixed exchange
rate system (the BCEAO's total trade is practically subjected to the
special fixed relationship between the CFA franc and the French
franc). Also a significant proportion of the region's trade and
financial commitments (in terms of oil and public debt obligations)
is linked to either sterling or the dollar. Because of this high
dependence, the stability of the European and other developed
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economies through the EMS would, quite apart from the exchange
rares, also help West African export proceeds and make them more
predictable and plannable. The slowdown of European inflation that
the EMS arrangement would help bring about would also help to reduce
import payments of the West African countries.
The above potential benefits of a successful EMS to West Africa
are obviously more certain if the EMS objectives are attained
without being deflationary. Alternatively, if, for instance,
through the EMS, European currencies were to rise against the dollar
then West African exports whose prices are quoted in dollars would
suffer a loss of proceeds. The rise against the dollar would also
hurt the exports of countries that are pegged to the French franc
because their exports would become much more expensive than those of
other West African countries. Also, if the EMS were to become
deflationary that would further reduce European demand for West
African exports.
As is however argued in this study, the establishment of a
common currency other than the pursuance of forms of partial
monetary integration (le clearing and payments, and simple exchange
rate co-ordination) is, in the light of existing circumstances, the
most realistic framework for monetary integration in West Africa.
This automatically involves the theory of optimum currency areas
against which the practicality or feasibility of a coma= currency
arrangment is more specifically discussed in the literature. The
extent to which the OCA theory is applicable in the context of West
Africa is examined in the next chapter, which, in essence, provides
the more direct .theoretical foundation against which the realism of
the main hypothesis of this study is appreciated.
374
CHAPTER 8
OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY AND MONETARY UNIFICATION IN WEST AFRICA
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The theoretical assumptions for the delineation of a currency
area imply the adoption of a common currency or the maintenance of
fixed exchange rates within the area. The pioneering works along
these lines (Meade 1957 and Scitovsky 1958) considered the problem
of monetary integration as part of the wider issue of economic union
and favoured the idea of a single currency area in Western Europe
(except that for Meade, a common currency provided the best longrun
solution to the achievement of payments equilibrium in the area).
Meade argued that in the shortrun the conditions for a common
currency did not exist in Europe and that, especially because of the
lack of factor mobility in the area, a system of flexible exchange
rates would be more effective in promoting external balance and
intern) stability.
It was Mundell (1961), in his classic paper by that title, who
coined the phrase 'Optimum currency areas' and since then the
concept of optimum currency areas has received the critical
attention of eminent analysts, especially McKinnon (1963), Kenen
(1969), Snider (1967), Ingram (1969), Grubel (1970), Fleming (1971),
Corden (1972), De Cecco (1974), Presley and Dennis (1976), Vaubel
(1979) and Nana-Sinkam (1978).
The term 'optimal' may appear to refer to an ideal or perfect
position as it would do in welfare theory, the objective being the
maximisation of the achievement of the standard macroeconomic
targets of full employment and payments equilibrium. But from the
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different theories that have emerged on the subject, the concept of
OCAs itself is hardly a unified body of analysis. Its origins can
be found in the longstanding controversial decision in the optimal
exchange rate regime, with the controversy revolving around the
relative desirability of fixed and flexible exchange rates and in
the recognition of the need to weigh between the factors which
crucially influence the optimal exchange rate regime. In theory and
in practice, these factors have differed and the policy targets have
also widened to include internal price stability and the realisation
of fiscal and monetary economies of scale. The general issue on
which the OCA concept is built is largely that, given a workable
system of flexible exchange rates, and given certain targets of
economic policy, what would be the criteria for finding the optimal
area in which to have a common currency or a permanently fixed
exchange rate plus perfect convertibility.
The theory of OCAs thus offers important considerations as to
the conditions under which a country may join a currency group with
possible accomplishments of maximum net benefits and suggests how
countries may be grouped into currency zones that would yield cost
minimisation in the attainment of economic goals and objectives.
With exchange rate variations excluded among potential member
countries, an OCA maximises the opportunities for optimum adjustment
processes. Whether the advantages of fixed exchange rates will
outweigh the cost related to the loss of exchange rate as an
instrument of national policy depends on a number of suggested
considerations, the analysis of which underlie the established
criteria for an OCA.
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In its various conceptual interpretations, the OCA has become a
proposition that is relatively advantageous to a region that has a
high degree of trade interdependence and factor mobility. These
conventional criteria have been expanded to incorporate the extent
to which the OCA is also socially, politically and geographically
homogenous enough to inspire the institutionalisation of currency
areas, especially in the case of developing countries (Nana-Sinkam,
1978). The cummulative effect of these factors is to provide a
definition of OCAs in the sense of fixing geographical and socio-
political-economic confines to such areas.
Curiously these factors are prescribed in practically all
statutory provisions that support and give weight to the
establishment of regional economic groupings as the hallmark of
integration. Thus, it is worthwhile understanding their main
theoretical perspectives in the monetary integration process.
Without pre-empting the conclusions of the analysis in this chapter,
the undoubted fact is that like other regions - including the EEC -
the sixteen ECO WAS member countries under consideration in this
study do not, in terms of the prescribed criteria, constitute a
currency area. The evidence as we have partly seen in previous
chapters, is that despite their substantial openness in terms of
external trade dependence (Chapter 4), little progress has been
achieved in improving either trade inter-dependence (Chapter 4) or
factor mobility (Chapter 3). In various parts of previous chapters
also, it has been shown that there is considerably little
convergence in political and economic thinking among ECOWAS
countries (eg convergence in political institutions and philosophy,
of a stable pattern of balance of payments, in currency and exchange
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rate arrangements, in many other aspects of monetary, financial and
fiscal policies, etc).
The discussion in this chapter of the theoretical framework for
currency areas does not only provide a critical survey of standard
criteria of OCA theory (Section 8.2), it seeks also to examine the
implications of the theory for the process of monetary integration
in West Africa (Section 8.3)
8.2 OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA CRITERIA AND MONETARY INTEGRATION
8.2.1 Factor Mobility
One of the early contributions to the literature on optimum
currency areas was Mundel (1961) who stressed factor (labour)
mobility as a criterion for the formation of such areas. Mundell
argues that flexible exchange rates among national currencies may
eliminate disequilibria in external payments only if labour mobility
is high internally and low internationally. He maintains that if
however, the area under consideration is divided into regions within
which only mobility is high and which do not correspond to national
boundaries, flexible rates cannot bring about adjustment unless
currencies are reorganised along regional lines.
To determine the OCA, Mundell considers the case of two
economic units (ie regions or nations) which have at the start full
employment and payments equilibrium. On the assumption that a
demand shift between them is the cause of balance of payments
disequilibrium, he maintains that factor mobility can, for the
purpose of adjustment, act as a substitute for variations in the
rate of exchange. If there is complete mobility of labour, the
required adjustment of the balance of payments should not cause
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unemployment in the case of a deficit or inflation in the case of a
surplus. Hence the exchange rate is not needed as a policy
instrument and currency areas are delineated therefore by factor
mobility. 'If the world can be divided into regions within each of
which there is factor mobility and between which there is factor
immobility', Mundell writes, 'then each of these regions should have
a separate currency which fluctuates relative to all other
currencies'.
Mundell describes the functioning of the factor mobility
mechanism as follows. First, suppose there is a shift in demand
from region B's output to that of A, where both regions are defined
by a high degree of factor mobility, and that the standard mechanism
of restoring external balance through exchange rate variations
works. Then, if regions A and B coincide with countries A ' and B, a
depreciation of B's currency and an appreciation of A's currency
will relieve unemployment in B and restrain inflation in A; thus,
reflecting a favourable case for flexible exchange rates. But, if
in A credit is restricted to prevent a rise in prices, the burden of
adjustment will fall entirely on B. Since the fall in B's real
income, necessary to maintain stability given the new demand
conditions, cannot take place through price changes - terms of trade
- (monetary authorities in both A and B, ex hypothesis, maintain
price stickiness), adjustment will have to be accompanied by a
decline in B's productivity and employment.
Secondly, if it is assumed that the shift in the demand from
B's to A's goods takes place not between two countries but between
two regions of the same nation, inducing unemployment in region B
and inflation in region A, monetary expansion in both countries to
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solve the unemployment problem in the depressed regions would not
solve the inflation in the prosperous regions; nor will a
contradiction of money supply in order to solve the inflation
problem in the prosperous region cure unemployment in the depressed
region. Therefore, Mundell concludes, a flexible exchange rate
system may solve the external imbalance between the two countries,
but it fails to achieve a simultaneous solution to the problems of
unemployment and inflation. Full employment is maintained by
monetary policy, but at the cost of monetary instability as the
monetary expansion aggravates the inflationary pressures in A,
modifies the terms of trade unfavourably in B and thus corrects the
surplus in A.
Consequently, in a currency area comprising many national
currencies, the level of unemployment in the deficit countries is
determined by the surplus countries' willingness to accept
inflation, whereas in a currency area with several regions but with
a single currency, the rate of inflation is determined by the
authorities' willingness to accept unemployment in the deficit
regions. The fact that a currency area of either type cannot
prevent both unemployment and inflation among its members, Mundell
maintains, depends not on the type of the currency area which is
adopted, but on the extent of the area itself. The OCA, he asserts,
cannot include the whole world. Its borders (that which allow both
monetary stability and full employment to be simultaneously
maintained), according to Mundell, coincide with the borders of
economic regions, defined only in terms of internal factor mobility
as opposed to inter-regional factor immobility.
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In a further illustration of his factor mobility concept,
Mundell (1961) considers the case where consumer demand shifts from
cars (Eastern goods) to lumber products (Western goods). As a
result, the East develops a current account deficit and an excess
supply of labour, while the West experiences a current account
surplus and an excess demand for labour. If labour cannot move from
East to West, the East has to accept worse terms of trade,
sufficient to reallocate aggregate demand and thereby to eliminate
the disequilibria in both regions' labour markets. If money wage
rates are sticky in both regions, Eastern currency must depreciate
in relation to Western currency. East and West should not be joined
in a monetary union, nor be made to peg their currencies once and
for all; they do not comprise an optitmum currency area. But in the
event that labour is freely mobile between East and West, the
westward migration of unemployed Eastern labour will serve to
ameliorate the labour market problems of both regions and, at the
same time, will help to solve their payments problem. As workers
move from East to West, their purchases of cars will be transformed
from home demand into extra Eastern exports; then purchases of
lumber products will be transformed from Western exports into extra
home demand.
In sum, Mundell contends that inter-regional.factor mobility
can substitute for changes in regional exchange rates, and that the
entire zone through which labour can move freely delineates the
right domain for a monetary union or for a fixed exchange rate
regime; with labour mobility, East and West do comprise an OCA.
Mundell's stabilisation approach has however required two broad
qualifications. The first, which he himself recognises, is that if
strictly followed, his argument leads to the dilemma that the OCA
has always to be small as many currency areas are preferred,
notwithstanding the increased costs which are likely to be
associated with the maintenance of many currency areas. As these
areas would inevitably be very small, the benefits derived from
labour mobility would be more than offset by its cost in terms of
the utility of the currency as a medium of exchange and store of
value.
Mundell concedes that 'such an arrangement hardly appeals to
common sense'. The role of money as a medium of exchange diminishes
and the costs of valuation and currency conversion increase as the
number of currencies rise under flexible exchange rates. Investors
would be deprived of a stable-valued liquid currency to hold as a
store of value or use as a standard of value.
Mundell explains further that too small a currency area
necessarily implies a thin foreign exchange market that may stand
hopelessly vulnerable to the price dictates of any single
speculator. Speculation would disrupt domestic monetary policy. He
notes that in the extreme case, in order for the system to work
adequately, a very high degree of money illusion would be required
of the workers of each productive activity. Thus as the degree of
money illusion necessary for the proper functioning of the system
becomes greater the smaller the currency area, this sets an 'upper
limit' to the number of currency areas necessary for the optimal
functioning of the adjustment mechanism.
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Secondly, if labour intensities in the industries of the
regions among which migration takes place are different, labour
mobility may not be sufficient to eliminate payment imbalances. As
Kenen (1969, p 45) has noted, 'rather special patterns of consumer
demand and methods of production may be needed in each region if a
simple labour movement and the corresponding locus of demand are to
end an imbalance in the two regions' labour markets and also to
equilibriate the trade flow between them'. In other words, perfect
intra-regional mobility requires perfect occupational mobility,
which in turn requires the homogeneity of labour or identical skills
in the industries effected.
In his two-country-world example - Canada and the United States
- with separate currencies, Mundell (1961) assumes the existence of
regions characterised not only by internal factor mobility but also
by prodictive homogeneity. His condition for optimality of currency
areas, in the strictest sense, applies only to single-product
regions. He adopts the classic Ricardian assumption on which the
theory of international trade was built as a body distinct from the
general theory of exchange; namely that productive factors are
mobile internally but immobile internationally. Ricardo (1964, p
83) argues that 'the difference .—. between a single country and
many is easily accounted for by considering the difficulty with
which capital moves from one country to another, to seek a more
profitable employment, and the activity with which it invariably
passes from one province to another in the same country'. The only
difference is that Mundell takes into account the fact that areas of
perfect (labour) mobility may not coincide with national boundaries.
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The most serious criticism of Mundell's analysis is based on
the grounds that in the real world factors of production are never
perfectly mobile. Moreover, not all that are mobile are readily
adaptable to other uses. There is therefore a continuum of
different degrees of labour mobility both internally and
internationally. It is unlikely that there should exist, in
practice, sufficient inter-regional labour mobility which can be
counted upon as a mechanism for payments adjustment, and that even
if there is mobility, the costs associated with workers' movements
cannot be ignored. However, the argument that labour flows can be
relied upon as a substitute for exchange rate adjustment, which
itself is seen as a substitute for changing real wage levels as a
consequence of changing demand and supply conditions, falls down
under two practical conditions: first, when it is recognised that
differential changes in unit factors costs are not the only possible
causes of payments disequilibrium, and secondly, when the reluctance
of workers to move even within the same country is fully
appreciated.
In reality, even if it is conceded for example, that the
original payments disequilibria were caused by higher unit labour
costs in country A, for instance, relative to country B, and hence
higher export prices in country A, factors may still not flow from A
to B. This is because higher unit labour costs may reflect higher
real wages in A, depending upon the relative levels of labour
productivity in A and B. Workers, even though unemployed, may not
be prepared to move from high wage areas to low wage areas even if
more jobs may be available in the low wage areas. It is more likely
that they would wait, anticipating job opportunities in the high
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wage area. Besides, if labour is prepared to flow from A to B, like
capital, it may set up disequilibriating forces in the two
countries.
The adjustment process through labour mobility is complicated
further by the many other discussed factors which in practice,
seriously inhibit the willingness of workers to move. Some of these
include the barriers to inter-industrial labour exchange (Lanyi,
1969), the real costs of migration as well as the psychic costs of
adjusting to a new environment (Corden, 1972 and Dunn, 1973),
monopolistic distortions of resource allocation due to trade union
aggressiveness (Corden, 1972), deliberate national government
barriers to geographical and/or occupational labour mobility, the
inflexibility of wages and prices, the degree of homogeneity of
labour, and a country's labour absorptive capacity. Labour mobility
is also affected by the existence of a host of other economic,
geographical, socio-political and cultural conditions. These
factors are more likely to influence the movement of workers than
changing supply-demand relationships.
In commenting on Mundell's East-West illustration in
particular, Kenen (1969, p 43) asks the questions: 'what should be
done for instance, when there is a major difference in the labour
intensities of eastern and western production? And are we really
sure that factor movements can restore a perfect balance in the
region's trade even when it does resolve both of their employment
problems?' Kenen argues that migration might leave a residential
imbalance in one region's labour market - enduring excess supply in
the East or excess demand in the West.
385
Fleming (1971) argues that a transfer of labour provoked by
unemployment, while it may mitigate the more obvious signs of
disequilibrium, is not necessarily justifiable from a structural
point of view, and may later have to be reversed. This view appears
to imply that factor mobility should not be encouraged. Presley and
Dennis (1976) reckon that such a view formed the basis of regional
policy in a number of countries in the past, including the United
Kingdom. The implication in such policy is that work must be
encouraged to move to workers rather than vice versa. The
justification for this policy, according to Presley and Dennis, is
partly to be found in the under-utilisation of social capital which
labour mobility creates in the depressed areas of the economy, and
the over-utilisation and shortage in the prosperous regions. In
addition, one may find damaging repercussions on the social and
economic environment in the depressed areas. Effectively, factor
movements tend to persist in certain directions for much longer
periods rather than being reversed frequently as 'expected in
Mundell's adjustment mechanism. Factor mobility takes time with its
intensity more often than not, fluctuating with the extent to which
excess factor demand tends to bring about a differential in
remunerations high enough to overcome the attitudes which make for
immobility. Besides, its limitation as a criterion for OCA
determination and hence in providing an equilibriating mechanism for
the area may be more conspicuous where capital is lacking and the
participating countries are the subject of massive unemployment at
the same time.
Fleming (1971) has noted further that an important distinction
has to be drawn between the mobility of labour and of capital. This
is because the mitigating effect of factor mobility is more certain
in the case of labour than capital mobility. The effect of labour
mobility may be reduced but not eliminated by the fact that it is
likely to be associated with a change in the location of workers'
expenditure from countries of emigration to those of immigration.
Whether a high degree of capital mobility can provide a good
precondition for the formation of a currency area is much more
doubtful than in the case of labour mobility because the former
depends on such forces as the nature of the payments disequilibria
between the member countries, the sensitivity of investment to the
level of economic activity, and the stipulated period of adjustment.
It is therefore not certain whether capital mobility will reduce the
costs associated with exchange rate fixity.
If in the light of Mundell's two-country demand-shift
illustration it is assumed further that exchange rate is rigidly
maintained between the two national currencies, and that payments
equilibrium is restored partly by deflation (and unemployment) in
one member country, and partly by inflation in the other, then the
incentive to investment would decline in the former (deficit)
country and rise in the latter (surplus country). What happens to
the interest rates in the two countries depends on the response of
investment and savings to the changes in the level of activity: they
will rise if investment increases more (or declines less) than
savings and vice versa. If the investment incentive declines more
than the level of savings in the deflating country, and rises more
than savings in the inflating country, both unemployment and
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inflation are expected to aggravate in the two countries
respectively. In this case, capital mobility worsens internal
disequilibrium, although the possibility of equilibriating capital
flows may also exist. Since capital flows will move towards areas
with higher interest rates, they may well constitute a
destabilising, rather than a stabilising factor.
Moreover, because international capital flows are, in practice,
not geared entirely to changes in demand for capital, the assumption
that an increase in demand for output in one country creates an
increase in the demand for capital in that country and therefore a
flow of capital into that country from the demand depressed partner
no longer holds. The flow of international capital is determined
partly by the anticipated rate of return on it and country risk, as
well as by the level of economic activity and absorptive capacity.
The increased demand for capital in one country does not necessarily
imply that the rate of return on capital is higher than in the other
country, nor that investment is less risky there. The fact that
potential investors do have specific views over time of the
riskiness of investment in certain areas, this is more likely to
interfere with the free flow of capital in response to
disequilibria.
Fleming asserts therefore that the higher the degree of capital
mobility the greater will be the shift in capital flows - whether of
an 'equilibrating' or of a 'disequilibrating' kind, and that the
response of capital flows to disequilibria is crucially important,
since capital is needed to finance investment, investment in turn
determines employment through the multiplier process. Where capital
is more a destabilising than a stabilising factor, a high capital
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mobility would make adjustment with a fixed exchange rate more
difficult, not easier. The likelihood that capital mobility will be
a destabilising influence is greater if surplus countries attempt to
use. monetary policy for internal rather than external stability.
The deliberate hiking of interest rates in this case to check
inflationary pressures, which will in turn stimulate capital flows,
will worsen the deficit countries' external positions.
8.2.2 The Openness of an Economy
The 'openness' of a country's economy provides another basis on
which currency areas may be identified. The argument is that
currency areas should comprise highly open economies. This view has
been stressed particularly by McKinnon (1963) whose impression of
the optimality of a currency area is related to the area's ability
to achieve external as well as internal equilibria:
'Optimum is used here to describe a single currency area
within which monetary-fiscal policy and flexible external
exchange rates can be used to give the best resolution of
three (sometimes conflicting) objectives:
(a) the maintenance of full employment;
(b) the maintenance of balanced international payments;
(c) the maintenance of a stable internal average price
level' (1963, p 717).
A currency area should be imposed in so far as it minimises the
costs of achieving these objectives, with particular emphasis, in
contrast to Mundell's stress on payments equilibrium, upon internal
price stability. McKinnon is of the opinion that what matters most
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in delineating currency areas is the size of the area and its degree
of openness.
For analytical purposes, McKinnon defines openness in terms of
the 'ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods'; where tradable goods
are defined to constitute exportables (ie goods produced
domestically which are either consumed domestically or exported;
hence, exportables will exceed exports by the extent to which
domestic consumption takes place from potential export production)
and importables, which are both produced and consumed domestically
and imported. The smaller that ratio, the easier it will be to
maintain both external and internal balance by means of flexible
exchange rates. That is, the higher is the ratio of tradables to
non-tradables, the more beneficial will be the formation of a
currency area. What differentiates tradables from non-tradables,
McKinnon assumes, is the fact that the fonmer can be transported
internationally.
McKinnon argues that if the ratio of non-tradables to tradables
is high, primary reliance on monetary-fiscal policy for reducing
domestic demand in order to maintain external balance will bring
with it higher unemployment. If on the other hand the ratio is low,
fixed exchange rates will be more appropriate. The achievement of
internal price stability is considered the key economic objective as
domestic price instability would not only undermine the liquidity
value of individual currencies, or induce domestic capital to be
transferred into other more stable currencies. It is seen also as
an impairment to savings and capital accumulation, trade development
and a discouragement to economic specialisation. Mundell (1961)
did, of course, recognise the importance of equalisation of unit
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factor costs in the adjustment but this might involve price
variations and therefore leading to domestic price instability. As
a result, Mundell's contribution to the OCA theory has not placed as
much emphasis on internal price stability as McKinnon's.
McKinnon stresses that the higher is the proportion of
tradables to total domestic consumption, the greater will be the
impact of an exchange rate adjustment upon the domestic price level.
In other words, by emphasising flexible exchange rates to correct an
external deficit, an open economy (compared to a closed economy) is
likely to suffer from greater domestic price instability. Because
the economy is open and exposed to highly elastic external demand
for and supply of goods, the domestic currency prices of its
tradables would change in more or less equal proportions with the
magnitude of the exchange rate variation.
The desired effects of a devaluation, for instance, would be to
correct a trade deficit, stimulate increased domestic production of
tradables and to diminish domestic consumption of tradables.
Exports can then be increased and imports reduced. Since the
desired effect may only be accompanied through a rise in the
domestic price level, the higher the marginal propensity to import,
the greater the disturbance to the price level, the less will be the
amount of unemployment that will be required over time to correct a
given payments deficit, or the amount of excess demand required to
correct a given surplus; hence, the more valid the case against
flexible exchange rates. As the domestic prices of tradables move
with the exchange rate, the higher is the proportion of tradable
commodities in the economy, the less is the possibility that
adjustments to domestic consumption can take place to export and
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import flows; the more also will the general price level be
affected, since tradable goods prices take an increasing weight in
the determination of the domestic price index. If stabilisation of
the overall price index were rigidly pursued, a depreciation and the
resulting price rise in tradables would need to be offset by a
decline in the price of non-tradables, requiring a severe
contraction in demand and unemployment. Thus, a number of open
economies with very high propensity to import from each other would
find it beneficial to form a relatively closed common currency area.
However, the higher the propensity for one member to import
from the other members of the area, the greater will be the
influence of the costs of imports from other group members on the
overall cost of living of each member (Fleming, 1971). Cost
disequilibria between member countries, however rising, will lead to
disequilibria in relative consumption price levels, and their
correction will therefore involve large real income changes for wage
earners in member countries that are out of line with the rest.
As in the case of Mundell's factor mobility criterion, the
degree of openness of an economy also affects the presence of money
illusion. The effectiveness of exchange rate variations in
correcting external imbalances largely depends on the existence of
money illusion, defined as people's readier acceptance of reductions
in real income brought about by price increases than of the same
reductions brought about by reducing their money income. Mundell
(1961) had argued:
'The thesis of those who favour flexible exchange rates
is that the community in question is not willing to
accept variations in its real income through adjustments
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in its money wage rate or price level, but that it is
willing to accept virtually the same changes in its real
income through variations in the rate of exchange. In
other words, it is assumed that unions bargain for a
money rather than a real wage, and adjust their wage
demands to changes in the cost of living, if at all, only
if the cost of living index excludes imports. Now as the
currency area grows smaller and the proportion of imports
in total consumption grows, this assumption becomes
increasingly unlikely'.
The implication for OCAs is that because of the downward
inflexibility of prices and national wages, deliberate variations of
the exchange rate might succeed in changing real wages and hence,
restore external balance. By this kind of money illusion, workers
are less likely to recognise that a devaluation, for instance, would
lead to a corresponding rise in the cost of living and a reduction
in real incomes. In a small area, where the import propensity is
high, the real income effect of exchange rate variations would be so
obvious to the inhabitants that they would not accept changes tied
to a price index excluding imports. If this were the case (absence
of money illusion), then the exchange rate variation would become an
ineffective instrument in correcting external imbalance. The more
open an economy becomes, the more unlikely , it becomes that this kind
of illusion will persist. In this instance, McKinnon emphasises
that exchange rate variations would sooner or later cause exactly
equal variations in costs; workers wold be more certain to recognise
the decline in living standards and real wages which result, and
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their corresponding resistance to prevent this decline would in turn
deprive the flexible exchange rate system of its effectivensss in
correcting the payments imbalance.
It is observed further than an indexation of wages seldom
operates instantaneously and only partially offsets the effects of
exchange rate adjustment (Fleming, 1971). In Fleming's opinion,
money illusion may well be relevant the other way around. Since
national currencies have a strong tendency to sustain their
traditional functions, especially where wage settlements and
payments are concerned, once a common currency is set up, it may be
very difficult to revoke it, even if its establishment has proved to
be a mistake.
Corden (1972) has observed that McKinnon's conclusion depends
crucially on the implicit assumptions that:
(a) the principal need for payments adjustments arises from
micro-economic changes in demand and supply conditions,
and
(b) conditions (price) in the external world as a whole are
relatively stable.
If this is not the case (ie if the disturbances leading to price
instability are macro in nature and emanate from abroad), flexible
exchange rates should be used to attempt to insulate the economy
from such external macroeconomic disturbances, and the more open is
the economy, the more important is this insulation. In this latter
situation therefore, McKinnon's argument appears reversed, with
fixed exchange rates being detrimental to a very open economy.
Corden also makes the point that even where McKinnon's world
price stability implicit assumption holds, a positive gain in
employing fixed exchange rates cannot be ascertained. It only
means that the more open the economy compared to a closed economy,
the less the costs of maintaining fixed exchange rates in terms of
the required increase in unemployment to effect the same degree of
improvement in the payments imbalance.
The currency stability requirement touched on earlier provides
yet another way in which the 'ratio of tradables to non-tradables'
affects the desirability of joining a currency union. If inflation
is zero, the domestic currency of a small economy characterised by
a high ratio of tradables to non-tradables will have a stable
liquidity value in terms of non-tradables, whereas its value in
terms of tradables will depend on the exchange rate vis-a-vis the
foreign currency. In these circumstances, and with the existence of
trade disturbances, exchange rate variations may lead to a severe
impairment of the liquidity of the domestic currency. With the
purchasing power of the domestic currency not sufficiently
guaranteed in terms of the range of goods which domestic owners of
financial wealth deem it to be representative, the result is likely
to be a shift from domestic to external assets even though the
former may be of higher rate of return. The resulting capital
outflows is therefore determined purely by the insufficient monetary
quality of the domestic currency rather than the country's real
characteristics. Consequently, the formation of a large currency
area may ensure that variations in the exchange rate of the common
currency will not impair its liquidity.
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The operational difficulties surrounding McKinnon's 'openness'
criterion derive essentially from three areas. The first is from
the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies to
correct, for instance, an unemployment which initially occurs in a
very open economy through, for example, technological changes
affecting the capital/labour intensiveness of industries. Secondly,
the assumed constancy of the world prices of tradable commodities
does not hold in the present economic climate. The third major
practical problem relates to the appropriateness of McKinnon's
definition of openness. The variety of analytic interpretations of
'openness' which have emerged from economic analysis, have made
openness a multidimensional concept.
Consequently the openness of an economy has also been expressed
in terms of:
(a) the share of trade in the economy's GNP (commercial
openness);
(b) the volume of domestic financial transactions and external
capital movements (financial openness); and
(c) the degree of international factor mobility (see for
instance, Mundell, 1961; Wallich, 1969 and Whitman, 1969).
Cross and Laidler (1974) have also represented McKinnon's
openness criterion in terms of the importance of tradables and non-
tradables in the output or consumption of an economy in the context
of an inflation model for 'open' and 'closed' economies.
The empirical difficulties in the applicability of these
measures constitute the actual defining and measuring of the
relevant aggregates as well as finding an adequate practical
justification for applying each measure in a given economic
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environment. Commercial openness (both in terms of average and
marginal propensities) is often criticised as unsatisfactory because
GNP data give only a very rough indication of aggregate volumes of
commercial (trade) transactions (see for example, Vaubel, 1978)
whereas financial openness, on the other hand, cannot be measured
directly, largely because of the difficulties in obtaining
comprehensive and reliable statistics of both the volume of
domestic financial transactions and gross external capital
movements. In some instances, financial openness has only been
ascertained in terms of the pattern of net capital movements between
countries (Whitman, 1969), or net flows and net outflows (Hawkins,
1972), or the ratio of some foreign assets to more or less
comparable domestic assets, eg the ratio of commercial banks'
foreign assets to total money shock (Heller, 1976).
The conclusion in the light of the above analysis is that in a
relatively open economy, variations in the exchange rate will lead
to greater domestic price instability. In this respect therefore
countries with high interpenetration will find it beneficial to form
a fixed exchange rate area. In its logical conclusion, McKinnon's
analysis for currency areas would involve the introduction of such
an area at the world level; the world cannot have external
disequilibria, and worldwide monetary and fiscal policies can be
relied upon to yield internal world objectives. The difficulties to
be encountered in the estimation of the 'openness' indices make it
extremely arduous to rely on McKinnon's theory, in particular, as a
general guide to practical assessment of optimum currency areas. As
in the case of the factor mobility criterion, the various
interpretations of openness also indicate the likely implications
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and limitations of exchane rate variations for restoring internal
and external equilibria - eg cost/price, and factor mobility
effects. This is important, especially for the LDCs whose
characteristic features often impair the success of adjustment
policies through this instrument.
8.2.3 Product Diversification
While Mundell and McKinnon stress factor mobility and economic
openness respectively, Kenen (1969) provides another major
contribution to the OCA theory by emphasising yet another condition
on which optimum currency areas may be delineated; this being 'the
diversity in a nation's product mix, the number of single product
regions contained in a single country'.
Kenen proposes that:
(a) a well diversified national economy will not have to
undergo changes in its terms of trade as often as a
single-product economy;
(b) when a diversified economy does not confront a drop in the
demand for its principal exports, unemployment will not
rise as sharply as it would in a less diversified economy;
and
(c) links between external and domestic demand, especially the
link between exports and investment, will be weaker in
diversified economies, so that variations in domestic
employment 'imported' from abroad will not be greatly
aggravated by corresponding variations in capital
formation.
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These factors, all of them deriving from the insurance
principle (or the law of large numbers), provide reasons for Kenen's
argument that countries with high product diversification can
tolerate fixed exchange rates better than those with less
diversified national economies. Thus, a low degree of product
diversification, particularly in relation to exports, provides a
good reason for the formation of an independent currency area. The
more diversified is an economy in this respect, the more independent
it will be of external disturbances. In other words, foreign
disturbances will have less repercussions on the payments as well as
the domestic income and price stability positions of an economy with
a greater variety of export commodities than they would in a less
diversified economy.
The thrust of Kenen's argument is the assumption that positive
changes with respect to some of the exports will be offset by
negative changes with respect to others; as demand for some exports
rises, that for others drops. Thus ., the greater is export
diversification, the greater will be this offsetting mechanism. In
contrast, the offsetting mechanism will be less in a less
diversified economy whose payments equilibrium is more likely to be
sensitive to micro-economic demand disturbances. Consequently,
substantial exchange rate changes as an equilibrating instrument
would be less necessary in a more diversified than in a less
diversified economy because of the averaging of the external shocks
- the variety of shocks on different export commodities would tend
to keep export earnings rather stable.
Kenen points out however that diversification of output and
exports cannot guarantee domestic stability even when external
shocks tend to average out. Sufficient occupational factor mobility
will be necessary in order to reabsorb the factors idled by adverse
disturbances. If there is a drop in the demand for one export
product, for example, aggregate unemployment would not rise so
sharply in a more diversified economy because in the former each
industry subject to an external shock provides only a fraction of
total employment and hence the effect becomes less. Kenen shows
that when exchange rate variation is employed to maintain the pre-
disturbance employment level, in the event of a deterioration in the
terms of trade or a downward shift in the foreign demand curve, it
must be greater in a less- than in a well-diversified economy.
Kenen maintains further that in protecting the economy from
external shocks, a greater diversity in exports will help to
stabilise capital formation, hence, easing the burden that has to be
borne by internal prices. He acknowledges that where changes in
export demand arise from business-cycle swings, the whole range of
exports will be hit, and therefore export diversification in this
instance may not be expected to forestall imported instability.
In practice, Kenen's product-diversification criterion suggests
that small areas with less diversification are optimum currency
areas. In this respect, flexible exchange rates are better suited
to the peculiar problems of the developing countries most of whose
economies are less diversified, depending essentially on 1-3 export
commodities. In contrast to the widely diversified developed
economies, the extent of export commodity concentration in LOCs (le
the proportion of the three principal exports to total exports) is
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very high, averaging about 79 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa in
1976/78 (World Bank, 1981); export diversification for the L0Cs is
costly in the presence of scale economies as well as of other
domestic and external economic and market forces; and their
relatively more diversified consumption bundle is reflected in large
dependence on imports, thus making them very 'open', though many of
them are small in size. Yet the LDCs, it is argued, should have a
stronger claim on exchange rate flexibility not only because of the
greater need for changes in their terms of trade, but also because,
as already indicated, capital is less mobile among them than among
the developed countries.
Another dimension is that the output of a large economic region
with a relatively small foreign trade sector is likely to be highly
diversified. It may be possible that by joining together, the small
'open' economies will create a large economic region that is more
diversified. On Kenen's criterion, these regions should prefer a
fixed exchange rate regime and pursue external balance by means of
monetary and fiscal policies. But the smallness of the trade sector
does imply greater instability when monetary and fiscal policies are
employed for internal balance, thereby leading to the 'tail-wagging-
the-dog' situation, ie wide variations in domestic demand and
employment would be required to correct relatively minor imbalances,
which is clearly not an optimal solution (McKinnon, 1963). The
contradictions between Kenen and McKinnon arise essentially from the
different assumptions underlying the major source of the payments
disequilibria; internal shocks for McKinnon, and external shocks in
the case of Kenen. When stability is assumed to exist in the rest
of the world, exchange rate flexibility becomes the inevitable
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policy choice in order to insulate the economy from outs di?
disturbances. This divergence in policy prescriptions does ind date
the relative importance of basic assumptions in the OCA debat.t.
Some analyses (see for instance Massell, 1970; Tower and nillet,
1976) do affirm that competing considerations (particularly ',ter a
freely floating exchange rate is taken as the alternative to
membership in a currency area) may well reverse Kenen's conclusfsr.
Furthermore, the validity of Kenen's argument is limited to
imbalances of a microeconomic nature, eg arising from shifts -in
demand as between the products of different participating countrrel-
But, as noted by Fleming (1971) if the imbalances are of a
macroeconomic type - eg when they are due to cost-push forces
affecting all economic sectors alike - the need for adjustTent
be equally great, whether product similarity among countries is high
or low.
Compared with Mundell, Kenen's distinction between regrws
(characterised by the same economic activity) and optimum currency
areas (characterised by internal factor mobility) hardly differs-
Both authors stress the principle of labour mobility bet4een
economic activities as opposed to capital movements. To enhance
adequate labour mobility however, Kenen assumes further that tie
economy is made up by activities with similar factor intensities, re
activities producing goods that are optimum substitutes of eacn
other. It does not necessarily follow that capital/labour ratios
are equal in expanding and contracting industries; if not, there is
bound to result unemployment of either factor through even changes
in export demand which totally offset one another.
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Similarly, Kenen's implicit assumptions, firstly, that labour
supply is infinitely elastic with respect to a given nominal wage
rate, and secondly, that the international price of the import good
and the nominal wage rate change at the same time appear rather
restrictive. To the extent that these assumptions are removed
because they do not hold in the real world, it becomes practically
impossible to prove his intended propostions, at least formally
(Shiyama, 1975). Certainly, in the real world, wages and prices may
not remain constant and so export demand changes may not be neutral
in a well diversified economy. Where the demand for export products
rises, prices and wages may probably rise within those sectors, but
where it falls, it is unlikely that these will drop correspondingly.
Kenen's analysis has been criticised on more technical grounds
by Flanders (1969) and Ingram (1969). Flanders concentrates on
Kenen's use of the word 'diversified' and maintains that Kenen has
not really demonstrated his second proposition as stated. In his
formal model, Kenen has used the term only to refer to an economy
having an import-competing industry, not an economy exporting many
products. Comparison is made between two economies exporting and
importing only one commodity. 'What is not clear to me from his
model', writes Flanders, 'is what happens if there are two export
goods rather than one'. This would involve him, of course, in a
three commodity model, and life would be complicated'. This point
(on which Kenen concedes) makes his two-product economy not so much
a more diversified as a less open economy.
Ingram, on the other hand, believes firstly that what is
implied in Kenen's analysis of OCAs is that when one region has
unemployment, other regions will have to accept inflation in order
403
to relieve the unemployment. Thus differing degrees of inflation
are expected in the regions. Ingram also points out that the
analysis further implies that the terms of trade will vary more for
regions with few products than for those with many products. He
argues nonetheless that instead of the change in the terms of trade,
Kenen should be referring instead to the changing greatness in the
amplitude of fluctuation. The empirical evidence on the
relationship between payments instability and export concentration
refers to macroeconomic swings in foreign trade and not to the kind
of microeconomic instability that Kenen considers. This evidence
does raise the possibility that instability in the composition of
trade may not be as important as Kenen's analysis makes it out to
be. Like Flanders, Ingram too does doubt whether comparison of one
product and two product economies provides sufficient grounds on
which to determine the influence of product diversification.
In the light of these observations, especially the last, Ingram
maintains that although plausible on theoretical grounds, Kenen's
theory may be too abstract and its assumptions are too extreme and
unrealistic to warrant practical conclusion thereon. More
specifically, the operational limitations of Kenen's analysis relate
firstly, to the means by which 'diversity in a nation's product-mix'
can be measured or the mode of identifying a single product region,
since his approach is to calculate the number of single product
regions in a single country. Both Kenen and Mundell concentrate on
the delineation of a country into regions between which factors are
immobile, and within which they are mobile.
i sAnother operational difficulty that, as in the case of
McKinnon's 'openness' analysis, Kenen's diversification criterion
also stops short of indicating a critical value above which a
country satisfies it such that the country can forego the ability to
vary its exchange rates. As with Mundell and McKinnon's criteria,
Kenen too has failed in his representative condition, to offer
practical guidance as to the size (at the lower and upper limits)
and other evaluation of any group of countries as a proposed OCA.
In Presley and Dennis (1976), diversification in the EEC, for
instance, is estimated on the basis of the industrial origin of the
GDP in each member country. A percentage contribution of each of
eleven sectors to the GDP is calculated and a diversification
statistic (DS) computed as the number of sectors contributing more
than 9.09 per cent to the GDP. The larger the DS, the greater is
the diversification of a country's GDP. But, in this case too the
109 percentage indicator is chosen arbitrarily. The test statistic
provides the surprising result that West Germany (DS = 3) is
considered less diversified than Denmark (DS = 5), hence casting
doubts on the procedure.
In another attempt, diversification has been measured by the
share of the largest export commodity group in total exports
(Heller, 1976). Similarly, the Commonwealth Secretariat (1981)
adopts a proxy in which an export diversification index ranges
between zero and one, with one representing the most extreme
concentration, and therefore the lowest diversification. But, as
Presley and Dennis (1976) concludes on the basis of their
statistical results, the EEC, for instance, would, even though most
countries are less diversified, in a monetary union be highly
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diversified and would then satisfy Kenen's criterion in contrast to
the individual member countries.
The basic problem with these diversification proxies is that
they all ignore diversification in imports and capital movements.
This is particularly an unsatisifactory state of affairs because low
export diversification (the limit case is a single producer) implies
high diversification of imports, and it is difficult to see how the
one can be weighed against the other in an imaginary 'index of
aggregate diversification of foreign transactions' (Vaubel, 1978).
8.2.4 Degree of Policy Integration
The basis of this criterion is that the degree of financial
market integration, policy attitudes and policy coordination, rather
than economic characteristics, are more relevant for the successful
formation of currency areas, and hence, on the desirability of a
fixed exchange rate area.
Ingram (1969) asserts that by referring to the real economic
characteristics of the economy, the models by Mundell, McKinnon and
Kenen have little scope for money; as, in their models, prices are
expressed in real terms of trade, and all external adjustment occurs
on current account, thus eliminating issues relating to the rest of
the balance of payments and general economic management. In
Ingram's own words: 'I do not think the optimum size of a currency
area can be discovered by looking for real economic determinants of
it, such as degree of labour mobility or homogeneity of output,
although these factors may certainly affect the speed and ease of
adjustment'. Ingram thinks that the 'efficiency of a currency area
depends on policy positions taken by (participating) governments and
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on the firmness of their commitments on them, on attitude§ de tliV
population towards the adjustment process involved on the ngtillre off
financial and other institutions..'. Consequently thl§ §teelms
useful basis, perhaps, to recommend 0CA/integration in IOC§ WO
have reached some partial financial market integration.
	
TagltidOw
with Scitovsky (1958 and 1967), Ingram believes that under al 13/41.0
degree of financial integration, especially in relation to orn-tenm
securities, the need for flexible exchange rates would be ellimilimbotAlti
because only fractional variations in interest rates %oulldewgke
sufficient equilibrating capital movements between merber
These equilibrating capital flows would be enhanced by a rilgild
permanent link among member currencies and by the liberalisattam eff
payments transactions among partners.
The exact content of 'policy integration' as well as the eAart
rules for obtaining optimality therefrom are not adequately defined
in this context of policies, although the extent to which count/nes
are co-ordinated, centralised or harmonised in these areas 1$
obviously relevant in considering the scope for an effectiiwe
currency area among them. Fleming (1971) emphasises the
establishment of centrally financed schemes among member ccwitriles
to assist, in particular, the more economically depressed -enters,
and, where practicable, to enhance the harmonisation of incenes
policies for the mitigation of the currency area's pa:i-ents
imbalances and the quickening of the adjustment process. He its
out, however, that a unified fiscal policy (a transfer of financial
resources from prosperous to depressed countries) will be helpful in
mitigating inter-member country disequilibria only to the extent
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that relative prosperity among them is correlated with relative
payments strength.
With specific reference to the EEC, Fleming has expressed
doubts whether the centralisation of banking through the
establishment of a supra-national central bank or the issuing of a
common currency for the area would improve upon the existing
arrangements whereby central banks of the member countries in a
relatively strong payments position could lend on short or medium
term to those central banks of countries in relatively weaker
payments positions in order to mitigate mutual payments
disequilibria. Such a step, he points out, would probably encourage
equalisation of short-term interest rates and mobility of capital
throughout the area, but it is by no means always helpful in
mitigating inter-member country imbalances because of the likely
disequilibrating effect of capital mobility.
These conclusions are very crucial because of the potential
critical role of inter-central bank credit facilities (implicitly
from the strong and surplus to the weak and deficit members) in
monetary integration. For the developing countries, the
establishment of credit arrangements as discussed in Chapter 7 has
also formed part of their initial, and perhaps the only hopeful,
steps in their monetary integration process. Even in such
sophisticated arrangements as the EMS, credit has also been an
important element of the scheme.
The more usual argument has been that all increases in official
international liquidity are likely to be inflationary because they
permit central banks to issue more of their own money without
incurring exchange rate depreciation. This belief has also been
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countered on the basis that central banks or their governments
cannot or do not have access to foreign exchange in the private
sector capital market. As Vaubel (1978, p 13) argues, to the extent
that there is free access to such markets, the extension of credit
facilities between central banks cannot be inflationary in itself
unless these credits are available at the lower rates than free-
market loans. Of course, this outcome is also possible where
inter-bank credits are used to finance non-income generating and
inflation-inducing projects.
What is equally important is that credit facilities can also be
financing rather than adjusting. In the EEC, for instance, the
three 'less prosperous' member states - Italy, the UK and Ireland -
(as they were called in the text of the conclusions of the Bremen
European Council of July 1978) claimed substantial budgetary
resource transfers as part of the package, while France sought a
stroger policy for reduction of agricultural monetary compensation
amounts (ie the realignment of farm support prices). These
countries had argued, firstly, that the process of adjusting to the
rigours of the EMS entailed a short run risk of weakening the real
economy, and secondly, that, since economic and monetary union
contained a strong public finance redistribution function and since
the EMS was meant to be a major step towards such a union, its
setting should be accompanied by some significant parallel progress
on the budgetary side. In addition, the UK's case was that the
Community budget involved perverse, negative net transfers as far as
it was concerned. The outcome of these arguments, especially for
Italy and Ireland, has been access to substantial financial
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assistance bilaterally from other EMS participant countries (see
Kruse, 1980, pp 246-47; Emerson, 1979, p 40).
The practical significance of policy integration on a wider
scale has been an integral part of discussions on the evolution and
review of both the EEC and the EMS. Monetary integration in the EEC
as has already been noted has involved two major schools of thought
- the 'economists' who have maintained that monetary integration
could usefully be implemented only when certain economic
preconditions were obtained, and the 'monetarists' who favoured an
early monetary integration in the belief that this would force
policy co-ordination.
Apart from the possible disequilibrating effect of capital
mobility which is thus hastened by policy integration, the general
difficulties confronting the applicability of this criterion also
derive from the fact that monetary and fiscal policies have the wide
roles of achieving economic growth, income and wealth distribution,
resource allocation, etc. Joint action in these policies designed
for internal and external balance may conflict with the attainment
of these other broader objectives of general economic management.
Besides, internal balance does not lend itself to a simple
definition. In most developed economies, there is an explicit or
implicit trade-off between inflation and unemployment, while in most
developing countries, internal balance implies a fierce battle with
both rising unemployment and inflation and with several other
structural distortions.
Moreover as the financing problem of countries become more
varied, acute and complex, it becomes increasingly important to
distinguish from a functioning perspective, between a type of
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financing requirement that is 'correcting' (merely provides for an
accounting balance within the various accounts of the balance of
payments), and that which is of an 'adjustment' type (designed to
correct structural deficiencies in the economy). Corden (1972)
doubts the true adjustment impact of 'correcting' financing since it
is merely a short-run stop gap measure, much like the Mundellian
argument for manipulating the fiscal -monetary policy mix for the
simultaneous realisation of internal and external balance. Policy
integration must therefore facilitate the flow of 'real' long term
funds if it is to transform a group of participating countries into
a successful currency area.
At the same time, drawing from the experiences of the EEC, it
is apparent that the restrictive functions of monetary and fiscal
policies as well as policy integration per se cannot be depended
upon as independent tenable criteria on which to resolve the problem
of OCA formation. The EEC has however provided a valuable guide in
assessing the importance of policy integration not only for
attaining monetary unification but, also, in ascertaining some of
the most crucial practical policy considerations which confront such
integration.
8.2.5 Similarity in Rates of Inflation
The level and diversion of inflation rates has also been of
central importance for assessing the feasibility and desirability of
establishing optimum currency areas. Most of the criteria discussed
so far in the literature on OCAs have assumed that external shocks
arise principally from macro-economic sources, le, changes in demand
and supply conditions in specific industries. Recent experience in
411
exchange rate management, in particular, suggests, however, that
this may not 'be the case and supports the importance of differential
rates of inflation and the discord of national demand management
policies behind them as a major source of payments imbalances.
Fleming (1971) argues, 'at least as important as any of the
(other) factors 	 , though occupying a much less prominent place
in the literature on OCAs, is the extent to which costs in the
various part of the fixed exchange rate area tend to rise at similar
or at different speeds when employment is at nationally acceptable
levels'. And Magnifico (1971) suggests that countries with similar
national propensities to inflation (PI) should form currency areas.
The need for an equalisation of inflation rates as a requisite
for a currency area is strengthened by the relevance of inflationary
pressures in present-day economic condjtions. Inflation is at the
heart of the economic policy debates, especially as countries are
forced by the complexity of modern economic problems to divert
attention from microeconomic payments disturbances in demand and
supply conditions and to focus increasingly on the macroeconomic
aspects. Whether or not countries should form currency areas is
answered by an examination of the respective inflation-unemployment
trade-offs.
Magnifico (1971) defines the PI concept as a function of the
trade-off existing in a country and the government's view of the
desirable rate of price change. If national PIs differ between
countries, he argues, the formation of a currency area is not
•feasible since the consequential differences in inflation rates
would bring payments difficulties which would need to be corrected
by exchange rate adjustment.
Apart from the similarity in trade-offs between countries, the
formation of a currency area also requires initial identical
preference points on that trade-off curve (Presley and Dennis,
1976). The argument is that an improvement in the trade-off as
countries attempt to synchronise their individual Phillips curves is
not necessarily a reflection that all of them are subjected to
welfare gains in excess of losses. For example, it is possible that
one member country may view the reduction in inflation as inadequate
compensation for the required increase in unemployment.
Against the background of the long-run Phillips curve analysis,
the PI argument implies that currency area formation will have to be
based on the national 'natural' levels of unemployment. The lower
the national rates, the lower will be the costs of attaining a
common inflation rate, and therefore the more worthwhile the
formation of a currency area will be.
The usefulness of the inflation criterion depends on the
significance of differential inflation rates and productivity growth
as a source of payments disturbances. It implies that by
equalisation of rates of inflation, member countries can avoid
payments difficulties. Some authors believe that participation in
a currency union may itself be a powerful instrument for correcting
the price trends of the most inflation-prone member countries. This
latter argument emerged, with particular reference to Italy, during
the formative discussion periods of the European Monetary System.
In the real world payments disequilibria and inflation have become
compound and complex concepts resulting from a wide variety of
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complex conditions and forces, all of which remain closely
interrelated. Payments imbalances constitute a delicate combination
of both micro- and macro-economic disturbances the treatment of
which requires an integrated policy approach. The rate of change of
export/import value for instance can be affected by fluctuations in
prices as well as in demand and supply conditions, the latter which
is reflected in the PI debate. Also, it is doubtful whether
national governments which were not able to implement anti-
inflationary policies before joining a currency union could easily
persuade their electorates to tolerate the cost of the operation,
simply in order to maintain an agreed rate of exchange. The UK is
presently not a member of the European Monetary System.
Nonetheless, the expressed conflict between its people and the
government on the inflation-unemployment trade-offs in more recent
years as the government stress the desire to obtain rates of
inflation comparable to the lower rates in other EEC member
countries, notably West Germany and France, does provide an
appropriate experience manifesting this line of thought.
It is essential, in applying the PI concept, to ascertain the
ultimate causes of divergencies in inflation rates as well as the
nature of the inflation - unemployment relationships between
countries. Where these are mainly determined by deep-rooted
differences in national employment and social goals, industrial
relations and trade union aggressiveness, inflationary expectations
occasioned by the failure of price stabilising and general
productivity and import trends, and domestic monetary and fiscal
policies, the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate may prove
unfeasible or exceedingly costly. It is also noteworthy that as
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countries differ in the composition of their trading partners, so
are they more likely to differ in the rates of 'imported' inflation
(Connolly, 1983). This aspect is important in that the PI criterion
appears to concentrate on the degree of inpractability of divergent
costs and inflation trends among member countries without actually
dealing with inflationary tendencies in trading partners outside the
currency area.
The formation of a currency area, thus, needs in practice, to
be decided according to the ability of the area, to work together to
achieve differential rates of inflation necessary to preserve
dynamic payments equilibria in the member countries while
considering the other .goals and objectives of general economic
management. It is undoubtedly difficult, particularly in the case
of the heavily dependent LDCs, to state the equalisation of PIs as a
sine qua non consideration for the formation of an optimum currency
area. Not only is the PI criterion difficult to apply even with
respect to the developed industrial countries, it is extremely
difficult to quantify for many developing countries.
In the more practical sense, the EMS, for instance, has
focussed attention on the convergence of inflation rates as a way of
achieving success in the exchange rate scheme. At the moment
empirical results as well as assessments of this objective are
mixed. A very significant fact worth pointing out again (see
Chapter 6) is that recent events in the world exchange markets have
suggested that exchange rates can also be misaligned as much by
other factors like speculative capital flows, domestic interest rate
policies, speculation regarding movements in oil prices, etc, as
inflation differentials. The increasing dependence in activities in
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the private foreign exchange markets has made asset/portfolio
management an important element in determining exchange rate
behaviour (asset market approach). At the same time the implicit
overvaluations of many currencies' real/nominal rates have also
highlighted some of the problems involved in first taking inflation
differentials as key monetary integration factors.
8.2.6 The 'Cluster' Framework
The review so far has attempted to highlight the importance of
the OCA theory in providing theoretical insights into the
identification of the relevant determinants of exchange rate
policies. Evidently, some of the issues have been attacked not in
the abstract all-or-none terms of much of the debate over fixed
versus floating rates, but rather in terms of the search for the
major factors that influence the relative desirability of
alternative exchange rate systems (see Tower and Willet, 1976).
Thus on the basis of the OCA conventional criteria reviewed above,
the logical domain of an OCA as a region is a fixed exchange rate
common currency area, and flexible rates are justified only when
based on a regional currency, not national currencies. The more the
argument for flexible exchange rates is strengthened, the less
nations correspond to OCAs. In practice, there appears to be still
only few guidelines available for determining the relative
significance of these 'optimality' conditions or even of the
qualifications which an OCA must fulfil since nearly all of them
present formidable problems of operational definition and
quantification.
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Significantly, although 'size' as an optimality criterion
constitutes one of the main pillars of the OCA theory, yet none of
these conventional optimality conditions it is argued, appears to
offer a satisfactory basis on which countries can claim membership
to a currency area or, indeed, on which the optimum size of the area
can be adequately ascertained or identified in the sense of
particular geographical entities or the kind of currency area it
could be. This makes OCA delineation still an open issue.
McKinnon (1963), for instance, observes that 'the analytical
framework for considering a large number of countries jointly and
then deciding how they should be divided into optimum currency
regions does not exist'. Ingram (1967) provides no clear-cut
guideline since the size of a currency area 'can be whatever we want
it to be', although governmental policy positions and commitment are
critically important in determining the geographical confines of the
OCA. In addition, Mundell's pioneering discussion on OCAs has
carefully defined 'region' in the classical sense, namely internal
factor mobility and external immobility of factors. He notes
nonetheless that constructing OCAs is a process of dynamic
adjustment in which currency blocs form and reform through trial and
error into OCAs, but depicts the process of resulting mainly from
structural/secular changes among nations in political jurisdiction
and power relations.
Consequently, another analytical task has been to look
elsewhere to develop, albeit within an OCA framework, combinations
of socio-economic characteristics of countries and principles of
bloc formation on which basis individual countries can be assigned
to specific currency areas capable of achieving predetermined policy
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objectives. Nana-Sinkam (1978) has thus argued that an adequate
theory of monetary integration should significantly enhance the
definition of a region and the determination of the number and
structure of OCAs into which it is divisible. Nana-Sinkam observes:
'Optimality criteria, even when we can agree about them,
are helpful in delineating a currency area and how it
might function only when the region is an optimum
currency area. When it is not, it is hardly possible to
determine, with their aid alone, whether a region, of
several countries having infeasible or suboptimal
currency areas should have one or more than one OCA'
(1978, p 162).
The question, how does one define an OCA is the 'which-country-
which-optimum currency area problem'. Neither in conventional
arguments for large size nor in the rationalisation of small scale
is there an adequate basis for determining an optimum size for a
regional grouping. The problem of which countries are to
participate therefore in which co-operation agreement is still a
live issue, precipitated mainly by the high degree of uncertainty
regarding the reform of the International Monetary System to evolve
determinate and stable global exchange rate relationships. This,
understadably, has intensified more or less the desire for more
meaningful and practically representative monetary co-operation
schemes among both those countries with evidently feasible national
currency domains (mainly the developed industrialsiqed countries)
and those relatively without (generally the LDCs). In the EMS, the
question can be asked whether the exclusion of sterling makes the
418
system less optimal in size, or whether the inclusion, for instance
of the US dollar, yen and Swiss franc, into a broader arrangement
could form a larger but optimal North Atlantic currency area.
Similarly in Africa, it can be asked whether the existing CFA franc
zone or the defunct FSA, both of which reflect de facto colonial
traditions would constitute OCAs purely in terms of conventional
criteria.
In a relatively broader (multi-dimentional) analytic framework,
Nana-Sinkam (1978) has suggested the delineation of OCAs in relation
to their homogeneity in not one but in as many structural
characteristics (integration variables) as are functionally
identifiable or implicit - ie, national and/or sub-regional geo-
political, financial, monetary and other socio-economic
considerations. This approach, as in the case of the reCommended
'dynamic' extensions to the conventional economic integration
theory, specially for LDCs, attempts to include as many variables as
possible which seem equally likely to affect trade-offs between sub-
regional and national goals and consequently to influence an
individual country's choice of prospective partners and the
resulting negotiations with minimum losses arising out of
integration. OCAs are thus delineated on the basis of clustering or
clumping countries in 'strong-attitude' domains - where they share
to a significant degree a sizeable set of integration
characteristics, or in 'weak-attribute' domains - where they do not.
As in the case of the conventional single-criterion approach,
delineating countries into one or more OCAs as geographical entities
against this multi-dimension framework can appear equally
inconclusive.
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Evidently, the existence of cross-country differences and
similarities among countries in the applied structural
characteristics can create several and generally less realistic OCAs
with a cross-country membership structure. But, as Nana-Sinkan
discusses, although it may be more difficult to group African
countries specifically according to 'political' (Clump 1) than
'regional' (Clump 2) and 'financial' (Clump 3) factors, in general,
it could be much easier to do so largely on the basis of
geographical contiguity, historical perspectives and on the existing
levels of co-operation among them. In this event, the delineation
of the Continent into North, West, East and Central monetary zones
becomes somehow apparent, but with the optimality of each sub-region
into an OCA framework remaining inadequately resolved.
The initial problems encountered in the Clump approach are
those of trying to systematically determine the relevant integration
variables, quantify them and then identify an oRtimum grouping
strategy. Clearly, greater sensitivity and refinement are
inevitably imminent in both the choice and definition of Clump
variables and in the choice of integration variables among the many
country characteristics, there is also the problem of determining
the so-called optimal variables on the basis of which regional
optimality is defined. Moreover, integration criteria are
fundamental and seldom representable by any single variable. There
are the familiar issues of defining these criteria with some
operational precision in choosing empirical correlates that are
sufficiently measurable for institutional and other relationships.
Also, the 'strong-attribute'/'weak attribute' criterion appears
to make no provisions for the cow= statistical 'extreme' influence
in the final score as well as for 'middle order' cases.
	 For
example, where countries are classified into country clusters on the
basis of geographical contiguity and socio-cultural homogeneity,
the possibility seems excluded of forming OCAs among them where
other integration characteristics are complementary.
The overriding advantage of the clump approach for identifying
OCAs, nonetheless, is that the set of country/regional
characteristics and institutional relationships which are more
likely to surface in the analysis are treated consistently in
general integration theory as much in classical customs-union theory
as in its varied extensions to include 'dynamic' factors and in
conventional OCA theory. Furthermore, as already indicated, the
integration variables applied seem most likely to affect trade-offs
between regional and national goals and consequently to influence an
individual country's choice of prospective partners and the
resulting negotiations.
	 The more systematic, realistic and
objective the assignment of the variables, the more likely it is to
evolve a more feasible OCA out of the Clump criterion. But like all
other criteria, this too provides no conclusive answers to the main
OCA problem: which country - which optimum currency area? It does
however emphasise the view that in its conceptual aspects the
process towards monetary unification must be seen in the broader
politico-socio economic system.
8.3 OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORY AND THE ECOWAS
The OCA criteria reviewed in the foregoing pages have reflected
both the so-called 'single criterion' approach and the wider socio-
economic framework (Cluster analysis) in determining the optimum
configuration of currency domains. While differing on the approach
to optimality and on the required speed of adjustment (only
Mundell's factor mobility has claimed automaticity), OCA criteria do
in general have a bearing on firstly, the magnitude of costs and
benefits that are potentially involved in currency area formation,
and secondly on the nature and the degree of convergence that may be
required for the inception and sustenance of such an area. 	 The
traditional criteria in particular indicate the instances under
which exchange rate changes can be either ineffective (ie the
absence of money illusion) or unnecessary, even though perhaps
effective (ie high degree of factor mobility, product
diversification or similarity in inflationary tendencies), as an
argument for having a common currency within a group of countries.
Among the major drawbacks of the traditional criteria is the
argument that in attempting to provide those characteristics which
set out the rule of optimality as well as those which point towards
the efficient attainment of internal and external balance, they have
not sufficiently emphasised those potential benefits and costs that
accompany the members' loss of national autonomy in the pursuit of
monetary and fiscal management. The complexities of monetary
integration, and indeed of currency area formation, are such that
the feasibility of an integration framework is, in the real world,
not only an optimality issue. Wood (1973) and Lamfalussy (1974)
have particuarly stressed the need to weigh between the potential
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benefits and costs in relation to the structural divergencies
between the participating states as these are more likely to inhibit
currency area formation. Added to this is also the fact that in the
real world, the 'automatic' adjustment theories of the OCA
literature are relatively inappropriate to the extent that
government intervention in all aspects of economic management is an
accepted thing.
The OCA criteria do however indicate the importance of
homogeneity, compatability, convergence and complementarity in the
process of economic adjustment between the participating countries
in a unified currency area. Whether the unified currency area will
face severe regional disequilibria or whether adjustment can be
relatively smoothly achieved depends on the economic characteristics
of the whole union. Broadly speaking, it can be stated that the
process of adjustment to economic disequilibria within a currency
area will be smoother:
(a) the greater the degree of factor mobility within the area,
(b) the greater the degree of economic diversification,
(c) the more similar the rates of inflation in the member
countries,
(d) the greater the share of intra-regional trade in the
national income in member countries.
Furthermore, OCA conditions do constitute those economic
structures whose polarisation could form a fundamental obstacle to
the acceptance of unified stabilisation policies. They ease the
process of monetary unification. Therefore, clarity is required
initially on how the participating countries in a unified currency
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area differ in such areas as commercial ownership, socio-economic
planning, the prevailing power and authority structures in political
life, transport, information and communication systems as well as in
their respective values and basic aims of economic activities.
Most of these structures have been examined in earlier chapters
with respect to the ECOWAS economies. The overall need for an
effective co-ordination of socio-economic activities, most of all
developmental processes and growth, forms a strategic part of the
region's integration process. Theoretically, the measurement of the
degree of convergence in each case could be directed either at
empirical data about convergence that has actually taken place, or
at projections and anticipated trends. Clearly the latter
possibility, especially in developing countries, is even less
tangible than the former. The methodological and conceptual
difficulties of monetary integration as reviewed in this and the
previous chapter are formidable especially for a group of countries
that are collectively at the low stages of development. Indeed,
even in the EEC, the apparent failure to come to agreement on these
basic issues have in part constituted the major problem that has
affected the economic and monetary unification of the member states.
The EMS scheme, which for now provides perhaps the most hopeful sign
of possible progress towards international monetary reform since the
collapse of the Bretton Woods, has, within its institutional
framework, safeguard measures to ensure co-ordination and
flexibility, even though the preconditions for an OCA in particular
are not met and the currency area established.
Thus, as already indicated, the evidence and conclusions on the
optimality of the ECO WAS as a currency area are presented in this
study without biasing the need for currency unification within the
area. It is argued that the establishment of a common currency
within the ECOWAS would generate incentives for improving upon the
constraints posed by currency area theory.
8.3.1 Mobility of Factors of Production
Official records on intra-ECOWAS factor mobility are scanty and
unreliable. The empirical evidence nonetheless is that this is low
and non-complementary.	 Sometimes seasonal occupational
opportunities, motivations for higher incomes and political concern
have aroused labour migration between countries. In more recent
years, Nigeria and Ivory Coast have attracted proportionately
massive drift of 'guest workers' from other states for purely very
short-term income gains (although this is reversing in the case of
Nigeria). There are large settlements of immigrant population in
border market centres where parallel market activities are dominant.
Political reasons had influenced, in part, the movement of Guineans
(mainly of the Fulani tribe) into Sierra Leone but this too is
reversing since the death of the Guinean President Sekou Toure in
1984. In general the close similarity in economic structures and
the lack of cross-country employment opportunities have provided
little scope for labour migration. The Community programme for free
intra-regional migration (ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of
Persons, Residence and Right of Establishment, May 1978), though
having been fully ratified by all 16 member states, is yet to be
compiled with. In any case the number of wage-salary-earners in the
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region represents on average no more than 10 per cent of the
economically active population and many of these are engaged in
either the urban informal sector, in agriculture alongside owner-
operations, family labour and apprentices or in government service
(Rimmer, 1984, p 95).
Capital or 'enterprise' has had no greater mobility in the
ECOWAS than has labour, although the prospects for this may be
better than labour through increased liberalisation and currency
convertibility as well as the regionalisation of activities in the
Nigerian and Ivorian Stock Exchange Markets. It is evidently clear
that non-regional enterprises have played a preponderant part of
direct investment in the ECOWAS than indigenous firms. This can be
explained by a number of factors including the profound external-
orientation of general economic activities, comparative costs and
low domestic savings. Aggregate domestic savings (defined as
exports minus imports plus gross fixed capital formation plus
increase in stocks - see Table 5F) as a proportion of GNP is
marginally above 30 per cent only in Ivory Coast (1980). It is
negative in Burkina and Mauritania and less than one per cent in
Sierra Leone. Quasi-money as a ratio of money supply is less than
40 per cent (1983) in all countries except Nigeria (40.7 per cent)
and Ivory Coast (49 per cent) (see Table 9H). This latter ratio
compares with 59.4 per cent in the USA and 62.3 per cent in the UK
during the same year.
The lack of 'official' intra-ECOWAS capital flows is
demonstrated in part, in the absence of 'capital transactions' in
the Clearing House Operations. It is feared that current upheavals
in the domestic and global economic scene and the widely differing
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external payments positions in the member countries may pose serious
problems on any thoughts of encouraging capital mobility at the
regional level as such thoughts are often subsumed in nationalistic
responses to external disturbances.
8.3.2 Economic Size and Openness
The degree of 'openness' in the ECOWAS economies is estimated
in terms of:
(a) the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (PT);
(b) the ratio of imports to GDP or the average propensity 6
import (APM); and
(c) the incremental ratio of imports to GDP or the marginal
propensity to import (MPM)._
These ratios have already been examined in Chapter 4 (see Table
4R).
The results reported for 13 member countries for which data was
available suggest the growing importance of trade especially during
the last decade. The PT ratio is over 40 per cent in all countries,
except Ghana where it is below 10 per cent purely because of the
astronomically growth in the GDP. In Liberia, the ratio had reached
120 per cent by 1981. In 1981, imports ranged between 26-85 per cent
of GDP in the region (except Ghana ). With the exception of
Mauritania and Sierra Leone, the MPM was positively high in 1981.
As noted in Chapter 3, the rate of growth of imports in most West
African states is represented more in terms of rising cost following
the oil-price increases than actual rise in volume.
Subject to their respective limitations as appropriate
indicators of openness, the calculated PT, MPM and APM were tested
for West Africa using 1981 values. The pooled T statistics (T =
1.401 for the MPM against APM; and T = 1.356 and -2.214 for PT
against MPM and APM respectively; df = 24; p = .05) show that in
practice (except for the PT against APM) there is no empirical
difference between them in demonstrating the largeness of the
foreign trade sector in the region.
A significant drawback to the application of the openness
criterion as indicated earlier is that neither it nor other optimum
currency area criteria provide a clear indication as to whether the
16 countries of ECOWAS, for instance, should form a complete
monetary union. In terms of market area, the region as a whole
represents over 150 million potential customers. In principle
however, ECOWAS can be sub-divided into a number of potential
'currency areas', although the question remains how large or small
each would be to achieve optimality.
Firstly, in terms of traditional colonial attachment, currency
domains can be delineated into:
(a) the former sterling area (FSA) comprising Gambia, Ghana,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone;
(b) the CFA franc area, comprising the WAMU countries;
(c) the Escudo area, com .prising the former Portuguese
territories, Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau;
(d) the dollar area with Liberia as the sole member country;
and
(e) the heterogeneous area comprising the French franc zone
break-away countries, Guinea and Mauritania.
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Apart from the CFA franc area which has survived and may be
expanding, and the dollar area, it is very unlikely that the FSA and
Escudo areas would be recreated.
Secondly, currency domains may be delineated in terms of the
intervention currencies that feature most significantly in the
current exchange rate arrangements of the member countries. In this
respect the two most prominent currencies are the US dollar and the
French franc. As shown in Table 61, each intervention-currency area
comprises seven countries. The Gambia is tied to sterling while in
Nigeria the flexible exchange rate system is maintained around the
dollar and sterling. The French franc area is synonimous to the CFA
franc. A dollar area by this definition is highly unlikely to exist
if only because of the heterogeneous nature of the countries
involved, but the dollar itself will feature prominently in
discussions on the choice of an optimum peg for regional monetary
arrangement. Except for the franc zone, there is no institutional
or collective monetary relationship between members of the dollar
intervention-currency area beyond what is provided for all countries
in the WACH framework.
Finally, in so far as national market size is concerned,
Nigeria, the largest and most powerful country in the region, is the
only country of substantial economic size and potential to probably
constitute an independent currency domain on its own. The only
,
problem is that because of its relative inconvertibility, the
national currency may lose its moneyness through escalated parallel
market activities were Nigeria to establish such a zone without co-
operating with other ECOWAS member countries.
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8.3.3 Economic Diversification
The economic base of individual West African economies is
severely undiversified in practically all aspects of econoric
activity, except, perhaps in the highly diversified import sector
(in terms of the wide range of imported goods). This characteristic
feature does not only disqualify them for currency area formatica
but, as we have explained elsewhere, it has made them criticallj
more vulnerable to external market conditions, especially in terms
of exchange rate costs.
The degree of diversification in these economies is however
estimated in terms of the composition (or distribution) of:
(a) the GDP;
(b) export commodities, and
(c) trading partners.
Agriculture and/or mining remain the principal contributor to the
GDP and foreign exchange earnings and are occupationally the largest
employers. On the basis of IMF sectoral classification of the GDP,
the agricultural and services sectors combined account for over two-
thirds of GDP in virtually all countries in 1981. Agriculture alone
provides over 60 per cent of the GDP in Ghana and over 40 per cent
in five other countries. The services sector on the other hand
represents more than 70 per cent of GDP in Cape Verde and over 40
per cent in ten other countries. In Cape Verde, the importance of
the services sector is explained in respect of foreign exchange
receipts from Cape Verdeans resident overseas. In 1981, these
receipts (also known as home remittances in Exchange Control
terminology) amounted to US$25 million as against the US$20 million
GNP (West Africa, 1 July 1985, p 319). From this sectoral
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perspective, the analysis indicates that of the bigger economies,
Ivory Coast and Senegal are the most diversified while Ghana is the
least diversified. The industrial base is generally small in all
countries, comprising very similar and simple value-added
manufacturing processes (these features are discussed in more detail
in Chapter 2).
On the basis of the degree to which exports are concentrated in
a single or closely related group of products (ie the percentage of
total exports to exports accounted for by the largest commodity
export), the range of exports in West Africa is concentrated Cl 1-3
products and as a group, all exports are of primary nature,
contributing agricultural and mineral commodities with little
value-added domestic processing. The relative importance of each
commodity for the national economies is discussed in Chapter 3 (see
Table 4E). Earlier in Chapter 2 (see Tables 2E and 2G) it was shonn
that as a region West Africa produces no less than 23 primary
commodities many of which have had (or still have) viable export
potential. Because of its relative significance in national import
bills, the availability of crude oil reserves is actively being
explored in practically all coastal states. Currently, crude oil is
of growing importance in the Ivorian export economy while in
Nigeria, it has represented over 90 per cent of the country's total
export revenues.
Despite growing competition from the USA and Japan, the
traditional markets of France and the UK still occupy prominence in
West Africa's limited list of trading partners. The geographical
concentration of trade in the region is such that in most countries
the sources of imports is much wider than the geographical
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distribution of their export markets. The EEC countries as a group
have taken up over 40 per cent of West Africa's total trade (see
Table 4H). Special trading arrangements between the EEC and West
African states have developed through the EEC/ACP institutional
relationship. In 1983, total exports accounted for by exports to
the largest market - the USA - was 20.6 per cent and France was
second with 13.9 per cent. The importance of the US market as
explained earlier is due mainly to the direction of Nigeria's crude
oil which in turn has represented over three quarters of the
region's total export value. The share of the EEC was 44.5 per
cent. In practice, the exchange rate arrangements of many
developing countries have been influenced in part by the degree of
geographical concentration of their trade. On this perspective,
three currencies are most important for West Africa - the US dollar,
the French franc and sterling.
8.3.4 Divergence between the Rates of Inflation
Evidence on the historical record of inflation rates in the
ECO WAS countries shows that the discrepancies between them are
considerable and although this record cannot be taken as a firm
guide to future movements, the marked differences in the national
policy responses to external (or domestic) inflation impulses are
likely to sustain this divergent behaviour. There is however no
guarantee, as the EMS experience has shown, that convergence in
inflation rates can be maintained even where it is an emphasised
policy of monetary unification. Besides, its limitations as an
instrument for achieving exchange rate stability have been made very
obvious by events during the last few years. At the same time, the
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EMS experience also indicates that the lack of convergence in
inflation rates is substantially a result of divergent diagnosis for
domestic inflation, ie monetarists versus economists/structuralists.
While for the developed countries inflationary pressures have
arguably been related to the Phillips Curve behaviour, developing
states have tended to stress 'imported inflation' than inflation
induced by domestic monetary and fiscal expansion. What is certain
is that in general the differences in rates of inflation appear to
arise partly for structural reasons, such as divergent rates of
growth in productivity and variations in the institutional structure
of wage bargaining and agreements and partly from divergences in
national policy objectives. While there could be some hope that in
a monetary union co-ordination in economic policies may resolve the
latter, the more deep-rooted structural differences between the
member countries seem likely to be less tractable and this would
tend to increase difficulties of economic adjustment within the
monetary union.
As can be observed from Table 50, inflation rates in the ECOWAS
have on average ranged from around 9 per cent in Burkina to 50 per
cent in Ghana in 1970-83. In 1983, the rate varied between -2.5
per cent in Niger and 122.9 per cent in Ghana. National rates have
deviated (as measured by the standard deviation) by 42.4 in Ghana
(widest deviation) and 4.3 in Mauritania (least deviation) over the
14 year period.
Regional averages over the reviewing period indicate that
inflation rates were worse in 1977, 1981 and 1983. The regional
standard deviation peaked at 38.3 in 1983 after improving from 30.8
to 12.0 in 1977-80 following the severe restraint in domestic
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policies which has tended to follow each oil price increase. It is
also evident that these regional measures have been pulled very
substantially by Ghana's worsening inflation after 1975, with
recorded rates of over 100 per cent in 1977, 1981 and 1983.
8.4 CONCLUSIONS
There are good reasons, against the foregoing, to doubt the
optimality of the ECOWAS as a currency area and hence, whether the
member countries should create a common currency or a system of
immutable exchange rates. The same is true for the sub-regional
currency domains delineated in Chapter 5. The inadequacies of the
countries in meeting the OCA criteria (except to some extent,
openness in foreign trade) are worsened further by the very low
inter-penetration of trade among them. Yet what is perhaps of the
greatest importance to any discussion of monetary unification for
the region, as pointed out in earlier parts of this chapter, is the
emphasis on potential characteristics, costs and benefits. The
traditional theory because of its static nature has not stressed
this aspect. Even if the feasibility of an ECOWAS monetary union is
judged purely on the basis of existing economic characteristics, it
does not follow that the necessary structural transformation and
policy co-ordination cannot be undertaken to bring about a
favourable configuration for such a union. The fact is that the
move towards its success implies a process of gradual convergence in
such areas as general economic policy, inflation policy, monetary
and banking structures, wage differentials, etc. Besides, it should
be recognised that cultural, historical and political bonds are as
important as economic factors in determining the feasibility (see
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discussion on clump/cluster analysis) and success of monetary
unification.
These factors imply the abandonment of the conventional search
for a single criterion formula to identify the desirable extent of
the currency domain in ECOWAS. They provide considerations which,
collectively, are powerful enough to justify immense support for an
ECOWAS monetary union. Most significantly, there is no doubt that
support for such transformation must, most urgently, derive from the
inability for developing countries on their own individually to
manage their monetary systems and overall economies in a floating
and highly volatile currency world whose reform is less imminent now
or in the foreseeable future. 	 Meanwhile such an unsettled
international monetary system continues to be difficult and costly
for the developing world. The failure by West Africa to meet the
OCA criteria also means that such conditions require sufficient
attention in the process of monetary unification.
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CHAPTER 9
TRANSITION TO ECOWAS MONETARY UNION
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The empiricism of this chapter represents an assessment of the
need for monetary unification in West Africa; first, against the
background of analysis and arguments raised in the previous
chapters, and second, in the light of a critical evaluation of the
experiences of the existing West African Clearing House and the West
African Monetary Union. Although optimum currency area theory has
also taken for granted that pegged rates automatically imply full
convertibility, the specific implications of this for West Africa
are explored. The thrust of the arguments in this study is that
serious and beneficial monetary integration in West Afrcia can only
be carried out under a common currency and a central monetary
supranational monetary authority, a point to which early arguments
for monetary integration among LDCs were somewhat oblivious. They
have undoubtedly overemphasised the scope of clearing and payments
arrangements, especially where the objectives o ..1 monetary
integration for LDCs are assessed against the background of existing
socio-economic developments and the apparent failure of multilateral
clearing and credit schemes to tackle the development constraints.
In more recent years, however, many countries in West Africa
have expressed some political will either to rejoin common currency
arrangements to which they originally were members or to re-inforce
bilateral economic relationships. In this regard, Mali, which had
left the WAMU in 1962 has rejoined the union (June 1984), while
Guinea, which had also opted out of the French Union in 1958 is
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considering reentry (West Africa, 11 June 1984, p 1227 and 17
September 1984, p 1905). The Gambia is 'discussing modalities' with
Senegal for joining WAMU (West Africa, 1 April 1985,p 608), while
Burkina has expressed the need for a common currency with Ghana
(West Africa, 6 February 1984, p 303). The idea for a uniform
currency has also been indicated within the Mano River Union (IMF,
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 1984, p 48).
The latest and easily the most significant step towards
monetary unification in West Africa has been the development of
political commitment of the 16 ECOWAS member countries to create an
'ECOWAS Monetary Zone' within the institutional framework of the
Community. This commitment, first stated in the Conference of Heads
of State of ECOWAS in Conakry, Guinea in May 1983, was reaffirmed by
the leaders during their 7th Annual Summit in Lome, Togo in November
1984. The leaders have resolved:
'to adopt as soon as possible measures to facilitate the
creation of an EGO WAS Monetary Zone to promote stable
monetary and financial conditions for sustaining regional
economic growth' (West Africa, 3 December 1984, p 2448).
This chapter is divided into five main sections. In Section
9.2 the analysis and arguments in the previous chapters are
condensed to state the 'overwhelming case' for currency unification
in West Africa. Section 9.3 analyses the operations of WACH and
WAMU and critically evaluates their implications for an ECO WAS
monetary union. The section also discusses the compatibility of
monetary unification in West Africa with the search for a new and
stable international monetary system. Section 9.4 argues that the
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creation of a common currency is more practical and gainful for West
Africa than a simple fixed exchange arrangement and then looks at
available options for establishing a West African common currency.
Concluding remarks are provided in Section 9.5.
9.2 THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MONETARY UNIFICATION IN WEST AFRICA
In the spectrum of monetary integration, as surveyed in Chapter
7, potential member states can opt for schemes that range from
limited liberalisation of trade and exchange restrictions to the use
of a single, uniform currency for the area. While the former could
form an integral part of a simple payments and clearing arrangement
for the settlement of international transactions at the regional
level, the latter implies the formation of a monetary union that
also exhibits supranational control over monetary and fiscal
policies. Somewhere in the spectrum are programmes for the
realignment of exchange rates and/or the co-ordination of all or
some aspects of national monetary and fiscal policies (eg taxation)
as is shown in the European Monetary System. The most important
repercussions of this transition are upon internal and external
equilibria and on the liquidity problem of the adjustment mechanism.
These emcompass, for the member countries, the specific aim of
establishing a 'zone of monetary stability' internally and
externally. External stability implies exchange rate stability,
whereas stability at home represents the adoption of monetary
developments consistent with stable domestic costs and prices. In
general, the stability of exchange rates as well as of costs and
prices is interpreted as an essential precondition for attaining a
reasonable degree of economic integration among the participating
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countries, for economic growth and the narrowing of economic
divergencies.
The basic elements of the balance of payments of a developing
economy, expressed in terms of the simple equation:
Bt . Xt - Mt
 + NSTt + NOTt + NCIt + Rt
where, at time (t)
Bt . overall balance
Xt . commodity exports
Mt . commodity imports
NSTt = net services and private transfers
NOTt
 = net official transfers
NCI t = net capital inflows
Rt
 = residual variable
(exogenous natural factors - eg climate, politics)
are more easily affected by endogenous and exogenous factors where
fluctuations have a very immediate and relatively irreversible
impact on the overall balance of the country concerned. 	 The
monetary and balance of payments of developing countries therefore
reflect the basic structural characteristics of their economies -
small and open with heavy reliance on external factors of
production. Because of their economic structure, West African
countries, in common with other developing countries, are more
sensitive to external shocks on any of the elements determining
their balance of payments and overall economic development.
Aside from other constraints - politics, climatic conditions,
global economic development - there is no doubt that the core of
West Africa's monetary and overall development problems since the
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1970s has been the foreign exchange constraint. The summary of the
balance of payments components in Table 6B reveals that the overall
situation for practically all countries has been severe. The current
account deficit has widened for most countries and as a proportion
of GDP, as shown below, has risen substantially even in the more
developed member countries. In 1970-81 this index rose from below 5
per cent to over 8 per cent in Nigeria and Senegal, and from around
2.5 to 3.7 per cent in the Ivory Coast. It rose up to 14 per cent
in Sierra Leone and 23 per cent in Mauritania and The Gambia.
ECOWAS: Balance of Payments Current Account Deficit as Per Cent of
GDP
1970a 1981b
Benin 0.5 6.7
Burkina (2.4) 4.6
Cape Verde - -
Gambia (1.5) 22:1
Ghana 3.1 1.0
Guinea -
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast 2.5 3.7
Liberia 8.6
Mali 13.0
Mauritania 2.4 23.4
Niger - -
Nigeria 4.7 8.3
Senegal 1.9 8.6
Sierra Leone 3.8 13.7
Togo (1.1) 8.3
Source: Table 6B; IMF International Financial Statistics
Notes:	 a	 Surplus for Burkina, Gambia and Togo
b	 1980 for Benin, Burkina, Senegal and Togo
Not available
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The international liquidity and adjustment problems have
arisen, in part, from the need of a growing economy for a
corresponding growth in earned foreign exchange reserves to support
it. The gap between demand for new reserves and available supply
has widened over the years as the commodity export-import gap
worsened for all countries, expect Liberia and to some extent,
Nigeria. Externally, factors such as the rising import costs of oil
in the 1970s, the rising prices of imported manufactured goods
compared with primary export prices, and the slow growth of world
trade in primary commodities have combined with the rising costs of
external borrowing and the massive reduction in concessionary
foreign assistance to impinge on foreign reserve balances and the
balance of payments. As shown in Table 60, West Africa's combined
external public debt outstanding in 1981 was over US$29 billion and
for the individual countries it ranged between 59 per cent of
commodity exports in Nigeria to nearly 800 per cent in the Gambia.
In practically all cases the precipitating factor for the rising
debt-service burden and hence the formal Paris Club negotiations for
some countries (eg Sierra Leone) was the inability to service the
sharp increase in commercial debt. The implications as illustrated
in Table 6E are that creditworthiness appears to be the major
constraint for further borrowing by a number of countries,
especially Senegal, Liberia and Sierra Leone, rated among the least
creditworthy in the world. The consequent drain on foreign exchange
reserve balances has been such that by the end of 1981 these
balances could not cover up to 10 per cent of total import bills in
at least seven of the thirteen countries for which data was
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available.	 For most countries - notably Gambia, Ivory Coast,
Nigeria - the situation worsened further between 1982 and 1983.
The deterioration has also been the result of domestic factors
as short fall in export receipts, fiscal and demand management
problems, and the maintenance of unrealistic exchange rate policies
further impinge on the balance of payments. The over-expansion of
aggregate demand in most countries, usually arising from unsound
fiscal and monetary policies, has given rise to huge government
budgetary deficits that are financed increasingly by borrowing from
the domestic banking system and external sources. The resultant
implications for the money supply aggregates, inflation and import
demand have supported the worsening of the foreign exchange
situation. It can be observed in Table 5C that money supply whose
growth was more conspicuous during 1973-79 for all countries, slowed
down remarkably for most states during the early years . of the
1980s. The average annual growth in money supply over the 14 year
period ranged from 9.2 per cent in Liberia (1975-83) to 33.4 per
cent in Ghana. The rate of inflation, on the other hand, which has
risen substantially over the period, ranged form around 8 per cent
in Liberia to 50 per cent in Ghana (Table 50). In general, West
African countries have experienced high and unstable rates of
inflation and monetary growth. Indeed in some countries - eg Ghana
and Nigeria - political instability has also been present,
indicating perhaps the close relationship between political
instability and monetary instability.
These relationships are demonstrated in Table 9A and Figures
9.1 and 9.2. Figure 9.1 plots the average annual rate of inflation
along the horizontal axis and the standard deviation in the annual
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rate of inflation along the vertical axis while a similar graph is
also produced in Figure 9.2 for growth in the money supply. We
regressed these two relationships and obtained the following (1970-
83):
(a) SD i = -1.65 + .88i
R2
 = .96
N = 11
(b) SDm = 11. 8 + •086m
R2
 = .02
N = 13
where
SD .
 = standard deviation of the rate of inflation1
SDm = standard deviation in the rate of money growth
N = number of cross-section countries for which data was
available
Table 9A ECOWAS: Growth in Inflation and Money Supply, 1970-83
INFLATION	 MONEY SUPPLY
Average Annual	 Standard	 Average Annual	 Standard
Rate	 Deviation	 Rate	 Deviation
Benin NA NA 18.2 10.0
Burkina 8.7 9.4 18.0 9.2
Gambia 9.3 6.5 18.5 11.3
Ghana 50.0 42.4 33.4 15.2
Ivory Coast 11.0 7.2 18.2 14.2
Liberia 8.4 6.3 9.2 21.8
Mali NA NA 15.1 8.7
Mauritania 9.9 4.3 19.6 16.6
Niger 10.4 8.1 19.9 10.5
Nigeria 15.5 8.2 29.3 18.8
Senegal 10.1 7.9 15.9 11.2
Sierra Leone 17.4 17.3 18.2 10.6
Togo 10.6 6.3 20.2 17.5
Source: Tables 5C and 5D
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These results indicate that while the relationship between high and
unstable rates of inflation remains significant, it is much weaker
in the case of money growth. The growth in money supply has been
high and relatively consistent over the years.
We also regressed the rate of inflation (I) on the rate of
money growth (M) for the same period and obtained the following
equation:
I = -14.0 + 1.43m
R2
 = .58
N = 11
In practice high inflation is generally associated with high money
growth. In West Africa, the relationship is statistically apparent
with a half percentage increase, in money supply adding about one per
cent in the rate of inflation. However, a very suggestive factor
for the high inflationary tendencies in several countries, notably
Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, strongly relates to the high
incidence of parallel (black) market practices, aggravated largely
by the persistently high import demand, amid the growing acute
shortage of foreign exchange (official) and commodities together
with the corresponding lack of or ineffectiveness in domestic price
controls. These relationships have appeared extremely stronger in
Ghana as is shown in Figure 9.3.
To the extent that excessive bank borrowing (or development by
inflation) has not supported projects that are directly productive
or improved economic performance, the expected 'neutralising effect'
of domestic credit expansion on the general price level and the
balance of payments has not materialised in most West African
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countries. At the same time the excessively high levels of domestic
inflation and the wide differentials that exist between the national
rates, especially as between the francophones and the anglophones,
do not only provide an additional inducement for the skewed pattern
of intra-regional trade, they also discourage the expansion of this
trade in favour of trade with third countries. This situation as
was shown (Chapter 3), provides for only minimal gains from the
trade diversion and creation effects of integration within the
ECOWAS.	 In other words, the higher the domestic rates of
inflation, the greater the external tariff that will be required to
equalise the price of domestically produced goods with that of
imported goods from third countries, and the higher this tariff
wall, the greater is the welfare loss to the grouping as a whole.
The massive differential in inflation and money growth rates between
member countries does create a major obstacle for tariff
harmonisation.
The additional problems of adjustment and confidence have
arisen as the currencies of many West African countries appear to be
losing domestic confidence and exchange value, and thereby becoming
increasingly inconvertible. Corrective measures have been sought
along the lines of introducing greater exchange rate flexibility (5
currencies have basket pegs while Nigeria and Ghana appear to
maintain relatively independent floating currencies) and massive
exchange rate depreciation (eg Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone). In
addition, three countries, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria have had
currency change-overs. The objectives are mainly to reduce the
attractiveness of speculative activities, restore a more realistic
and responsive exchange rate system, provide price stability and
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facilitate economic performance by stimulating exports and
discouraging imports. The growing distrust of national as well as
foreign economic agents in the value of national currencies and
their obsession regarding the frequent devaluation exercises have
urged many to aggressively evolve channels for exchange rate and
capital evasion. This surge in parallel market activities in
currencies and commodities have caused further distortions in
resource allocation, resulting in an even more severe economic
slowdown.
In practically all cases, previous attempts at exchange rate
flotation and then outright devaluation - to reflect parallel market
exchange rates - have failed as the parallel market continued to
exploit the relative scarcity of foreign exchange in the banks.
Consequently, since the temptation to go to the parallel market for
foreign exchange is not eliminated by the official exchange rate
adjustment policy, the corresponding parallel market exchange rate -
supported largely by smuggling, official foreign exchange retention
facilities, excessive claims of government on bank credit and the
non-compliance to the surrender obligation by private as well as
parastatal institutions - is generally more than doubled the
official exchange rate after every devaluation.
In Sierra Leone for instance, in 1982, when the leone was
devalued from Le 1.25 to Le 2.50 to the dollar, the parallel market
rose to Le 8 from Le 4 to the dollar. A further devaluation in 1984
from Le 2.50 to Le 6 to the dollar also led to a further rise in the
parallel market rate which is currently estimated at an average of
Le 10 to the dollar. Similarly, in Ghana, the cedi/dollar parallel
market rate stood at around 200 cedis to one dollar after the cedi
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was devalued to 50 cedis to the dollar in 1985. In Nigeria also,
although no official devaluation has taken place, the parallel
market naira rate for the dollar is currently estimated at around 6
nairas to $1 on average, compared with the official rate of 0.88
naira to $1. These exchange rate divergencies influence the
corresponding intra-regional currency exchange rates, especially in
the parallel market, compounding smuggling as well as the situation
in which the banking system is continuously starved of foreign
exchange.
Table 9B ECOWAS: Estimates of Currency Over-Valuation
1970 1975 19781
Burkina -22.7 -0.4 24.1
Ghana -5.7 35.9 298.3
Ivory Coast -7.0 24.8 58.2
Mauritania -8.1 34.9 40.7
Nigeria 9.1 72.9 117.1
Senegal -13.0 35.0 28.5
Sierra Leone -3.7 -3.3 -3.7
Togo -21.2 16.8 25.7
Source: AGMS, 'Balance of Payments Problems of African Countries
and their Effects on the Development Objectives', August
1979, p 69
Notes:
	 1 1977 for Nigeria
2 Position change indicates high overvaluation; the sign
(-) indicates low over-valuation
The over-valuation of exchange rates has further distorted the
price relationships such that imports have become more attractive in
most domestic markets than domestic products. While many of these
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corrective solutions have induced further shortages, higher
inflationary pressures and dampened economic growth, their
frequently intensive adoption and the high failure rate associated
with them clearly manifest the lack of capacity of individual West
African countries to eliminate the consequent growing economic
imbalances. As shown in Table 9B, the West African currencies have
been increasingly over-valued in recent years. The over-valuation
has been more severe especially for Ghana and Nigeria. With the
exception of Sierra Leone, the anglophone countries have tended to
be more overvalued than the francophone states.
Institutionally, the role of monetary integration in ECOWAS is
linked to the trade liberalisation programme of the Community
(Article 13 of the Lagos Treaty). The need for co-operation in
monetary and fiscal policies is expressed in Article 36 of the
Treaty. These provisions by and large have required the
liberalisation of exchange and payments restrictions, the
harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies, the setting up of a
balance of payments support fund, and the inception by 1989 of an
exchange agreement within the Community. As was observed in Chapter
3, the impressive and optimistic time-table set against each of
these objectives has hardly been achieved and no new dates have been
fixed, ostensibly because member states may still be studying the
potential effects of these measures on their fast declining
economies. In' the meantime while the West African Clearing House
exists as the first and only all-embracing post-independence and
post-ECOWAS institutionalised form of monetary co-operation, the
Community, as has been noted in Chapter 1 and elsewhere in this
study, has commissioned three separate studies (see IMF, 1980;
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Cincin-Sain and Marshall, 1983; and Frimpong-Ansah, 1983) on
measures for the improvement of albeit, 'limited' monetary
integration, and their main conclusions and recommendations have not
differed in this direction. Consequently, it is not surprising that
as was commissioned, these studies have independently merely
stressed payments and exchange liberalisation and the
institutionalisation of credit and balance of payment support
schemes within WACH. These recommendations may be derived of course
from the recognised member states' fear for total or partial loss of
national autonomy.
In principle, the gains to be derived from monetary integration
are associated with savings from foreign exchange resources, from
reallocating resources to higher yielding activities, increasing
mutual trade, reducing uncertainties and improving the efficiency of
the monetary mechanism.
A common currency is typically expected to yield advantages in
terms of removing some uncertainty in transactions between member
countries, by extending the area over which one currency acts as a
medium of exchange and a store of value and through the
establishment of free factor mobility which will augment the gains
from trade and the pooling of shocks from social disturbances or
economic fluctuations. Political and socio-economic disturbances in
a country can lead to pressure on the country's reserves,
speculation against the currency, and hence to the adoption of often
uneconomic adjustment policies, eg exchange controls and
devaluation. If, however, that country is joined to others in a
currency or montary union, the discipline of the fixed exchange
system is enforced and monetary and financial discipine, in terms of
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contraction of monetary expansion combined with realistic interest
rates and exchange rates, automatically follows.
A wider currency area would take the national exchange rate and
montary management out of politics, ensure protection against
disturbances that arise from central government or interest group
domination. In Africa, because of the smallness and dependent
nature of the economies, economic cartels or interest groups have
been powerful enough to influence exchange rate changes and threaten
the viability of the national currencies.
There are three principles which provide a direct source of
reserve saving from having a common currency (see for instance
Mundell, 1973, p 53; Nana-Sinkam, 1978, p 99). The first is the
insurance principle - in the sense of smoothering the losses and
gains in trade between countries or, in other words, balancing
intra-regional trade. The algebraic sum of the average deficits of
members of a reserve pool is less than the average of the deficits
of the individual countries. This is due to both price and quantity
variations. Thus, because the prices and production volume of
export products do not move together, neither will the balance of
payments of different countries. The same holds for imports of
goods, services and capital.
Secondly, reserve saving is ensured through the
internationalisation principle.	 Credit-backed reserves can
,
substitute for hard-currency-backed reserves due to intra-regional
trade. Elements of a deficit arising from intra-regional trade
would not require foreign exchange cover and could indeed be
financed by mutual bank balances.
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Thirdly, in the context of the externalities principle, there
are economies of scale associated with the spreading of overhead
costs of management, the sharing of 'publc goods' such as
information, communications, etc. Other dimensions of externalities
are due to the pooled exploitation of natural and industrial
production capacities and the efficiency of reserve and overall
management of financial resources.
These three principles yield reserve saving, and therefore
extra interest-aggregate reserves in addition to greater confidence
in the regional currency. But the major gains arise from the
increase in recorded trade itself. By breaking away from all
financial barriers to intra 7regional trade, smuggling and black
markets, rife throughout West Africa, would be reduced to those
arising from tariff barriers, which can themselves be eliminated by
more rational (from the standpoint of regional interests) tariff
policies.
It is expected that after a common currency has been in
operation for some time, habits and expectations are formed which
make withdrawal relatively difficult and costly. To the extent that
the currency area sustains, West African countries would gain from a
strengthened ability not only to deal with the rest of the world in
financial and socio-economic negotiations, but also in imposing
improved financial discipline and stability within the region. Real
economic convergence and greater mutually beneficial growth among
the member states would be enhanced.
Thus, the role of monetary integration for West Africa in the
context of our study is in sum related to its capacity and
effectiveness as a catalysing element in solving the complex
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problems of foreign exchange . liquidity, balance of payment
adjustment, currency inconvertibility and confidence, and exchange
rate stability.	 In dealing with some of the 'deep-rooted'
structural transformations that are fundamental in enhancing
domestic and external financial stability, and against which the
attainment of sustainable levels of eonomic growth is critically
dependent, monetary integration should catalyse economic integration
and overall development in West Africa. As in Europe during the
early post-war years, montary integration in West Africa must be
seen as a medium through which the economies of the region can be
'reconstructed' after the 'shocks' of the 1970s and early 1980s.
These transformations, many of which are largely dependent and
historic in nature, cannot be replaced or avoided by an integration
strategy that is too far short of significant political and economic
sacrifice in national autonomy on aspects of fiscal and monetary
management.
The associated costs of monetary integration to a participating
country cannot, however, be ignored. In the literature, they stem
maily from constraints imposed on national sovereignty in the
pursuit of monetary and fiscal policies and the possibility that
such policies taken at the regional level would not always work in
the individual partner's national interests. The nearer the process
of monetary integration is towards the establishment of a full
monetary union, the greater the degree of potential inflexibility in
the pursuance of national economic policies, and the more pronounced
and perceived the cost indicators are. This, from a definitional
point of view, is because as countries enter into a monetary union,
they relinguish control of their monetary and, possibly, fiscal
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policies to supra-national authorities controlled only at the union
level. Decisions relating to monetary policies, in particular,
would have to be made at the union level and the flexibility of
seeking central banks (or overall bank financing for budgetary
deficits or exploiting inflation finance) would be limited through
collective decision making.
It is recognised at the same time that within the monetary
grouping, economies may diverge in their stages of development and
growth with different degrees of financial and structural
disequilibria as well as in their response to variations in demands
for their goods and services. These divergencies appear partly as a
result of long histories of national identity and preference of
national policies to create artificial barriers between national
economies. Moreover, as Allen (1983) explains, a national
government within a monetary union continues to represent a national
constituency, which holds the government responsible for the health
of the national economy. Yet in a monetary union, the government
must give up, for instance, a major instrument of national economic
policy, control of money and credit. This juxtaposition of
continued accountability and a perception of weakened capability
makes the question of how to address divergent national interests
particularly important. One notes however, that in a formal model,
Allen and Kenen (1980) argue that countries may not have much real
national monetary independence to lose in joining a monetary union.
This, according to them, presupposes that there is market
integration between the prospective members and also that they
maintain fairly stable exchange rates among themselves, thus begging
the issues which forming a monetary union is all about.
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In the lower forms of monetary integration, designed
essentially to liberalise exchange restrictions, and, hence improve
currency convertibility, participating countries are obliged to
adopt monetary and fiscal policies that are consistent with a
sustainable degree of external balance. This, in turn, will impose
certain constraints on the use of policy instruments at the national
level. As the higher degrees of monetary integration are attained,
ie fixed exchange rate parities or the adoption of one currency
within the union, the principle cost for a participating country is
related more to the loss of the use of the exchange rate as a basic
instrument of international adjustment policy and/or the loss of
national identity in the issuance of the currency notes and coin.
The exchange rate aspect is emphasised by Corden (1972) who
concludes that if countries deprive themselves of appropriate
exchange rate adjustments (or trade and payments restrictions) as
policy instruments, they 'impose on themselves losses that are
essentially the losses resulting from enforced departure from
internal balance'.
Corden explains this enforced departure from internal
equilibrium by assuming further that a country is initially in
internal balance but with a deficit in the external account. If the
exchange rate instrument were available, the appropriate policy
would consist of a combination of devaluation and expenditure
reduction to achieve simultaneously, external and internal
equilibria. When the exchange rate is not available as a policy
instrument, it is necessary to reduce expenditure by more than is
required in the optimal situation with the result of extra
unemployment. The excess unemployment, which can be valued in terms
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of output, represents the cost to that participating country of
depriving itself of the exchange rate as a policy instrument. The
extent of this loss is determined, ceteris paribus, by the marginal
propensity to import and to consume exportables, or, more generally,
by the marginal propensity to consume tradeables relative to non-
tradeables.	 The expenditure reduction that is required for
eliminating the initial external deficit will be smaller the higher
the marginal propensity to import.
The perceived cost of monetary union is also explained in terms
of a loss associated with a trade-off in achieving economic goals.
For instance, against the framework of the Phillips Curve, a common
monetary policy makes it impossible for countries to opt for
different trade-offs between inflation and unemployment along their
'
Phillips curves. Hence, it would be likely to result in an unwanted
combination of unemployment and inflation in some or all members of
the union. So, if optimal domestic policies require different rates
of inflation in different member states but, as in the case in a
monetary union, exchange rates are fixed, some countries will have
to depart from their optimal positions if a uniform change in costs
is to be ensured. In the circumstances, some member states will be
compelled to accept more inflation than they would choose, while
others will have to accept more unemployment. For those obliged to
suffer additional unemployment, the excess, valued by the loss of
output that it represents, provides a measure of the cost of
monetary integration.
Further empirical evidence on the existence of the Phillips
curve trade-off (see for instance Phelps, 1968; Friedman, 1975)
suggests, however, that this trade-off exists only for very short
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periods and has no significance for long-range macroeconomic policy
formation. The evidence shows that monetary policy, whilst
influencing the rate of inflation, cannot reduce the 'natural' rate
of unemployment, ie, the rate of unemployment which is determined by
such factors as labour market conditions, taxation policy and a
variety of structural and institutional characteristics.
Consequently, any attempt to drive the rate of unemployment below
the 'natural' rate through the use of expansionary monetary policies
will be self-defeating and will engender a process of accelerating
inflation. A single exchange rate change will therefore not have
lasting effects on employment, so that the ability of a country to
achieve relatively low unemployment by depreciating its exchange
rate is also a short term matter. Under these conditions a very
significant source of welfare cost from monetary integration is
eliminated. Unification of the rate of inflation in all member
countries brought about by monetary integration does not therefore
cause added unemployment, but through the medium of fixed exchange
rates, increases price stability and encourages trade and
specialisation.
However, as Robson (1980) points out, the costs of monetary
integration cannot be discussed merely by describing them as
shortrun or transitional. To the extent that there are differences
between the Phillips curves of participating countries, adjustment
costs will necessarily occur to some as a result of the adoption of
a common inflation rate even if the countries were initially on
their longrun Phillips curves. Determined by several factors,
including the form of the shortrun Phillips curves, the time it
takes for inflationary expectations to stabilise, the initial
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divergencies between the national and union-adopted rates of
inflation, and the period it takes to attain the cow= inflationary
rate, the magnitude of the transitional costs would, where they
exceed the benefits, seriously jeopardise the future of a hastily
arranged monetary union. Against the background of differential
inflation rates among prospective integrating countries, the issues
of determining the union optimal rate and of the extent to which
collective money supply should be managed in dealing with short-term
employment problems cannot be underestimated.
Moreover, even where capital market integration is obtained in
enhancing the union's adjustment policies, the outcome may be
equilibrating or disequilibrating for some member countries. The
freeing of capital movements, as Robson (1980) notes, may lead
investors in an area of higher unemployment to invest in other
member countries because the marginal productivity of capital is
relatively low at home. This may then result to further
unemployment. 'From this standpoint capital mobility is Janus-
faced' (Fleming, 1971). Also, if the union interest rates were set
at levels higher than the return in the 'low-return' member
countries and at a lower rate than the return in the 'high-return'
member countries, investment in the former may be wiped, thereby
increasing further inter-country-disparities.
In addition, there are other implications of monetary
integration for regional development. First, the least developed
member countries might be forced to follow excessively austere
financial policies that may adversely affect their investment and
economic growth. Second, the more advanced member states, in terms
of infrastructural build-up, can become 'poles of growth' within the
460
region attracting more capital and investments. These tendencies,
as in 'pure' economic integration, could obviously be minimised
through the introduction of fiscal transfers between member
countries (from the high to low productivity members) and/or
deliberate adoption of union policies designed to equalise the
growth rates of productivity in the member states. Experience with
regional integration policies in a national context suggests,
however, that both fiscal transfers and an equalisation of regional
productivity growth rates might be extremely difficult to achieve.
It would still be more difficult for a monetary union to be
accompanied by a convergence in real wages. As a result, some
countries, especially those which may be adversely affected by those
equalisation policies, will be unlikely to see monetary integration
in itself as an attractive proposition. It is also likely, on the
other hand, that a decision on the part of such countries to
participate in monetary integration would presumably be determined
by whether their loss in real income growth would be more than
compensated for by other related benefits, such as trade gains or
gains of a potential nature.
In the final analysis, the question of participation in
monetary integration automatically becomes one of weighing the
expected net benefits against the potential net losses. The
decision to join is as purely economic as it is political, as the
weights that would be necessary during the evaluation process would
have to be established by political considerations. In reaching
decisions at each stage or form of monetary integration, short terr
net positions for each prospective member country are just as
important as longer term net positions. It is argued that in the
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short run, some countries entering the integration process could
find themselves incurring net costs, but that, as the process
attains towards higher degrees and develops, the original parameters
might gradually change with the result that net benefits could
eventually emerge. In any case it is observed from the preceding
discussions that any disagreements about the benefits and costs for
a country joining monetary integration appear to set in only where
the latter are discussed.
No doubt, the costs of monetary integration, for the region as
a whole, have also to be closely related to the opportunity costs of
not achieving it. For the individual country, costs can be
associated with the opportunity cost of staying outside monetary
integration. The cummulative effects of both costs on the countries
or country concerned should vary, depending more on their
geographical contiguity, their relative economic strengths and
perhaps, more importantly, on the relative convertibility of the
national currencies both internally and externally.
Arguably, the expected opportunity costs for a country staying
outside the integrated area relate to a depreciation of the
liquidity value of its money and to the loss of price
competitiveness. For such a country the rigour of monetary, fiscal
and overall economic policies has to constantly be demonstrated in
'fine-tuning' and by providing greater monetary and financial
incentives (eg high interest rates, low business taxes, etc) in
order to defend the economy in general, and the national currency in
particular. In short, the 'recalcitrant' country would under such
circumstances be enjoying more of the disadvantages of membership of
monetary integration.
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Obviously, these conclusions could be reversed in favour of the
'recalcitrant' country in which case such country has the likelihood
of 'stealing' a competitive advantage by allowing its economy to
slide rather than by deciding to control it in unison with the
integrated group.
In practice, these arguments have featured very prominently (on
exchange rate management prices, and interest rates) in discussions
as to whether or not Britain should become a full member of the
European Monetary System. In the ECOWAS, the issue could arise
should: (a) Nigeria - because of oil revenues, policial and
economic size; (b) Liberia - because of a convertible dollar and US
assistance; or (c) the WAMU countries - either because the union
has survived for so long or for fear of Nigerian domination and/or
the relative finacial instability of non-WAMU countries - each
decides to opt out of an ECOWAS monetary union. It could also arise
should some countries appear complacement with the existing Clearing
House arrangement and therefore show little enthusiasm for further
stages in monetary co-operation.
It is obvious that the magnitude of the potential benefits and
costs do vary with different levels of monetary integration. Until
these contrasting aspects are firmly established and reasonably
understood at the initial stages, montary integration in any form
is, as Grubel (1981) puts it, 'putting the cart before the horse'.
The crucial question for the participating countries at each stage
or form of monetary integration is therefore whether that level (or
further levels) is (are) worth striving for in respect of the
potential gains and losses, although in most cases, the latter
appear more obvious than the former. Indeed, as most writers have
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observed, the benefits of a monetary union accrue in the form of
externalities and in small doses to the general public but these
should become more apparent as the processes of monetary and
economic co-operation gain an impressive pace. This is because in
the short to medium term, the nature and level of the benefits of
integration are determined largely by existing production structures
and infrastructural facilities than the pure monetary obstacles. In
the longer term, the costs, which are more readily identifiable at
the beginning of the integration process - especially as they affect
special interest groups in the participating countries, are more
than offset by the gains.
9.3 THE TRANSITION PROBLEM
The difficulties of reconcling national views and interests, of
shaking the traditional inertia of bureaucracies and of accepting
the political and economic risks apart, the promise and prospects
for the issuance of a common currency in West Africa, for the
pooling of reserves and the unification of domestic monetary
policies have important implications for the all-embracing West
African Clearing House and the all-francophone West African Monetary
Union. At the same time neither institution could provide a
profound basis for the transition towards monetary unification,
although the latter poses greater threat than the former. As noted
earlier, the actual post-independence experience of monetary co-
operation in West Africa up to the present time centres largely on
these two institutions. A critical appraisal of their operations
and experience would therefore serve to highlight some of the issues
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and problems already touched on regarding the feasibility and scope
of further advances in monetary integration in West Africa.
It should be noted, however, that while the WAMU had its
foundation from the Franc zone established in the mid-forties
between France and its colonies, the origins of an all-embracing
monetary co-operation scheme in West Africa were in two previously
unsuccessful attempts at creating an African Payments Union (APU).
The first was in 1962 between Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali
and Morocco. It failed as the members became reluctant to execute
the formulated 'Casablanca Charter'.
The second attempt in 1963 was inspired by the Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA). - The Commission invited the Executive
Secretariat to:
'study the possibility of creating a clearing system
within a payments union of African countries and to
present the study of the Commission during its 7th
meeting in 1965' (Resolution 98(v) of the 5th Assembly of
ECA, 1963)%
In the ECA's view, the APU was necessary as the 'situation of
exchange and payments in Africa in the early 1960s was rather poor
and called for immediate correction'.
The emerging study on the project by Professor Triffin
recommended a gradual process towards the creation of a continental
monetary union and the African Monetary Co-operation Charter which
he advocated required African states to:
(a) periodically examine discriminatory restrictions and
measures in matters of payments with a view to gradually
suppressing them;
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(b) encourage mutual assistance agreements and policy co-
ordination with a view to overcoming possible obstacles to
this liberation and arising from balance of payments; and
(c) to seek for and enlarge similar agreements on a wide an
area as possible.
These objectives according to Professor Triff in, were to be achieved
through the establishment of a 'Pan-African Advisory Body' dealing
with monetary and payments matters. He maintained that the monetary
co-operation charter he envisaged could only be an integral part of
a much wider economic co-:operation charter for the continent.
This project too never materialised as the preliminaries for
its realisation - eg statutory matters, membership, policy and
implementation strategies, and other logistics were never adequately
resolved. It was however on the basis of the foundations laid by it
that the signing, on 14 March 1975 and the ratification on 25 June
1975 of an agreement providing for the establishment of the West
'
African Clearing House (WACH) were effected. Through the
Association of African Central Banks (established in 1966), the
African Payments Union project was more or less transformed into the
formation of four sub-regional (monetary) committees (delineated
geographically as North, West, Central and East African sub-regional
committees) with basic responsibilities to facilitate payments and
clearing arrangements at the sub-regional level. The WACH was hence
the first concrete 'indigenous' experiment of multilateral monetary
co-operation in West Africa and in Africa as a whole; the second in
Africa was the Central African Clearing House, established in 1979.
9.3.1 The West African Clearing House (WACH)
The objectives of the West Africa Clearing House as stated in
Article II, section 2 of the Articles of Agreement are:
(a) to promote the use of member countries' currencies for
sub-regional trade and other transactions;
(b) to secure economies in the use of foreign reserves of
member countries;
(c) to encourage trade liberation between member countries;
and
(d) to promote monetary co-operation and consultation between
member countries.
The WACH's other essential operational features as addressed in
the Articles include provisions for a unit of account and exchange
guarantees (Article VII), and for credits, eligible transactions and
exceptions in the clearing mechanism (Article VIII). Centralised in
Freetown, Sierra Leone, operations in the Clearing House commenced
on 1 July 1976, a year after its establishment.
The WACH arrangement was thus originally justified largely in
terms of its ability to provide a framework through which certain
subsidiary benefits of monetary integration could be secured within
the ECOWAS. For a group of countries lacking a common currency, the
stated aims of the Clearing House imply the desire to use the
clearing mechanism as a vehicle through which some of the major
monetary obstacles which have hampered intra-regional trade (le
multiplicity of currencies with varied convertibility levels, and
trade and payments restrictions which to a large extent do not
discriminate against mutual trade) might be minimised, thereby
467
improving such trade relations and hence, secure savings in foreign
reserves.
More specifically, the role of the WACH was seen against the
background of the established modes of settlement for intra-regional
transactions. The common feature in West Africa is however that
while unrecorded and recorded border trade is normally transacted in
cash (often through a parallel market utilising regional or other
convertible currencies, eg CFA, dollar), the principal channel for
effecting intra-regional settlements is through the region's
commercial banks, which in turn settle in convertible currencies
through correspondent banks overseas. This was the system that the
establishment of the Clearing House was designed to improve upon.
There are thus three major areas on which we now attempt to
evaluate the performance of the multilateral clearing system after
nearly a decade of operational experience:
(a) the relationship between the clearing operations and
intra-regional trade;
(b) the degree of currency convertibility and the level of
savings in international reserves accomplished; and
(c) the extent of monetary consultation and integration
achieved and prospects for further advances in monetary
co-operation.
9.3.1.1	 Intra-Regional Trade Expansion 
The WACH Agreement provides that all current account
transactions (ie goods, services, income and unrequited transfers)
are eligible for clearing through the system. Transactions exempted
are:
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(a) those specified by the WACH Exchange and Clearing
Committee (comprising at least two representatives from
each member central bank or monetary authority), and
(b) payments relating to goods of 'non-local 	 ie,
goods from third countries.
(c) trade among member states of WAMU as they share a common
currency between them (the CFA franc). In practice also,
oil transactions with Nigeria are not channelled through
the Clearing House, although ECOWAS countries are allowed
90 days credit in contrast to the official OPEC pricing
policy of allowing 30 days credit across the board for all
countries.
The initial implications of these exemptions can be illustrated
by drawing from the intra-ECO WAS trade matrices discussed in Chapter
4 (Tables 40 and 4P). WAMU trade has represented over half of total
intra-ECOWAS trade; rising from 54.1 per cent in 1970-75 to 57.0 per
cent in 1983 after declining slightly to 49.7 per cent over 1976-80.
Of this, over half is among its member countries, ie 52.6, 51.6 and
53.1 per cent in 1970-75, 1976-80 and 1983 respectively. Until it
rejoined the union in 1985, almost all of Mali's trade in the ECOWAS
(representing 7-9 per cent) was with the WAMU states, ie 92.1, 97.2
and 100 per cent over the three periods respectively. Nigeria's
exports to the Community has accounted for 17-22 per cent of total
intra-Community trade in 1976-83 and virtually all of this can
safely be assumed to be in respect of oil. Thus, taking intra-WAMU-
Mali trade together with Nigeria's ECOWAS exports (which are assumed
to correspond with ECOWAS imports from Nigeria), it means in
practice that an average of over two-thirds of their share in total
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intra-ECOWAS trade (ie 69.1, 71.0 and 70.3 per cent in 1976-80, 1981
and 1982 respectively) or around 60 per cent (ie 54.1, 60.8 and 61.3
per cent) of total trade among ECOWAS member countries is
automatically not a part of the WACH mechanism. Furthermore, when
compared with the corresponding total value of WACH transactions
(derived in Table 9C), it is further revealed that of the remaining
intra-ECOWAS trade (ie $3099, $754 and $659 millions), only up to a
quarter of this trade has been channelled through the Clearing
House, ie 14.4, 25.7 and 15.5 per cent in 1976-80, 1981 and 1982
respectively.
The underutilisation of WACH is illustrated further in terms of
the ratio of total clearing transactions to total intra-regional
trade. The evidence is that eventhough the value of WACH
transactions has shown a steady rise since the commencement of the
operations, rising by several fold between 1976 and 1981, only
around 10 per cent of intra-regional trade has actually been
channelled through the mechanism (Table 90. The steady rise though
in this ratio from 2.4 per cent in 1976 to 6.5 per cent in 1979 and
10.1 per cent in 1981 compares unfavourably with performance by the
Central American Clearing House whose proportion of total clearing
transactions to intra-regional trade grew spectacularly from 10 per
cent to 77 per cent during the first two years of its operations -
1961/1963 (Del Valle, 1966).
The Table also indicates that the proportion of intra-ECO WAS
trade that is theoretically compensable (ie on the assumption that
all intra-community trade is channelled through the WACH) is limited
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to around 50 per cent and has not improved since the Clearing
House's creation. The implication is that at best only about half
of total intra-West African trade can be freely financed in regional
currencies through the WACH.	 The total volume of 'trade'
transactions cleared through the WACH (as against non-trade
transactions - financial, capital and unclassified) as a percentage
of the theoretical maximum compensable trade has also remained
significantly low at less than 10 per cent; falling to 4.2 per cent
in 1981 from 7.7 per cent in 1979. The continuous decline in
'trade' transactions in terms of total WACH transactions (from 77 to
23 per cent in 1977-81) appeared to favour non-trade transactions
(although there has been no capital transactions), which might have
suggested a change in emphasis for clearing mechanism from trade to
non :trade transactions, but the reverse was the case in 1982.
Furthermore, the value of transactions actual ly cleared as a
proportion of total WACH transactions has also remained low. After
reaching a peak of 29 per cent in 1977, this ratio dropped steadily
to 18.4 per cent in 1982. This continuous decline implies a
corresponding rise in the proportion of WACH transactions requiring
non-regional currency settlement, which is contrary to the foreign
exchange saving objective of the WACH. The failure of the Clearing
House to provide or stimulate savings of international reserves by
bringing about a substantial reduction in the use of such foreign
exchange assets in relation to intra-regional transactions (since
only net balances after clearing operations have to be settled in
foreign convertible currencies) is demonstrated further in the Table
by the continuous rise in the ratio of final settlements to total
WACH transactions. The overall picture is that well over two-thirds
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of WACH transactions are actually due for settlement in foreIgn
currencies.
Another critical feature of the WACH's operational experience
is shown in Table 9D in that the pattern of clearing transactions
and settlements have merely reflected the pronounced mutual tree
imbalances as were shown in Chapter 4. In particular, the skenness
is between the francophone countries as a group and the rest of
ECOWAS. The Table indicates the predominance of the WAMU countries
(BCEAO as central bank) as net creditors in the clearing system as
against persistent debtor positions by such countries as Ghana,
Guinea and Mauritania. Inclusion of oil payments for WACH clearing
would not only greatly augment the overall volume of transactions
cleared, it would also reverse Nigeria's chronic debtor position.
Payments (or receipts) in favour of the BCEAO, as a proportici
of total WACH transactions, increased from 68.98 per cent in 1976/77
to 82.80 per cent in 1981/82, while the proportion of the
corresponding payments it has had to order has dropped consistently.
In general, the WAMU states as a group have not manifested an.)
significant utilisation of the clearing facility, although this is
also true for most countries in the ECOWAS. Although it may appear
that some of the countries with the more highly inconvertible
currencies, owing to stricter exchange restrictions (eg Ghana)
Guinea and Nigeria) have channelled an increasing proportion of
their payments for intra-regional transactions through the 1,ACH,
Ghana's participation has been steadily declining. Liberia, the
most liberal in terms of trade and payments restrictions, Guinea:-
Bissau which joined the WACH only in 1978/79 and Sierra Leone, yott
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restrictions almost as tight as in Ghana and Nigeria, have also
shown little participation in the clearing operations.
9.3.1.2	 Regional Convertibility 
The performance of the WACH after 10 years of operation can
also be appraised in terms of its effectiveness in fostering greater
convertibility among the currencies of the region. The concept of
currency convertibility relates to the ability to exchange one
currency for another at a given conversion rate and to the usability
of a currency to settle external transactions (IMF, 1980). In
practice this definition emcompasses various degrees of
convertibility, ranging from total (or perfect) convertibility - the
unrestricted exchange of one currency into all other currencies
without limitations imposed on its usability for any type of foreign
transactions - to total (or complete) inconvertibility, which refers
to the complete inability to exchange one currency into any other
currency or to use it for any foreign transaction. While perfect
convertibility applies to the case where a country has no payments
and exchange restrictions vis-a-vis the rest of the world, by
contrast, total inconvertibility would require the complete absence
of international transactions in that country, le, a completely
closed economy. Along this spectrum, the degree of currency
convertibility is identified mainly by the scope and intensity of
exchange and other financial restrictions towards international
transactions, le, the ease with which a currency can be converted
into other currencies and the extent to which it can be used for
various types of foreign transactions.
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A more formal treatment of the concept of convertibility is
provided in Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement which
expresses the current convertibility obligations for all Fund
members. The convertibility matrix presented in Table 9E defines
more clearly the concept of 'limited convertibility' which, as
already noted, is widely recommended as the most appropriate form of
convertibility which developing countries must aspire towards in
their monetary integration efforts. Preconditions for achieving
other forms of convertibility (total and Fund convertibility) or
indeed, complete inconvertibility are also shown in the matrix.
In general terms, limited convertibility refers to the
unrestricted exchange and use of national currencies within a
region. Or, in line with IMF provisions regarding restrictions
imposed on residents on the making of payments and transfers
overseas, limited currency convertibility, especially for those
developing countries whose national currencies are generally not
held by non-residents would mean the 'absence or a minimum of
restrictions on residents in respect of their ability to use such
currencies for the purchase of other currencies' (Cincin-Sain and
Marshall, 1983) and it is only this type of convertibility is what
has been variously recommended for the ECO WAS member countries.
Hence, the institution of WACH arrangements it was argued, should
provide for a larger degree of payments liberalisation between
member countries and for a much larger reliance on national
currencies through an ad hoc intra-regional accounting unit as a
means for settlement of mutual balances incurred in exchange
transactions between them.
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Where countries within a region do differ significantly in
their initial degree of restrictions, as is the case in West Africa,
it is expected that to improve regional convertibility, those
countries with more highly restrictive exchange systems would have
to more positively adopt liberalisation measures in order to achieve
the degree of liberalisation of the least restrictive member
countries. In other words, the dismantling of exchange restrictions
within the region would be accompanied by a shift into those
regional currencies which display the highest degree of
convertibility. Those countries with greater currency
convertibility would in practice act as a conduit for the foreign
exchange transactions of the region as a whole and this may have
negative consequences for the balance of payments of countries with
weaker currencies. This 'conduit effect' is worsened further by the
divergencies in the exchange rate regimes of member countries.
Obviously, the best way of preventing it is by the creation of a
full monetary union with member countries sharing a uniform
currency.
Currency inconvertibility in West Africa is explained largely
by the observance of a range of exchange restrictions by most
countries. As noted previously (Chapter 6), some countries maintain
exchange systems that are free or relatively free of restrictions,
while others continue to apply severe . restrictions on virtually all
types of payments and transfers for current external transactions.
Perfect convertibility can be said to exist within the member states
of the WAMU which has a common currency issued by a common central
bank and whose residents can freely exchange transfers to one
another, whereas Liberia, with the US dollar as national currency
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and with relatively no exchange restrictions on international
transactions, displays the highest degree of convertibility in West
Africa. The rest of the currencies are highly inconvertible
although many of them are traded illegally in large quantities in
border areas.
As in the case of any multi-currency clearing arrangements,
regional convertibility is initially promoted in West Africa through
the introduction of a common unit of account within the WACH
mechanism. The West African Unit of Account (WAUA) (Cincin-Sain and
Marshall, 1983 have suggested the name, the 'African' or 'West
African) is equivalent to one SDR. To record and settle
transactions through the Clearing House, national currencies are
converted into WAUAs through cross rate mechanism involving their
respective intervention currencies and the SDR. This tedious
exercise has required, as a first stage, determining the central
rate of each currency relative to its intervention currency, and on
the second stage, converting the currency in terms of the SDR via
the intervention currency's rate in terms of the SDR. Official
settlement rates in WACH (the average of daily rates) are calculated
over two determining periods each month (1-15 and 16-end of month).
Although this rate determining procedure is designed to
minimise fluctuations in rates used for clearing operations and
reduce the administrative burden and operational costs, there is
still an imminent exchange risk, arising out of exchange variations
which originate from the daily intervention currency and SDR
relationship. WACH procedures do require that in the event of a
more than 2.5 per cent discrete devaluation of a national currency
with respect to its intervention currency, the new rate of that
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currency in terms of the WAUA applies immediately for the country's
WACH transactions.
Some form of convertibility is maintained as member countries
provide exchange guarantees which require the free conversion of
their domestic currencies into the WAUA in respect of all eligible
transactions cleared through the WACH. The member central banks are
however not committed to hold prior consultations with the WACH in
the case of changes in their official exchange policies, but must
promptly notify the Clearing House and other member banks. In
addition, the WACH arrangements also ensure full convertibility in
one of five foreign convertible currencies - US dollars, pound
sterling, French franc, Swiss franc, and German mark - in all net
settlements. This implies that a member country forced to maintain
exchange restrictions on international transactions could in no case
impose such limitations on the convertibility of its debt
obligations in the WACH.
Other basic provisions of the WACH to improve regional
convertibility include an assurance by member banks for prompt
settlement of debt obligations and the institution of credit
facilities. While considerable delays in effecting settlements (25
delayed settlements in 1982) and in some cases, an actual incidence
of default (16 cases in 1981 and a monthly average of 2.8 million
WAUA in 1982) have characterised WACH operations since their
commencement, the WACH as an institution, has not, unlike other
regional clearing institutions such as the Santa Domingo Agreement
(1969) and the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility (1977), been
designed typically to support balance of payments imbalances,
or protracted debtor balances in clearings or long settlement
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periods. The credit facility that is provided for in the WACH
system is the minimum possible - WAUA 0.5 million or 25 per cent of
the previous year's cleared transactions for debtors or twice that
for creditors - and the mechanism is meant to function as an
accounting office. Notwithstandng this limited and very short term
technical credit facilities, all debtor positions are required to be
settled monthly and promptly on demand or not later than 15 days
after the month to which the debt relates.
As the extended debtor positions persist, this fundamental
limitation of the WACH to enhance a meaningful credit mechanism is
manifested in continuous delayed settlements and several cases of
actual default. Calculations in Table 9F of the theoretically
available credit facilities in WACH show that net ceilings for
debtor member countries between 1980/81 - 1982/83 range from WAUA
8000 in Liberia to WAUA 2.672 million for the BCEAO, whereas credit
limits span a range of WAUA 0.016 to 5.344 million for the two areas
respectively. The inadequacy of the credit mechanism is
demonstrated here by matching the calculated credit facilities
against actual net settlement positions. In 1980/81 and 1981/82,
the BCEAO's respective net settlement balances of WAUA 131.96
million and 108.01 million, were 49 and 22 times the stipulated
credit limits, while for Nigeria, net settlements were over 20 times
the allotted debit ceilings. For the region as a whole, net credit
facilities are about 7 times short of the volume of net settlements
needing financial support. Purely on the basis of country intra-
regional trade imbalances, it appears that only surplus countries -
Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Senegal, are more capable of extending
481
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credit to countries such as Benin, Ghana, Guinea and Mali which have
incurred pronounced intra-regional trade deficits. On a sub-
regional basis, credit must come from the WAMU member countries to
the rest of the ECOWAS. In terms of overall balance of payments
performance, only the Ivory Coast and to a limited extent Liberia,
Nigeria and Senegal could be capable of extending credit to deficit-
stricken countries - Benin, Gambia, Burkina and Sierra Leone. These
assumptions do re-emphasise the expected additional role for the
larger and relatively more developed member countries of the ECOWAS
to the smaller and relatively more vulnerable states.
9.3.1.3	 Prospects for Monetary Union 
The foregoing analysis clearly shows that in its existing
state, the West African Clearing House mechanism is significantly
insufficient as a medium for establishing regional convertibility,
stabilising exchange rates within narrow margins of fluctuation,
creating liquidity support even for mutual imbalances, promoting
intra-regional trade, and hence, for securing the much desired
saving in foreign exchange which could have been used to finance
part of the overall external trade imbalances.
Often in discussions on the apparent weaknesses of the WACH
mechanism, attention is focused largely on those factors which, as
outlined in Chapter 7, are inherent in virtually all clearing house
institutions. These inhibiting factors include the narrow range of
eligible transactions, protracted delays and default in executing
transfer orders and net settlements, problems of insufficient
transport, communications and publicity networks, the lack of active
participation by the commercial banks, other financial institutions
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and the general public, as well as the marked inadequacy of credit
facilities within the clearing system. There is no doubt that these
weaknesses have partly resulted in the marked underutilisation of
the WACH.
There are nonetheless obstacles which are much more structural
and fundamental in nature and for which the realisation of monetary
integration in West Africa only in the form of the WACH can provide
no penetrating solution. To begin with, it is extremely likely that
a number of member countries would deliberately want to avoid the
embarrassment of becoming hardcore debtors in the system should they
institute stricter regulations to encourage greater participation by
their nationals. In some countries, there is simply not enough
enthusiasm to increase participation, especially by the fiscal and
treasury authorities. It can also be argued that the timing and
speed with which WACH was established in relation to the inception
of the ECOWAS hardly provided enough time for the type of
preparedness and concerted efforts that was required for
appreciating its role more meaningfully with respect to regional
financial and overall economic problems which began in the 1970s and
which have exaggerated in the early 1980s. No doubt then that WACH
has had limited capacity to influence both the frequent and, in
almost all cases, the massive and generally downward exchange rate
adjustments as well as the continued severity of quantitative
controls and exchange restrictions adopted in several countries.
These policy options, as already noted, are to a large extent
symptomatic of the sustained balance of payments pressures
experienced in these countries and against which WACH has no scope.
Moreover, they provide the main source of the high incidence of
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black market commodity and currency activities. Above all, WACH has
lacked the scope to stimulate and expand reciprocity in trade,
financial and production profiles of the member countries as well as
that with which to effectively disturb the predominance of non-
regional currencies in settlement operations. There have been no
capital transactions through the WACH system.
Whatever the theoretical virtues of the WACH, its scope and
ability as a medium for furthering monetary integration among the
West African states is practically constrained by both its
operational weaknesses as well as by the structural problems and
distortions that have characterised the region. With the continued
deterioration in overall export performance and other international
reserve sources, what is required is a monetary integration
framework that should in the first instance eliminate or minimise
the scope for foreign exchange leakages and restore confidence for
domestic transactors, foreign investment, and mutual and
international assistance. In the medium to longer-term, the
mechanism required is one through which the more structural problems
of food shortages, stabilisation of export supplies and prices,
rationalisation of concessionary aid, external public debts and
import demand can be grappled with more concertedly.
It is all too apparent that for most financial and commercial
operators in West Africa, the utter desire is to seek to maximise
the relatively risk-free profits which can be extracted from the
fragmented and unco-ordinated systems of fiscal and monetary
(exchange rates) arrangements. These, of course, contribute further
to destabilising the overall economic system by increasing domestic
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fiscal expenditures and money stocks, thereby injecting further
inflationary bias.
A number of proposals have recently been put forward with a
view to improving the scope and performance of the WACH. Frimpong-
Ansah (1983) has recommended the upgrading of the WACH into a credit
institution with legal powers to mobilise regional and extra-
regional resources and to provide for larger but short-term credit
tranches and longer settlement periods. There have also been
proposals for expanding the moniness of the West African Unit of
Account and these include:
(a) the introduction of West African travellers cheques
denominated in WAUA for travel within the region;
(b) the prompt repurchase of a member country through the
clearing system, of its currency notes held by individuals
and institutions in other member states; and
(c) the establishment of a West African Confirming House for
intra-regional trade.
These proposals do have conceptual appeal, but their ultimate
realisation and impact on furthering monetary co-operation in the
region cannot be ascertained. Firstly, it should be pointed out
that an arrangement in which credit is linked to the incidence of
intra-regional imbalance is open to the objection that in so far as
the mutual deficits and surpluses result from fundamental
differences in structural economic and financial distortions and
comparative costs, insistence upon the elimination of these
imbalances would lead to a less efficient allocation of resources
with little impact on intra-regional trade expansion. However, it
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may be argued that the impact on such credit arrangements on the
volume of West Africa's mutual trade which is presently conducted
under highly restrictive conditions may be improved if provision is
made for the balancing of incremental rather than total trade. This
provides an additional incentive for participation in mutual trade.
The review of the experience of West Africa's intra-regional trade
flows implicitly recognises that member countries incurring
persistent regional deficits may be unwilling to go very far with
liberalisation of such trade if reciprocity in the form of balancing
the growth in their imports resulting from their own liberalisation
against the growth in exports attributable to liberalisation by
other countries is not judiciously achieved.
At the same time, a country contributing reserve assets to the
working capital of any credit arrangement will almost certainly
require automatic access to at least an equivalent amount of credit,
and an additional degree of automaticity might be in order. How far
such automaticity should go is a matter for judgement and
negotiation in each case, and should depend on such factors as the
standards of monetary discipline of member countries, their
confidence in one another and the quality of their experience in
working together. Obviously, the more certain a country is of
access to substantial credit facilities, the more inclined it will
be to risk the balance of payments consequence of reducing
restrictions on imports from other members of the group.
It should be noted also that while the initial problem with the
credit proposal is the required mobilisation of the capital
endowments amidst the currently depleted foreign reserve positions,
the seriousness of the balance of payments implications of intra-
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regional trade for the majority of countries relates not so much on
that trade which is officially recorded but, more significantly on
that which goes through unrecorded, and is substantially on the
black market. There are as we have noted no estimates available on
unrecorded intra-West African trade but it is undoubtedly of
considerable importance as the goods involved are generally re-
exports and are transacted in the relatively more convertible
regional and foreign convertible currencies. However, strictly on
the basis of the intra-regional trade imbalance positions revealed
in our analysis, a credit facility to support this trade would
automatically imply placing a disproportionate burden on the surplus
countries - Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Liberia, but such a
reasoning is merely theoretical because of the equally worsening
balance of payments pressures in these countries. .
As far as the travellers cheques and currency notes repurchase
proposals are concerned the greatest worry is that, because of the
wide disparities in the degree of convertibility among the West
African currencies, these mechanisms if instituted would seriously
aggravate the 'conduit effect' and its consequent adverse
implications for the balance of payments of the less convertible
countries. It is too apparent that for a start a traveller from
Sierra Leone, for instance, would purchase WAUA denominated
traveller's cheques or leone notes. On arrival in Liberia he would
then encash them into dollars, either through the banking system or
at a discount in the parallel market. The dollars would later be
exported illegally to Sierra Leone to finance both commodity
smuggling and black market currency activities; and the vicious
circle starts again. Until currency convertibility differentials
488
are eliminated through the introduction of a uniform currency or
narrowed down through some fixed exchange rate arrangement,
instituting these proposed facilities would only institutionalise at
the regional level those black market and parallel market activities
which in most countries are already deeply entrenched within the
overall economic system.
On the foregoing, the idealised picture of the role of WACH
that was drawn in the Articles of Agreement is thus evidently far
from reality. As was envisaged before its inception the Clearing
House has functioned without interfering in any way with the member
central banks' autonomy in the choice of exchange regimes or in the
application of national monetary and fiscal policies. Since
exchange rates were not fixed within the mechanism, they too have
continued to fluctuate widely against each other, reflecting, among
other factors, the absence of harmonisation in monetary and fiscal
policies. In essence, the Clearing House has done little to support
economic integration in that it has operated over the years without
making any impact on liberalising and expanding mutual trade and on
improving regional convertibility. Indeed, the potential importance
of its consultative mechanism, which have been evident among the
member central and commercial banking systems, cannot be ignored, at
least, if only to complement the transitional framework towards
monetary union.
9.3.2 The West African Monetary Union (WAMU or UMOA)
The WAMU model provides the closest conceptual example of a
full monetary union in that throughout its existence, the union has
operated with a common currency and union-wide central bank; foreign
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reserves of the member countries are pooled at the union level;
there is a broad uniformity in the application of monetary policy;
and convertibility (the permanent absence of all exchange controls
on current and capital transactions) is maintained among member
states. In these respects, the WAMU largely satisfies both Corden's
(1972) and Machlup's (1976 and 1977) definitions of complete
monetary integration.
Significantly, however, the model has not evolved around the
deliberate observance of the optimum currency area criteria in that
inflationary tendencies have differed among the members and product
diversification is limited only to 1-3 primary products with a high
degree of non-complementarity even in the equally limited industrial
activities. As in most developing countries, the only surplus
labour at the disposable of the WAMU countries is unskilled so that
apart from the border movements encouraged largely by historical and
ethnic traditions, there is little mobility of complementary labour.
Similarly, there is hardly any capital movement between the WAMU
countries, which reflects the lack of adequate domestic savings and
the non-complementary financial and monetary structures in the
union. Economic openness, reflected mainly in terms of the high
degree of trade and financial transactions with the outside world,
is profoundly structural.
It should be emphasised that at the time of its formation in
1962, no special provisions were originally incorporated within the
WAMU to invite economic integration by directly encouraging intra-
union trade, mobility of factors of production, or by some central
allocation of investment between member states, to foster
complementary investment. In theory a free movement of labour and
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capital between member countries is allowed in the Union but, as is
widely the situation among ECOWAS countries, most of the WAMU
countries only dispose surplus unskilled labour so that, apart from
border mobility of labour encouraged by historical and ethnic
traditions, there has been little mobility of complementary labour.
Similarly, despite the free movement of capital, each of the WAMU
countries, like virtually all other ECOWAS countries, suffers from a
shortage of savings and a significant intra-regional mobility of
capital could not be expected. Thus, economic integration in these
circumstances could only arise from a free, and increasing movement
of products, enhanced by an inflow of complementary external capital
and skilled labour. The important point here is that the creation
of WAMU was originally not an integral part of a consciously
designed policy of economic integration among the member states.
It is evident however that while the WAMU has worked and
endured for over two decades, its member states have represented the
most active participants in the emerging economic integration
schemes in West Africa. In addition to the CEA() in which they are
all members, it has been observed (see Table 3C) that all
integration schemes in West Africa, except the MRU, are evolved
around WAMU countries. Although monetary integration is justified
in large part because it promotes economic integration, the
experience of the WAMU shows that there is hardly any established
conceptual relationship between the two types of integration
efforts.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, WAMU countries share similar
production and trade profiles, producing competitive primary
commodities typically for export and importing the bulk of consumer
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and intermediate goods and services. Economic developments in these
countries since the early seventies have shown a mixed picture that
has been greatly influenced by a number of exogenous factors,
notably, the oil price increases and the depressed demand conditions
in the international primary commodity market. As a result, their
overall economic picture, especially in the more recent years, has
equally been one of rising severity in problems of international
liquidity, represented by growing current account deficits, mounting
external debt-service obligations, falling reserve balances, rising
levels of monetary aggregates, strong inflationary tendencies and an
unimpressive degree of financial intermediation.
The union represents about a fifth of total ECOWAS population,
growing at around an average of 3 per cent per annum during the last
decade. Per capita incomes among the member states may be diverging
but are equally close and low compared with the other West African
countries (except Nigeria). Niger and Senegal had negative growth
in per capita incomes during the period: In growth terms, WAMU
countries (except Senegal at 2 per cent) grew at over 3 per cent per
annum with Ivory Coast growing at 6.2 per cent (the highest in West
Africa). These growth rates compare with an average rate of 2.7 per
cent for the ECOWAS as a whole in the 1970-80 decade.
As one looks back upon the discussions on monetary union, there
is general agreement that the key factors on which the performance
of such a union is assessed should include the nature and stability
of the exchange rate and/or currency arrangements, the trade
patterns of the member countries, and the price differentials at
home and abroad. The conditions under which the fixed exchange rate
system which characterises the monetary union is superior involves a
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complicated weighting of these key factors, making generalisations
difficult. However, in assessing the experience of the WAMU model
and its implications for an ECOWAS monetary union, emphasis is
placed on examining the integration of the member countries of the
union with each other, their interaction with France and the union's
performance in monetary policy compared with the rest of the West
African countries, notably the FSA countries. In this respect three
key questions are asked:
(a) is intra-WAMU trade improving?
(b) are WAMU monetary policies and performance more
disciplined and converging?
(c) is the special relationship between WAMU and France
inhibiting for achieving ECOWAS monetary union?
9.3.2.1	 Intra-WAMU Trade 
The picture in Table 9G reveals that intra-WAMU trade has not
grown and is on average below 6 per cent (except Burkina, with an
average of over 20 per cent) of total trade. While this trade
represents over 50 per cent of the member countries' trade within
ECOWAS, it also accounts for over half of the Community's total
mutual trade. These two ratios, however, demonstrate both the
degree of trade concentration within the WAMU as well as the
relative importance of the Union's involvement in intra-ECOWAS
trade. If one were to compare the mutual trade performance of the
WAMU with that of the three countries that withdrew from the union
- Guinea, Mali and Mauritania (although they have never been
integrated to each other) - and of the rest of ECOWAS, the evidence
is that the WAMU countries have at least not done any worse than
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they and a few have in fact done better. The balance of trade is
significantly in favour of the Ivory Coast and Senegal in the union
just as it is in favour of Nigeria in the rest of the ECOWAS. There
is hardly any meaningful trade relation between Guinea, Mali and
Mauritania since much of Mali's intra-regional trade is with the
WAMU. Because of the deep-seated structural pattern of the West
African countries' trading relations, as Chapter 4 showed, it is not
surprising that the WAMU should have very low impact on trade among
its member states.
9.3.2.2	 Financial Efficiency in WAMU 
The principal formal means of policy co-ordination in the WAMU
involves the collective pegging of the 'national currencies' to a
single currency - the French franc - at the same exchange rate - and
the statutory limit on credit accorded to member governments by the
BCEAO central banking system (ie, 20 per cent of the previous year's
government domestic tax revenue). Comparative statistical tests are
therefore carried out on whether monetary stability or convergence
has been achieved by the collective exchange rate arrangements
compared with the alternative unco-ordinated exchange rate policies
adopted by the other West African countries.
In summing up the monetary experiences of the African
countries, Mundell .(1972, p 93) has argued:
'The French and the English economic traditions in
monetary theory and history are different. At the risk
of over-simplification the French tradition has stressed
the passive nature of monetary policy and the importance
of exchange stability with convertibility (within the
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franc area); stability was achieved at the expense of
institutional development and monetary experience. The
British countries by opting for monetary independence
have sacrificed stability, but gained experience and
better developed monetary institutions'.
The conclusion along this view is that for the West African
countries the choice in exchange rate arrangements implies a trade-
off between monetary stability and development. Seeking explicit
evidence along these lines is difficult because of the very close
economic similarities between the countries. However the
controversy about the costs and benefits of the WAMU exchange rate
system or indeed, of the independent regimes maintained by the other
countries merely reflects how the volatility of the French franc and
the other intervention currencies have affected the West African
countries in relation to the Mundellian monetary
stability/development trade-off.
Since the 1970s, stability relative to one currency has meant
instability in relation to other floating currencies so that fixing
the exchange rate is no longer a valid option. Despite the French
franc devaluations in the seventies and the early eighties, the
annual variation in the exchange rates of West African currencies
presented in Table 6C indicates that in contrast to non-WAMU
currencies, especially the Ghanaian cedi and the Sierra Leonean
leone, the nominal fluctuations of the CFA franc vis-a-vis the SDR
and the US dollar have been of smaller magnitudes and less erratic.
The overall average nominal variation of the CFA franc in 1970-83
was -3.52 per cent against the SDR (-3.45 per cent against the US
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dollar) as against -12.87 per cent (-22.11 per cent) for the cedi
and -8.27 per cent (-5.59 per cent) for the leone.
	
It is also
evident that the currency distortions which are imminent in many of
the non-WAMU countries - represented by black market rates much
lower than the official rates and with direct consequences for high
incidence of smuggling and other illegal exchange activities - are
generally non-existent within WAMU as the CFA franc indirectly
enjoys the same convertibility as the French franc.
Mundell (1972) has suggested that the simplest test for the
trade-off between monetary stability and development is the extent
of development of money substitutes. There are generally no marked
differences among the West African countries on the supra-national
nature of the monetary and financial systems. No doubt the banking
system in the former sterling area (FSA) countries is more
diversified in terms of institutional arrangements although Nigeria
and the Ivory Coast have the widest range of financial institutions.
The discussion in chapter 6 of some of the indicators of financial
intermediation suggests a blurring of the differences between the
WAMU and the FSA countries in particular.
Table 9H provides evidence that although the degree of
financial intermediation is generally improving in the region as a
whole, the propensity to hold cash (ie the ratio of currency outside
banks to money supply - M1) remains higher in the WAMU countries
whose median propensity of 38 per cent in 1983 compares with 35.6
per cent in the FSA countries. The propensity to save (ie the ratio
of quasi-money to money supply) is much higher in the FSA than in
the WAMU states whose median propensity to save (24.7 pe cent) in
1983 was lower than 36.3 per cent in the FSA. The table shows
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however that in 1962-83, the propensity to save has increased much
faster in the WAMU than in the FSA countries. Also, the level of
liquidity (ie the ratio of money supply - M2 to GDP) has been much
higher in the WAMU states. In 1982, it ranged between 20.1 per cent
in Burkina to 43.8 per cent in Togo in contrast to a range of 17.3
per cent in Ghana to 37.2 per cent in Nigeria.
Trends in overall money supply and inflationary tendencies
(Tables 5C, 50 and 9A) indicate that the WAMU states have had better
performance over the non-WAMU countries in terms of having recorded
lower growth in both aggregates. The relationship in inflationary
and monetary stability within the WAMU and non-WAMU groups of
countries was tested further by regressing the standard deviation of
each aggregate to its rate of growth over 1970-83. The obtained
equations for inflation were:
SD i = 19.1 - 1.11xi
R2
 = .72
N = 5	 (for WAMU, excluding Benin)
and
SD i
 = -2.44 + •90xi
R2 = .97
N = 6	 (for non-WAMU) (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mauritania,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone)
The results suggest that even though inflation has been both rising
and unstable throughout West Africa, the relationship remains less
strong in the WAMU than in the non-WAMU states where the rates have
remained relatively much higher and unstable. The differences
between the two groups in the average rate of growth of inflation
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over the 14 year period was statistically significant (t = 2.785, p
= 0.05, df = 152).
In money supply, the derived simple regression equations for
the period 1970-83 were:
SDm
 = -4.38 + .90m
R2
 = .19
N = 6	 (for WAMU)
and
SDm = 14.3 + 0.23m
R2
 = .002
N . 7	 (for non-WAMU) (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone)
These results suggest that the growth in money supply has been
consistently higher in non-WAMU countries. The difference in the
overall average growth in money supply between the two groups was
however found not statistically significant (t = 1.225,p = .05, df
= 175). ' The causal relationship between inflation (I) and the money
supply (M) was evidently stronger in the non-WAMU (I = -11.2 +
1.39 m ; R2
 = .58; N = 6) than among the WAMU (I = 7.0 + 0•17m; R 2 =
0.11; N = 5) countries. There has also been better budgetary
control in the WAMU in terms of moderate deficit financing by the
BCEAO but a higher growth rate of investment and modest balance of
net foreign assets to short-term liabilities in non-WAMU countries.
There has also been some measure of cohesion in inflationary
performance inside the WAMU, notably in terms of the standard
deviation in the distribution of annual inflation rates around the
WAMU average and the range from highest to lowest, especially after
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1976. Inflation peaked in 1977 and the indicators of divergence
reached their maximum within three years after the first oil price
explosion in 1973. The differentials again widened sharply in 1981,
shortly after the second wave of oil-price increases.
	 Such
convergence is hardly visible among the non-WAMU countries and the
inflationary impulses of the two oil-price explosions were of
relatively less comparable magnitude between the two groups of
countries. It cannot be concluded whether or not this improved
record of cohesion in the WAMU has been in line with expectations in
the absence of any prescribed union targets. There can be little
doubt however that the relatively more improved financial discipline
and cohesiveness in the WAMU can be attributed to their collective
monetary arrangements, albeit with close supervision from France.
In sum, the statistical results and conclusions obtained above
and elsewhere in this study (see in particular, Chapters 5 and 6) on
the comparative performance of the WAMU countries compare with those
obtained by the ACMS (see ACMS, 1981). Both sets of analysis
support the BCEAO group in connection with better control of money
supply as well as inflation. Given its structure, vis-a-vis the
rest of the central banks in West Africa, (especially the FSA banks)
the BCEAO has by and large been more capable in resisting the
financing of very large government deficits which accelerate the
growth of money supply and therefore help to worsen the inflationary
situation in a country. It is expected that the lower the ratios of
currency in circulation to money supply the better, since they
depict restraint from pressure to increase the proportion that the
currency in circulation bears to the remaining components of the
money supply.
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The technique analysis of variance (ANOVA) (for one factor
design for an unequal number of observations) adopted by the ACMS
for comparison between BCEAO (six countries) and FSA (four
countries), in particular, has observed no signficant difference (at
95 per cent confidence level) between the two groups of countries in
relation to several important money supply variables, eg growth of
the ratio of currency in circulation to money supply, growth in
money supply (M1 and M2), growth rates of total deposits of the
banking system, commercial banks assets, domestic credit and credit
to the private sector. Money supply is however observed to be
consistently lower in the BCEAO. The difference between the BCEAO
and FSA is found statistically significant in the currency ratio and
money supply on the one hand, and the level of inflation on the
other, in the FSA.
9.3.2.3	 WAMU and France 
The strong caveat for the relatively better financial
efficiency of the WAMU states has been the special role of France in
supporting the international convertibility of their cow= currency
through the Operations Account as well as in France's efforts to
sustain its overseas franc area. The WAMU-France relationship is
explained in the special treaty between the two parties:
'the BCEAO shall pay into the Operations Account the
disposal funds that can be raised outside its zone of
issue .... with exceptions' (Article 2).
In the event of a shortage of disposable funds in the account, the
French Treasury may, in accordance with Article 5, grant overdrafts.
Article 7 stipulates the conditions of payment of the debit or
credit balances of the Account (see Omrana, 1980).
The main provisions of the revised statutes (1974) and the
decisions subsequently taken by the WAMU states provide for:
(a) new agreements with France governing economic co-
operation and access to the 'operations account', which
limit the union's liquid assets held in the Account to 65
per cent of total assets, lay down the principles for
diversifying the remaining 35 per cent into other foreign
exchange holdings, and provide for an exchange guarantee
based on the SDR-French franc rate on the Operations
Account deposits;
(b) the establishment of an inter-bank money market managed by
the BCEAO;
(c) the harmonisation of union interest rates with
international markets; and
(d) the limiting of the liquid assets which banks and
financial institutions could hold outside the Union to
minimise working balances in order to avoid leakages.
There are divergent views about the consequent costs and
benefits of France's role in the WAMU for both parties. Omrana
(1980) has argued that the system has two major advantages for
France. Firstly, in the event of an excess of French imports of
WAMU products over French exports to WAMU, the system enables France
to settle its resulting trade deficit by simply crediting the
Operations Account with the deficit value without an immediate
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settlement involving actual transfer of foreign exchange. In this
respect also there is loss of choice in the dominance of a
settlement currency. Secondly, to the extent that any expected
surpluses resulting from WAMU's trade with non-franc zone countries
are instantly credited to the Operations Account in the union's
favour, France should benefit from the temporary use of such reserve
balances.
In practice, however, trade between WAMU and France has been on
the decline. The share of France in WAMU's total trade dropped from
41.4 per cent in 1970 to 28.6 per cent in 1983 (Table 9G) while the
trade imbalances between the two parties have widened considerably
in favour of France (Table 91).
Table 91	 WAMU: Net Trade with France (million dollars)
1970 1975 1980 1983
Benin -13.98 -47.48 -135.51 -95.24
Burkina -18.82 -57.42 -118.17 -68.45
Ivory Coast -26.10 -120.20 -537.20 -140.20
Niger -11.95 +27.07 +101.57 +116.44
Senegal -16.34 -17.68 -210.96 -230.14
Togo -3.59
-11.55 -86.71 -83.77
Total
-90.78 -227.26 -986.98 -501.36
Source:
	 See Table 4H
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As a group, WAMU's trade deficit with France has risen by more than
tenfold between 1970-1980. This implies (on the merchandise trade
side) persistently negative operations account with France. The
overall operations account moved from a claim of CFAF 54.6 million
on France in December 1979 to a liability of CFAF 13.2 million in
March 1980 (de Macedo, 1985, p 32). The steep increases in the
reserves of Togo in 1980-83 were offset by an even steeper decline
in Benin, Ivory Coast and Senegal (Table 6H).
The extent of the French transfers - which have allowed the
continuous sterilisation of the loss in reserves - cannot be
neglected. But as de Macedo observes (op cit, p 35), the reversal
in the increase in WAMU's money stock relative to France's in the
last few years has been in line with France's emerging reluctance to
continuously replenish the operations account. The implication is
that in the future the monetary allocation of the transfer may
become a central policy issue for the union's relationship with
France and this could be aggravated by the readmission of Mali,
another structurally deficit country.
Available statistics on the listed sources of financing
indicate that French aid to WAMU rose from 40.5 per cent in 1974 to
44.1 per cent in 1976 of total financing. This was explained by a
marginal drop in private investments especially between 1974-75, and
the slow rise in public funds, the bulk of which was allocated to
technical and cultural co-operation and equipment needs. The share
of French aid in 1977 was marginally lower, at 39.6 per cent
(Omrana, 1980, p 17).
505
The most obvious cost of the WAMU system to the member
countries derives from the disadvantages associated with the loss of
national autonomy in the use of the exchange rate as an instrument
of policy as discussed previously. The fixed CFA franc/French franc
rate has remained unamended since 1948 and there is little evidence
of this arrangement being openly contested by any member country.
Advantageously, the convertibility guarantee which is at the centre
of the system has positive impact on the union both in terms of
maintaining the confidence of investors and in the inflow of
economic and technical assistance. The CFA franc is collectively
less over-valued compared with currencies like the cedi and naira
(Table 9E). The CFA franc's stable fixed relationship with the
French franc makes it easier for foreign investors to plan and
forecast their CFA franc obligations and the potential exchange risk
by simply observing fluctuations of the French franc in the
international exchange markets. It is however difficult to judge
determinately the likely effect on the WAMU of the absence of such a
convertibility as well as that of an overall withdrawal of French
support for the WAMU system. Under such circumstances and judging
from the experience of other ECOWAS countries, the WAMU countries
would be more likely to retain their single currency system,
implying that the costs associated with the France-WAMU relationship
are more than offset by the corresponding benefits.
The fact, however, is that like all other West African
countries the WAMU countries have not escaped the disasterous impact
of the global shocks of the seventies. The economies have
experienced widening trade deficits and a marked economic slow down.
The low level of domestic savings has equally precipitated increased
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foreign borrowing while economic and financial policies are
increasingly expansionary with serious implications for inflation
and the balance of payments. Intra-union trade remains marginal and
complementary production and financial services are inexistent. The
WAMU system, despite its relative political coherence, has had
limited capacity to insulate the member economies from these
constraints. This should develop greater enthusiasm for membership
to an ECO WAS common currency arrangement, at least to moderate total
dependence on France.
Unlike the existing situation in economic integration where
ECOWAS co-exists with sub-regional groupings, it is much more
complicated for the WAMU arrangement to co-exist with an all-
embracing ECOWAS monetary union, especially if a new currency were
to be created. For as long as France is willing and ready to
sustain and support the WAMU agreement, it would be unrealistic to
imagine that at least they would abandon the union in place of
independent monetary systems without the implied feeling that they
would be jeopardising their economic and political unity, thereby
undermining economic confidence. Besides, the WAMU membership is
increasingly likely to expand with the re-admission of Guinea and
Mauritania and the new admission of Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.
Moreover, the conduit effect of the CFA franc is becoming
increasingly apparent in these countries as well as Ghana and
Nigeria where the currency is already illegally traded widely since
it . is
 regarded just as valuable an exchange medium as sterling or
the US dollar.
Finally, it may be difficult to attribute whatever performance
or disparate levels of development obtainable among the WAMU states
exclusively to the membership of the union. Even where some of the
intra-union disparities may be severe, there is apparently no
evidence - from the point of view of the members - that membership
of the union has been gravely disadvantageous to them. This is what
would count heavily - from the point of view of the WAMU members -
against an ECO WAS monetary unification strategy that would either be
completely different from the WAMU tradition or necessitate its
complete structural dissolution or overhauling.
9.3.3 West African Monetary Unification and International Monetary
Relations
Monetary unification in West Africa on the scale envisaged also
has important implications for the reform of the international
monetary system. There is no problem in the IMF Articles of
Agreement inhibiting the creation of a common monetary bloc in West
Africa. There are provisions however that specify the rules with
respect to exchange rate and intervention policy. From a formal
point of view there is no problem to the transition; firstly, as the
desired objectives of the pecuniary gains to West Africa from
reserve saving, a more independent control over the West African
money supply, the recovery of mutual trade and seiniorage to West
Africa, the enhancement of regional convertibility and the
availability of a new instrument to correct the West African balance
of payments problem do not imply an abrupt demonetisation of
existing international reserve and pivot currencies; and secondly,
because monetary unification in West Africa is fully compatible with
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the spirit of international co-operation that is sought for the
reform of the international monetary system.
The latter implies directly making currency unification in West
Africa subject to IMF guidelines - whether for exchange rate
arrangements and surveillance; for drawings on the Fund; for the
role of lenders/borrowes in the fund; for the respective roles of
the common currency or unit of account and the SDR; or for payments
and transfers. More specifically, in terms of the IMF Articles of
Agreement, West African monetary unification is internationally
acceptable to the extent that it promotes exchange rate stability,
maintains orderly exchange rate arrangements among the countries and
avoid competitive exchange depreciation (Article I); and it is
compatible with Article IV, Section 26, which stipulates that Fund
members may adopt 'co-operative arrangements by which members
maintain the value of their currencies in relation to the value of
currency or currencies of other members'. Against this background,
monetary unification in West Africa becomes an integral part of the
search for a new and stable international monetary system.
9.4 EXCHANGE RATE UNIFICATION VERSUS COMMON CURRENCY
9.4.1 The Case for Common Currency
ECOWAS has two policy options for achieving monetary union. The
first is to establish some form of exchange rate unification among
the member currencies, in which case the member states would have to
establish firm commitment to accept and trade each other's
currencies for all transactions within the region at some acceptable
exchange rate conversion margins. The more irrevocably fixed the
rates are the closer is the union towards the establishment of the
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second option; namely, a full monetary union in which the member
countries will share a single common currency and an autonomous
central monetary authority. The choice between the two options has
to be influenced essentially by the extent to which each is
potentially more capable of achieving the required regional
convertibility, sustain it and hence, insulate the economies against
the social and economic costs associated with the marked disparity
in the convertibility levels of the individual currencies.
In these respects, the obvious candidate is a single currency
whose creation would eliminate the technical problem of maintaining
fixed exchange rates among the currencies, and which, as Cooper
(1973, p 230) puts it, 'would make irrevocability of parities really
credible'. The single currency would, moreover, eliminate the
problem of having to maintain a clearing system for the various
currencies in a fixed rate arrangement. These and other differences
between the two options have already been discussed, especially in
Chapter 7. The main contention in this study is that exchange rate
unification would appear a less viable policy option especially for
less-developed countries such as the ECOWAS where the financial and
monetary system is severely dependent, rudimentary and has very
limited facilities to support such a system.
The interest in a unified exchange rate system derives in large
measure from its utilisation as a step in a gradual approach towards
having a common currency for the monetary union or, where the latter
is found to be completely impracticable to attain exchange rate
unification is considered a second best situation. A unified
exchange rate system, where the rates are irrevocably fixed and
convertibility is completely free, is for all practical purposes a
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single currency, as the established rates are merely another way of
expressing one currency against the other. If for example country A
and country B were to adopt a unified exchange rate system, it
matters not, as far as the concept of a single currency is
concerned, where one unit of currency of A is defined as equal to
one or half a unit of B. If the rates are fixed at B1 equal to
A0.50, then B1 is merely another way of expressing A0.50 and vice
versa. The implication however is that in the absence of a similar
if not identical monetary policy between the two countries, a more
than proportionate increase in the money supply in one member
country would give it a greater claim on the goods and services of
the partner country. This skewed situation can only cancel out
through a reciprocal but proportionate increase in the money supply,
otherwise the unified exchange rate system would rapidly degenerate
to a situation where one country may be subsidising another.
These implications are further examined by Sohmen (1969a,
1969b) who stresses the necessity for the constancy of both 'spot'
and 'forward' exchange rates and maintains that since governments
today are far from being capable of pegging the exchange rates for
all maturities, a single common currency must be preferred to secure
the benefits of a currency area. Meade (1957), Johnson (1963) and
Ingram (1969) have emphasised that exchange rate unification by
itself would not lead to an acceleration of capital mobility and
competition within the area since, in defence of the fixed exchange
rate, governments may be obliged to resort to exchange controls,
thus destroying convertibility. Fleming (1971) and Palankai (1977)
argue that even though exchange rate fixation at a given date might
have taken place according to 'balanced exchange rates', at a later
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date the actual parity of currencies may shift mainly because, as
Fleming sums it up, 'developments would occur ... that pushed the
relative costs levels of the participating countries out of line' (p
468). The repercussions of such developments on the balance of
payments, unemployment and inflation would necessitate adjustment,
in the absence of exchange rate fluidity, through domestic
expansionary or deflationary policies in the member countries. This
may involve the attainment of one economic objective at the expense
of the other, thus worsening the trade-off relationships between key
economic policy targets for the countries subject to exchange rate
unification.
As Palankai suggests, efforts aiming at the maintenance of
fixed exchange rates and consequently of balance of payments
equilibrium can create long-range problems for the member countries.
The reason, according to him, is that in the longer-term of exchange
rate unification, as parity shifts, it is highly improbable that the
inflation of the national currencies will be of equal rate and
extent, and this brings about the over-valuation and/or under-
valuation of the currencies in respect to the price levels in the
individual countries. On the other hand, the different development
of effectiveness and productivity results in the same situation and
this causes a change in the cost levels among the different
countries. From the over-valuation and/or under-valuation of
currencies there ensues an increasing and even cumulative tension
both as regards the maintenance of fixed exchange rates and the
equilibrium of the balance of payments.
The differences between systems of a single cow= currency and
multiple national currencies pegged to each other may be great. Yet
in view of the different conceivable stages of currency unification,
it may seem an extremist position to claim that a single common
currency must exist from the beginning and then to say than a common
currency is not feasible in practice; and therefore that fixed
exchange rates would lead to more problems. At least in practice,
the experiences of both the EEC and the former East African
Community are indicative of the difficulties and gross limitations
of exchange rate unification as a strategy for achieving monetary
integration. In the EEC, the 'snake' failed and there are still
several 'hiccups' in the EMS as it tries to achieve its main
objective of monetary stability in Europe. Eight EMS realignments
have so far taken -place since 1979.
In the defunct EAC, the exchange rate unification system under
which exchange restrictions between the three member states - Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania - were liberalised, the three currencies -
Kenyan shilling, Ugandan shilling and Tanzanian shilling - had full
convertibility against each other on a one to one basis, and a par
clearance of national currency notes was available; the system fell
apart within four years of its creation. By this time (in 1970)
economic policies had begun to diverge widely with money supply
growing at different rates, different wage legislation enacted and
different investment policies pursued. In fact full convertibility
between the currencies was never restored even after the repulsion
of the temporary reintroduction of exchange controls against each
member country. The high degree of uncertainty that surrounded the
exchange rate arrangement after these developments escalated the
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divergences in the relative strengths of the member currencies as
well as black market practices against each country. As these
developments continued, showing an increasing awareness by each
member state for foreign exchange shortage, it was obvious that the
net benefactor in terms of both trade, investment and capital flows
was Kenya whose national currency and economy became increasingly
stronger in the Community; a situation which also influenced the
final collapse of the Community in 1977.
In principle, ' an exchange rate unification scheme in ECOWAS may
take the form whereby the 10 member currencies can be linked at
exchange rates determined by cross rates vis-a-vis a reference
currency or currencies in international markets. The more advanced
form of exchange rate unification may also be adopted with rates
irrevocably fixed, although this is a much harder policy to
conceive of following the dependent nature of the member countries'
exchange rate systems. Table 9J gives some indication of the cross-
rate relationship between the currencies. The US dollar is used as
reference currency. However, as long as varying margins and
different currency pegs are used in the region, the cross rates of
the member currencies will continue to exhibit more or less large
daily fluctuations, depending on the movement of the intermediary
currencies in the world markets. Table 9K shows the changes in the
exchange rates of member currencies against each other in 1980 as
compared with 1984.
The cross rates of West African currencies and their exchange
rates in relation to foreign currencies will only become stable if
they are pegged, with given margins, to a common currency. But this
pegging would not be completely reliable as differing monetary and
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financial policies could generate pressures to alter prevailing
rates or even force other member countries to withdraw. In this
respect it is not enough to lift restrictions on foreign exchange in
order to maintain cross-rate stability, although the situation could
be worse, if exchange rate unification is pursued without exchange
control liberalisation. Such a situation may further strengthen the
already stronger CFA franc and Liberian dollar and, hence, encourage
capital flight in favour of these currencies. It matters not that
under exchange rate unification the rates are irrevocably fixed, for
as other currencies become relatively weaker, everybody begins to
anticipate the irrevocable to be revoked. The immediate consequence
is a heightening of black market activities so that although the
fixation of a common rate is maintained, it is achieved at the
expense of the movement of commodities inside the region.
It should, of course, be emphasised that the tables have only
shown theoretically equivalent cross rates between the member
currencies. Real or actual nominal cross rates would have to
reflect the extent of over-valuation, the difference between black
market and official rates, and, most importantly, the ability of
each economy to be able to support any derived rate. It is now
evidently clear from the WACH experience that any exchange agreement
that allows for freedom of choice as to the type of exchange rate
arrangement by each country is hardly a realistic monetary
integration framework for ECOWAS. At the minimum there has to be a
form of irrevocably fixed exchange rate, which in turn means
movement towards the common currency option. At the same time, the
EMS system cannot be mirrored, especially its exchange rate margin
mechanism. The EMS member currencies are already independently
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convertible and each currency is in a relatively better position to
withstand or protect itself against destabilising forces compared
with any of ECOWAS' currencies. For ECOWAS, the most urgent problem
is the achievement of regional convertibility and this can no longer
be made wholly dependent on the prior complete liberalisation of
trade via liberal exchange payments restrictions since this
objective, on its own, can never be achieved (see Chapter 6 for some
of the reasons).
9.4.2 Common Currency Options
The idea of creating a genuinely new West African currency can
be realised in basically two ways: to adopt one of the existing
national currencies or to create an entirely new unit of account.
It may not be technically difficult to design a new currency,
although it should be noted that the SDR is not an appropriate
precedent in this case because even though it has become an
increasingly attractive store of value (ie reserve asset in foreign
asset portfolios), its use as a means of payment has still been very
limited. Unlike the SDR, the West African currency is a claim to be
held not by central banks alone but substantially by the general
public as well. The main problem rather would be to gain public
acceptance. To make it work, it would be necessary to make it
conveniently available in adequate supply, create adequate demand
for it and make it widely acceptable for all transactions within
the region. It is inevitable that until the regional currency
establishes itself fully, it would face stiff competition from the
existing national currencies in domestic use and much stiffer
competition on the international scene for the settlement of
international obligations.
Naturally in cases where small countries are involved in a
monetary union, it is expected that the larger and most relatively
developed partner is more likely to influence the choice of a common
currency with the highest probability of its own currency performing
this function. If one could abstract from political considerations,
one of the most important factors to influence this decision is the
strong assumption that technical facilities already exist in the
dominant country for dealing with its currency. In such instances,
the smaller countries would commence by pegging their currencies
irrevocably to the currency of the dominant economy, and,
thereafter, allow a smooth and complete replacement of these
currencies by the dominant currency. The most obvious factors that
would tend to inhibit the use of a particular national currency as
regional money originate from either the seiniorage problem or from
political considerations of national prestige and a sense of
fairness therefore calls for some form of compensation.
Among the 10 West African currencies, three may emerge for this
enlarged role. Firstly, in term of convertibility, the Liberian
dollar, which is the same as the US dollar, competes with the CFA
franc, currently circulating in seven of the 16 member countries but
with strong indications for the zone to expand to 11 Countries. The
other feasible alternative to these two currencies would be the
Nigerian naira, for which the absence of experience of technical
advantages available to the CFA franc in particular from the point
of view common currency management in a monetary union might be more
than outweighed by size, political and economic considerations,
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especially the huge oil revenues which, with prudent management
would yield large external savings (attested by the potential
currency account surplus). Compared with both the CFA franc area
and Liberia, other countries (including Nigeria) with varying
degrees of inconvertible currencies have to implement measures which
would lead to their currencies being convertible. Most of these
countries have over issued currency in order to finance the
persistently rising budget deficits and, in addition, their external
reserves are rplatively more depleted. In the final analysis, it is
the speed with which the Problem of basic adjustment is solved in
these countries as well as their readiness also to observe monetary
discipline that is the crux of their monetary union membership.
It can be argued that the logical candidate for the enlarged
role of a West African money is the CFA franc, which means that the
other West African countries would have to join the WAMU and thus
allow a denigration of their national currencies. This appears to
be the easiest and fastest route to the creation of a West African
currency. Apart from the general experience already obtained by
seven of the 16 countries in the region on monetary union affairs,
important institutional facilities already exist in the CFA franc
area for dealing with a common currency and these could be upgraded
in terms of the ECO WAS monetary union. In particular, the BCEAO,
already a supra-national central banking institution for over two
decades, could be functionally enlarged to enhance the issue and
distribution of the new enlarged CFA franc as well as the co-
ordination of monetary policies. The Stock Exchange market in the
Ivory Coast and the inter-bank money market being managed by the
BCEAO would all be expanded to provide a sizeable money market in
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the region, whereas the West African Development Bank of the CFA
franc area would facilitate the rationalisation of common industrial
and agricultural investment programmes. It must be reiterated that
in the light of the conspicuous failures by several countries,
regionalising agricultural and industrial policies has to be a
strategic feature of an ECO WAS monetary union if it is to succeed
otherwise there can be little change in the magnitude of the
.development constraints - eg savings, foreign exchange, balance of
payments, etc - of the region even if a single common currency is
successfully launched.
An equally important consideration is how to acquire external
convertibility for the 'new CFA franc'. It is not likely that on
her own France would be in a position to provide for the new franc
the special convertibility guarantee which it does for the existing
franc because of the possible pressure which a larger group might
pose on the French balance of payments as well as on the French
franc in both the EMS and in the international money markets. It is
however not proposed in this study that acquiring a similar
convertibility guarantee must be a sine qua non for the common West
African currency.
This problem is related to the problems of choice in an
exchange rate regime, and this as was discussed in Chapter 6, has
gained wide currency in the literature. 	 With the collapse of the
Bretton Wood System in March 1973, it has no longer been possible
for small open economies to adopt a fixed exchange rate. At best,
they can peg to a major currency (or basket of currencies including
the SDR) and thereby float (or live dangerously) with respect to
others, or they may adopt a crawling peg rule, either active or
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passive. Until very recently, pegging arrangements in most West
African countries have been modeled more along the lines of
historical political considerations. In the light of the pegging
experiences of the member countries especially now that the
'floating' of the major currencies which would normally qualify as
pegs is a fact of life, it is of utmost importance that the choice
of an optimum peg for the West African money is cautiously
contrived. Regional convertibility is required but certainly not at
any price. This aspect of the common currency arrangement needs
further elaborate analysis because of its theoretical and practical
complexities. In essence, however, emphasis must be placed on
designing a peg that should:
(a) stabilise export earnings;
(b) insulate the economies from international monetary shocks;
(c) promote confidence in the regional currency;
(d) provide a restraint against the over supply of domestic
'money; and
(e) enhance overall monetary stability, especially where
monetary stability is characterised not only by the rate
of inflation but also by stability in the rate of
inflation (Benjamin, 1976 and 1978).
Because of the openness of the West African economies, the choice
between the two broad alternative pegs - a single currency versus a
basket peg - can be modeled in light of the extent to which these
objectives are achieved.
Specifically, the choice can be determined by three major
factors:
522
US Dollar
Exp	 Imp
1980	 32.8	 7.4
1981	 36.7	 8.7
1982	 31.6	 8.3
1983	 20.6	 8.2
(a) the region's desired rate of inflation and its variance;
(b) monetary policies in each of the economies of the five
competing industrial currencies - the US dollar, the mark,
the French franc, the yen an the pound; and
(c) the regional pattern of the member countries'
international trade and other financial transactions and
the extent of deviations in exchange rates from purchasing
power parity movements (for other alternative approaches
see for example Black (1976), Connolly (1982), Lipschitz
(1979) and Williamson (1982)).
Table 9L ECOWAS: Estimated Share of Trading Currencies in Total
Merchandise Trade
(Per Cent)
French franc
Exp	 Imp
Pound sterling
Exp	 Imp
ECUl
Exp	 Imp
12.5 16.1 2.6 14.5 41.2 54.5
9.9 15.0 2.5 14.6 34.9 53.8
11.8 14.9 3.6 11.7 37.2 48.5
13.9 16.5 4.0 9.8 44.5 46.6
Source: Tables 4H and 41
Notes:	 1	 European Currency Unit is assumed as trading currency
for trade with the EEC
(Exp) Exports
(Imp) Imports
The major focus of the choice of a peg therefore should be on the
level of influence which each of the industrial countries has on the
trade and financial transactions of the region as a whole as well as
on the quality of each country's monetary policy, its economic
performance and the position of its currency in the world financial
markets. While one does not know the future conduct of monetary and
economic policies by the various industrial countries, there is a
long record from which lessons can be drawn.
Meanwhile, in terms of a single currency peg for the 'new CFA
franc' (with a new 'convertibility guarantor' it may be necessary to
change the name of the currency - call it the WAC meaning the West
African currency or the SHELL denoting the cowrie shell; this will
be politically logical in view of the changed situation), there are
two main candidates; the US dollar and the French franc. As shoWn
in Table 9L (in terms of country trade stress), the dollar accounts
for over a fifth of total exports but less than one tenth of the
total import value. The share of the French franc on the other hand
is more evenly distributed, accounting for 10-14 per cent of total
export value and 15-17 per cent of import value. The skewness in
the direction of trade with the USA is a reflection of Nigeria's oil
exports. The French franc is a peg in seven of the 16 member
countries, while the dollar too is the intervention currency in
seven countries. From an inflationary point of view, the US rate of
inflation over 1970-83 was on average lower than France's (7.4 per
cent versus 9.8 per cent), although as measured by the standard
deviation, France's rate of inflation has been more stable (2.8 per
cent versus 3.2 per cent). Comparative rates over the 14 year
period were 4.9 and 1.4 per cent for Germany; 12.1 and 5.5 per cent
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for the UK; and 7.7 and 5.7 per cent for Japan. Strictly on the
basis of this inflationary performance and its likely impact on
imported inflation in West African countries, a hypothetical US
dollar peg for the common currency would be less inflationary than a
French franc peg but more inflationary than a mark peg. The most
inflationary would be a sterling peg. In contrast, a French franc
peg would provide a more stable peg than a dollar peg in terms of
the standard deviation in the pegging country's inflation rate. A
mark peg is the most stable compared with a yen peg which is the
least stable.
Alternatively, there are three options for a basket peg, a
trade-weighted peg, an SDR peg or an European Unit of Account (ECU)
peg. In essence basket pegs have characterics in common, since they
are all expected to shield a country from disturbances to the
domestic rate of inflation due to deviations in exchange rates from
purchasing power parity movements than a single currency peg. The
choice between them must essentially be influenced by the extent to
which each basket of currencies reflects the regional structure of
the bulk of the region's international trade and other transactions.
Often because of the complex and discrete nature of non-trade
transactions between the West African countries and their overseas
partners, it is practically difficult to diversify total
transactions by currency of commitment. However, in terms of
merchandise trade as discussed in Chapter 4, the region's major
trading partners - the UK, France, the USA, West Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, Italy and Spain account for over 60 per cent of total
trade (see Table 9M). It should be noted nonetheless that in
practice most invoices especially for trade with countries like
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Japan, Netherlands, Italy and Spain, are prepared and settled in US
dollars. Consequently, a trade-weighted basket may not necessarily
reflect as a whole the national currencies of the trading partners.
An SDR peg on the other hand (constituting the US dollar, mark,
French franc, sterling and yen) would reflect around half of the
region's total merchandise trade, although this percentage would
rise substantially with the inclusion of SDR-denominated IMF
transactions (see Table 9N). From Table 9L, it can be observed that
an ECU peg would reflect a little over 40 per cent of total trade,
but this percentage should rise to around 50 per cent with the
admission of Spain and Portugal into the EEC, as both countries are
increasingly becoming important trading partners for several
countries in the region. Spain's share in particular has risen from
0.5 per cent of total imports (2.3 per cent of exports) in 1970 to
1.8 and 3.6 per cent (1.6 and 2 per cent) in 1980 and 1983
respectively.
Table 9M ECOWAS: Combined Share of Eight Currencies' in Total
Merchandise Trade, 1970-83 (Per Cent)
Exports	 Imports
1970 77.7 71.9
1975 75.5 71.9
1980 73.9 66.7
1983 64.4 60.5
Source: Table 41; World Bank, Direction of Trade Statistics
Notes:	 1 US dollar, sterling, mark, French franc, yen, Dutch
guilder, lira and Spanish peseta
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Table 9N
	 ECOWAS: Combined Share of SDR-Basket in Merchandise
Trade, 1970-83 (Per Cent)
Exports
	 Imports
1970 53.8 63.3
1975 61.0 62.0
1980 59.2 55.3
1983 50.3 46.3
Source: Table 41
Though an SDR peg would be relatively easier to pursue and from
an IMF perspective, the most favoured, a trade-weighted basket has
the advantage of reflecting the true currency weights of the
region's trading and other transactions. An ECU peg on the other
hand has the advantage of reflecting and strengthening the region's
trade and financial relationships with the EEC especially as are
indicated in the ACP/EEC pact. It might even be easier to work out
a special 'convertibility guarantee' deal under this peg. The ECU
however has the disadvantage of totally excluding the dollar and
yen.
The second method of creating a common currency in West Africa
is the launching of an entirely new unit of account which, during a
transitory period that should not be far too long, would co-exist
with national currencies before displacing them finally as the
region's only currency. In this respect, the most logical step
would be to redefine the West African Unit of Account (WAUA) and
possibly change its name to the West African Currency Unit (WACU).
Originally the share of the individual currencies in the basket
would be fixed in accordance with the respective countries' shares
in intra-regional trade, national product and quotas in a
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transformed West African Clearing House or the ECOWAS Secretariat
support mechanisms. As fluctuations in exchange rates occur the
relative weights of the component currencies in the basket are
subject to constant adjustment.
The WACU approach is certainly a more difficult and complex
strategy in the light of the dependent monetary and financial
systems in the region. Making it work in terms of both public and
private sector transactions involves many complications including:
(a) choosing it as a numeraire for expressing central
parities;
(b) creating its supply and demand conditions; and
(c) making it an acceptable worldwide monetary unit.
In these respects there are certainly several lessons to be learnt
from the experience of the EEC in establishing the ECU as a fully
convertible monetary unit. While in the EEC obstacles to the
further development of the ECU and, hence the EMS, have included
Britain's opposition to becoming a full member of the EMS, West
Germany's ban on domestic use of the ECU, the special status of the
Italian lira, and controls on capital movements in Italy and France
(see The Times, 15 April 1985, p 21), in West Africa the key problem
for the WACU is the rudimentary nature of the monetary and financial
markets and the high propensity of foreign-currency related
transactions. Indeed, to launch the WACU or any other common
currency successfully in the region, it must be reiterated that it
would be necessary not only to solve the problem of basic adjustment
within the region, but also to denigrate existing national
currencies; a high degree of equality in the distribution of gains
and losses in the system must be ensured; and, finally, member
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countries must be involved operationally to the extent that all
legal, political and monetary constraints for the proper working of
the system are removed.
9.5 CONCLUSIONS
Building on the analysis in prevous chapters, this chapter has
further analysed the problem of common currency, its process and
meaning for West Africa. We have argued that having a common
currency means that West Africa as a whole can exploit the economic
and political potentialities of the member countries more
efficiently. The benefits would appear as a result of reserve
saving and concerted effort at tackling the balance of payments and
development constraints. To the extent that monetary co-operation
for West Africa is envisaged in this broader perspective, the
operational limitations of the existing Clearing House arrangement
have been analysed.
In addition, the chapter has also described the implications of
the West African Monetary Union for achieving monetary unification
in the region. One of the key transition problems for achieving
ECOWAS monetary union is the apparent loss of a WAMU autonomy that
has existed for more than two decades. The analysis of the WAMU
experience indicates that the influence of France in sustaining the
union cannot be easily ignored. It can be argued however that in
the light of existing circumstances, the WAMU members can be better
off within the wider ECOWAS monetary union.
Finally, the chapter has argued that a simple exchange
unification (or realignment) strategy would not be beneficial to
West Africa since this would not eliminate the disparate levels of
currency inconvertibility and hence, the consequent 'conduit effect'
and related black market operations. The development nature of West
African currencies means that a simple exchange rate arrangement
would not ensure the gains that may result from simplification of
international transactions nor will it eliminate exchange risks and
the banking costs of currency conversion. However, for pegging the
common currency, comparison was made between a single currency and
basket pegs. A more independent and relatively flexible collective
exchange rate policy is more gainful compared with a single currency
fixed peg.
Mundell (1972, p 55) has argued:
'.. For African attempts to integrate in the 1970s
present a far greater chance for success the sooner they
are begun. If time is allowed to cement vested interest
in the status quo at the present tierage of authority,
Africa's problems will increase not diminish.
Integration should proceed from the top down, not from
the grass roots up'.
and has then stressed that 'Africa needs a currency of its own' as
'Partial substitutes for it are bound to do more harm
than good by occupying space and preventing ultimate
reform later. An arrangement imitating the European
Payments Union is neither necessary nor desirable because the
level of intra-African trade is insufficient. It would only
get in the way of the ultimate goal later on'.
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CHAPTER 10
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Monetary unification in West Africa (in terms of full monetary
union) is clearly not a panacea and it is unlikely alone to provide
the perfect solution to the multifarious socio-economic problems
that have severely constrained the member countries' economic growth
process since the achievement of political independence in the later
1950s and early 1960s. As in most other developing countries, West
African's economic problems have derived in part from the structural
disposition of the national economies and, more importantly, from
the apparent lack of disciplined, prudent and realistic overall
economic management.
At the national level, West African countries are currently
faced with a severe liquidity strain, low levels of success in
adjustment policies, rising inflationary tendencies, low growth
rates and a high incidence of political fragility. Undoubtedly, the
severity of these problems has also had its background from the
collapse of the international monetary system with the advent of
obvious and grossly unexpected variability of the major currencies'
exchange rates; from the oil price crises; and from the depressed
state of the economies of the developed industrialised economies.
But in some countries like Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria,
socio-economic problems in more recent years have been worsened by
the waning confidence in national monies as the general public
shifts rapidly away from them towards foreign money - as store of
value, unit of account and as medium of transactions.
For the region as a whole, the co-existence of several national
currencies with varying convertibility and over-valuation levels has
provided a firm base for the so-called 'dollarisation' process. As
a concept 'dollarisation' applies generally to the increasing use of
any foreign money (Fischer, 1982, p 295). In West Africa and in the
context of this study, dollarisation explicitly refers to the
movement towards the dollar in Liberia and the CFA franc in the WAMU
group of countries. The resulting 'conduit effect' has had more
serious economic implications for the more inconvertible currencies
although even the corresponding advantages to the economies of the
two most convertible currencies are arguably not so clear-cut.
Added to this problem has been the low degree of socio-economic
complementarity and interdependence among West African states.
This study has nevertheless attempted to enquire into the
reality of and potential benefits which monetary unification holds
for West Africa - within the institutional framework of EGO WAS,
given the basic a priori reasoning that there is an important role
for monetary integration in general in the process of political
unity, economic growth and development. At the national level, the
role of monetary unification is assessed in terms of finding an
alternative but very realistic policy approach (need not be wholly
national) that would enhance further development in some economies
while in many others, the essence is to rehabilitate or revive
overall performance trends, and instill comparable financial
stability and discipline. In the context of EGO WAS, the question
arising is whether the objective of economic integration -
maximising the potential static and dynamic resource allocation
gains - is best served by the establishment of full monetary union.
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The main trend of thought in this study is that in both
respects, monetary unification now provides the most viable (if not
the only available option for most countries) alternative towards
monetary co-operation. As the literature review reveals, this
hypothesis is formulated against the considerable concern that a
full monetary union is neither a practical proposition for
developing countries (Kafka, 1969, p 135) nor is a common currency
in particular regarded as a pre-requisite for effective economic
integration (Johnson, 1973, p 195). Johnson argues that it is
merely an 'outward symbol' of effective economic integration.
Alternatively, Mundell's view (1972, p 54), is that 'Africa needs a
currency of its own' as partial substitutes for it are bound to do
more harm than good by occupying 'space' and preventing ultimate
reform later.
Moreover, the question as far as the required fixity of
exchange rates within the full monetary union is concerned is asked
not with the general implications of fixed or floating rates for
developing countries, but with the specific implications of the two
alternatives for the process of economic integration. From this
narrower but extremely critical point of view, the answer must
depend first on the effects of the two alternatives upon the
relative prices of an integrating country's products with respect to
those of its partners as well as the relative costs of intra-union
factor mobility. And secondly, once the union is formed, the
fundamental concern is to let the collective exchange rate co-exist
with other international currencies with minimum adverse impact on
both the union and the rest of the world. Indeed, in the context of
the varying rates of inflation both within and outside the union,
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the more relevant consideration is not variations in the nominal
parity rate but rather variations in the 'real' rate of exchange
since changes in this rate appears to denote more clearly changes in
the international competitiveness that result from disparate
movements in domestic prices and exchange parities.
For the ECOWAS specifically, Robson (1983, p 143) has referred
to the optimum currency area criteria as well as the dependent and
disparate structural pattern of trade, monetary, and financial
policies of the member states to object any immediate move towards
full monetary union in the Community. Similarly the scope and final
positions taken by the three most authoritative studies that have
emerged so far since the inception of the WACH on how to improve the
process of monetary integration in the Community have concentrated
on two broad options:
(a) the achievement of 'limited' currency convertibility (IMF,
1980; and Cincin-Sain and Marshall, 1983) and
(b) the establishment of intra-ECOWAS financing mechanisms to
expand the West African Clearing House operations and for
balance of payments support (Frimpong-Ansah, 1983).
The substance of the partial convertibility which each of the
studies (all of them were under the auspices of the Committee of
Central Bank Governors of ECOWAS) has tried to achieve relates to a
firm commitment by member states to co-ordinate and liberalise
national exchange arrangements and restrictions with a view to
expanding intra-regional trade.
Accordingly, the IMF study, for instance, proposes a
'convertibility agreement' that would allow the free inter-change of
national currencies without interfering with on-going flexibility
and national autonomy in exchange arrangements. The study regards
any form of monetary integration towards a cow= or a set of fixed
exchange rates system only as a 'longer term' prospect for ECO WAS.
Similarly, the Cincin-Sain/Marshall study which is substantially a
follow up to the IMF study, recommends the application of
preferential treatment to intra-regional payments that would allow
the elimination of exchange restrictions on current transactions
(Stage I) and on capital transactions (Stage II). This study also
concludes that the establishment of a monetary union within ECOWAS
- ie maintaining a coma= currency characterised by a rather high
degree of convertibility with outside currencies - cannot be
achieved within the foreseeable future. There i5 no conclusive
timing of either the 'longer-term' or the 'foreseeable future'.
Although closely linked to the partial convertibility studies,
the Frimpong-Ansah study specifically examines the modalities for
the.possible expansion of the Clearing House into an effective
clearing mechanism with a view to arriving at a financing scheme
that would minimise the hardcore debtor /creditor imbalances as well
as the level of settlements in convertible currencies. Accordingly,
the study has proposed the upgrading of WACH to a Settlement
Institution, eg 'Bank for West Africa Settlements'. On the balance
of payments, the study has also recommended the setting up of a
monetary institution to supervise exchange rate and balance of
payments conditions in member states as well as provide members with
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balance of payments support aimed at correcting payments
disequilibria.
In large measure, these three studies have generally stressed,
as one of a number of impediments to the development of intra-ECOWAS
trade, the existence of widespread controls and restrictions on
exchange transactions which render most of the 10 member currencies
inconvertible. The need therefore to achieve convertibility in
terms of liberalisation and/or co-ordination in these arrangements
is viewed as the most viable and urgently required form of monetary
integration in the ECOWAS. There is no doubt room within this
proposition for achieving greater regional convertibility. Albeit,
it broadly reflects the so-called 'economists' strategy which is the
antithesis of the 'monetarists' approach towards monetary
integration.
The basic limitation however is that in the light of existing
socio-economic realities in the member states, limited
convertibility even if it were fully achieved would lead to
substantial 'leakages' within the sub-region and out of it. There
is little scope for it to provide any meaningful answer to the
intra-regional trade and payments problem
	 It need not be
emphasised that the 'leakages' problem has posed one of the most
serious threats to domestic monetary and fiscal policies in many
ECOWAS countries. 'Leakages' cannot therefore be avoided or stopped
by mere administrative measures aimed at fiscal and monetary control
or surveillance since in the last resort the substantial profits to
be gained in the 'illegal transactions' involved would be
overwhelming, and would be more than sufficient to overcome the
physical obstacles and legal penalties imposed by governments.
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On the other hand, the proposed financing mechanisms, in
particular, raise the issue of assuring resource transfers mainly to
the poorer members of the Community. This issue emerged in the
initial stages of the European Monetary System as Italy and Ireland
joined the System with resource transfers from the core countries
(Germany, France, Benelux and Denmark) for whom the advantages of
such monetary integration were regarded as most clear-cut at the
time. In the context of the ECO WAS, the greatest difficulty with
financing mechanisms is their funding. Besides, apart from the
limited reserve base capacities of virtually all member states,
except Nigeria, another important sceptiscism is whether the
institutionalisation of financing mechanisms without full
convertibility would make any meaningful impact on the structurally
skewed pattern of intra-regional transactions and the overall
balance of payments disequilibria. Obviously the future of monetary
integration in the sub-region must expand beyond that of providing
short-term to medium-term credit alone. At the same time the extent
to which such financing facilities will be able to influence even
the policies of the most likely non-borrowing member countries -
Ivory Coast and Nigeria - is definitely an open question.
As indicated in Chapter 1, the context against which monetary
integration is considered in this study for ECO WAS is much wider.
The role of monetary integration is viewed here in terms of
providing a firmer and new form of monetary stability on which
national and regional policies can be based with the hope of
achieving currency confidence within and outside the sub-region and,
hence, inducing complementary resource and factor mobility both
within and to the sub-region. Indeed, the external motivation for
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monetary integration in ECOWAS is to rationalise and/or lessen the
degree of monetary and financial dependence and to enhance the
Community's own general economic independence. These challenges can
and must be considered more seriously if national economic recovery
and economic integration are to be strengthened and sustained.
In this respect, this study has examined the case for monetary
unification. In particular, its theoretical foundations, some of
the problems it will encounter, and some of the doubts it evokes
for West Africa are investigated. The position taken is
conceptually 'monetarist' in the sense that the adoption of a common
currency at the initial stage is expected to lay better and more
realistic foundations in the search for a solution to the problems
of liberalisation of payments restrictions, management of exchange
rates, monetary and fiscal policies and balance of payments. This
view compares with that held by France and other members of the
'monetarist' group on European monetary integration and is strongly
supported in this study by the results of our analysis of West
Africa's economic problems which have escalated unabated since the
early 1970s.
The evidence presented in Chapter 2 discusses the natural
economic and geo-political and other structural features of the West
African economy and shows its structural dependence and the apparent
disparities that exist between the member economies. Economically
the sub-region is endowed with some of the richest mineral deposits
in Africa, eg diamonds, gold, iron ore, crude oil, uranium, bauxite,
etc - and exportable agricultural resources. The resource
potentials are such that with an improved rate and form of
exploitation, West Africa as a coherent economic unit can become
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substantially self-dependent. It hardly needs to be said that the
disparities which have existed between the countries in their socio-
economic historical and political developments over the years as
well as their geographical features pose substantial difficulties
for the process of monetary unification. The backwardness of most
countries stems not so much from the lack of natural resources or
even from trends in the international commodity markets for most of
these resources. Virtually all West African economies have
exhibited incomplete or rudimentary sectoral interdependence. This
situation reinforces the underdeveloped international division of
labour whereby they continuously specialise in producing raw
materials or primary goods for export. These features are
compounded not only by the rudimentary state of economic
infrastructures and of the commodity-money relationship in these
economies but, also, by the high incidence of political instability
or fragility in all countries except to a lesser extent, Ivory Coast
and Senegal.
Chapter 2 shows further that politically leadership is
militarised in 11 of the 16 member countries. Of the remaining 5
countries, there has been successful or abortive take-over attempts
in all except Ivory coast and Senegal. .Ghana and Nigeria are proved
undoubtedly the most politically fragile with each country having
experienced over five changes of political leadership in form and
personality (including a major Civil War in Nigeria) since
independence. In terms of economic growth and overall performance,
the francophones have, as a group, performed a lot better than the
rest of the countries, especially the anglophones. But what has
greater implication for ECOWAS monetary integration efforts is the
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fact that the francophones have remained very closely linked
together both economically and politically. Even more critical is
their continued undisturbed relationship with France.
As between individual countries, the chapter illustrated the
initial importance of Ivory Coast (in terms of overall political and
economic performance and apparent leadership among the francophones)
and Nigeria (in terms of geo-political size and crude oil
resources). The Ivorian economy is practically the most
economically diversified and has grown fastest (at an average annual
GDP growth rate of 6.2 per cent in 1970-81 - one of the highest in
the world). Nigeria, on the other hand, commands around 57 per cent
of ECOWAS' potential market of around 153.4 million people (mid-
1981) spread over an area of 6,143,000 square kilometres. At the
other extreme, are the smaller and poorer countries like Cape Verde,
and Guinea-Bissau whose growth rate together with that in Ghana,
Liberia, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone has deteriorated sharply to
less than 2 per cent during the last decade. While growth problems
in some countries like Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have been
induced largely by undisciplined and inappropriate macro-economic
planning and management, in others, notably Cape Verde, Mali,
Mauritania and Niger, economic performance has, despite the resource
potentials been seriously affected by persistent drought, desertic
conditions and the fact that some are geographically landlocked.
Based on the above disparate historical, political and economic
orientations of the member countries, the comparative analytic
methodology basically adopted for the study has been to divide the
sub-region into two: the francophones (of which the seven members of
the CFA franc zone - Benin, Burkina, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger,
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Senegal and Togo are stressed) and the four anglophone countries
(Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) which were all members of
the former sterling area. In between, comparisons are extended to
the rest of the region especially Liberia because of its perfect
links with the United States dollar. There is no doubt that the
viability and success of monetary unification in EGO WAS depends
substantially on the extent to which these apparent structural
disparities can be realistically reflected in the scheme.
The review in Chapter 3 showed the extent to which these
structural elements have already impeded or threatened further
progress in the process of economic integration in the region. The
francophones are the most economically integrated as they have,
collectively or separately, participated in practically all of the
30 or more inter-governmental economic organisations that have
emerged so far in West Africa. Their all-embracing CEAO poses,
perhaps the most serious threat for the existence of ECOWAS. It has
to be emphasised however that the process of West African economic
integration is slowed down mainly because it conceptually lacks a
concrete financial, development and industrialisation strategy to
enhance its objectives.
	 As pointed out in Chapter 3, these
objectives are more or less formulated strictly within the static
considerations for the trade creation and trade diversion elements
of the conventional customs union theory.
Moreover, apart from the inherent political, financial and
general economic difficulties across the region, West African
economic integration is also impaired substantially by a high
incidence of inter-personal suspicion and mistrust between the
political leadership and also by waving interest. Indeed, part of
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this mistrust has its historical origins in the genesis of ECOWAS.
Financially, total arrears on the Community's operational budgetary
contributions have grown by more than 118 times since its inception.
Liberia's arrears date as far back as 1978 and currently represent
21.2 per cent (Ghana 15.9 per cent) of total arrears outstanding in
1985. In most countries arrears have accumulated since 1980, while
only in three countries - Guinea, Ivory Coast and Nigeria - are
arrears with respect to 1985 contributions only.
The limitations and apparent failures of ECOWAS are
demonstrated not only in the grouping's low success rate at its
trade liberalisation programme but also in its zero impact on
improving intra-regional trade whose pre-integration level of less
than 5 per cent of either exports or imports remains unchanged.
Nearly two thirds of this trade is still by and between the
francophone states. Nigeria's share in this trade is basically in
terms of petroleum exports. Besides the lack of basic physical,
monetary and financial infrastructures, it has been emphasised in
Chapter 4 that the most important determinant of the low level of
intra-regional trade is the profiles of resource endowment, general
production, trade and consumption of the member countries between
which there is a high incidence of non-complementarity.
The profiles of international trade indicate the general
persistence of colonial trade relationships although there has been
increasing importance in relations with non-traditional partners,
especially Germany, Japan and the United States. Especially in the
early 1980s, the level of exports in most countries has declined
almost continuously thereby forcing a compression of imports which
in turn, with all its unfavourable consequences, has mainly been
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responsible for some semblance of improvements in the overall
balance of payments position in some countries. In the face of an
increasingly difficult foreign exchange situation over the last few
years, imports have declined steadily from around $26 billion
(exports $35 billion) in 1980 to $18 billion (exports $21 billion)
in 1983. Faced with this reality, the question that arises is the
extent to which imports can be compressed further in economies with
a high import content in all expenditures. Crude oil imports alone
have accounted for almost a third of total imports in several
countries, notably Ghana and Sierra Leone. At the same time there
is need for substantial increase in export earnings through official
channels.
In response to trade problems, several of the most affected
countries have resorted to excessive monetary and fiscal
expansionary policies as well as the imposition of tighter exchange
controls and payments restrictions. The results in Chapters 5 and 6
showed that domestic money supply has on average grown between 9.2
per cent in Liberia and 33.4 per cent in Ghana in 1970-83.
Correspondingly, the average annual rate of inflation has ranged
between 8.4 per cent (Liberia) and 50 per cent (Ghana). The
pressures on international reserves are such that except Mauritania,
to a lesser extent, current balances can hardly finance three months
level of imports in most countries. The group differences in these
developments between the WAMU states and the rest of EGO WAS were
statistically tested and the results indicate that they cannot be
ignored (Chapter 9). There are obviously serious implications for
the convergence process. The general conclusion from the analysis
of monetary and financial development in West Africa is that the
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rudimentary and relatively underdeveloped monetary and financial
institutions presently existing must be made capable of adaptation
and growth and must possess flexibility of reflection and initiative
if they are to be more useful to the region. These policies apart,
many countries have resorted to relatively unsuccessful wider
margins of exchange rate depreciation (discrete and/or official)
(Table 6K and Figure 6.1).
The literature review in Chapter 7 and 8 focuses on the
conceptual role and modalities of the various forms of monetary
integration in general. 	 Unfortunately there appears to be no
agreeable situation or firm basis on which firm monetary integration
can be best suitable for a given group of countries. The most
difficult problem, and the one about which this study is undertaken
is on the factors which make countries better or worse candidates
for joining together to form a currency area. These include both
systematic tendencies in the size, nature and source of the socio-
economic disturbances countries face and the factors influencing the
ease of monetary unification, such as factor mobility, openness,
diversification and inflation differentials. In Chapter 8, the
ECOWAS subregion was tested against these various criteria and was
found to be substantially unfeasible as an optimum currency area.
The analysis provides nonetheless a clear indication of some of the
major areas for policy consideration for beneficial currency
unification.
The economic benefit for currency unification was clearly
analysed in chapter 9 as well as the unfeasibility of an exchange
rate co-ordination strategy.
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With the long-established WAMU and the more recently
established WACH as the actual post-independence experience of
monetary co-operation in West Africa up to the present time, the
analysis has also shown the severe limitations of both institutions
for improving the member economies or enhancing the performance of
the ECOWAS. It was found that both institutions have had very
little influence on the expansion of intra-region transactions or on
the elimination of the 'leakages' problem. Although the absolute
value of transactions passing through the clearing house had risen
since its commencement in 1976, this has represented less than 10
per cent of the intra-regional trade which itself, as already shown,
is also less than 10 per cent of total external trade. In many
respects, the failure of the clearing house to stimulate regional
growth., development and integration is fully recognised in this
study and the arrangements are seen simply as a euphemism of laxer
monetary integration or no integration at all. Its failure means
that it has also not bridged the crucial gap between francophone and
anglophone relations but simply created a more brazen kind of
regional unity.
As the foregoing analyses have shown, the practical
implementation of a common currency for any group of countries with
disparate socio-economic orientation is obviously a very lofty
proposition with serious transitional adjustment pressures on
monetary expansion, deficit and inflationary financing, exchange
rate variation and reserves mobilisation policies, as well as on the
overall balance of payments management. Basically, these pressures
are related to the extent to which member countries are prepared to
give up national for regional autonomy. The common currency
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arrangement is consequently bound to be subjected to strain unless
member states' policies can be co-ordinated more closely than
heretofore.
In West Africa, countries within the convertible CFA franc
zone, and Liberia, which uses the US dollar, have less difficulty in
terms of convertibilty. No doubt the pressures of transitional
adjustment have to be more on the other countries with varying
degrees of inconvertible currencies. It is however clear that by
now such countries as Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeira which
have been prone to the most frequent and more serious devaluations
and revaluations (Nigeria), currency changeovers, as well as to
expansionary fiscal and monetary programmes should have come to
appreciate that erratic exchange rate movements and undisciplined
monetary and fiscal policies must form part of the reasons for their
deterioration in their national monies (in terms of both internal
and international exchange values) and their economies are
constrained to sub-optimal performance. Indeed, the divergent
exchange rates have in part exacerbated divergent inflationary
tendencies in the region, thus making well-nigh impossible to
identify or control any business cycles.
This is mainly because emphasis on exchange rate policies has
been more on the fluctuations of national currencies against hard
currencies than on reducing the intra-regional conduit effect or
attaining positive gains to their economies from maintaining
stability among currencies. Yet, as the study has shown, the
structural dispositions and interests of the West African states are
not so divergent that economic disturbances have created
circumstances in which the region cannot strive towards a currency
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area or in which it is preferable for some countries to collectively
hold exchange rates and other socio-economic policies steady and for
others to let them vary independently. The main concern is the
speed with which transitional adjustment is undertaken and monetary
and financial discipline is improved.
It was indicated that once a common currency is preferred as
against a more unrealistic exchange rate co-ordination scheme in
which members retain their independent monies and exchange rate
policies, the most logical step would be to refer to the existing
CFA franc and EMS arrangements for guidance on the implied
operational technicalities. While an automatic expansion of the CFA
franc zone requires very substantial transitional adjustment for the
members, especially the anglophones, a more crucial modification is
with respect to France's special role in guaranteeing the
convertibility of the existing CFA franc. As was pointed out, where
this crucial element is to form part of an ECOWAS common currency,
France may not on her own be in a position to guarantee
convertibility because of the possible pressure which such large
group might pose on the balance of payments and the French franc's
position in the EMS. It may thus be necessary in this case to seek
the concerted assistance of the EEC and/or the United States. With
a new guarantor then, it may be politically logical and necessary to
change the name of the currency (eg the SHELL or West African
DOLLAR). Of course it is also believed that a more practical
strategy would be to allow the new currency to obtain its
international market value independently. This eliminates the
dependence risks that are apparent in existing national monetary
policies.
547
Reference to the EMS on the other hand provides guidance for
instituting an in-built flexibility and an 'early warning system'
within the concerted currency system. The system must be stable but
at the same time flexible enough and in time to tolerate further
adjustments of parities and objectives and allow member states to
survive the tumult in their exchange rates, monetary and fiscal
policies and overall economies, especially in the initial years.
This requirement clearly indicates that the implications of entry to
monetary unification at the 'wrong rate' cannot be underestimated.
It would be a fundamental mistake for member countries to enter or
continue to operate in a monetary union at the wrong exchange rate
or wrong adjustment policies. In the event this happens, it would
make their economies uncompetitive, widen the economic disparities
and in the end set up tensions in the union. And the worst results
would be for members to come in and then drop out (as it happened in
the European Snake).
It has to be recognised on the other hand that it is never
possible or easy enough to pick the best moment for each potential
member country for joining the monetary arrangement in advance. As
in the case of the EMS, countries may stay out (temporarily or
indefinitely) because of the fear that their economies may be weak
compared with others. Yet the proposition that is envisaged for
West Africa in this study is not exactly in the same time-frame as
the Lagos Treaty's 15-year programme for the detailed break-down of
national barriers to labour and trade in goods and services, neither
is it in complete harmony with the IMF's (1980) or Cincin-
Sain/Marshall's (1983) limited convertibility first step action.
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Eventually, a true regional market must be enhanced by the initial
availability of a common currency.
Furthermore, it would be difficult for member states to enter
the monetary union at anything other than the prevailing market
rates against each other. But for West Africa in particular, the
exchange rate matrix presented in Chapter 9 (Table 9J) merely
indicates the theoretically equivalent values of the member
currencies. It has been indicated that the so-called 'market' rates
for these currencies diverge considerably and violently with the
officially quoted rates. Market exchange rates of national
currencies in the region substantially reflect black market exchange
practices which have given rise to exchange rates that are
practically between 2-3 times the officially quoted rates. These
market rates are directly influenced by over-valuation, multiple
exchange rate policies many of which are more generally in favour of
private monopolies, as well as by the shortage of official
international reserves. All of these provide the firm foundations
for illegal commodity and currency practices.
It is recognised also that the disparity between the CFA franc
zone and Liberian dollar exchange rates on the one hand and those in
the other countries on the other are not seemingly entirely
justified by the differences in economic performance or structural
distortions. The most noticeable feature nonetheless is that while
payments and exchange restrictions in the CFA franc zone and Liberia
are more liberalised than in the rest of ECOWAS, the latter's
exchange rate policies appear for less dependent than the former's.
It is a fact that the true market rates in the CFA franc zone and
Liberia are hidden within their fixed exchange rate systems and are
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not entirely reflected in their national economic performances or in
their apparent leakage problem. In this respect therefore the main
thrust of a transitional exchange rate policy for monetary
unification would be the prompt and concerted adoption of an
unmanaged dual exchange rate system in each country with respect to
a nominated numeraire (eg the French franc or US dollar). In such a
circumstance the burden of adjustment would fall equally on the CFA
franc zone and Liberia as it would on the other ECOWAS member
states. For each member country however, the most important area of
concern at the very initial transitional stage would be an
improvement in reserve mobilisation which in turn requires improved
and stricter enforcement of foreign exchange surrender obligations.
It may be important in this concluding chapter to examine more
closely another important aspect of the costs and benefits of using
a local currency at the national level as opposed to a foreign
currency as in the case of Liberia. The emphasis here is on the
seigniorage foregone by using a foreign money. As already noted, in
countries with rising rates of inflation, there is typically
movement away from the use of the domestic currency towards a
foreign money (ie dollarisation). This process is increasingly the
case for most West African currencies. Even if it should be
desirable for a country to fix its exchange rate, it still loses
seignorage if it does not use its own money. The case for using a
foreign money then turns largely on the superior discipline imposed
on domestic policymakers by removing their control over money
supply.
There are nonetheless some implications for domestic government
finance, the balance of payments, the banking system, and economic
policy. The most important autonomous taxing power the government
gives up is seigniorage. The right to print money is peculiarly
important in the West African economies in providing most
governments with a ready source of finance following the narrow tax
base, low tax effort and a wide range of subsidies. On the other
hand, a country using foreign money has, on average, to run a
balance of payments surplus to import the high-powered money needed
for domestic use. The size of the required surplus depends on the
nature of the banking system as the domestic banks, including the
central bank, would have to hold foreign currency assets and issue
corresponding liabilities. There should thus be a strong incentive
for the banking system to operate efficiently, treating high-powered
money as a scarce resource. An extremely vital consideration is
that the choice between a floating rate regime in which the
government collects seigniorage and a fixed rate system in which the
government collects seigniorage but at a rate determined by the
foreign country's inflation rate, or elects to pay seigniorage to
the foreign country (ie where the fixed exchange rate regime implies
the complete use of a foreign money) is made on the basis of a cost-
benefit analysis in which the loss of control over the country's
rate of seigniorage collection and domestic policy instruments that
have to be directed to maintenance of a fixed exchange rate are
balanced against the benefits of having a fixed exchange rate.
There is no absolutely guaranteed way of providing discipline for
governments determined to avoid the misuse of external reserves or
high-powered money. But the discipline imposed by use of a foreign
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money appears greater than that imposed by fixity of the exchange
rate, which is greater than that imposed under a flexible rate
system.
Estimates of the amount of seigniorage raised by a number of
West African governments are presented in Table 10A. The evidence
shows that several governments have made substantial use of
seigniorage in recent years. For the twelve countries for which
data is available, the ratio of the change in high-powered (or
'Reserve Money', Line 14 in the IMF's International Financial
Statistics) to nominal GNP or GDP is calculated, representing the
command over resources as a ratio of the GNP or GDP that government
obtained by creating high-powered money. Also shown in the table is
the ratio, for each country of seigniorage use to total government
revenue (including seigniorage). The rate of high-powered money
creation relative to GNP is typically greater for the anglophone and
higher inflation countries. In Nigeria for instance, it peaked 6.1
per cent in 1980 and ranged between 3 and 5 per cent in Ghana in
1975-83. By contrast, the ratio has, with the exception of Togo,
generally fallen below 2 per cent in the CFA franc zone countries in
1970-83. Correspondingly, there are a number of countries for which
seigniorage has constituted over 10 per cent of total revenue on
average. In Ghana, for example, this ratio rose from 6.4 per cent
in 1970 to 31.3 per cent in 1980. Seigniorage is thus only not a
major factor for West African governments but the disparate rates
of seignorage between them also indicate a crucial problem for
policy co-ordination in monetary unification.
Change in high-power-
ed money as a ratio
of change in high
-powered money plq
Government revenue°
Change in high-powered money
as a ratio of GNP (or GDP)a
Table 10A ECOWAS: Seigniorage Rates, 1970-83 	 .
1970 1975 1980 1983 1970 1975 c 1983d
Benin .009 .018 .015 -.012 - .059 .113
Burkina .002 .019 .006 .033 .100 .148 .118
Gambia .028 .010 .013 .057 .115 .065 .150
Ghana .014 .054 .033 .037 .064 .260 .313
Ivory Coast .021 .015 .001 .006 .005
Mali - .007 .013 - .055
Mauritania .008 .009 .006 -.003 - -.046 .104
Niger - .012 - - .123 .059
Nigeria .022 .040 .061 .005 .196 .114 -.021
Senegal .014 .006 .017 .003 .077 .030 .068
Sierra Leone .007 .006 -.010 .040 -.052 .033 -.060
Togo - .021 .020 .027 - .062
Source: IMF, IFS and GFS
Notes:	 a High-powered is 'Reserve Money', Line 14 in the IMF,
International Financial Statistics 
b 'Total Revenue', Line 2 in the IMF, Government 
Financial Statistics 
c	 1976 for Benin and Niger
d	 1978 for Gambia and Nigeria; 1979 for Benin, Burkina
and Mauritania
-	 Data not available
Fischer (1982) argues that to the extent that high-powered
money is backed by foreign currency reserves, the assumption is that
the reserves are invested in interest-bearing assets and do not
represent any offset to the seigniorage effects of creating high-
powered money. A major obstacle for the West African monetary
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systems whose rates are practically pegged to hard currencies has
been the widespread shortage of foreign exchange reserves and their
fixed parity systems have increasingly been vulnerable to a crisis
of confidence because speculators cannot lose.
	 With the
corresponding balance of payments crises, many fixed rate systems
have been forced into adjustable peg regimes. The problem then is
how can discipline be enforced in such fixed-rate regimes to ensure
smooth transition towards monetary unification.
Fischer (1982, pp 299 :800) asks the question 'How, in other
words, does the system ensure that the exchange rate regime remains
fixed rather than becoming an adjustable peg?' In so far as the
difficulty of maintaining fixity of the exchange rate stems from the
possibility of balance of payments crises, fixity of the exchange
rate could be preserved by holding at least 100 per cent reserves.
If such reserves were maintained, there would be no risk that the
monetary authority could not meet demands for foreign money.
Further, since reserves can be borrowed and reinvested, the costs of
keeping 100 per cent reserves would be small. Much larger holdings
of reserves would be needed to guarantee 100 per cent convertibility
of currency and commercial bank deposits. Curiously, however, with
such large holding of reserves, little need be used. 	 With
confidence, small holding of reserves would suffice. In the current
context, however, there is little confidence in the ability of
practically all West African countries to maintain fixed or even
active crawling pegs. what would be needed would be large-scale
loans of reserves from overseas. Indeed, if such loans were made in
order to guarantee exchange rate fixity and stability, and to
restore currency confidence, they could instead be extended towards
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the maintenance of a collective exchange rate system. Such a
move would more meaningfully enhance regional confidence and
stability.
A final point of consideration is the political argument for
monetary unification in West Africa. Throughout the analysis, the
study has managed to skip - not with any contempt or underestimation
- the purely political motivations that may contribute to blocking
any agreement or positive movement towards monetary unification. A
monetary union, along with the technical procedures designed to
achieve it, will require much enhanced political co-operation among
member states. The political commitment needed to make the union
work is very far-reaching, extending as it does into issues usually
considered to be rigorously domestic in nature. The central
question is: Are the governments ready to take the hard decisions
and carry out the politically charged policies that could give
stability to a common currency arrangement?
In West Africa, the divergent political orientations of the
member states are not so sharp and intense that they alone should be
allowed to dictate the pace of monetary unification. Economic
considerations are far more important. There are notwithstanding
tremendous odds to be overcome particularly the difficulties of
reconciling national views and interests, of shaking the traditional
inertia of bureaucracies, of minimising the incidence of recurring
border closures and disputes, and of accepting the political risks
entailed in such bold attempt to reshape the socio-politico-economic
future of ECOWAS. In this case the real problem is harmonising the
more politically coherent francophones with the more politically
disparate anglophone states. As far as the existing Lagos Treaty
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provisions are concerned it has to be sensibly conceded that some
alterations are required, at least, to set monetary integration as a
general objective. In particular, there is need for agreement on a
new preamble or provision to the Treaty referring to the ultimate
goal of an economic and monetary union and implying
institutionalisation of a common West African currency.
While the requisite political will cannot be underestimated,
there is also the fear that in circumstances like this, it may be
overestimated, thereby giving the feeling that politicians too are
not human and therefore cannot feel the pinch of economic crises.
What is certain is that the transition period under which their
feelings matures may be much longer than that of economists and
other non-politicians. This makes the achievement of a monetary
union in West Africa still a long waiting game which for the benefit
of the unconverted politicians is bound to hide behind the unproven
proposition that a monetary union is a non-starter for developing
countries. The question, however, is how long can the ECOWAS afford
to wait, at least, in the light of the foregoing analysis?
APPENDIX 1
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
Memorandum on monetary co-operation studies and the decision of
heads of states and government on the creation of an ECO WAS monetary
zone (ECW/COG/R/4/2, Lagos, July 1983).
STUDY ON THE CREATION OF AN ECOWAS MONETARY ZONE
Item 5 on the provisional agenda addresses itself to an outline
of possible studies to be undertaken in accordance with the decision
of the Authority of Heads of State and Government to create an
ECOWAS Monetary Zone.
These studies are listed as follows:
(a) Economic implications and pre-requisites for the creation
of an ECOWAS monetary zone
- the case for a monetary zone within the overall
context of economic integration of the sub-region
sub-region as optimum currency area advantages and
disadvantages
- necessary preconditions, etc ...
(b) Analysis and critical evaluation of UMOA, experience and
its relevance to the creation of an ECOWAS Monetary Zone
appraisal of UMOA model
- possibilities for expansion
- conditionalities for accession
- possible modifications and adaptation needed, etc ...
(c) The framework of a management system including
institutional arrangements for an ECOWAS Monetary Zone
- the design of a viable model of an EGO WAS monetary
zone
▪ review of existing regional institutions
appropriate regional institutions to be created
• examination of rules and procedures for membership
▪ external relationships and convertibility guarantee,
etc ...
(d) Country studies of ECOWAS member states to determine the
relevant policy and adjustment measures required for their
successful membership of the proposed EGO WAS Monetary
Zone.
- assessment of costs and benefits to individual member
countries
- policy measures to be adopted
▪ institutional measures to be taken at national and
community level, etc ...
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of WACH transactions are actually due for settlement in foreign
currencies.
Another critical feature of the WACH's 8perational experience
is shown in Table 9D in that the pattern of clearing transactions
and settlements have merely reflected the pronounced mutual trade
imbalances as were shown in Chapter 4. In particular, the skewness
is between the francophone countries as a group and the rest of
ECOWAS. The Table indicates the predominance of the WAMU countries
(BCEAO as central bank) as net creditors in the clearing system as
against persistent debtor positions by such countries as Ghana,
Guinea and Mauritania.
	
Inclusion of oil payments for WACH clearing
would not only greatly augment the overall volume of transactions
cleared, it would also reverse Nigeria's chronic debtor position.
Payments (or receipts) in favour of the BCEAO, as a proportion
of total WACH transactions, increased from 68.98 per cent in 1976/77
to 82.80 per cent in 1981/82, while the proportion of the
corresponding payments it has had to order has dropped consistently.
In general, the WAMU states as a group have not manifested any
significant utilisation of the clearing facility, although this is
also true for most countries in the ECOWAS. Although it may appear
that some of the countries with the more highly inconvertible
currencies, owing to stricter exchange restrictions (eg Ghana,
Guinea and Nigeria) have channelled an increasing proportion of
their payments for intra-regional transactions through the WACH,
Ghana's participation has been steadily declining. Liberia, the
most liberal in terms of trade and payments restrictions, Guinea-•
Bissau which joined the WACH only in 1978/79 and Sierra Leone, with
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